











# ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS

ON THE

## ORIGIN AND HISTORY

OF

## THE PEOPLE OF INDIA,

### THEIR RELIGION AND INSTITUTIONS,

COLLECTED, TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED,

BY

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## VOLUME THIRD.

THE VEDAS: OPINIONS OF THEIR AUTHORS AND OF LATER INDIAN WRITERS  
ON THEIR ORIGIN, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY.

SECOND EDITION,  
REVISED AND ENLARGED.



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*Arthepsavaḥ rishayo devatāś chhando bhīr abhyadhāvan |  
Anukramaṇikā.*

“Rishis, seeking to obtain the various objects of their desire,  
hastened to the deities with metrical compositions.”

(See p. 211 of this volume.)

## P R E F A C E.

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THE object which I have had in view in the series of treatises which this volume forms a part, has been to investigate critically the most important points in the civil and religious history of the Hindus. Having shown in the First Volume that the mythical and legendary accounts given in the Purāṇas, etc., regarding the origin of the caste system which has long prevailed in India, are mutually contradictory and insufficient to establish the early existence of the popular belief regarding the distinct creation of four separate tribes, as an original and essential article of the Brahmanical creed ; and having endeavoured to prove, in the Second Volume, by a variety of arguments, drawn chiefly from comparative philology and from the contents of the Rigveda, that the Hindus are descended from a branch of the Indo-European stock, which dwelt originally along with the other cognate races in Central Asia, and subsequently migrated into Northern Hindustan, where the Brahmanical religion and institutions were developed and matured ;—I now come, in this Third Volume, to consider more particularly the history of the Vedas, regarded as the sacred Scriptures of the Hindus, and the inspired source from which their religious and philosophical systems (though,

to a great extent, founded also on reasoning and speculation) profess to be mainly derived; or with which, at least, they all claim to be in harmony.

When I speak, however, of the history of the Veda, I am reminded that I am employing a term which will suggest to the philosophical reader the idea of a minute and systematic account of the various opinions which the Indians have held in regard to their sacred books from the commencement, through all the successive stages of their theological development, down to the present time. To do anything like this, however, would be a task demanding an extent of research far exceeding any to which I can pretend. At some future time, indeed, we may hope that a history of the theological and speculative ideas of the Indians, which shall treat this branch also of the subject, may be written by some competent scholar. \* My own design is much more modest. I only attempt to show what are the opinions on the subject of the Veda, which have been entertained by certain distinct sets of writers whom I may broadly divide into three classes—(1) the mythological, (2) the scholastic, and (3) the Vedic.

The first, or mythological class, embraces the writers of the different Purāṇas and Itihāsas, and partially those of the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, who, like the compilers of the Purāṇas, frequently combine the mythological with the theosophic element.

The second, or scholastic class, includes the authors of the different philosophical schools, or Darśanas, with their scholiasts and expositors, and the commentators

on the Vedas. The whole of these writers belong to the class of systematic or philosophical theologians ; but as their speculative principles differ, it is the object of each particular school to explain and establish the origin and authority of the Vedas on grounds conformable to its own fundamental dogmas, as well as to expound the doctrines of the sacred books in such a way as to harmonize with its own special tenets.

The third class of writers, whose opinions in regard to the Vedas I have attempted to exhibit, is composed (1) of the rishis themselves, the authors of the Vedic hymns, and (2) of the authors of the Upanishads, which, though works of a much more recent date, and for the most part of a different character from the hymns, are yet regarded by later Indian writers as forming, equally with the latter, a part of the Veda. As the authors of the hymns, the earliest of them at least, lived in an age of simple conceptions and of spontaneous and childlike devotion, we shall find that, though some of them appear, in conformity with the spirit of their times, to have regarded their compositions as in a certain degree the result of divine inspiration, their primitive and elementary ideas on this subject form a strong contrast to the artificial and systematic definitions of the later scholastic writers. And even the authors of the Upanishads, though they, in a more distinct manner, claim a superhuman authority for their own productions, are very far from recognizing the rigid classification which, at a subsequent period, divided the Vedic writings from all other religious works, by a broad line of demarcation.

It may conduce to the convenience of the reader, if I furnish here a brief survey of the opinions of the three classes of writers above described, in regard to the Vedas, as these opinions are shown in the passages which are collected in the present volume.

The first chapter (pp. 1–217) contains texts exhibiting the opinions on the origin, division, inspiration, and authority of the Vedas, which have been held by Indian authors shortly before, or subsequent to, the collection of the Vedic hymns, and consequently embraces the views of the first two of the classes of writers above specified, viz. (1) the mythological and (2) the scholastic. In the first Section (pp. 3–10), I adduce texts from the Purusha Sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the Chhāndogya Upanishad, the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, and the Institutes of Manu, which variously represent the Vedas (*a*) as springing from the mystical sacrifice of Purusha; (*b*) as resting on (or inhering in) Skambha; (*c*) as cut or scraped off from him, as being his hair, and his mouth; (*d*) as springing from Indra; (*e*) as produced from time; (*f*) as produced from Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya; (*g*) as springing from Prajāpati, and the waters; (*h*) as being the breathing of the Great Being; (*i*) as being dug by the gods out of the mind-ocean; (*j*) as being the hair of Prajāpati's beard, and (*k*) as being the offspring of Vāch.

In page 287 of the Appendix a further verse of the Atharva-veda is cited, in which the Vedas are declared to have sprung from the leavings of the sacrifice (*uchchhishta*).

In the second Section (pp. 10–14) are quoted passages from the Vishnu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkandeya Purāṇas, which represent the four Vedas as having issued from the mouth of Brahmā at the creation ; several from the Harivamśa, which speak of the Vedas as created by Brahmā, or as produced from the Gāyatrī ; another from the Mahābhārata, which describes them as created by Vishnu, or as having Sarasvatī for their mother ; with one from Manu, which declares the Vedas, along with certain other objects, to be the second manifestation of the Sattva-guna, or pure principle, while Brahmā is one of its first manifestations.

The third Section (pp. 14–18) contains passages from the Brāhmaṇas, the Vishnu Purāṇa, and the Mahābhārata, in which the Vedas are celebrated as comprehending all beings, as being the soul of metres, hymns, breaths, and gods, as imperishable, as the source of form, motion, and heat, of the names, forms, and functions of all creatures, as infinite in extent, as infinite in their essence (*brahma*), though limited in their forms as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman verses, as eternal, and as forming the essence of Vishnu.

The fourth Section (pp. 18–36) contains passages from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, in which the great benefits resulting from the study of the Vedas, and the dignity, power, authority, and efficacy of these works are celebrated ; together with two other texts from the latter author and the Vishnu Purāṇa, in which a certain impurity is predicated of the Sāma-veda (compare the Mārkandeya Purāṇa, as quoted in p. 12, where the four

Vedas are described as respectively partaking differently of the character of the three Gunas, or Qualities); and some others from the Vāyu, Padma, Matsya, and Brahma-vaivartta Purānas, and the Mahābhārata, and Rāmāyana, which derogate greatly from the consideration of the Vedas, by claiming for the Purānas and Itihāsas an equality with, if not a superiority to, the older scriptures. A passage is next quoted from the Mundaka Upanishad, in which the Vedas and their appendages are designated as the “inferior science,” in contrast to the “superior science,” the knowledge of Soul; and is followed by others from the Bhagavad Gītā, the Chhāndogya Upanishad and the Bhāgavata Purāna, in which the ceremonial and polytheistic portions of the Veda are depreciated in comparison with the knowledge of the supreme Spirit.

The fifth Section (p. 36–49) describes the division of the Vedas in the third or Dvāpara age, by Vedavyāsa and his four pupils, according to texts of the Vishnu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purānas; and then adduces a different account, asserting their division in the second or Tretā age, by the King Purūravas, according to another passage of the same Bhāgavata Purāna, and a text of the Mahābhārata (though the latter is silent regarding Purūravas).

Section vi. (pp. 49–57) contains passages from the Vishnu and Vāyu Purānas and the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, regarding the schism between the adherents of the Yajur-veda, as represented by the different schools of Vaiśampāyana and Yājnavalkya, and quotes certain remarks of

Prof. Weber on the same subject, and on the relation of the Rig and Sāma Vedas to each other, together with some other texts, adduced and illustrated by that scholar, on the hostility of the Ātharvaṇas towards the other Vedas, and of the Chandogas towards the Rig-veda.

Section vii. (pp. 57–70) contains extracts from the works of Sāyana and Mādhava, the commentators on the Rig and Taittirīya Yajur Vedas, in which they both define the characteristics of the Veda, and state certain arguments in support of its authority. Sāyana (pp. 58–66), after noticing the objections urged against his views by persons of a different school, and defining the Veda as a work consisting of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, asserts that it is not derived from any personal, or at least not from any human, author (compare the further extract from him in p. 105); and rests its authority on its own declarations, on its self-<sup>f</sup>ixing power, on the Smṛiti (*i.e.* non-vedic writings of eminent saints), and on common notoriety. He then encounters some other objections raised against the Veda on the score of its containing passages which are unintelligible, dubious, absurd, contradictory, or superfluous. Mādhava (pp. 66–70) defines the Veda as the work which alone reveals the supernatural means of attaining future felicity; explains that males only, belonging to the three superior castes, are competent to study its contents; and asserts that, inasmuch as it is eternal, it is a primary and infallible authority. This eternity of the Veda, however, he appears to interpret as not being absolute, but as dating from the first creation, when it was produced from Brahmā,

though, as he is free from defects, the Veda, as his work, is self-proved.

Section viii. (pp. 70–108) contains the views of Jaimini and Bādarāyana, the (alleged) authors of the Mīmānsā and Brahma (or Vedānta) Sūtras on the eternity of the Veda. Jaimini asserts that sound, or words, are eternal, that the connection between words and the objects they represent also, is not arbitrary or conventional, but eternal, and that consequently the Vedas convey unerring information in regard to unseen objects. This view he defends against the Naiyāyikas, answering their other objections, and insisting that the names, derived from those of certain sages, by which particular parts of the Vedas are designated, do not prove those sages to have been their authors, but merely the teachers who studied and handed them down; while none of the names occurring in the Veda are those of temporal beings, but all denote some objects which have existed eternally. Two quotations in support of the supernatural origin of the Veda are next introduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara (a condensed account of the Mīmānsā system) and from the Vedārtha-prakāśa (the commentary on the Taittiriya Yajur-veda). The arguments in both passages (pp. 86–89) are to the same effect, and contain nothing that has not been already in substance anticipated in preceding summaries of the Mīmānsā doctrine. In reference to their argument that no author of the Veda is remembered, I have noticed here that the supposition which an objector might urge, that the rishis, the acknowledged utterers of the hymns,

might also have been their authors, is guarded against by the tenet, elsewhere maintained by Indian writers, that the rishis were merely seers of the pre-existing sacred texts. Some of the opinions quoted from the Sūtras of Jaimini are further enforced in a passage from the summary of the Mīmānsā doctrine, which I have quoted from the Sarva-darśana-sangraha. The writer first notices the Naiyāyika objections to the Mīmānsaka tenet that the Veda had no personal author, viz. (1) that any tradition to this effect must have been interrupted at the past dissolution of the universe; (2) that it would be impossible to prove that no one had ever recollect ed any such author; (3) that the sentences of the Veda have the same character as all other sentences; (4) that the inference,—drawn from the present mode of transmitting the Vedas from teacher to pupil,—that the same mode of transmission must have gone on from eternity, breaks down by being equally applicable to any other book; (5) that the Veda is in fact ascribed to a personal author in a passage of the book itself; (6) that sound is not eternal, and that when we recognize letters as the same we have heard before, this does not prove their identity or eternity, but is merely a recognition of them as belonging to the same species as other letters we have heard before; (7) that though Parameśvara (God) is naturally incorporeal, he may have assumed a body in order to reveal the Veda, etc. The writer then states the Mīmānsaka answers to these arguments thus: What does this alleged ‘production by a personal author’ (*paurushyatva*) mean? The Veda, if supposed to be so pro-

duced, cannot derive its authority (*a*) from inference (or reasoning), as fallible books employ the same process. Nor will it suffice to say (*b*) that it derives its authority from its truth: for the Veda is defined to be a book which proves that which can be proved in no other way. And even if Parameśvara (God) were to assume a body, he would not, in that state of limitation, have any access to supernatural knowledge. Further, the fact that different śākhās or recensions of the Vedas are called after the names of particular sages, proves no more than that these recensions were studied by those sages, and affords no ground for questioning the eternity of the Vedas,—an eternity which is proved by the fact of our recognizing letters when we meet with them. These letters are the very identical letters we had heard before, for there is no evidence to show either that letters of the same sort (G's, for instance,) are numerically different from each other, or that they are generic terms, denoting a species. The apparent differences which are observable in the same letter, result merely from the particular characteristics of the persons who utter it, and do not affect its identity. This is followed by further reasoning in support of the same general view; and the writer then arrives at the conclusion, which he seems to himself to have triumphantly established, that the Veda is undriven and authoritative.

The question of the effect produced on the Vedas by the dissolutions of the world is noticed in some extracts from Patanjali's Mahābhāshya and its commentators, which have been adduced by Prof. Goldstücker.

in the Preface to his Mānava-kalpa Sūtra, and which I have partly reprinted in pp. 95 ff. It is admitted by Patanjali, that, though the sense of the Vedas is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same, and that this difference is exhibited in the different recensions of the Kāṭhakas and other schools. Patanjali himself does not say what is the cause of this alteration in the order of the letters ; but his commentator, Kaiyyaṭa, states that the order was disturbed during the great mundane dissolutions, etc., and had to be restored (though with variations) by the eminent science of the rishis. Kullūka, the commentator on Manu (see p. 6), maintains that the Veda was preserved in the memory of Brahmā during the period of dissolution ; and promulgated again at the beginning of the Kalpa, but whether in an altered form, or not, he does not tell us. The latter point is also left unsolved in Sankara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30, which I quote in the Appendix, pp. 300 ff. Pages 93 ff. contain some remarks (by way of parenthesis) on the question whether or not the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā admits the existence of a Deity.

In the extract given in pp. 98–105 from his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras,<sup>1</sup> Sankara, who follows the author of those Sūtras, and Jaimini, in basing the authority of the Vedas on the eternity of sound, finds it necessary to meet an objection that, as the gods mentioned in the Veda had confessedly an origin in time, the

<sup>1</sup> My attention was originally drawn to this passage by a treatise, then unpublished, by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, formerly of Bishop's College, Calcutta.

words which designate those gods cannot be eternal, but must have originated co-evally with the created objects which they denote, since eternal words could not have an eternal connection with non-eternal objects. This difficulty he tries to overcome (ignoring the ground taken by Jaimini, that the Veda contains no references to non-eternal objects) by asserting that the eternal connection of words is not with individual objects, but with the species to which these objects belong, and that Indra and the other gods are proved by the Veda to belong to species. Sankara then goes on to assert, on the authority of Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 28, fortified by various texts from the Vedas and the Smṛitis, that the gods and the world generally are produced (though not in the sense of evolution out of a material cause) from the word of the Vedas (see pp. 6 and 16) in the form of *sphoṭa*. This last term will be explained below. This subject above referred to, of the eternal connection of the words of the Veda with the objects they represent, is further pursued in a passage which I have quoted in the Appendix, p. 300, where an answer is given to the objection that the objects denoted by the words of the Veda cannot be eternal, as a total destruction of everything takes place (not, indeed, at the intermediate, but) at the great mundane dissolutions. The solution given is that, by the favour of the supreme Lord, the inferior lords Brahmā, etc., retain a recollection of the previous mundane conditions; and that in each successive creation everything is produced exactly the same as it had previously been. I then proposed in p. 105 to adduce a passage from Śāyana, the

commentator on the Rig-veda, who refers to another of the Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3 (quoted in p. 106), declaring that Brahma was the source of the Veda, which Sankara interprets as containing a proof of the omniscience of Brahma. Sāyana understands this text as establishing the superhuman origin of the Veda, though not its eternity in the proper sense, it being only meant, according to him (as well as to Mādhava; see p. xi.), that the Veda is eternal in the same sense as the æther is eternal, *i.e.* during the period between each creation and dissolution of the universe.

In opposition to the tenets of the Mīmānsakas, who hold the eternity (or the eternal self-existence) of the Veda, and to the dogmas of the Vedānta, as just expounded, Gotama, the author of the Nyāya aphorisms, denies (Section ix. pp. 108–118) the eternity of sound; and after vindicating the Veda from the charges of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology, deduces its authority from the authority of the wise, or competent, person or persons who were its authors, as proved by the efficacy of such of the Vedic prescriptions as relate to mundane matters, and can be tested by experience. It does not distinctly result from Gotama's aphorism that God is the competent person whom he regards as the maker of the Veda. If he did not refer to God, he must have regarded the rishis as its authors. The authors of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras, and of the Tarka Sangraha, as well as the writer of the Kusumānjali, however, clearly refer the Veda to Īśvara (God) as its framer (pp. 118–133). Udayana, the author of the latter

work (pp. 128–133), controverts the opinion that the existence of the Veda from eternity can be proved by a continuous tradition, as such a tradition must, he says, have been interrupted at the dissolution of the world, which preceded the existing creation. He, therefore (as explained by his commentator), infers an eternal (and omniscient author of the Veda; asserting that the Veda is *paurushya*, or derived from a personal author; that many of its own texts establish this; and that the appellations given to its particular sākhās or recensions, are derived from the names of those sages whose persons were assumed by Īśvara, when he uttered them at the creation. In pp. 125 ff. I have quoted one of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras, with some passages from the commentator, to show the conceptions the writers entertained of the nature of the supernatural knowledge, or intuition, of the rishis.

Kapila, the author of the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms (pp. 133–138), agrees with the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika aphorists in denying the eternity of the Veda, but, in conformity with his own principles, differs from Gotama and Kanāda in denying its derivation from a personal (*i.e.* here, a divine) author, because there was no person (*i.e.* as his commentator explains, no God) to make it. Vishnu, the chief of the liberated beings, though omniscient, could not, he argues, have made the Veda, owing to his impassiveness, and no other person could have done so from want of omniscience. And even if the Veda have been uttered by the primeval Purusha, it cannot be called his work, as it was breathed forth by him unconsciously. Kapila agrees

with Jaimini in ascribing a self-demonstrating power to the Veda, and differs from the Vaiśeshikas in not deriving its authority from correct knowledge possessed by a conscious utterer. He proceeds to controvert the existence of such a thing as *sphoṭa* (a modification of sound which is assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, and described as single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words, and constituting a whole), and to deny the eternity of sound.

In the tenth Section (pp. 138–179) I shew (*a*) by quotations from the aphorisms of the Vedānta and their commentator (pp. 140–145), that the author and expounder of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (the Vedānta) frequently differ from Jaimini the author of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in the interpretation of the same texts of the Upanishads. A similar diversity is next (*b*) proved at greater length (pp. 145–173), by quotations from the aphorisms and commentaries of the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya, to characterize the expositions proposed by the adherents of those two systems respectively. One quotation is given in pp. 175 ff. to shew (*c*) that the same is true in regard to the followers of the Vaiśeshika philosophy, who distinctly reject the Vedāntic explanations; and last of all (*d*) I have made some extracts (pp. 177 ff.) from the Bhakti Sūtras of Sāṇḍilya to exhibit the wide divergence of that writer from the orthodox views of the Vedānta regarding the sense of the Vedas. In pp. 173–175 I quote some remarks of Dr. E. Roer, and Prof. Max Müller, regarding the doctrines of the Upanishads, and their relations to the different philosophical schools.

In the facts brought forward in this section we find another illustration (1) of the tendency common to all dogmatic theologians to interpret in strict conformity with their own opinions the unsystematic and not always consistent texts of an earlier age which have been handed down by tradition as sacred and infallible, and to represent them as containing, or as necessarily implying, fixed and consistent systems of doctrine ; as well as (2) of the diversity of view which so generally prevails in regard to the sense of such texts among writers of different schools, who adduce them with equal positiveness of assertion as establishing tenets and principles which are mutually contradictory or inconsistent.

In the eleventh Section (pp. 179–207) some passages are adduced from the *Nyāya-mālā-vistara*, and from Kullūka's commentary on *Manu*, to show that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the scholastic writers between the *Vedas* on the one hand, and all other classes of Indian scriptures, embraced under the designation of *Smṛiti* (including the *Darśanas*, the *Institutes of Manu*, the *Purāṇas*, and *Itihāsas*, etc.), on the other, the first being regarded as independent and infallible guides, while the others are (in theory) held to be authoritative only in so far as they are founded on, and coincide with, the *Veda*. The practical effect of this distinction is, however, much lessened by the fact that the ancient sages, the authors of the *Smṛitis*, such of them, I mean, as, like *Manu*, are recognized as orthodox, are looked upon by *Mādhaba* and *Sankara* as having had access to Vedic texts now no longer extant, as having held communion with the gods,

and as having enjoyed a clearness of intuition into divine mysteries which is denied to later mortals (pp. 181–185). Sankara, however (as shewn in pp. 184–192), does not regard all the ancients as having possessed this infallible insight into truth, but exerts all his ingenuity to explain away the claims (though clearly sanctioned by an Upani-shad) of Kapila, who was not orthodox according to his Vedāntic standard, to rank as an authority. In his depreciation of Kapila, however, Sankara is opposed to the Bhāgavata Purāna (p. 192). I then proceed to observe (pp. 194–196) that although in ancient times the authors of the different philosophical systems (*Darsanas*) no doubt put forward their respective opinions as true, in opposition to all the antagonistic systems, yet in modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta appears to be generally recognized; while the authors of the other systems are regarded, e.g. by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, as, amid all their diversities, having in view, as their ultimate scope, the support of the Vedāntic theory. The same view, in substance, is taken by Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sāṅkhya Sūtras, who (pp. 196–203) maintains that Kapila's system, though atheistic, is not irreconcilable with the Vedānta and other theistic schools, as its denial of an Īśvara (God) is only practical, or regulative, and merely enforced in order to withdraw men from the too earnest contemplation of an eternal and perfect Deity, which would impede their study of the distinction between matter and spirit. To teach men this discrimination, as the great means of attaining final liberation, is one of the two main objects, and strong

points, of the Sāṅkhyā philosophy, and here it is authoritative ; while its atheism is admitted to be its weak side, and on this subject it has no authority. Vijnāna Bhikshu goes on to say that it is even supposable that theistic systems, in order to prevent sinners from attaining knowledge, may lay down doctrines partially opposed to the Vedas ; and that though in these portions they are erroneous, they will still possess authority in the portions conformable to the Sruti and Smṛiti. He then quotes a passage from the Padma Purāṇa, in which the god Śiva tells his consort Pārvatī that the Vaiśeṣhika, the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhyā, the Purva-mīmāṁsā Darśanas, and the Vedāntic theory of illusion, are all systems infected by the dark (or *tāmasa*) principle, and consequently more or less unauthoritative. All orthodox (*āstika*) theories, however, are, as Vijnāna Bhikshu considers, authoritative, and free from error on their own special subject. And as respects the discrepancy between the Sāṅkhyā and the Vedānta, regarding the unity of Soul, he concludes that the former is not devoid of authority, as the apparent diversity of souls is acknowledged by the Vedānta, and the discriminative knowledge which the Sāṅkhyā teaches is an instrument of liberation to the embodied soul ; and thus the two varying doctrines, if regarded as, the one practical (or regulative), and the other real (or transcendental), will not be contradictory. At the close of Section eleventh (pp. 204–207) it is shewn that the distinction drawn by the Indian commentators between the super-human Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the Smṛitis, is not borne out by

certain texts which I had previously cited. The *Bṛihad Āranyaka* and *Mundaka* Upanishads (pp. 8, 31) seem to place all the different sorts of Sāstras or scriptures (including the four Vedas) in one and the same class, the former speaking of them all promiscuously as being the breathing of Brahma, while the latter describes them all (except the Upanishads) as being parts of the "inferior science," in opposition to the "superior science," or knowledge of Brahma. In the same spirit as the *Mundaka*, the *Chhāndogya* Upanishad also (quoted in p. 32 f.) includes the four Vedas in the same list with a variety of miscellaneous Sāstras (which Nārada has studied without getting beyond the confines of exoteric knowledge), and never intimates (unless it be by placing them at the head of the list) that the former can claim any superiority over the other works with which they are associated. As, however, Sankara could not, in consistency with the current scholastic theory regarding the wide difference between the Vedas and all other Sāstras, admit that the latter could have had a common origin with the former, he endeavours in his comment on the passage of the *Bṛihad Āranyaka* Upanishad to which I have adverted, to shew that the other works, which are there said to have been breathed out by the great Being along with the Vedas, were in reality portions of the *Brāhmaṇas*. This explanation can scarcely apply to all the works enumerated, and its force is weakened by the tenor of the other passages from the *Mundaka* and *Chhāndogya* Upanishads, while any such distinction is repudiated in the statements of the *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* quoted in pp. 27–30 and 105.

In the twelfth Section (pp. 207–217) the arguments in support of the Veda, adduced in the philosophical systems, and by the various commentators, as above summarised, are recapitulated, and some remarks are made on these reasonings. My observations are intended to shew that the arguments in question are inconclusive, or assume the points to be established; that the rishis are proved by the contents of the hymns to have been their real authors; and that numerous events which have occurred in time, are undoubtedly mentioned in the Vedas. This as we have seen (above, p. xvi.) is admitted by Sankara.

The Second Chapter (pp. 217 – 286) exhibits the opinions of the rishis in regard to the origin of the Vedic hymns. Its object is to shew in detail that, though some at least of the rishis appear to have imagined themselves to be inspired by the gods in the expression of their religious emotions and ideas, they at the same time regarded the hymns as their own compositions, or as (presumably) the compositions of their fore-fathers, distinguishing between them as new and old, and describing their own authorship in terms which could only have been dictated by a consciousness of its reality. The first, second, and third Sections (pp. 218–244) contain a collection of passages from the Rig-veda in which a distinction is drawn (1) between the rishis as ancient and modern, and (2) between the hymns as older and more recent; and in which (3) the rishis describe themselves as the makers, fabricators, or generators of the hymns; with some additional texts in which such authorship appears

to be implied, though it is not expressed. Section fourth (pp. 245-283) contains a variety of passages from the same Veda, in which (1) a superhuman character or supernatural faculties are ascribed to the earlier rishis; and (2) the idea is expressed that the praises and ceremonies of the rishis were suggested and directed by the gods in general, or, in particular, by the goddess of speech, or by some other or others of the different deities of the Vedic pantheon. To illustrate, and render more intelligible and probable, the opinions which I have ascribed to the old Indian rishis regarding their own inspiration, I have quoted in the same Section (pp. 267 - 273) a number of passages from Hesiod and Homer to shew that the early Greek bards entertained a similar belief. I then advert (pp. 273 - 274) to the remarkable divergence between the later religious histories of Greece and of India. I next enquire briefly (in pp. 274 - 275) in what way we can reconcile the apparently conflicting ideas of the rishis on the subject of the hymns, considered, on the one hand, as their own productions, and, on the other, as inspired by the gods. Then follow (pp. 275- 279) some further texts from the Rig-veda, in which a mystical, magical, or supernatural efficacy is ascribed to the hymns. These are succeeded (pp. 279- 283) by a few quotations from the same Veda, in which the authors complain of their own ignorance; and by a reference to the contrast between these humble confessions and the proud pretensions set up by later theologians in behalf of the Veda, and its capability of imparting universal knowledge. The ideas of the rishis regarding their own inspiration differ widely from the conceptions

of later theorists; for while the former looked upon the gods, who were confessedly mere created beings, as the sources of supernal illumination, the latter either regard the Veda as eternal, or refer it to the eternal Brahma, or Īśvara, as its author. The fifth and last Section (pp. 283 - 286) adduces some texts from the Svetāśvatara, Mundaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, which show the opinions of the writers regarding the inspiration, of their predecessors; and refers to the similar claims set up on their own behalf by the writers of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as shewn in the passages quoted in pp. 27-30.

With all its imperfections this volume may perhaps possess a certain interest, not only for the student of Indian history, but also for the divine and the philosopher, as furnishing a few documents to illustrate the course of theological opinion in a sphere far removed from the ordinary observation of the European student, —a course which, quite independently of the merits of the different tenets involved in the enquiry, will, I think, be found to present a remarkable parallel in various respects to that which is traceable in the history of those religious systems with which we are most familiar. In both cases we find that a primitive age of ardent emotion, of simple faith, and of unarticulated beliefs, was succeeded by a period of criticism and speculation, when the floating materials handed down by preceding generations were compared, classified, reconciled, developed into their consequences, and elaborated into a variety of scholastic systems.

In the Preface to the first edition I stated as follows:

"In regard to the texts quoted from the Rig-veda, I

have derived the same sort of assistance from the French version of M. Langlois, which has been acknowledged in the Preface to the Second Volume, p. vi. I am also indebted for some of the Vedic texts to Boehltingk and Roth's Lexicon."

A comparison of the former edition with the present will shew that considerable alterations and additions have been made in the latter. The texts which formerly stood in the Appendix have now been transferred to their proper places in the body of the work; and various other passages have been transposed. The principal additions will be found in the first four sections, in the ninth (pp. 115-127), tenth (which is altogether new), eleventh (pp. 185 ff.), and in the Appendix.

I am indebted to various learned friends for assistance in different parts of the work, which I have acknowledged in the notes. My thanks are especially due to Professors Goldstücker and Cowell for various important corrections which they have suggested in my translations of passages of a scholastic and philosophical character, quoted either in the body of the volume or in the Appendix,—corrections which are incorporated in the text,—as well as for some further remarks and suggestions which will be found in the notes or Appendix. I am also under obligations to Professor Aufrecht for some emendations of my renderings in the early part of the work, as well as for his explanations of many of the texts of the Rig-veda cited in the Second Chapter.



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## ERRATA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page 24, line 11. For Brahmū read Brahmā.

„ 45, „ 15. For *Yayush* read *Yajush*.

„ 53, „ 8. For theologians read theologians.

„ 62, „ 2 from foot: For its author read their authors.

„ 85, „ 4 „ Before *Prajāpatr* insert xi. 248.

„ 95, „ 2 „ For *dhvanitvam* read *dhvanitam*.

„ 96, „ 16. The same correction.

„ 101, „ 22. For Vanap. read S'āntip.

„ 149, „ 6. For *sabdādīkshiter* read *śabdād īkshiter*.

„ 159, „ 16. For *chaīndri-* read *cha indri-*.

„ 159, „ 31. For *paratvou-* read *paratvo-*.

„ 160, „ 18. For *punar-utpattir* read *punar-anutpattir*.

„ 213, „ 16. For p. 120 read p. 118.

„ 221, „ 24. For vi. 21, 1 read vi. 21, 8.

„ 224, „ 7 from foot. Omit *dhisheṇī*.

„ 261, „ 12. For vi. 62, 3 read vi. 26, 3.

# ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS.

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## VOLUME THIRD.

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### CHAPTER I.

OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, DIVISION, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS SHORTLY BEFORE, OR SUBSEQUENT TO, THE COLLECTION OF THE HYMNS OF THE RIG-VEDA.

IN the preceding volumes of this work<sup>1</sup> I have furnished a general account of the ancient Indian writings, which are comprehended under the designation of Veda or Sruti. These works, which, as we have seen, constitute the earliest literature of the Hindus, are broadly divisible into two classes : (1) The Mantras or hymns, in which the praises of the gods are celebrated and their blessing is invoked ; (2) the Brāhmaṇas, which embrace (*a*) the liturgical institutes in which the ceremonial application of these hymns is declared, the various rites of sacrifice are prescribed, and the origin and hidden import of the different forms are explained, and (*b*) the Āranyakas,<sup>2</sup> and Upanishads (called also Vedāntas, *i.e.* concluding portions of the Vedas), which in part possess the same character as some of the earlier portions of the Brāhmaṇas, and are in part theological treatises in which the spiritual aspirations which

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. I. pp. 2 ff. and Vol. II. pp. 169 ff. See also Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

<sup>2</sup> For more precise information see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 313 ff. from which it will be perceived that only some of the Āranyakas form part of the Brāhmaṇas, and that two of the Upanishads are included in a Sanhitā.

were gradually developed in the minds of the more devout of the Indian sages are preserved. It is, therefore, clear that the hymns constitute the original and, in some respects, the most essential portion of the Veda ; that the Brāhmaṇas arose out of the hymns, and are subservient to their employment for the purposes of worship ; while the Upanishads give expression to ideas of a speculative and mystical character which, though to some extent discoverable in the hymns and in the older portion of the Brāhmaṇas, are much further matured, and assume a more exclusive importance, in these later treatises.

I content myself here with referring the reader who desires to obtain a fuller idea of the nature of the hymns, and of the mythology which they embody, to the late Professor H. H. Wilson's translation of the earlier portion of the Rig-veda, to his prefaces to the several volumes, to Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, and to two papers of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, entitled Contributions to a knowledge of the Cosmogony and Mythology of the Rig-veda. In the fourth volume of this work I return to the latter branch of the subject, and compare the conceptions which the rishis entertained of the different objects of their worship, with those representations of the deities who bore the same names, which occur in Indian writings of a later date, whether mythological or theological.

The task to which I propose in the meantime to devote myself, is to supply some account of the opinions entertained by Hindu writers, ancient and modern, in regard to the origin and authority of the Vedas. With this view I have collected from some of the later hymns, from the Indian writings of the middle and later Vedic era (the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as well as from the books, whether popular or scientific, of the post-vedic period (the Purāṇas, the Itihāsas, the Institutes of Manu, the aphorisms of the Darśanas, or systems of philosophy, and their commentators, and the commentaries on the Vedas) such passages as I have discovered which have reference to these subjects, and propose to compare the opinions there set forth with the ideas entertained on some of these points by the writers of the more ancient hymns, as deducible from numerous passages in their own compositions.

The mythical accounts which are given of the origin of the Vedas

are mutually conflicting. In some passages they are said to have been created by Prajāpati from fire, air, and the sun, or by some other process. In other texts they are said to have been produced by Brahmā from his different mouths, or by the intervention of the Gāyatrī, or to have sprung from the goddess Sarasvatī, or to have otherwise arisen. I proceed to adduce these several passages.

*SECT. I.—Origin of the Vedas according to the Purusha-sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, and Institutes of Manu.*

*Purusha-sūkta.*—In the ninth verse of this hymn (Rig-veda, x. 90, already quoted in Vol. I. pp. 8 and 9) the three Vedas are said to have been produced from the mystical victim Purusha : *Tasmād yajnāt sarva-hutah ṛichaḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāṁsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata |* “From that universal sacrifice sprang the ḍrich and sāman verses: the metres sprang from it: from it the yajush arose.”<sup>3</sup>

This is the only passage in the hymns of the Rig-veda in which the creation of the Vedas is described.

In the Atharva-veda the following texts refer to that subject :

x. 7, 14. *Yattra ṛishayah prathamajāḥ ṛichaḥ sāma yajur mahī | ekarshir yasminn ārpitah Skambhaṁ tam brūhi katamah svid eva sah | . . . . . 20. Yasmād ṛicho apātakshan yajur yasmād apākashan | sāmāni yasya lomāni atharvāṅgiraso mukham | Skambham tam brūhi katamah svid eva sah |*

“ Declare who that Skambha (supporting-principle) is in whom the primeval rishis, the ḍrich, sāman, and yajush, the earth, and the one rishi, are sustained. . . . . 20. Declare who is that Skambha from whom they cut off the ḍrich verses, from whom they scraped off the yajush, of whom the sāman verses are the hairs, and the verses of Atharvan and Angiras the mouth.”

<sup>3</sup> The word *veda*, in whatever sense we are to understand it, occurs in R.V. viii. 19, 5 : *Yah samidhāyah āhutīyo vedena dadāśa martyo agnaye | yo namasā svadhvārah | 6. Tasya id arvanto raṁhayante āśavas tasya dyumnitamaṁ yaśah | na tam āśho deva-kritāṁ kutā chana na martya-kritam nāśat |* “The horses of that mortal who, devoted to sacrifice, does homage to Agni with fuel, with an oblation, with ritual knowledge (?), with reverence,—(6) speed forward impetuously; and his renown is most glorious. No calamity, caused either by god or by man, can assail him from any quarter.”

xiii. 4, 38. *Sa vai rigbhyo ajāyata tasmād rīcho ajāyanta |*

“He (apparently Indra, see verse 44) sprang from the rich verses: the rich verses sprang from him.”

xix. 54, 3. *Kālūd rīchāḥ samabhāvan yajuh kālād ajāyata |*

“From Time the rich verses sprang: the yajush sprang from Time.”<sup>4</sup>

The following texts from the same Veda may also be introduced here:

iv. 35, 6. *Yasmāt pakvād amṛitaṁ sambhūva yo gāyatrīḥ adhipatir babhūva | yasmin vedāḥ nihitāḥ viśvarūpāḥ tenaudanenāti tarāmi mṛityum |*

“I overpass death by means of that oblation (*odana*), from which, when cooked, ambrosia (*amrita*) was produced, which became the lord of the Gāyatrī, and in which the omniform Vedas are comprehended.”

vii. 54, 1. *Rīchaṁ sāma yajāmahe yābhyaṁ karmāṇi kurvate ; ete sadasi rājato yajnaṁ deveshu yachhataḥ | 2. Rīchaṁ sāma yad aprāksham havir ojo yajur balaṁ | esha mā tasmād mā hiṁśid vedāḥ priṣṭhāḥ śachiṣpate |*

“We worship the Rich and the Sāman, wherewith men celebrate religious rites, which shine in the assembly, and convey sacrifices to the gods. 2. Inasmuch as I have asked the Rich and the Sāman for butter and for vigour, and the Yajush for strength,—let not the Veda, so asked, destroy me, o lord of strength (Indra).”

The next passage is from the Satapatha Brähmaṇa, xi. 5, 8, 1 ff. :

*Prajāpati vai idam agre āśid ekaḥ eva | so'kāmayata syām prajāyeya iti | So'śrāmyat sa tapo'tapyata | tasmāch chrāntāt tepānāt trayo lokāḥ asrīyyanta prīthivy antarikshaṁ dyauḥ | sa imāṁs trīṇi lokān abhītatāpa | tebhyaś taptebhyaś trīṇi jyotiṁshy ajāyanta agnir yo'yaṁ pāvate sūryaḥ | sa imāni trīṇi jyotiṁshy abhītatāpa | tebhyaś taptebhyaś trayo vedāḥ ajāyanta agnē rigvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ sūryāt sāmavedaḥ | sa imāṁs trīṇi vedān abhītatāpa | tebhyaś taptebhyaś trīṇi sukrāṇy ajāyanta bhūr ity rigvedād bhuvaḥ iti yajurvedāt svar iti sāmavedāt | Tad rigvedenaiva hotram akurvata yajurvedena ḍhvaryavaṁ sāmavedena udgītham | yad eva trayai vidyāyai śukraṁ tena brahmaṇatvam uchchakrāma.*

“Prajāpati was formerly this universe [*i.e.* the sole existence], one only. He desired, ‘may I become, may I be propagated.’ He toiled

<sup>4</sup> See my translation of the entire hymn in the Journal of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1865, p. 381. The Vishṇu Purāṇa, i. 2, 13, says: *Tad eva sarvam evaitad vyaktū-vyakta-svarūpavat | tathā puruṣa-rūpena kāla-rūpena cha sthitam |* “This (Brahma) is all this universe, existing both as the perceptible and the imperceptible; existing also in the forms of Puruṣa and of Kāla (Time).”

in devotion, he performed austerity. From him, when he had so toiled, and performed austerity, three worlds were created,—earth, air, and sky. He infused warmth into these three worlds. From them, thus heated, three lights were produced,—Agni (fire), this which purifies (*i.e.* Pavana, or Vāyu, the wind),<sup>5</sup> and Sūrya (the sun). He infused heat into these three lights. From them so heated the three Vedas were produced,—the Rig-veda from Agni (fire), the Yajur-veda from Vāyu (wind), and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya (the sun). He infused warmth into these three Vedas. From them so heated three luminous essences were produced,—bhūḥ from the Rig-veda, bhuvaḥ from the Yajur-veda, and svar from the Sāma-veda. Hence, with the Rig-veda they performed the function of the hotṛi; with the Yajur-veda, the office of the adhvaryu; with the Sāma-veda, the duty of the udgātṛi; while the function of the brahman arose through the luminous essence of the triple science [*i.e.* the three Vedas combined].”

*Chhāndogya Upanishad*.—A similar passage (already quoted in Volume Second, p. 200) occurs in the Chhāndogya Upanishad (p. 288 of Dr. Röer's ed.):

*Prajāpatir lokān abhyatapat | teshāṁ tapyamānānāṁ rasān prābrihad agnim prīthivyāḥ vāyum antarikshād ādityān divāḥ | sa etās tisro devatāḥ abhyatapat | tāsāṁ tapyamānānāṁ rasān prābrihad agner richo vāyor yajūṁshi sāma ādityāt | sa etāṁ trayīṁ vidyāṁ abhyatapat | tasyās tapyamānāyāḥ rasān prābrihad bhūr iti rigbhyo bhuvar iti yajurbhyāḥ svar iti sāmabhyaḥ |*

“Prajāpati infused warmth into the worlds, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences, viz. Agni (fire) from the earth, Vāyu (wind) from the air, and Sūrya (the sun) from the sky. He infused warmth into these three deities, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences,—from Agni the rich verses, from Vāyu the yajush verses, and from Sūrya the sāman verses. He then infused heat into this triple science, and from it so heated he drew forth its essences,—from rich verses the syllable bhūḥ, from yajush verses bhuvaḥ, and from sāman verses svar.”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 2, 19 : . . . ayam eva sa Vāyur yo 'yam pavate . . . “This is that Vāyu, he who purifies.”

<sup>6</sup> Passages to the same effect occur also in the Aitareya (v. 32-34) and Kaushitaki Brāhmaṇas. That in the former will be found in Dr. Haug's translation of the

*Manu.*—The same origin is assigned to the three Vedas in the following verses from the account of the creation in *Manu*, i. 21–23, where the idea is no doubt borrowed from the Brāhmaṇas :

*Sarveshāṁ tu sa nāmāni karmāni cha prithak prithak | Veda-śabdebhya evādau prithak saṁsthāś cha nirmame | Karmātmanāṁ cha devānāṁ so 'srijat prāṇīnāṁ prabhuh | sādhyanāṁ cha gaṇāṁ sūkshmaṇaṁ yajnaṇaṁ chaiva sanātanam | Agni-vāyu-ravibhyas tu trayam brahma sanātanam | dudoha yajna-siddhyartham rig-yajuh-sāma-lakṣaṇam |*

“He [Brahmā] in the beginning fashioned from the words of the Veda<sup>7</sup> the several names, functions, and separate conditions of all [creatures]. That Lord also created the subtle host of active and living deities, and of Sādhyas, and eternal sacrifice. And in order to the performance of sacrifice, he drew forth from Agni, from Vāyu, and from Sūrya, the triple eternal Veda, distinguished as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman.”

Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, the commentator, annotates thus on this passage :

*Sanātanaṁ nityam | vedāpaurusheyatva-paksho Manor abhimataḥ | pūrva-kalpe ye vedās te eva Paramātma-mūrtter Brahmanaḥ sarvajnasya smṛity-ārūḍhāḥ | tān eva kalpādāv agni-vāyu-ravibhyah ḍchakarshaḥ | śrautaś cha ayam artha na śankāṇiyah | tathācha śrutiḥ | “agner rigvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ ādityāt sāmavedaḥ” iti |*

“The word *sanātana* means ‘eternally pre-existing.’ The doctrine of the superhuman origin of the Vedas is maintained by *Manu*. The same Vedas which [existed] in the previous mundane era (Kalpa) were preserved in the memory of the omniscient Brahmā, who was one with the supreme Spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in the beginning of the [present] Kalpa, he drew forth from Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya : and this dogma, which is founded upon the Veda, is not to be questioned, for the Veda says, ‘the Rig-veda comes from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya.’”

Another commentator on *Manu*, Medhātithi, explains this passage in a more rationalistic fashion, “by remarking that the Rig-veda opens with a hymn to fire, and the Yajur-veda with one in which air is mentioned.”—Colebr. Misc. Ess. i. p. 11, note.

Brāhmaṇa ; and the one in the latter is rendered into German by Weber in his Ind. Stud. ii. 303 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Kullūka explains this to mean, “Having understood them from the words of the Veda” (*Veda-śabdebhyaḥ eva avagamyā*).

To the verses from Manu (i. 21–23) just cited, the following from the second book may be added, partly for the purpose of completing the parallel with the passages previously adduced from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Chhāndogya Upanishad :

Manu, ii. 76 ff. *Akāraṁ chāpy ukāraṁ cha makāraṁ cha Prajāpatih | Veda-trayād niraduhad bhūr bhuvaḥ svar itītī cha | 77. Tribhyah eva tu vedebhyaḥ pādam pādam adūduhat | “tat” ity richo’syāḥ sāvitryāḥ parameshthī prajāpatih | . . . . 81. Oṁkāra-pūrvikās tisro mahāvyāhṛitayo’vyayāḥ | Tripadā chaiva gāyatrī vijneyaṁ Brahmāno mukham.*

76. “Prajāpati also milked out of the three Vedas the letters *a*, *u*, and *m*, together with the words *bhūḥ*, *bhuvaḥ*, and *svar*. 77. The same supreme Prajāpati also milked from each of the three Vedas one of the [three] portions of the text called *sāvitri* [or *gāyatrī*], beginning with the word *tat*.<sup>8</sup> . . . . 81. The three great imperishable particles (*bhūḥ*, *bhuvaḥ*, *svar*) preceded by *om*, and the *gāyatrī* of three lines, are to be regarded as the mouth of Brahmā.”

The next passage, from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 1, 8, first speaks generally of Prajāpati creating the three Vedas, and then afterwards, with some inconsistency, describes their production from the waters :<sup>9</sup>

*So’yam purushāḥ Prajāpatir akāmayata “bhūyān syām prajāyeya” iti | so’śrāmyat sa tapo’tapyata | sa śrāntas tepāno brahma eva prathamam asrijata trayīm eva vidyām | sā eva asmai pratishṭhā ‘bhavat | tasmād āhur “brahma asya sarvasya pratishṭhā” iti | tasmād anūchya pratitishṭhati | pratishṭhā hy eshā yad brahma | tasyām pratishṭhāyām pratishṭhito’tapyata | 9. So’po’srijata vāchaḥ eva lokāt | vāg eva asya sā’srijyata | sā idām sarvam āpnod yad idām kincha | yad āpnōt tasmād āpah | yad avrinot tasmād vāḥ | 10. So’kāmayata “ābhyo’dbhyo’dhi prajāyeya” iti | so’nayā trayyā vidyayā saha apah prāviśat | tataḥ āṅḍām samavarttata | tad abhyamṛisat | “astv” ity “astu bhūyo’stv” ity eva tad abravit | tato brahma eva prathamam asrijyata trayy eva vidyā | tasmād āhur “brahma asya sarvasya prathamajam” iti | api hi tasmāt purushād brahma eva pūrvam asrijyata tad asya tad mukham eva asrijyata | tasmād anūchānam āhur “agni-kalpah” iti | mukhaṁ hy etad agner yad brahma |*

<sup>8</sup> This text, Rig-veda, iii. 62, 10, will be quoted in the sequel.

<sup>9</sup> This passage with the preceding context is given in the Fourth Volume of this work, pp. 18 f.

"This Male, Prajāpati, desired, 'May I multiply, may I be propagated.' He toiled in devotion; he practised austere-fervour. Having done so he first of all created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. This became a basis for him. Wherefore men say, 'sacred knowledge is the basis of this universe.' Hence after studying the Veda a man has a standing ground; for sacred knowledge is his foundation. Resting on this basis he (Prajāpati) practised austere-fervour. 9. He created the waters from Vāch (speech), as their world. Vāch was his: she was created. She pervaded all this whatever exists. As she pervaded (*āpnot*), waters were called 'āpah.' As she covered (*avriṇot*) all, water was called 'vār.' 10. He desired, 'May I be propagated from these waters.' Along with this triple Vedic science he entered the waters. Thence sprang an egg. He gave it an impulse; and said, 'Let there be, let there be, let there be again.' Thence was first created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. Wherefore men say, 'Sacred knowledge is the first-born thing in this universe. Moreover, it was sacred knowledge which was created from that Male in front, wherefore it was created as his mouth. Hence they say of a man learned in the Veda, 'He is like Agni; for sacred knowledge is Agni's mouth.'"

The next passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 3, 10, 1, briefly states that the Vedas were created after Soma:

*Prajāpatiḥ Somam rājānam asrijata | taṁ trayo vedāḥ anv asrijyanta |*

"Prajāpati created king Soma. After him the three Vedas were created."

The same Brāhmaṇa in other places, as iii. 3, 2, 1, speaks of the Veda as derived from Prajāpati (*Prajāpatyo vedah*).

*Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*.—According to the following passage of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 5, 4, 10 (= Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 455 of Röer's ed. and p. 179 of trans.) the Vedas, as well as other Sāstras, are the breath of Brahma:

*Sa yathā ārdredhāgner abhyāhitāt prithag dhūmāḥ viniścharanti evān  
vai are 'sya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad rigvedo yajurvedaḥ  
sāmavedo 'tharvāṅgirasaḥ itihāsaḥ purāṇaṁ vidyā upanishadaḥ ślokāḥ  
sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni asyaiva etāni sarvāṇi niśva-  
sitāni |*

"As from a fire made of moist wood various modifications of smoke proceed, so is the breathing of this great Being the Rig-veda, the

Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharvāṅgirases, the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, science, the Upanishads, verses (*ślokas*), aphorisms, comments of different kinds—all these are his breathings.”

It is curious that in this passage the Vedas appear to be classed in the same category with various other works, such as the Sūtras, from some at least of which (as we shall see further on), they are broadly distinguished by later writers, who regard the former (including the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as of superhuman origin, and infallible correctness, while this character is expressly denied to the latter, which are represented as *paurushya*, or merely human compositions, possessed of no independent authority.

In the Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad (pp. 50–53 of Dr. Röer’s ed.) Prajāpati [identified with Death, or the Devourer] is said to have produced *Vāch* (speech), and through her, together with soul, to have created all things, including the Vedas :

*Sa tayā vāchā tenu ātmanā idaṁ sarvam asrijata yad idaṁ kincha  
ṛicō yajūnshi sāmāni cchandāñsi yajnān prajāḥ paśūn |*

“By that speech and that soul he created all things whatsoever, ṛich, yajush, and sāman texts, metres, sacrifices, creatures, and animals.”

And in Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 4, 3, 12 (p. 290 of the same Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad) it is said :

*Trayo vedāḥ ete eva | vāg eva rig-vedo mano yajur-vedāḥ prānah sāma-  
vedāḥ |*

“The three Vedas are [identifiable with] these three things [speech, mind, and breath]. Speech is the Rig-veda, mind the Yajur-veda, and breath the Sāma-veda.”

The following text, from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 52, gives a singular account of the production of the Vedas :

“*Samudre tvā sadane sādayāmi*” iti | *Mano vai samudraḥ | manaso vai  
samudrād vāchā bhṛyā devās trayīm vidyām nirakhanan | tad esha śloko  
'bhuyuktāḥ “ye(yat?) samudrād nirakhanan devās tīkshṇābhīr abhrībhīḥ |  
sudevo adya tad vidyād yatra nirvapanām dadhur”* iti | *manah samudro  
vāk tīkshṇā bhṛis trayī vidyā nirvapanam | etad esha śloko 'bhuyuktāḥ |  
manasi tām sādayati |*

“‘I settle thee in the ocean as thy seat.’<sup>10</sup> Mind is the ocean.

<sup>10</sup> I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht for the following explanation of this formula, which is taken from the Vājasaneyi Sanhita, xiii. 53. The words are addressed to a

From the mind-ocean with speech for a shovel the gods dug out the triple Vedic science. Hence this verse has been uttered: ‘May the brilliant deity to-day know where they placed that offering which the gods dug out with sharp shovels.’ Mind is the ocean; speech is the sharp shovel; the triple Vedic science is the offering. In reference to this the verse has been uttered. He settles it in Mind.”

The next passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 39, 1, speaks of the Veda as being “the hair of Prajāpati’s beard” (*Prajāpater vai etāni śmaśrūni yad vedah*). The process of its germination is left to the imagination of the reader.

In another text of the same Brāhmaṇa, Vāch (speech) is called the mother of the Vedas :

ii. 8, 8, 5. *Vāg aksharam prathamajā ṛitasya vedānām mātā amṛitasya nābhiḥ | sā no jushānā upa yajnam āgād avantī devī suhavā me astu | yām rishayo mantra-krito maniṣināḥ anvaichhan devās tapasā śramena |*

“Vāch (speech) is an imperishable thing, and the first-born of the ceremonial, the mother of the Vedas, and the centre-point of immortality. Delighting in us, she came to the sacrifice. May the protecting goddess be ready to listen to my invocation,—she whom the wise rishis, the composers of hymns, the gods, sought by austere fervour, and by laborious devotion.”

## SECT. II.—*Origin of the Vedas according to the Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkandeya Purāṇas, the Harivānśa, the Mahābhārata; eternity of the Veda; miscellaneous statements regarding it.*

In the Vishṇu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas we find a quite different tradition regarding the origin of the Vedas, which in these works are said to have been created by the four-faced Brahmā from his several mouths. Thus the Vishṇu Purāṇa says, i. 5, 48 ff.:

*Gāyatrām cha ṛicas̄ chaiva trivrit-sāma-rathantaram | Agniṣṭomām cha yajnānām nirmame prathamād mukhāt | yajūṁshi traishṭubhaṁ chhandaḥ stomaṁ panchadaśām tathā | Vrihat sāma tathokthyaṁ cha dakshinād aṣṭrijad mukhāt | sāmāni jagatī-chhandaḥ stomaṁ saptadaśām*

brick at the time when the hearth (*chityā*) for the reception of the sacred fires is being constructed. As the bricks are severally called *apasyā* (properly ‘efficacious,’ but erroneously derived from *ap*) they are addressed as if placed in various parts of water

*tathā | vairūpam atirātram cha paśchimād asrijad mukhāt | ekavīṁśam atharvānam āptoryāmānam eva cha | Anushṭubhaṁ sa vairājam uttarād asrijad mukhāt |*

“From his eastern mouth Brahmā formed the gāyatra, the ṛch verses, the trivṛit, the sāma-rathantara, and of sacrifices, the agnīṣṭoma. From his southern mouth he created the yajush verses, the trishṭubh metre, the panchadaśa-stoma, the vṛihat-sāman, and the ukthya. From his western mouth he formed the sāman verses, the jagatī metre, the saptadaśa-stoma, the vairūpa, and the atirātra. From his northern mouth he framed the ekavīṁśa, the atharvan, the āptoryāman, with the anushṭubh and virāj metres.”<sup>11</sup>

In like manner it is said but with variations, in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. 12, 34, and 37 ff. :

*Kadācid dhyāyataḥ srashṭur vedāḥ āśaṁś chaturmukhāt | kathaṁ śrakshyāmy aham lokān samavetān yathā purā | . . . . Rig-yajuh-sāmā-tharvākhyān vedān pūrvādibhir mukhaiḥ | ūstraṁ ijjyām stuti-stomam prāyaśchittām vyadhat kramāt |*

“Once the Vedas sprang from the four-faced creator, as he was meditating ‘how shall I create the aggregate worlds as before?’ . . . . He formed from his eastern and other mouths the Vedas called ṛch, yajush, sāman, and atharvan, together with praise, sacrifice, hymns, and expiation.”

And in verse 45 it is stated that the ushnīḥ metre issued from his hairs, the gāyatrī from his skin, the trishṭubh from his flesh, the anushṭubh from his tendons, the jagatī from his bones (*Tasyoshniḥ āśil lomebhyo gāyatrī cha tvacho vibhoḥ | trishṭup māṁsāt snuto 'nushṭup jagaty asthnaḥ Prajāpateḥ*).

The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa says on the same subject, 102, 1:

*Tasmād andād vibhinnāt tu Brahmano 'vyakta-janmanāḥ | ṛchō babhū-vah prathamam prathamād vadānād mune | 2. Javā-pushpa-nībhāḥ sadyas tejo-rūpānta-asāṁhatāḥ | pṛīthak pṛīthak vibhinnāś cha rajo-rūpa-vahāś tataḥ | 3. Yajūṁshi dakshinād vaktrād aniruddhāni kāñchanām | yādrig-varṇām tathā-varṇāny asāṁhati-dharāṇi cha | 4. Paśchimām yad vibhor vaktrām Brahmanāḥ paramesthināḥ | āvirbhūtāni sāmāni tatas chhan-dāṁsi tāny aīha | 5. Ātharvaṇām aśeṣām cha bhṛingānjanā-chaya-prabham | ghorāghora-svarūpām tad abhīchārika-śāntikam | 6. Uttarāt pra-*

<sup>11</sup> See Wilson's Transl. vol. i. p. 84.

*kaṭibhūtāṁ vadanāt tasya vedhasaḥ | sukha-sattva-tamah-prāyaṁ saumyā-saumya-svarūpavat | 7. Richo rajo-guṇāḥ sattvāṁ yajushāṁ cha guṇa-mune | tamo-guṇāni sāmāni tamah-sattvam atharvasu |*

1. "From the eastern mouth of Brahmā, who sprang by an imperceptible birth from that divided egg (Manu, i. 9, 12), there suddenly issued first of all the rich verses, (2) resembling China roses, brilliant in appearance, internally united, though separated from each other, and characterized by the quality of passion (*rajas*). 3. From his southern mouth came, unrestrained, the yajush verses of the colour of gold, and disunited. 4. From the western mouth of the supreme Brahmā appeared the sāman verses and the metres. 5 and 6. From the northern mouth of Vedhas (Brahmā) was manifested the entire Ātharvana of the colour of black bees and collyrium, having a character at once terrible and not terrible,<sup>12</sup> capable of neutralizing the arts of enchanters, pleasant, characterized by the qualities both of purity and darkness, and both beautiful and the contrary. 7. The verses of the rich are distinguished by the quality of passion (*rajas*), those of the yajush by purity (*sattva*), those of the sāman by darkness (*tamas*), and those of the atharvan by both darkness and purity."

*Harivamśa*.—In the first section of the *Harivamśa*, verse 47, the creation of the Vedas by Brahmā is thus briefly alluded to :

*Richo yajūñshi sāmāni nirmame yajna-siddhaye | sādhyās tair ayajan devān ity evam anuśruma |*

"In order to the accomplishment of sacrifice, he formed the rich, yajush, and sāman verses : with these the Sādhyas worshipped the gods, as we have heard."

The following is the account of the same event given in another part of the same work ; *Harivamśa*, verse 11,516 :

*Tato 'srijad vai tripadām gāyatrīm veda-mātaram | Akaroch chaiva chaturo vedān gāyatri-sambhavān |*

After framing the world, Brahmā "next created the gāyatrī of three lines, mother of the Vedas, and also the four Vedas which sprang from the gāyatrī."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Ghorāghora* is the correct MS. reading, as I learn from Dr. Hall, and not *gāvaddhora*, as given in Professor Banerjea's printed text.

<sup>13</sup> The same words *gāyatrīm veda-mātaram* also occur in the M.Bh. Vanaparvan, verse 13,432 ; and the same title is applied to Vāch in the Taitt. Br. as quoted above, p. 10.

A little further on we find this expanded into the following piece of mysticism, verse 11,665 ff. :

*Samāhita-manā Brahmā moksha-prāptena hetunā | chandra-manḍala-saṁsthānāj jyotis-tejo mahat tadā | Praviśya hridayaṁ kshipraṁ gāyatryāḥ nayanāntare | Garbhasya sambhavo yaś cha chaturdhā purushātmakah | Brahma-tejomayo 'vyaktaḥ śāśvato 'tha dhruvo 'vyayaḥ | na chendriya-gunaṁ yuktas tejo-guṇena cha | chandrāṁśu-vimala-prakhyo bhrājishnur varṇa-saṁsthitaḥ | Netrābhyāṁ janayad devaḥ rig-vedāṁ yajushā saha | sāma-vedāṁ cha jīhvāgrād atharvāṇāṁ cha mūrddhataḥ | Jāta-mātrās tu te vedāḥ kshetraṁ vindanti tattvataḥ | Tena vedatvam āpannā yasmād vindanti tat padam | Te srijanti tadā vedāḥ brahma pūrvam̄ sanātanam | Purushāṁ divya-rūpābhām̄ svaiḥ svair blāvaiḥ mano-bhavaiḥ |*

"For the emancipation of the world, Brahmā, sunk in contemplation, issuing in a luminous form from the region of the moon, penetrated into the heart of Gāyatrī, entering between her eyes. From her there was then produced a quadruple being in the form of a Male, lustrous as Brahmā, undefined, eternal, undecaying, devoid of bodily senses or qualitics, distinguished by the attribute of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, and embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, with the Yajush from his eyes, the Sāma-veda from the tip of his tongue, and the Atharvan from his head. These Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body (*kshetra*). Hence they obtain their character of Vedas, because they find (*vindanti*) that abode. These Vedas then create the pre-existent eternal brahma (sacred science), a Male of celestial form, with their own mind-born qualities."

I extract another passage on the same subject from a later section of the same work, verses 12,425 ff. When the Supreme Being was intent on creating the universe, Hiranyagarbha, or Prajāpati, issued from his mouth, and was desired to divide himself,—a process which he was in great doubt how he should effect. The text then proceeds :

*Iti chintayatas tasya "om" ity evotthitaḥ svaraḥ | sa bhūmāv antarīkṣhe cha nāke cha kṛitavān svanam | Taṁ chaivābhyasatas tasya manah-sāra-mayam punaḥ | hridayād deva-devaaya vashaṭkāraḥ samutthitaḥ | bhūmy-antarīksha-nākānām bhūyah svarātmakah parāḥ | mahāsmritimayah punyāḥ mahāvyāhṛitayo'bhavan | chhandasām pravarā devī chaturviṁśā-ksharā 'bhavat | Tat-padaṁ sāñsmaran divyam sāvitrīm akarot prabhuh |*

*rīk-sāmātharva-yajushaś chaturo bhagavān prabhuh | chakāra nikhilān  
vedān brahma-yuktena karmanā |*

“While he was thus reflecting, the sound “om” issued from him, and resounded through the earth, air, and sky. While the god of gods was again and again repeating this, the essence of mind, the vashaṭkāra proceeded from his heart. Next, the sacred and transcendent vyāhṛitis, (bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, svar), formed of the great smṛiti, in the form of sound, were produced from earth, air, and sky. Then appeared the goddess, the most excellent of metres, with twenty-four syllables [the gāyatri]. Reflecting on the divine text [beginning with] “tat,” the Lord formed the sāvitri. He then produced all the Vedas, the Rich, Sāman, Atharvan, and Yajush, with their prayers and rites.” (See also the passage from the Bhāg. Pur. xii. 6, 37 ff., which will be quoted in a following section.)

*Mahābhārata.*—The Mahābhārata in one passage speaks of Sarasvatī and the Vedas as being both created by Achyuta (Vishṇu) from his mind (Bhīṣma-parvan, verse 3019 : *Sarasvatīṁ cha vedāṁś cha manasah  
sasrije 'chyutah*). In another place, Sānti-parvan, verse 12,920, Sarasvatī is said, in conformity with the texts quoted above, pp. 10 and 12, from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the Vana-parvan, and the Harivāṁśa, to be the mother of the Vedas :

*Vedānāṁ mātarāṁ paśya mat-sthām devīm Sarasvatīm |*

“Behold Sarasvatī, mother of the Vedas, abiding in me.”

*Manu.*—According to the verses in Manu, xii. 49, 50, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 41, the Vedas, with the other beings and objects named along with them, constitute the second manifestation of the sattva guna, or pure principle; while Brahmā is placed in a higher rank, as one of the first manifestations of the same principle. The word Veda in this passage is explained by Kullūka of those “embodied deities, celebrated in the Itihāsas, who preside over the Vedas” (*Vedā-  
bhimāninyaś cha devatāḥ vigrahavatyāḥ itihāsa-prasiddāḥ*).

**SECT. III.—Passages of the Brāhmaṇas and other works in which the Vedas are spoken of as being the sources of all things, and as infinite and eternal.**

The first text of this sort which I shall cite is from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 4., 2, 21 :

*Atha sarvāṇī bhūtāni paryakshat | sa trayyām eva vidyāyām sarvāṇī bhūtāny apāśyat | altra hi sarveshām chhandasām ātmā sarveshām stomā-nām sarveshām prāṇānām sarveshām devānām | etad vai asti | etad hy amritam | yad hy amritam tad hy asti | etad u tad yad martyam | 22. Sa aikshata Prajāpātiḥ “trayyām rāvā vidyāyām sarvāṇī bhūtāni | hanta trayīm eva vidyām ātmānam abhisāṃskaravai” iti | 23. Sa richo vyau-hat | dvādaśa bṛihati-sahasrāṇy etāvatyo ha richo yāḥ Prajāpati-srishṭas tās triṁśattame vyūhe panktishv atishṭhanta | tāḥ yat triṁśattame vyūhe tishṭhanta tasmāt triṁśad māsasya rātrayaḥ | atha yat panktishu tasmāt pāṅktah Prajāpatiḥ | tāḥ ashṭūṣataṁ śatāni panktayo 'bhavan |*

21. “Then he looked around upon all beings. He beheld all beings in this triple Vedic science. For in it is the soul of all metres, of all hymns of praise, of all breaths, of all the gods. This, indeed, exists.<sup>14</sup> It is an undying thing. For that which is undying (really) exists. This is that which is mortal.<sup>15</sup> Prajāpati reflected, ‘All beings are comprehended in the triple Vedic science : come let me dispose myself in the shape of the triple Vedic science.<sup>16</sup> He arranged the verses of the Rig-veda. Twelve thousand Brihatīs, and as many Rich-verses which were created by Prajāpati, stood in rows in the thirtieth class. Since they stood in the thirtieth class there are thirty nights in the month. Since they stood in rows (*pankti*) Prajāpati is called Pāṅkta. They formed eighteen hundreds of rows.”

The next text, from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 12, 9, 1, speaks of the three Vedas as being respectively the sources of form, motion, and heat, or brilliancy :

*Rigbhyo jātām sarvaśo mūrtīlīm āhuḥ sarvā gatir yājushī haiva śaśvat | sarvām tejaḥ sāma-rūpyām ha śaśvat |*

“They say that form universally proceeds from rich verses; that motion is always connected with the yajush, and that all heat has the nature of the sāman.”

We have already seen, p. 6, that Manu (i. 21) speaks of the names,

<sup>14</sup> “Always exists” (*sarvadā vidyate*).—Comm.

<sup>15</sup> On this the commentator remarks: *Yach cha martyam marana-dharmakam manusyādi tad apy etat trayī-bhūtam eva | ato martyāmritātmakaṁ sarvām jagat attrantarbhūtam |* “And that which is mortal, subject to death, the human race, etc., is also one with the triple Vedic science. Hence the latter includes all the world both mortal and immortal.”

<sup>16</sup> I owe this interpretation of this clause to Prof. Aufrecht.

functions, and conditions of all things as fashioned from the words of the Veda. It is similarly said in the Vishnu Purāṇa, i. 5, 58 :

*Nāma rūpaṁ cha bhūtānāṁ krityānāṁ cha pravarttanaṁ | Veda-śabdebhya evādau devādīnāṁ ohakāra saḥ | rishīnāṁ nāmadheyāni yathā veda-śrutāni vai | yathā-niyoga-yogyāni sarveshām api so'karot |*

“In the beginning he created from the words of the Veda the names, forms, and functions of the gods and other beings. He also assigned the names of all the rishis as indicated in the Vedas, and as appropriate to their respective offices.”

The same idea is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, 8533 :

*Rishayas tapasā vedān adhyaishanta divāniśam | An-ādi-nidhanā vidyā vīg utsrishṭā Svayambhuvā | ādau vedamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravrittayaḥ | rishīnāṁ nāmadheyāni yūś cha vedeshu srishṭayaḥ | nānā-rūpaṁ cha bhūtānāṁ karmanāṁ cha pravarttayan (pravarttanam?) | veda-śabdebhya evādau nirmimīte sa īśvarah |*

“Through austere-scrvour (*tapas*) the rishis studied the Vedas, both day and night. In the beginning knowledge (*vidyā*)<sup>17</sup> without beginning or end, divine speech, formed of the Vedas, was sent forth by Svayambhū (= Brahmā, the self-existent) : from her all activities are derived. It is from the words of the Veda that the lord in the beginning frames the names of the rishis, the creations which (exist) in the Vedas, the various forms of beings, and the activity manifested in works.”

The Mangalācharaṇa, or prayer prefixed to their commentaries on the Rik Sanhitā and Taittirīya Sanhitā, by both Sāyaṇa and Mādhava, is as follows :

*Yasya niśvasitām vedāḥ yo vedebhyo 'khilaṁ jagat | nirmame tam aham vande vidyā-tirtham maheśvaram |*

“I reverence Maheśvara the hallowed abode of sacred knowledge, of whom the Vedas are the breathings, and who from the Vedas formed the whole universe.”

The following passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 10, 11, 3, asserts that the Vedas are infinite in extent :

*Bharadvājo ha tribhir āyurbhir brahmacharyyam uvāsa | tam ha jīrṇim*

<sup>17</sup> In quoting this line in a passage of his Vedārtha-prakāśa, or commentary on the Taittirīya Sanhitā, which I shall adduce further on, Mādhava Āchāryya gives the reading *nityā*, ‘eternal,’ instead of *vidyā*, ‘knowledge.’ It is possible that the line may be taken from some other book.

*sthavirāṁ śayānam Indraḥ upavrajya uvācha | “Bharadvāja yat te chaturtham āyur dadyāṁ kim etena kuryyāḥ” iti | “brahmacharyyam eva enena chareyam” iti ha uvācha | 4. Taṁ ha trīn giri-rūpān avijñatān iwa darśayānohakāra | teshāṁ ha ekaikasmād muṣṭim ādade | sa ha uvācha “Bharadvāja” ity āmantrya | “vedāḥ vai ete | anantāḥ vai vedāḥ | etad vai etais tribhir āyurbhir anvavochathāḥ | atha te itarad ananūktam eva | ehi imāṁ viddhi | ayaṁ vai sarva-vidyā” iti | 5. Tasmai ha etam agnim sāvitram uvācha | taṁ sa viditvā amṛito bhūtvā svargāṁ lokam iyāya ādityasya sāyujyam | amṛito ha eva bhūtvā svargāṁ lokam ety ādityasya sāyujyāṁ yaḥ evaṁ veda | eshā u eva trayī vidyā | 6. Yāvantāṁ ha vai trayyā vidyayā lokāṁ jayati tāvantam lokāṁ jayati yaḥ evaṁ veda |*

“Bharadvāja lived through three lives<sup>18</sup> in the state of a religious student (*brahmacharyya*). Indra approached him when he was lying old and decrepit, and said to him : ‘Bharadvāja, if I give thee a fourth life, how wilt thou employ it?’ ‘I will lead the life of a religious student,’ he replied. 4. He (Indra) showed him three mountain-like objects, as it were unknown. From each of them he took a handful : and, calling to him, ‘Bharadvāja,’ said, ‘These are the Vedas. The Vedas are infinite. This is what thou hast studied during these three lives. Now there is another thing which thou hast not studied, come and learn it. This is the universal science.’ 5. He declared to him this Agni Sāvitra. Having known it he (Bharadvāja) became immortal, and ascended to the heavenly world, to union with the sun. He who knows this ascends to heaven, to union with the sun. This is the triple Vedic science. He who knows this conquers a world as great as he would gain by the triple Vedic science.”

Another text from the Taittirīya Sanhitā, vii. 3, 1, 4, puts the matter somewhat differently :

*Atha brahmā (brahma-vādino?) vadanti parimitāḥ vai richāḥ parimitāni sāmāni parimitāni yajūñshi atha tasya eva anto nāsti yad brahma |*

“The expounders of sacred science say, ‘Rich verses are limited, sāman verses are limited, yajush verses are limited ; but there is no end of sacred knowledge.’”

*Vishṇu Purāṇa*.—At the end of Section 6 of the third book of the

<sup>18</sup> This does not appear to mean, three lives in three different births, but a life of thrice the usual length, or already twice renewed.

Vishṇu Purāṇa we have the following assertion of the eternity of the Veda :

*Iti śākhāḥ prasankhyatāḥ śākhā-bhedāḥ tathaiva cha | karttāraś chaiva śākhānām bheda-hetus tathoditah | sarva-manvantareshv eva śākhā-bhedāḥ samāḥ smritāḥ | Prājāpatyā śrutiḥ nityā tad-vikalpāḥ tv imē dvija |*

“Thus the Śākhās, their divisions, their authors, and the cause of the division have been declared. In all the manvantaras the divisions of the Śākhās are recorded to be the same. The śruti (Veda) derived from Prajāpati (Brahmā) is eternal : these, o Brāhmaṇa, are only its modifications.”

In another passage of the same book, Vishṇu is identified with the Vedas : Vishṇu Purāṇa, iii. 3, 19 ff. :

*Sa riñ-mayah sa sāmamayah sa chātmā sa yajurmayah | rig-yajuh-sāma-sārātmā sa evātmā śarīrinām | sa bhidyate vedamayah sa vedāṁ karoti bhedair bahubhiḥ saśākham | śākhā-pranetū sa samasta-śākhāḥ ināna-svarūpo bhagavān anantah |*

“He is composed of the Rich, of the Sāman, of the Yajush ; he is the soul. Consisting of the essence of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, he is the soul of embodied spirits. Formed of the Veda, he is divided ; he forms the Veda and its branches (*śākhās*) into many divisions. Framer of the Śākhās, he is also their entirety, the infinite lord, whose essence is knowledge.”

**Sect. IV.—Passages from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, eulogistic of the Veda, with some statements of a different tenor from Manu and other writers.**

The following panegyric on Vedic study is taken from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 6, 1 :

*Panoha eva mahāyajnāḥ | tāny eva mahāsatatrāṇī bhūta-yajno manu-shya-yajnāḥ pitṛi-yajno deva-yajno brahma-yajnāḥ iti | 2. Ahar ahar bhūtebhyo. balim̄ haret | tathā etam bhūta-yajnāṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahar dadyād ā uda-pātrāt tathā etam manushya-yajnāṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svādhākuryād ā uda-pātrāt tathā etāṁ pitṛi-yajnāṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svādhākuryād ā kāshṭhāt tathā etāṁ deva-yajnāṁ samāpnoti | 3. Atha brahma-yajnāḥ | svādhyāyo vai brahma-yajnāḥ | tasya vai etasya brahma-*

yajnasya vāg eva juhūr manah upabhṛich chakshur dhruvā medhā sruvah  
 satyam avabhrithaḥ svargo lokaḥ udayanam | yāvantāṁ ha vai imām pri-  
 thivīṁ vittena pūrnām dadaṁ lokaṁ jayati tris tāvantāṁ jayati bhūyām-  
 saṁ cha akshayyaṁ yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte |  
 tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyah | 4. Paya-āhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānām yad  
 rīchāḥ | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān rīcho 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte paya-  
 āhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati | te enāṁ triptās tarpayanti yoga-  
 kshemena prāñena retasā sarvātmanā sarvābhīḥ puṇyābhīḥ sampadbhīḥ |  
 ghrīta-kulyāḥ madhu-kulyāḥ pītrīn svadhā abhivahanti | 5. Ājyāhutayo  
 ha vai etāḥ devānām yad yajūṁshi | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān yajūṁshy ahar  
 ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte ājyāhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati te enam  
 triptās tarpayanti yoga-kshemena ityādi | 6. Somāhutayo ha vai etāḥ  
 devānām yat sāmāni | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān sāmāny ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam  
 adhīte somāhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati ityādi | 7. Meda-āhutayo  
 ha rai etāḥ devānām yad atharvāngirasaḥ | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān atharvān-  
 giraso 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte meda-āhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tar-  
 payati ityādi | 8. Madhv-āhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānām yad anuśāsanāni  
 vidyā vākovākyam itihāsa-purāṇām gāthāḥ nārāšāṁsyah | sa yaḥ evaṁ vid-  
 vān ityādi | 9. Tasya vai etasya brahma-yajnasya chatvāro vashaṭkārāḥ  
 yad vāto vāti yad vidyotate yat stanayati yad avasphürjati | tasmād evaṁ  
 vidvān vāte vāti vidyotamāne stanayaty avasphürjaty adhīyita eva vashaṭ-  
 kārānām achhaṁbaṭkārāya | ati ha vai punar mrityum muchyate gachhati  
 Brahmanah sātmatām | sa ched api prabalam iva na śaknuyād apy ekām  
 deva-padam adhīyita eva tathā bhūtebhyo na hīyate | xi. 5, 7, 1 : Atha  
 ataḥ svādhyāya-praśānsā | priye svādhyāya-pravachane bhavataḥ yukta-  
 manah bhavaty aparādhino 'har ahar arthān sādhayate sukham evapiti  
 parama-chikitsakah ātmano bhavati | indriya-saṁyamaś cha ekārāmata  
 cha prajnā-vriddhir yaśo loka-paktih | prajnā vardhamānā chaturo dhar-  
 mān brāhmaṇam abhinishpādayati brāhmaṇyam pratirūpa-charyyām yaśo  
 loka-paktim | lokaḥ pachyamānaś chaturbhīr dharmair brāhmaṇam bhun-  
 akty archayā cha dānena cha ājyeyatayā cha abadhyatayā cha | 2. Ye ha vai  
 ke cha śramāḥ ime dyāvā-prīthivī antareṇa svādhyāyo ha eva teshām para-  
 matā kāshṭhā yaḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo  
 'dhetavyah | 3. Yad yad ha vai ayam chhandasaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte tena  
 tena ha eva asya yajna-kratunā iṣṭam bhavati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhyā-  
 yam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyah | 4. Yadi ha vai apy abhyak-  
 taḥ alankritah suhitah sukhe śayane śayānah svādhyāyam adhīte ā ha

*eva sa nakhagrebhyas tapyate yaḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tas-māt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyah | 5. Maāhu ha vai richo ghrītaṁ ha sāmāny amṛitaṁ yajāṁshi | yad ha vai ayaṁ vākovākyam adhīte kshīraudana-māṁsaudanau ha eva tau | 6. Madhunā ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān richo 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enāṁ triptās tar-payanti sarvaiḥ kāmaiḥ sarvair bhogaiḥ | 7. Ghrītena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān sāmāny ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enāṁ triptāḥ ityādi | 8. Amritena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān yajūṁshy ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enāṁ triptāḥ ityādi | 9. Kshīraudana-māṁsaudanābhīyāṁ ha vai esha devāṁs tar-payati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān vākovā'yam itihāsa-purānam ity ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enāṁ triptāḥ ityādi | 10. Yanti vai āpaḥ | ety ādityaḥ | eti chandramāḥ | yanti nakshatrrāṇi | yathā ha vai na iyur na kuryur evaṁ ha eva tad ahar brāhmaṇo bhavati yad ahaḥ svādhyāyam na adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetaryah | tasmād apy richaṁ vā yajur vā sāma vā gāthāṁ vā kūmyāṁ vā abhīryuhāred vratasya avyavachchedāya |*

"There are only five great sacrifices, which are the great ceremonies, viz., the offering to living creatures,<sup>19</sup> the offering to men, the offering to the fathers, the offering to the gods, and the Veda-offering (*brahma-yajna*). 2. Let an oblation be daily presented to living creatures. Thus the offering to them is fulfilled. Let (hospitality) be daily bestowed even down to the bowl of water. Thus is the offering to men fulfilled. Let the oblation to the fathers be daily presented,<sup>20</sup> down to the bowl of water with the svadhā formula. Thus is the offering to the fathers fulfilled. Let the oblation to the gods be daily presented as far as the faggot of wood. Thus is the offering to the gods fulfilled. 3. Next is the Veda-offering. This means private study<sup>21</sup> (of the sacred books). In this Veda-sacrifice speech is the juhū, the soul the upabhrīt, the eye the dhruvā, intelligence the sruva,<sup>22</sup> truth the ablution, and paradise

<sup>19</sup> This sacrifice, as I learn from Prof. Aufrecht, consists in scattering grain for the benefit of birds, etc. See Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. *bali*. In regard to the other sacrifices see Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. pp. 150, 153, 182 ff., 203 ff.

<sup>20</sup> In explanation of this Professor Aufrecht refers to Kātyāyana's S'rāuta Sūtras, iv. 1, 10, and Manu, iii. 210, 214, 218.

<sup>21</sup> *Svādhyāyāḥ svā-sākhādhyanam* | "Reading of the Veda in one's own sākhā."—Com.

<sup>22</sup> These words denote sacrificial spoons or ladles of different kinds of wood. See the drawings of them in Prof. Müller's article on the funeral rites of the Brāhmans, Journ. of the Germ. Or. Soc. vol. ix. pp. lxxviii. and lxxx.

the conclusion.. He who, knowing this, daily studies the Veda, conquers an undecaying world more than thrice as great as that which he acquires who bestows this whole earth filled with riches. Wherefore the Veda should be studied. 4. Verses of the Rig-veda are milk-oblations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with milk-oblations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him with property, with breath, with generative power, with complete bodily soundness, with all excellent blessings. Streams of butter, streams of honey flow as svadhā-oblations to the fathers. 5. Yajush-verses are offerings of butter to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with offerings of butter; and they, being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as in the preceding paragraph). 6. Sāman-verses are soma-libations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with soma-libations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as above). 7. Verses of Atharvan and Angiras (*atharvāṅgirasaḥ*<sup>23</sup>) are oblations of fat to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with oblations of fat; and they etc, (as above). 8. Prescriptive and scientific treatises, dialogues, traditions, tales, verses, and eulogistic texts are oblations of honey to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these, satisfies the gods with oblations of honey; and they etc. (as above). 9. Of this Veda-sacrifice there are four Vashaṭkāras, when the wind blows, when it lightens, when it thunders, when it crashes; wherefore when it blows, lightens, thunders, or crashes, let the man, who knows this, read, in order that these Vashaṭkāras may not be interrupted.<sup>24</sup> He who does so is freed from dying a second time, and attains to an union with Brahma. Even if he cannot read vigorously, let him read one text relating to the gods. Thus he is not deprived of his living creatures."

xi. 5, 7, 1: "Now comes an encomium upon Vedic study. Study and teaching are loved. He (who practises them) becomes composed in mind. Independent of others, he daily attains his objects, sleeps pleasantly, becomes his own best physician. Control of his senses, concentration of mind, increase of intelligence, renown, capacity to educate mankind [are the results of study]. Increasing intelligence secures for

<sup>23</sup> The Atharva Sanhitā is so called.

<sup>24</sup> See Böthlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. *chhambaṭ*.

the Brähman the four attributes of saintliness, suitable conduct, renown, and capacity for educating mankind. When so educated, men guarantee to the Brähman the enjoyment of the four prerogatives which are his due, reverence, the receipt of gifts, freedom from oppression, and from death by violence. 2. Of all the modes of exertion, which are known between heaven and earth, study of the Veda occupies the highest rank, (in the case of him) who, knowing this, studies it. Wherefore this study is to be practised. 3. On every occasion when a man studies the Vedic hymns he (in fact) performs a complete ceremonial of sacrifice, i.e. whosoever, knowing this, so studies. Wherefore this study, etc., etc. 4. And even when a man, perfumed with unguents, adorned with jewels, satiated with food, and reposing on a comfortable couch, studies the Veda he (has all the merit of one who) performs penance (felt) to the very tips of his nails:<sup>25</sup> (such is the case with him) who, knowing this, studies. Wherefore etc. 5. Rig-veda-verses are honey, Sāma-verses butter, yajus-verses nectar (*amṛita*). When a man reads dialogues (*vākovākyā*) [and legends], these two sorts of composition are respectively oblations of cooked milk and cooked flesh. 6. He who, knowing this, daily reads Rig-veda-verses, satisfies the gods with honey; and they, when satisfied, satisfy him with all objects of desire, and with all enjoyments. 7. He who, knowing this, daily reads Sāma-verses, satisfies the gods with butter; and they, when satisfied, etc. (as before). 8. He who, knowing this, daily reads Yajus-verses, satisfies the gods with nectar; and they, etc. (as before). 9. He who, knowing this, daily studies dialogues and the different classes of ancient stories, satisfies the gods with milk- and flesh-oblations; and they, etc. (as before). 10. The waters move. The sun moves. The moon moves. The constellations move. The Brähman who on any day does not study the Veda, is on that day like what these moving bodies would be if the ceased to move or act. Wherefore such study is to be practised. Let

<sup>25</sup> This sentence is differently rendered by Professor Weber, Ind. Stud. x. p. 112, as follows: "He burns (with sacred fire) to the very tips of his nails." In a later page of the same Essay we are told that according to the doctrine of a teacher called Nāka Maudgalya as stated in the Taittirīya Āranyaka, the study and teaching of the Veda are the real *tapas* (*svādhyāya-pravachane eva tad hi tapah*). In the text of the Āranyaka itself, vii. 8, it is declared that study and teaching should always accompany such spiritual or ritual acts as *ritam*, *satyam*, *tapas*, *dama*, *sama*, the *agnihotra* sacrifice, etc. See Indische Studien, ii. 214, and x. 113.

a man therefore present as his offering a verse of the Rig-veda, or the Sāman, or the Yajush, or a Gāthā, or a Kum̄yā, in order that the course of his observances may not be interrupted."

Manu employs the following honorific expressions in reference to the Vedas (xii. 94 ff.) :

*Pitṛi-deva-manushyāñām̄ vedaś chakshuh sanātanam | aśakyaṁ chāprameyaṁ cha veda-śāstram iti sthitih | Yā veda-vākyāḥ smṛitayo yāś cha kāścha kudriṣṭayah |<sup>26</sup> sarvāś tā nishphalāḥ pretya tamo-nishṭhāḥ hi tāḥ smṛitāḥ | Utpadyante chyavante cha yāny ato 'nyāni kānichit | Tāny arvāk-kalikatayā<sup>27</sup> nishphalāny anṛitāni cha | Chāturvarṇyām̄ trayo lokāś chatvāraś chāśramāḥ prithak | Bhūtam bhavad bhavishyām̄ cha sarvaṁ vedāt prasiddhyati | śabdah sparsāś cha rūpaṁ cha raso gandhaś cha panchamāḥ | vedād eva prasiddhyanti prasūti-guṇa-karmataḥ | Bibhartti<sup>28</sup> sarva-bhūtāni veda-śāstram̄ sanātanam | Tasmād etat param manye yaj jantor asya sādhanam | Sainīpatyām̄ cha rājyaṁ cha danda-netritvam eva cha | sarva-lokādhipatyām̄ cha veda-śāstra-vid arhati | Yathā jātabalo vahnir dahaty ādrān api drumān | tathā dahati veda-jnaḥ karma-jām̄ dosham ātmanāḥ | veda-śāstrārtha-tattva-jno yatra tatrāśrāme vasan | ihaiva loke tishṭhan sa brahmabhu�āya kalpate |*

"The Veda is the eternal eye of the fathers, of gods, and of men ; it is beyond human power and comprehension ; this is a certain conclusion. Whatever traditions are apart from the Veda, and all heretical views, are fruitless in the next world, for they are declared to be founded on darkness. All other [books] external to the Veda, which arise and pass away, are worthless and false from their recentness of date. The system of the four castes, the three worlds, the four states of life, all that has been, now is, or shall be, is made manifest by the

<sup>26</sup> *Drishṭartha-vākyāni "chaitya-vandanāt svargo bharati" ity ādīni yāni cha asat-tarka-mūlāni devatā-'pūrvādi-nirākaranātmakāni veda-viruddhāni chārvāka-daria-nani |* "That is, deductions from experience of the visible world ; such doctrines as that 'heaven is attained by obeisance to a chaitya,' and similar Chārvāka tenets founded on false reasonings, contradicting the existence of the gods, and the efficacy of religious rites, and contrary to the Vedas."—Kulluka.

<sup>27</sup> *Idānīntanatvāt |* "From their modernness."—Kulluka.

<sup>28</sup> *"Havir agnau hūyate | so'gnir ādityam upasarpati | tat sūryo rāśmibhir var-shati | tenānnam bhavati | atha iha bhūtānām utpatti-sthitī cheti havir jāyate" iti brāhmaṇam |* "The oblation is cast into the fire ; fire reaches the sun ; the sun causes rain by his rays ; thence food is produced ; thus the oblation becomes the cause of the generation and maintenance of creatures on this earth ;' so says a Brāhmaṇa."—Kulluka.

Veda. The objects of touch and taste, sound, form, and odour, as the fifth, are made known by the Veda, together with their products, qualities, and the character of their action. The eternal Veda supports all beings : hence I regard it as the principal instrument of well-being to this creature, man. Command of armies, royal authority, the administration of criminal justice, and the sovereignty of all worlds, he alone deserves who knows the Veda. As fire, when it has acquired force, burns up even green trees, so he who knows the Veda consumes the taint of his soul which has been contracted from works. He who comprehends the essential meaning of the Veda, in whatever order of life he may be, is prepared for absorption into Brahmā, even while abiding in this lower world."

The following are some further miscellaneous passages of the same tenor, scattered throughout the Institutes (Manu, ii. 10 ff.):

*Srutis tu vedo vijneyo dharma-sāstraṁ tu vai smṛitiḥ | te sarvārtheshv  
amīmāṁsye tābhyaṁ dharmo hi nirbabhau | 11. Yo 'vamanyeta te mūle  
hetu-sāstrāśrayād dvijah | sa sādhubhir vahishkāryyo nāstiko veda-ninda-  
kah | . . . . 13. Dharmān jyñāsamānānām pramānām paramānām śrutiḥ |*

"By śruti is meant the Veda, and by smṛiti the institutes of law : the contents of these are not to be questioned by reason, since from them [a knowledge of] duty has shone forth. The Brāhmaṇ who, relying on rationalistic treatises,<sup>28</sup> shall contemn these two primary sources of knowledge, must be excommunicated by the virtuous as a sceptic and reviler of the Vedas. . . . . 13. To those who are seeking a knowledge of duty, the śruti is the supreme authority."

In the following passage, the necessity of a knowledge of Brahma is asserted, though the practice of ritual observances is also inculcated (vi. 82 ff.):

*Dhyānikān̄ sarvam evaitad yad etad abhiśabdītam | na hy anadhyātma-  
vit kaśchit kriyā-phalam upāśnute | adhiyajnam brahma japed ādhidai-  
vikam eva cha | ādhyatmikān̄ cha satataṁ vedāntābhīhitān̄ cha yat | Idaṁ  
śaranām ujnānānām idam eva vijānatām | idam anvichchhatām svargam idam  
ānāntyam ichchhatām |*

<sup>28</sup> This, however, must be read in conjunction with the precept in xii. 106, which declares : *ārshāṁ dharma-padeśān̄ cha veda-sāstrāvirodhinā | yaś tarkenānusandhatte  
sa dharmān̄ veda nāparah |* "He, and he only is acquainted with duty, who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the precepts of the smṛiti, by reasonings which do not contradict the Veda."

" All this which has been now declared is dependant on devout meditation : no one who is ignorant of the supreme Spirit can reap the fruit of ceremonial acts. Let a man repeat texts relating to sacrifice, texts relating to deities, texts relating to the supreme Spirit, and whatever is declared in the concluding portions of the Veda (the Upanishads). This [Veda] is the refuge of the ignorant, as well as of the understanding ; it is the refuge of those who are seeking after paradise, as well as of those who are desiring infinity."

The following text breathes a moral spirit, by representing purity of life as essential to the reception of benefit from religious observances (ii. 97) :

*Vedas tyāgaś cha yajnāś cha niyamāś cha tapānsi cha | na viprav-  
dushṭa-bhāvasya siddhiṁ gachhanti karchchit |*

" The Vedas, almsgiving, sacrifices, observances, austerities, are ineffectual to a man of depraved disposition."

The doctrine which may be drawn from the following lines does not seem so favourable to morality (xi. 261 ff.) :

*Hatvā lokān apīmāns trin aśnann api yatastataḥ | Rigvāñ dhārayan  
vipro nainaḥ prāpnoti kinchana | Riksāñhitāñ trir abhyasya yajushāñ  
va samāhitāḥ | sāmnāñ vā sa-rahasyānāñ sarva-pāpaiḥ pramuchyate |  
yathā mahā-hradam prāpya kshiptam loshṭāñ vinaśyati | tathā duścha-  
ritāñ sarvāñ vede trivṛiti majjati |*

" A Brāhmaṇ who should destroy these three worlds, and eat food received from any quarter whatever, would incur no guilt if he retained in his memory the Rig-veda. Repeating thrice with intent mind the Sanhitā of the Rik, or the Yajush, or the Sāman, with the Upanishads, he is freed from all his sins. Just as a clod thrown into a great lake is dissolved when it touches the water, so does all sin sink in the triple Veda."

Considering the sacredness ascribed in the preceding passages to all the Vedas, the characteristics assigned to three of them in the passage quoted above (p. 12) from the Mārkanḍeya Purāṇa, as well as the epithet applied to the Sāma-veda in the second of the following verses are certainly remarkable ; (Manu, iv. 123 ff.) :

*Sāma-dhvānv rig-yajushī nādhīyita kadāchana | vedasyādītya vā 'py  
antam āranyakam adhitya cha | Rigvedo deva-daivatyo yajurvedas tu  
mānushaḥ | Sāmavedaḥ smṛitaiḥ pitryas tasmāt tasyāśuchir dhvanīḥ |*

"Let no one read the Rich or the Yajush while the Sāman is sounding in his ears, or after he has read the conclusion of the Veda (*i.e.* the Upanishads) or an Āranyaka. The Rig-veda has the gods for its deities; the Yajur-veda has men for its objects; the Sāma-veda has the pitris for its divinities, wherefore its sound is impure."

The scholiast Kullūka, however, will not allow that the sound of the Sāma-veda can be really "impure." "It has," he says, "only a semblance of impurity" (*tasmāt tasya aśuchir iva dhvaniḥ | na tv aśuchir eva*). In this remark he evinces the tendency, incident to so many systematic theologians, to ignore all those features of the sacred text on which they are commenting which are at variance with their theories regarding its absolute perfection. As it was the opinion of his age that the Veda was eternal and divine, it was, he considered, impossible that impurity or any species of defect could be predicated of any of its parts; and every expression, even of the highest authorities, which contradicted this opinion, had to be explained away. I am not in a position to state how this notion of impurity came to be attached to the Sāma-veda. The passage perhaps proceeded from the adherents of some particular Vedic school adverse to the Sāma-veda; but its substance being found recorded in some earlier work, it was deemed of sufficient authority to find a place in the miscellaneous collection of precepts,—gathered no doubt from different quarters, and perhaps not always strictly consistent with each other,—which make up the Mānava-dharma-śāstra.

*Vishnu Purāna*.—The following passage from the *Vishnu Purāna*, at the close, ascribes the same character of impurity to the Sāma-veda, though on different grounds, *Vish. Pur. ii. 11, 5*:

*Ya tu śaktiḥ parā Vishnor rig-yajuh-sāma-sanjnītā | saishā trayī tapaty am̄ho jagataś cha hinasti yat | saiva Vishnuḥ sthitāḥ sthityāṁ jagataḥ pālanodyataḥ | rig-yajuh-sāma-bhāto 'ntaḥ savitur dvija tish-thati | māsi māsi ravir yo yas tatra tatra hi sā parā | trayīmayī Vishnu-śaktir avasthānam karoti vai | Richas tapanti pūrvāhne madhyāhne 'tha yajūñshy atha | vrihadrathantarādīni sāmāny ahnāḥ kshaye ravau | angam esha trayī Vishnor rig-yajuh-sāma-sanjnītā | Vishnu-śaktir avasthānam māsāditye karoti sā | na kevalāṁ ravau śaktir vaishṇavī sā trayīmayī | Brahma 'tha Purusho Rudras trayam etat trayīmayam | sar-gaddāv riñmayaḥ Brahmā sthitau Vishnur yajurmayaḥ | Rudraḥ sāmamayo 'ntaya tasmāt tasyaśuchir dhvaniḥ |*

"The supreme energy of Vishṇu, called the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman—this triad burns up sin and all things injurious to the world. During the continuance of the world, this triad exists as Vishṇu, who is occupied in the preservation of the universe, and who in the form of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, abides within the sun. That supreme energy of Vishṇu, consisting of the triple Veda, dwells in the particular form of the sun, which presides over each month. The Rich verses shine in the morning sun, the Yajush verses in the meridian beams, and the Vṛihad-rathantara and other Sāma verses in his declining rays. This triple Veda is the body of Vishṇu, and this his energy abides in the monthly sun. But not only does this energy of Vishṇu, formed of the triple Veda, reside in the sun: Brahmā, Purusha (Vishṇu), and Rudra also constitute a triad formed of the triple Veda. Acting in creation, Brahmā is formed of the Rig-veda; presiding over the continuance of the universe, Vishṇu is composed of the Yajur-veda; and for the destruction of the worlds, Rudra is made up of the Sāma-veda; hence the sound of this Veda is impure."

*Vāyu Purāna*.—Other passages also may be found in works which are far from being reputed as heretical, in which the Vedas, or particular parts of them, are not spoken of with the same degree of respect as they are by Manu. Thus the *Vāyu Purāna* gives precedence to the Purāṇas over the Vedas in the order of creation (i. 56<sup>30</sup>):

*Prathamāṁ sarva-śastrāṇāṁ Purāṇāṁ Brahmanā smṛitam | anantaram  
cha rāhtrebhyo vedās tasya vinissritāḥ |*

"First of all the Sastras, the Purāṇa was uttered by Brahmā. Subsequently the Vedas issued from his mouths."

Similarly the Padma Purāṇa says:

*Purāṇam sarva-śastrāṇāṁ prathamam Brahmanā smṛitam | tri-varga-  
sādhanam punyāṁ śata-koti-pravistaram | nirdagdheshu cha lokeshu vājī-  
rūpena Keśavāḥ | Brahmanas tu samādeśād vedān ahṛitavān asau | angāni  
shaturo vedān purāṇa-nyāya-vistarā[n?] | mīmāṁsā[m?] dharma-śāstraṁ  
oha parigṛihyātha sāmpratam | matsya-rūpena cha punah kalpādāv uda-  
kāntare | aśesham etat kathitam ityādi |<sup>31</sup>*

"The Purāṇa, which is an instrument for effecting the three objects

<sup>30</sup> Page 48 of Prof. Aufrecht's Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.

<sup>31</sup> See the same Catalogue p. 12, col. i.

of life, which is pure, and extends to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of all the Sāstras which Brahmā uttered. When the worlds had been burnt up, Keśava (Kṛishṇa), in the form of a horse, and obeying Brahmā's command, rescued the Vedas. Having taken them with their appendages, the Purāṇas, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Institutes of Law, he now at the beginning of the Kalpa promulgated them all again in the form of a Fish from the midst of the waters."

In the Matsya Purāṇa, iii. 2 ff., not only is priority of creation claimed for the Purāṇas, but also the qualities of eternity and identity with sound, which are generally predicated of the Vedas alone :

*Rūpañ dadhāra<sup>32</sup> prathamam amarāñam Pitāmahah | āvirbhūtās tato vedāḥ sāṅgopāṅga-pada-kramāḥ | 3. Purāṇāñ sarva-śāstrāñām prathamam Brahmanā smritam | nityāñ śabdamayam punyam śata-koṭi-pravistaram | 4. Anantaraṁ cha vaktrebhyo vedās tasya vinisṛitāḥ | mīmāṃsā nyāya-vidyā cha pramāṇāśṭaka-saṃyutā | 5. Vedābhyaṣa-ratasyāsyā prajā-kāmasya mānasāḥ | manasā pūrva-srīshṭāḥ vai jātāḥ ye tena mānasāḥ.*

2. "Pitāmaha (Brahmā), first of all the immortals, took shape : then the Vedas with their Angas and Upāngas (appendages and minor appendages), and the various modes of their textual arrangement, were manifested. 3. The Purāṇa, eternal, formed of sound, pure, extending to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of the Sāstras which Brahmā uttered : and afterwards the Vedas, issued from his mouth ; and also the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya with its eightfold system of proofs. 5. From him (Brahmā), who was devoted to the study of the Vedas, and desirous of offspring, sprang mind-born sons, so called because they were at first created by his mind."

The Vāyu Purāṇa says further on in the same section from which I have already quoted :<sup>33</sup>

*Yo vidyāch chaturo vedān sāṅgopanishado dvijuh | na chet purāṇāñ saṃvidyād naiva sa syād vichakshanaḥ | Itihāsa-purāṇābhyañ vedān samupavriñhayet | vibhety alpa-śrutād vedo mām ayaṁ praharishyati |*

<sup>32</sup> This quotation is made from the Taylor MS. No. 1918 of the India Office Library. The Guikwar MS. No. 3032 of the same collection, reads here *tapas cha-chāra*, "practised austerity," instead of *rūpañ dadhāra*, "took shape," and has besides a number of other various readings in these few lines.

<sup>33</sup> See p. 50 of Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue.

"He who knows the four Vedas, with their supplements and Upanishads is not really learned, unless he know also the Purāṇas. Let a man, therefore, complete the Vedas by adding the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. The Veda is afraid of a man of little learning, lest he should treat it injuriously."

The first of these verses is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Ādiparvan verse 645, with a variation in the first half of the second line *na chakhyānam idam vidyāt*, "unless he know also this narrative" (*i.e.* the Mahābhārata). The second of the verses of the Vāyu Purāṇa also is to be found in the same book of the Mahābhārata verse 260, and is followed by these lines :

261. *Kārshṇaṁ vedam imāṁ vidvān śrāvayitvā 'nnam aśnute | . . . .*  
 264. *Ekatas chaturo vedān Bhārataṁ chaitad ekataḥ | purā kila suraiḥ sarvaiḥ sametya tulayā dhṛitam | chaturbhyāḥ sa-rahasyebhyo vedebhyo hy adhikāṁ yadā | tadā-prabhṛiti loka'smin mahābhāratam uchyate |*

"The man who knows this Veda relating to Kṛishṇa (the Mahābhārata), and repeats it to others, obtains food. . . . 264. All the collected gods formerly weighed in a balance the four Vedas which they placed in the one scale, and this Bhārata which they put into the other. When the latter was found to exceed (in weight) the four Vedas with the Upanishads, it was thenceforward called in this world the Mahābhārata."

Here there is a play upon the word Bhārata, as in part identical with *bhāra*, "weight."

The following verses of the same Ādiparvan and many others are also eulogistic of the great epic poem :

2298. *Idam hi vedaiḥ sammitam pavitram api chottamam | śrāvyānām uttamām chedam purāṇam rishi-saṁstutam |*

"This (Mahābhārata) is on an equality with the Veda, pure, most excellent, the best of all works that are to be recited, ancient, and praised by rishis."

2314. *Vijneyah sa cha vedānām pārago Bhāratam paṭhan |*

The reader of the Bhārata is to be regarded as having gone through the Vedas."

The benefits derivable from a perusal of the same poem are also set forth in the Svargārohanīka-parvan, verses 200 ff.

In the same way the Rāmāyaṇa, i. 1, 94, speaks of itself, as "this

pure and holy narrative, which is on an equality with the Vedas" (*idam pavitram ākhyānam punyaṁ vedaiś cha sammitam*).

And in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, ii. 8, 28, it is said : *Prāha bhāgavataṁ nāma purāṇam brahma-sammitam | Brahmane Bhagavat-proktam Brahma-kalpe upāgate |*

"(Brahmarāta) declared the Purāṇa called the Bhāgavata, which stands on an equality with the Veda (*brahma*), and was declared by Bhagavat to Brahmā when the Brahma-kalpa had arrived."

*Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇa*.—The Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇa asserts in a most audacious manner its own superiority to the Veda (i. 48 ff.) :

*Bhavagan yat tvayā prishṭam jnātaṁ sarvam abhipsitam | sāra-bhūtaṁ purāṇeshu Brahma-vaivarttam uttamam | Purāṇopapurāṇānām vedānām bhrama-bhanjanānām |*

"That about which, venerable sage, you have inquired, and which you desire, is all known to me, the essence of the Purāṇas, the pre-eminent Brahma-vaivartta, which refutes the errors of the Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas, and of the Vedas." (Professor Aufrecht's Cat. p. 21.)

In the following passage also, from the commencement of the Mundaka Upanishad, the Vedic hymns (though a divine origin would no doubt be allowed to them<sup>34</sup>) are at all events depreciated, by being classed among other works as part of the inferior science, in contrast to the Brahma-vidyā or knowledge of Brahma, the highest of all knowledge, which is expressly ascribed to Brahmā as its author :

1. *Brahmā devānām prathamah sambabhūva viśvasya karttā bhuvanasya goptā | sa brahma-vidyāṁ sarva-vidyā-pratishṭhām Atharvāya jyeshṭha-putrāya prāha |* 2. *Atharvane yām pravadeta Brahmā Atharvā tām purovāchāṅgire brahma-vidyām | sa Bhāradvājāya Satyavāhāya prāha Bhāradvājo 'ngirase parāvarām |* 3. *S'aunako ha vai Mahāśālo 'ngirasaṁ*

<sup>34</sup> In fact the following verses (4 and 6) occur in the second chapter of the same Mund. Up.: *Agnir mūrddhā chakshushī chandra-sūryyau diśah śrotre vāg vivritāś cha vedāḥ | vāyuh prāṇo hridayaṁ viśvam asya padbhīyāṁ prīthivī hy esha sarva-bhūtarātmā | . . . . 6. Tasmād richāḥ sāma yajūñshi dīkṣhā yajñāś cha sarve kratava dakshināś cha | sañvatsaramānām cha yojamānāś cha lokāḥ somo yatra pavate yatra sūryāḥ |* "Agni is his [Brahma's] head, the sun and moon are his eyes, the four points of the compass are his ears, the uttered Vedas are his voice, the wind is his breath, the universe is his heart, the earth issued from his feet : he is the inner soul of all creatures. . . . . 6. From him came the Rich verses, the Sāman verses, the Yajush verses, initiatory rites, all oblations, sacrifices, and gifts, the year, the sacrificer, and the worlds where the moon and sun purify."

*vidhivad upapanṣah prapachchha | kasmin nu bhagavo vijnāte sarvam idam  
vijnātam bhavatiti | 4. Tasmai sa hovācha | dve vidye veditavye iti ha sma  
yad brahma-vido vadanti parū chaivāparā cha | 5. Tatrāparā “rigvedo  
yajurvedah sāmavedo ’tharvavedah śikshā kalpo vyākaraṇām niruktām  
chhando jyotisham” iti | atha parā yayā tad aksharam adhigamyate |*

“Brahmā was produced the first among the gods, maker of the universe, preserver of the world. He revealed to his eldest son Atharva, the science of Brahma, the basis of all knowledge. 2. Atharvan of old declared to Angis this science, which Brahmā had unfolded to him; and Angis, in turn, explained it to Satyavāha, descendant of Bharadvāja, who delivered this traditional lore, in succession, to Angiras. 3. Mahāśala Saunaka, approaching Angiras with the proper formalities, inquired, ‘What is that, o venerable sage, through the knowledge of which all this [universe] becomes known?’ 4. [Angiras] answered, ‘Two sciences are to be known—this is what the sages versed in sacred knowledge declare—the superior and the inferior. 5. The inferior [consists of] the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharva-veda, accentuation, ritual, grammar, commentary, prosody, and astronomy. The superior science is that by which the imperishable is apprehended.<sup>35</sup>

I adduce some further passages which deprecate the ceremonial, or exoteric parts of the Vedas, in comparison with the esoteric knowledge of Brahma.

My attention was drawn to the following passage of the Bhagavad Gītā, ii. 42 ff., by its quotation in the Rev. Professor K. M. Banerjea’s Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy :

*Yām imām pushpitām vācham pravadanty avipaśchitah | veda-vāda-rataḥ  
pārtha nānyad astiti vādinah | kūmātmānah svarga-parāḥ janma-karma-  
phala-pradām | kriyā-viśeṣa-bahulām bhogaiśvaryā-gatim prati | bhogaiś-  
varyā-prasaktānām tayā ’pahrīta - chetasām | vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ  
samādhau na vidhiyate | traiguṇya-viśhayāḥ vedāḥ nistraiguṇyo bhavār-*

<sup>35</sup> Compare the Mahābhārata, Ādip. verse 258, which speaks of the Āranyakas as superior to (the other parts of) the Vedas, and amṛita as the best of medicines (āranya-*kañčha vedebhyas’ chaushadhibhyo’mrītām yathā*). Similarly the S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 3, 5, 12 (quoted in Müller’s Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 315, note), speaks of the Upanishads as being the essence of the Yajush: *Tasya vai etasya yajusho rasāḥ eva upaniṣhat* |

*juna | . . . . yāvān arthaḥ udapāne sarvataḥ samplutodake | tāvān sar-  
veshu vedeshu brāhmaṇasya vijānataḥ |*

"A flowery doctrine, promising the reward of works performed in this embodied state, prescribing numerous ceremonies, with a view to future gratification and glory, is preached by unlearned men, devoted to the injunctions of the Veda, assertors of its exclusive importance, lovers of enjoyment, and seekers after paradise. The restless minds of the men who, through this flowery doctrine, have become bereft of wisdom, and are ardent in the pursuit of future gratification and glory, are not applied to contemplation. The Vedas have for their objects the three qualities (*sattva, rajas, tamas*, or 'goodness,' 'passion,' and 'darkness'); but be thou, Arjuna, free from these three qualities . . . . As great as is the use of a well which is surrounded on every side by overflowing waters, so great [and no greater] is the use of the Vedas to a Brāhmaṇ endowed with true knowledge."

Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1, p. 473 (Colebrooke's Essays, i. 12) :

"*Adhihi bhagavah*" iti ha upasasāda Sanatkumāraṁ Nāradaḥ | taṁ ha uvācha "yad vetha tena mā upasīda tatas te ūrddhvām vakshyāmi" iti | 2. Sa ha uvācha "rigvedam bhagavo 'dhyemi yajurvedam sāmavedam ātharvanañ chaturtham itihāsa - purāñam panchamañ vedānāñ vedam pitryañ rāśiñ daivām nidhiñ vākovākyam ekāyanāñ deva-vidyām brahma-vidyām bhūta-vidyām kshatra-vidyām nakshatra-vidyām sarpa-deva-jana-vidyām etad bhagavo 'dhyemi | 3. So 'ham bhagavo mantra-vid evāsmi na ātma-vit | śrutiñ hy eva me bhagavaddriśebhyas 'tarati śokam ātma-vid' iti so 'ham bhagavah sochāmi tam mā bhagavān śokasya pārañ tārayatu" iti | taṁ ha uvācha "yad rai kincha etad adhyagīshthāḥ nāma evaitat | 4. Nāma vai rigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedaḥ ātharvanaś chaturthaḥ itihāsa-purānaḥ panchamo vedānāñ vedāḥ pitryo rāśir daivo nidhir vākovākyam ekāyanāñ deva-vidyā brahma-vidyā bhūta-vidyā kshatra-vidyā nakshatra-vidyā sarpa-deva-jana-vidyā nāma evaitad nāma upāsva" iti | 5. "Sa yo nāma brahma ity upāste yāvad nāmno gatañ tatra asya yathā kāmachāro bhavati yo nāma brahma ity upāste" | "asti bhagavo nāmno bhūyah" iti | "nāmno vāva bhūyo 'sti" iti | "tan me bhagavān bravītv" iti |

1. "Nārada approached Sanatkumāra, saying, 'Instruct me, venerable sage.' He received for answer, 'Approach me with [i.e. tell me] that which thou knowest; and I will declare to thee whatever more is to be learnt.' 2. Nārada replied, 'I am instructed, venerable sage, in the

Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvana, [which is] the fourth, the Itihāsas and Purānas, [which are] the fifth Veda of the Vedas, the rites of the pitṛis, arithmetic, the knowledge of portents, and of great periods, the art of reasoning,<sup>36</sup> ethics, the science of the gods, the knowledge of Scripture, demonology, the science of war, the knowledge of the stars, the sciences of serpents and deities ; this is what I have studied. 3. I, venerable man, know only the hymns (*mantras*) ; while I am ignorant of soul. But I have heard from reverend sages like thyself that 'the man who is acquainted with soul overpasses grief.' Now I, venerable man, am afflicted ; but do thou transport me over my grief.' Sanatkumāra answered, 'That which thou hast studied is nothing but name. 4. The Rig-veda is name ; and so are the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvana, which is the fourth, and the Itihāsas and Purānas, the fifth Veda of the Vedas, etc. [all the other branches of knowledge are here enumerated just as above],—all these are but name : worship name. 5. He who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma, ranges as it were at will over all which that name comprehends ;—such is the prerogative of him who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma.' 'Is there anything, venerable man,' asked Nārada, 'which is more than name ?' 'There is,' he replied, 'something which is more than name.' 'Tell it to me,' rejoined Nārada.'

(Sankara interprets the words *panchamañ-vedānām vedam* differently from what I have done. He separates the words *vedānām vedam* from *panchamañ* and makes them to mean "the means of knowing the Vedas," i.e. grammar. See, however, the Bhāg. Pur. i. 4• 20, below, p. 42, and iii. 12, 39, to be quoted further on.

Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 7, 1, 22 (= Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, iv. 3, 22, p. 792 ff., p. 228-9 of Dr. Röer's English) : *Atra pitā apitā bhavati mātā amātā lokāḥ alokāḥ devāḥ adevāḥ vedāḥ avedāḥ yajnāḥ aya-jnāḥ | atra steno 'steno bhavati bhrūna-hā abhrūna-hā paulkaso 'paulkasaś chāndālo 'chāndālaḥ śramaṇo 'śramaṇas tāpaso 'tāpaso nanvāgatam puṇ-yena ananvāgatam pāpena<sup>37</sup> tīrṇo hi tadā sarvān śokān hridayasya bhavati |*

<sup>36</sup> *Vākovākyam* = *tarka-sāstram* — Sāyaṇa. The word is elsewhere explained as meaning "dialogues" (*uktī-pratyukti-rūpam prakaranam*—Comm. on S'. P. Br. xi. 5, 6, 8). The sense of some of the terms in this list of sciences is obscure ; but exactness is not of any great importance to the general drift of the passage.

<sup>37</sup> I give here the reading of the Br. Ār. Up. The S'. P. Br. in Professor Weber's

"In that [condition of profound slumber, *sushupti*,] a father is no father, a mother is no mother, the worlds are no worlds, the gods are no gods, and the Vedas are no Vedas, sacrifices are no sacrifices. In that condition a thief is no thief, a murderer of embryos is no murderer of embryos, a Paukasa no Paukasa, a Chāṇḍāla no Chāṇḍāla, a Sramana no Sramana, a devotee no devotee; the saint has then no relation, either of advantage or disadvantage, to merit or to sin; for he then crosses over all griefs of the heart."

(I quote from the commentary on the Br. Ār. Up. Sankara's explanation of the unusual words *nanvāgata* and *ananvāgata*: *Nanvāgataṁ na anvāgatam ananvāgatam asambaddham ity etat punyena sāstra-vihitena karmāṇā tathā pāpena vihiākarāna-pratishiddha-kriyā-lakshanena |* " *Nanvāgata*=*na* (not) *anvāgata*, and *ananvāgata*=*asambaddha*, unconnected. This condition is unconnected either with merit, i.e. action enjoined by the sāstra, or with sin, i.e. action defined as the neglect of what is enjoined, or the doing of what is forbidden."

To the same effect the great sage Nārada is made to speak in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iv. 29, 42 ff. :

*Prajāpati-patiḥ sākshād bhagavān Giriśo Manuh | Dakshādayaḥ prajādhyakshāḥ naishṭhikāḥ Sanakādayaḥ | Marīchir Atry-angirasau Pulastaḥ Pulahaḥ Kratuḥ | Bhrigur Vaśishṭhaḥ ity etc mad-antāḥ brahma-vādināḥ | adyāpi vāchaspatayas tapo-vidyā-samādhībhīḥ | paśyanto 'py na paśyanti paśyantam Parameśvaram | śabda-brahmani dushpāre charantaḥ uruvietare | mantra-lingair vyavachchhinnam bhajanto na viduh param | yadā yasyānugrihnāti bhagavān ātma-bhāvitah | sa jahāti matīm loke vede cha parinishṭhitām | tasmāt karmaśu varhishmann ajanānād artha-kāśishu | mā'rtha-drishṭim krithāḥ śrotra-sparśishu asprishta-vastushu | svā-lokaṁ na vidus te vai yatra devo Janārdanaḥ | āhur dhūmra-dhiyo vedaṁ sa-karmakam a-tad-vidāḥ | āstīrya darbhaiḥ prāg-agraiḥ kārtṣṇyena kṣiti-māṇḍalam | stābdho vṛihad-vadhād māṇī karma nāvaishi yat param | tat karma Hari-toṣaṁ yat sā vidyā tan-matir yayā |*

"Brahmā himself, the divine Giriśa (Siva), Manu, Daksha and the other Prajāpatis, Sanaka and other devotees, Marīchi, Atri, Angiras, Pulasta, Pulaha, Kratu, Bhrigu, Vaśishṭha—all these exponents of sacred knowledge, and masters of speech, including myself (Nārada) as text gives *ananvāgataḥ punyena ananvāgataḥ pāpena*. And yet the commentary alludes to the word *ananvāgata* being in the neuter.

the last, though seeing, are yet, to this day, unable, by austerity, by science, by contemplation, to see Parameśvara (the supreme God), who sees all things. Wandering in the vast field of the verbal brahma (the Veda), which is difficult to traverse, men do not recognise the Supreme, while they worship him as he is circumscribed by the attributes specified in the hymns (*mantras*). When the Divine Being regards any man with favour, that man, sunk in the contemplation of soul, abandons all thoughts which are set upon the world and the Veda. Cease, therefore, Varhishmat, through ignorance, to look upon works which merely seem to promote the chief good, as if they truly effected that object, (works) which only touch the ear, but do not touch the reality. The misty-minded men, who, ignorant of the Veda, declare that works are its object, do not know [his] own world, where the divine Janārdana abides. Thou who, obstinate man that thou art, strewest the whole earth with sacrificial grass, with its ends turned to the east, and art proud of thy numerous immolations,—thou knowest not what is the highest work of all. That by which Hari (Vishnu) is pleased, is work; that by which the thoughts are fixed on him, is science."

I copy the comment on a part of this passage, viz. on verses 45 and 46:

*S'abda-brahmani vede urur vistāro yaaya arthato 'pi pāra-sūnye tasmin varttamānāḥ mantrānām lingair vajra-hastavādi-guna-yukta-vividha-devatā-'bhidhāna-sāmarthyaiḥ parichchhinnam eva Indrādi-rūpam tat-tat-karmāgraheṇa bhajantah param Parameśvaraṁ na viduh | Tarhy anyaḥ ko nāma | karmādy-āgrahaṁ hitvā parameśvaraṁ eva bhajed ity ata āha "yadā yam anugrihnāti" | anugrahe hetuḥ | ātmani bhāvitah san sa tada loke loka-vyavahāre vede cha karma-mārge parinishṭhitām matīṁ tyajati |*

"Men, conversant with the verbal brahma, the Veda, of which the extent is vast, and which, in fact, is boundless, worshipping Parameśvara [the supreme God] under the form of Indra, etc., circumscribed by the marks specified in the hymns, i.e. limited to various particular energies denominated deities, who are characterised by such attributes as 'wielder of the thunderbolt,' etc.; worshipping Him, I say, thus, with an addiction to particular rites, men do not know the supreme God. What other [god], then, [is there]? He therefore, in the words, 'When he regards any one with favour,' etc., says, let a man, abandoning all addiction to works, etc., worship the supreme God alone. The reason for this favour [is supplied in the following words]:

'Sunk in the contemplation of soul, he then relinquishes his regard directed to the business of the world and to the Veda, i.e. to the method of works.'"

The following passage from the Kaṭha Upanishad (ii. 28) is of a somewhat similar tendency (p. 107 of Roer's ed. and p. 106 of Eng. trans.):

*Nāyam ātmā pravachanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena |  
yam evaisha vrinute tena labhyas tasyaisha ātmā vrinute tunūṁ svām |*

"This Soul is not to be attained by instruction, nor by understanding, nor by much scripture. He is attainable by him whom he chooses. The Soul chooses that man's body as his own abode."

The scholiast interprets thus the first part of this text:

*Yadyapi durvijneyo 'yam ātmā tathāpy upāyena svijneyah eva ity  
āha nāyam ātmā pravachanena aneka-veda-svīkaraṇena labhyo jneyo nāpi  
medhayā granthārtha-dhāraṇā-śaktyā na bahunā śrutena kevalena | kena  
tarhi labhyah ity uchyate |*

"Although this soul is difficult to know, still it may easily be known by the use of proper means. This is what [the author] proceeds to say. This soul is not to be attained, known, by instruction, by the acknowledgement of many Vedas; nor by understanding, by the power of re-collecting the contents of books; nor by much scripture alone. By what, then, is it to be attained? This he declares."

It is not necessary to follow the scholiast into the Vedantic explanation of the rest of the passage.<sup>38</sup>

The preceding passages, emanating from two different classes of writers, both distinguished by the spirituality of their aspirations, manifest a depreciation, more or less distinct and emphatic, of the polytheism of the Vedic hymns, as obstructive rather than promotive, of divine knowledge, and express disregard, if not contempt, of the ceremonies founded on that polytheism, and performed with a view to the enjoyments of paradise.

SECT. V.—*Division of the Vedas, according to the Vishnu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata.*

Some of the Purāṇas, as we have seen above, represent the four Vedas as having issued from Brahmā's different mouths. If they had

<sup>38</sup> See Prof. Müller's *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* 1st ed. p. 320, and p. 109.

each a separate origin of this kind, it would seem that they must have had from the time of their production a distinct existence also. And yet it is elsewhere said that there was originally but one Veda, which was subsequently divided into four portions.

Thus the Vishṇu Purāṇa gives the following account of the division of the Veda, described as having been originally but one, into four parts, iii. 2, 18 :

*Krite yuge paraṁ jnānam Kapilādi-svarūpa-dhṛik | dadāti sarva-bhūtānāṁ sarva-bhūta-hite rataḥ | chakravarti-svarūpeṇa tretāyām api sa prabhuh | Dushṭānāṁ nigrahaṇī kurvan paripāti jagattrayam | Vedam ekāṁ chatur-bhedaṁ kṛitvā śākhā-śatair vibhuḥ | karoti bahulam bhūyo Vedavyāsa-svarūpa-dhṛik | vedāñś tu dvāpare vyasya, etc.*

"In the Kṛita age, Vishṇu, devoted to the welfare of all creatures, assumes the form of Kapila and others to confer upon them the highest knowledge. In the Tretā age the Supreme Lord, in the form of a universal potentate, represses the violence of the wicked, and protects the three worlds. Assuming the form of Vedavyāsa, the all-pervading Being repeatedly divides the single Veda into four parts, and multiplies it by distributing it into hundreds of śākhās. Having thus divided the Vedas in the Dvāpara age," etc.<sup>39</sup>

This is repeated more at length in the following section (Vish. Pur. iii. 3, 4 ff.):

*Veda-drumsaya Maitreya śākhā-bhedaiḥ sahasraśaḥ | na śakyō vistaro vaktuṁ sankshepeṇa śrinuṣhva tam | Dvāpare dvāpare Vishṇur Vyāsa-rūpi mahāmune | Vedam ekāṁ sa bahudhā kurute jagato hitaḥ | vīryām tejo balaṁ chālpam manushyānām avekshya vai | hitāya sarva-bhūtānāṁ veda-bhedaṁ karoti saḥ | yayā sa kurute tanvā vedam ekāṁ prithak prabhuh | Vedavyāsābhidhānā tu sā mūrttir Madhuvidvishaḥ | . . . . Ashṭā-viṁśati-kṛitvo vai vedāḥ vyastāḥ maharshibhiḥ | Vairasvate 'ntare tasmin dvāpareshu punaḥ punaḥ |*

"It is not possible, Maitreya, to describe in detail the tree of the Vedas with its thousand branches (śākhās); but listen to a summary. A friend to the world, Vishṇu, in the form of Vyāsa, divides the single Veda into many parts. He does so for the good of all creatures, because he perceives the vigour, energy, and strength of men to have become

<sup>39</sup> Compare on this subject portions of the passage of the Mahābhārata quoted in the First Volume of this work, pp. 144-146.

decreased. Vedavyāsa, in whose person he performs this division, is an impersonation of the enemy of Madhu (Vishnu). . . . Eight-and-twenty times in the Dvāpara ages of this Vaivasvata Manvantara<sup>40</sup> have the Vedas been divided by great sages." These sages are then enumerated, and Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana<sup>41</sup> is the twenty-eighth.

The subject is resumed at the beginning of the next section (Vish. Pur. iii. 4, 1 ff.):

*Ādyo vedaś chatushpādaḥ śata-sāhasra-sammitaḥ | Tato daśa-gunaḥ  
krītēno yajno 'yaṁ sarva-kāmadhuk | Tato 'tra mat-suto Vyāso 'śṭāviṁ-  
śatitame 'ntare | vedam ekam chatushpādaṁ chaturdhā vyabhajat prabhuh |  
yathā tu tena vai vyastāḥ Vedavyāsena dhīmatā | Vedās tathā samastais  
tais vyastāḥ Vyāsais tathā mayā | tad anenaiva vedānāṁ sākhābhedān  
dvijottama | chaturyugeshu rachitān samasteshu avadhāraya | Kṛishṇa-  
dvaipāyanāṁ Vyāsam viddhi Nārāyaṇam prabhūm | ko 'nyo hi bhuvi  
Maitreya Mahābhārata-kṛid bhavet | Tena vyastāḥ yathā Vedāḥ mat-pu-  
trenā mahātmanā | Dvāpare hy atra Maitreya tad me śrīnu yathārthataḥ |  
Brahmanā chodito Vyāso vedān vyastum prachakrame | Atha śishyān sa  
jagrāha chaturo veda-pāra-gān | Rigveda-śrāvakam Pailāṁ jagrāha sa  
mahāmuniḥ | Vaiśampāyana-nāmānaṁ Yajurvedasya chāgrahīt | Jaimi-  
niṁ Sāma-vedasya tathaivātharvaveda-vit | Sumantus tasya śishyo 'bhud  
Vedavyāsasya dhīmatā | Romaharshana-nāmānam mahābuddhim mahā-  
muniṁ | Sūtaṁ jagrāha śishyām sa itihāsa-purāṇayoh |*

"The original Veda, consisting of four quarters, contained a hundred thousand verses. From it arose the entire system of sacrifice, tenfold (compared with the present) and yielding all the objects of desire. Subsequently, in the twenty-eighth manvantara my son, [Parāśara is the speaker] the mighty Vyāsa, divided into four parts the Veda which was one, with four quarters. In the same way as the Vedas were divided

<sup>40</sup> For an account of the Manvantaras, see the First Part of this work, pp. 39, 43 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Lassen (Ind. Ant. 2nd ed. i. 777, note) remarks: "Vyāsa signifies arrangement, and this signification had still retained its place in the recollection of the ancient recorders of the legend, who have formed from his name an irregular perfect, viz. *vivyāsa*." Lassen refers to two passages of the Mahābhārata in which the name is explained, viz. (i. 2417), *Vivyāsa vedān yasmāt sa tasmod Vyāsaḥ iti smritāḥ* | "He is called Vyāsa because he divided the Veda." And (i. 4236) *Yo vyasya vedānāṁ chatusras tapasō bhagavān rishih | loke vyāsatvam āpede kārshnyat krishnatvam eva cha* | "The divine sage (Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa) who, through fervid devotion, divided the four Vedas, and so obtained in the world the title of Vyāsa, and from his blackness, -the name of Kṛishṇa."

by the wise Vyāsa, so had they been divided by all the [preceding] Vyāsas, including myself. And know that the sākhā divisions [formed] by him [were the same as those] formed in all the periods of four yugas. Learn, too, that Kṛiṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa was the lord Nārāyaṇa; for who else on earth could have composed the Mahābhārata? Hear now correctly how the Vedas were divided by him, my great son, in this Dvāpara age. When, commanded by Brahmā, Vyāsa undertook to divide the Vedas, he took four disciples who had read through those books. The great muni took Paila as teacher of the Rich, Vaiśampāyana of the Yajush, and Jaimini of the Sāman, while Sumantu, skilled in the Atharva-veda, was also his disciple. He took, too, as his pupil for the Itihāsas and Purāṇas the great and intelligent muni, Sūta, called Romaharshana.”<sup>42</sup>

*Vāyu Purāṇa*.—In the same way, and partly in the same words, the *Vāyu Purāṇa* (section lx.) represents the Vedas to have been divided in the Dvāpara age. It first describes how this was done by Manu in the Svāyambhuva, or first manvantara, and then recounts how Vyāsa performed the same task in the existing seventh, or Vaivasvata manvantara; and, no doubt, also in the Dvāpara age, though this is not expressly stated in regard to Vyāsa.

The following is an extract from this passage (as given in Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue of the Bodleian Sanskrit MSS. p. 54):

*Dvāpare tu purāvritte Manoh svāyambhuve 'ntare | Brahmā Manum uvāchedam vedāṁ vyasya mahāmate | Parivrittāṁ yugāṁ tāta svalpa-viryāḥ dvijātayah | saṁvrittāḥ yuga-doshena sarvāṁ chaiva yathākramam | bhrashṭa-mānaṁ yuga-vaśād alpa-śishṭāṁ hi dṛiṣyate | Daśa-sāhasra-bhāgena hy avaśishṭam kritād idam | vīryāṁ tejo balāṁ shalpaṁ sarvāṁ chaiva prapaṇyati | vede vedāḥ hi kāryyāḥ syur mā bhūd veda-vināśanāṁ | vede nāśam anuprāpte yajno nāśām gamishyati | yajne nashṭe deva-nāśas*

<sup>42</sup> Mahīdhara on the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā (Weber's ed. p. 1) says, in regard to the division of the Vedas: *Tatradau Brahma-paramparayā prapitām Vedām Vedavyāso manda-matiṁ manushyān vichintya tat-kripayā chaturdhā vyasya Rig-yajuh-sāmnā-tharavākhyāmō chaturo vedān Paila-Vaiśampāyana-Jaimini-Sumantubhyāḥ kramād upadideśa to cha sva-śishebhyaḥ | Evam paramparayā sahasra-sākho Vedo jātāḥ | “Vedavyāsa, having regard to men of dull understanding, in kindness to them, divided into four parts the Veda which had been originally handed down by tradition from Brahmā, and taught the four Vedas, called Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, in order, to Paila, Vaiśampāyana, Jaimini, and Sumantu; and they again to their disciples. In this way, by tradition, the Veda of a thousand sākhās was produced.”*

*tataḥ sarvam pranaśyati | Ādyo vedaś chatush-pādo śatā-sāhasra-sammitah | Punar daśa-gunah kṛitsno yajno vai sarva-kāma-dhuk | Evam uktas tathety ukta Manur loka-hite rataḥ | vedam ekam chatush-pādaṁ chaturdhā vyabhajat prabhūḥ | Brahmano vachanāt tāta lokānām hita-kāmyayā | tad aham varttamānena yushmākam veda-kalpanam | manvantareṇa va-kshyāmi yatitānām prakalpanam | pratyakshena parokṣhaṁ vai tad nibodhata sattamāḥ | Asmin yuge kṛito Vyāsaḥ Pārāśaryāḥ parantapaḥ | “Dvaiḍāyanaḥ” iti khyāto Vishṇor aṁśah prakīrttitah | Brahmanā chodi-taḥ so ‘smīn vedaṁ vyastum prachakrame | Atha śishyān sa jagrāha cha-turo veda-kāraṇāt | Jaiminiṁ cha Sumantuṁ cha Vaiśampāyanam eva cha | Pailāṁ teshāṁ chaturthaṁ tu panchamaṁ Lomaharshanam |*

“In the former Dvāpara of the Svāyambhuva manvantara, Brahmā said to Manu, ‘Divide the Veda, o sage. The age is changed; through its baneful influence the Brāhmaṇas have become feeble, and from the same cause the measure of everything has gradually declined, so that little is seen remaining. A part (of the Veda) consisting of only these ten thousand (verses) is now left to us from the Kṛita age; vigour, fire, and energy are diminished; and everything is on the road to destruction. A plurality of Vedas must be made out of the one Veda, lest the Veda be destroyed. The destruction of the Veda would involve the destruction of sacrifice; that again would occasion the annihilation of the gods, and then everything would go to ruin. The primeval Veda consisted of four quarters and extended to one hundred thousand verses, while sacrifice was ten-fold, and yielded every object of desire.’ Being thus addressed, Manu, the lord, devoted to the good of the world, replied, ‘Be it so,’ and in conformity with the command of Brahmā, divided the one Veda, which consisted of four quarters, into four parts.<sup>43</sup> I shall, therefore, narrate to you the division of the Veda in the existing manvantara; from which visible division you, virtuous sages, can understand those invisible arrangements of the same kind which were made in past manvantaras. In this Yuga, the victorious son of Parāśara, who is called Dvaiḍāyana, and is celebrated as a portion of Vishṇu, has been made the Vyāsa. In this Yuga, he, being commanded by Brahmā, began to divide the Vedas. For this purpose he took four pupils, Jaimini, Sumantu, Vaiśampāyan, and

<sup>43</sup> The Mahābhārata, Sāntip. verse 13,678, says the Vedas were divided in the Svāyambhuva manvantara by Apāntaratamas, son of Sarasvatī (*Tena bhinnāś tadaṁ veda manoh svāyambhuvo 'ntare*).

and Paila, and, as a fifth, Lomaharshana" [for the Purūṇas and Itihāsas, etc.]

*Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.—It is in its third book, where the different manvantaras are described, that the Vishṇu Purāṇa gives an account of the division of the Vedas. In the book of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa where the manvantaras are enumerated, there is no corresponding allusion to the division of the Vedas; but a passage to the same effect occurs in the fourth section of the first book, verses 14 ff. :

*Dvāpare samanuprāpte trītya-yuga-paryayo | jātaḥ Parāśarād yogī  
Vāsavyām kalayā Hareḥ | 15. Sa kadāchit Sarasvatyāḥ upasprīṣya jalāṁ  
śuchi | viviktaḥ ekaḥ āśināḥ udite ravi-mandale | 16. Parāvara-jnāḥ sa  
rishiḥ kālenāvyakta-rañhasā | yuga-dharma-vyatikaram prāptam bhūvi  
yuge yuge | 17. Bhautikānām cha bhāvānām śakti-hrāsaṁ cha tat-kri-  
tam | aśraddhadhānān nissatvān durmedhān hrasitāyushaḥ | 18. Dur-  
bhagāṁś janān vīkshya munir divyena chakshushā | sarva-varṇāśramānām  
yad dadhyau hitam amogha-drik | 19. Chāturhotraṁ karma śuddham pra-  
jānām vīkshya vaidikam | vyadadhād yajna-santatyai vedam ekaṁ chatur-  
vidham | 20. Rig-yajuḥ-sāmātharvākhyāḥ vedāś chatvāra uddhritāḥ |  
itihāsa-purāṇām cha panchamo veda uchyate | 21. Tattrag-veda-dharaḥ  
Pailaḥ sāmagro Jaiminiḥ kaviḥ | Vaiśampāyana evaiko nishṇāto yajushām  
uta | 22. Atharvāṅgirasām āśit Sumantur dāruṇo muniḥ | itihāsa-purāṇā-  
nām pitā me Romaharshanaḥ | 23. Te ete rishayo vedām svām svām vyasyann  
anekadhaḥ | śishyaiḥ praśishyais tach-chhishyair vedāś te śakhino 'bhavan |  
24. Te eva vedāḥ durmedhair dhāryante pṛushair yathā | evaṁ chakāra  
bhagavān Vyāsaḥ kripaṇa - vatsalah | 25. Strī - śudra - dvijabandhūnām  
trayī na śruti-gocharā | karma-śreyasi mūḍhānām śreyāḥ eva bhaved iha |  
iti Bhāratam ākhyānām kripayā muninā kritam |*

14. "When the Dvāpara age had arrived, during the revolution of that third yuga, the Yогin (Vyāsa) was born, a portion of Hari, as the son of Parāśara and Vāsavyā. 15. As on one occasion he was sitting solitary at sunrise, after touching the pure waters of the Sarasvatī, (16) this rishi, who knew the past and the future, perceiving, with the eye of divine intelligence, that disorder had in each yuga been introduced into the duties proper to each, through the action of time, whose march is imperceptible, (17) that the strength of beings formed of the elements had in consequence declined, that men were destitute of faith, vigour, and intelligence, that their lives were shortened, (18) and that they

were miserable,—reflected with unerring insight on the means of benefitting the several castes and orders. 19. Discerning that the pure Vedic ceremonies ought to be performed for men by the agency of four classes of priests, he divided the one Veda into four parts, with a view to the performance of sacrifice. 20. Four Vedas, called the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, were drawn forth from it; while the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are called the fifth Veda. 21. Of these the Rich was held by Paila, the sage Jaimini chanted the Sāman, Vaiśampāyana alone was versed in the Yajush, (22) the dreadful muni Sumantu in the verses of Atharvan and Angiras, and my father Romaharṣhaṇa in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. 23. Each of these rishis arranged his own Veda in many ways; and by the successive generations of their disciples the Vedas were separated into branches (*sākhās*). 24. The venerable Vyāsa, kind to the wretched, acted thus in order that the Vedas might be recollected by men of enfeebled understanding. 25. And as women, Sūdras, and the inferior members of the twice-born classes were unfitted for hearing the Veda, and were infatuated in desiring the blessings arising from ceremonies, the muni, with a view to their felicity, in his kindness composed the narrative called the Mahābhārata."

But notwithstanding the magnitude of the great legendary and theological repertory which he had thus compiled, Vyāsa, we are told, was dissatisfied with his own contributions to sacred science until he had produced the Bhāgavata Purāṇa consecrated to the glory of Bhagavat (Krishṇa).<sup>44</sup> The completion of this design is thus narrated, Bhāg. Pur. i. 7, 6 :

*Anarthopāśamaṁ sākshād bhakti-yogam Adhokshaje | lokasyājñānato  
vidvāṁś chakre Sātvata-sāṁhitām | 7. Yasyāṁ vai śrīyamāndyāṁ  
Krishṇe parama-pūrusho | bhaktir udpatyate pūṁsaḥ śoka-moha-bhayā-  
pahā | 8. Sa sāṁhitām Bhāgavatām kṛitvā 'nukramya chātmajam |  
Sukam adhyāpayāmāea nivitti-niratam munih |*

"Knowing that devotion to Adhokshaja (Krishṇa) was the evident means of putting an end to the folly of the world, which was ignorant of this, he composed the Sātvata-Sanhitā (the Bhāgavata). 7. When a man listens to this work, devotion to Krishṇa, the supreme Purusha, arises in his mind, and frees him from grief, delusion, and fear. Having

<sup>44</sup> See Wilson's Vishṇu Purāṇa, Preface, p. xlvi.

completed and arranged this Sanhitā, the muni taught it to his son Suka, who was indisposed to the pursuit of secular objects."

Towards the close of this Purāṇa also, in the sixth section of the twelfth book (verses 37 ff.), there is to be found what Professor Wilson (Vish. Pur. Pref.) calls "a rather awkwardly introduced description of the arrangement of the Vedas and Purāṇas by Vyāsa."

The passage (as given in the Bombay lithographed edition) is as follows:

Sūta uvācha | samāhitātmano brahman Brahmanah parameshthinaḥ | hṛid-ākāśād abhūd nādo vritti-rodhād vibhāvyate | yad-upāsanayā brahman yogino malam ātmānāḥ | dravya-kriyā-kārakākhyām dhūtvā yānty apanurbhavam | Tato 'bhūt trivṛidā omkāro yo 'vyakta-prabhavaḥ svarāt | yat tal lingam Bhagavato Brahmanāḥ paramātmānāḥ | śrinoti yaḥ imāṁ sphoṭām supta-śrotre cha śūnya-dṛik | yena vāg vyajyate yasya vyaktir ākāśe ātmānāḥ | evadhāmno brahmanāḥ sākshād vāchakah paramātmānāḥ | sa-sarva-mantropanishad-veda-vijām sanātanam | tasya hy āśāṁs trayo varṇāḥ a-kārādyāḥ Bhṛigūdvaha | dhāryante yais trayo bhāvāḥ gunāḥ nāmārtha-vrittayāḥ | tato 'kṣhara-samānnāyam asrijad bhagavān ajah | Antassthoshma-svara-sparśa-hrasva-dīrghādi-lakshānam | tenāsau chaturvedāṁs chaturbhir vadānair vibhuḥ | sa-vyāhṛitikān somkārāmś chāturuhotra-vivakshayā | putrān adhyāpayat tāṁs tu brahmaśarin brahma-kovidān | te tu dharma-padeśtārah sva-putrebhyāḥ samādiśan | te paramparayā prāptās tat-tach-chhishyair dhṛita-vrataiḥ | chaturyugeshv atha vyastāḥ dvāparādau maharshibhiḥ | kshīṇāyushāḥ kshīṇā-sattvān durmedhān vikshya kālataḥ | vedān brahmaśrayo vyasyan hṛidisthāch-yuta-noditāḥ | Asminn apy antare brahman bhagavān loka-bhāvanaḥ | brahmaśādyair lokapālair yāchito dharma-guptage | Parāśarāt Satyavat-yām amśāṁśa-kalayā vibhuḥ | avatīrṇo mahābhāga vedaṁ ohakre chaturvidham | rig-atharva-yajuh-sāmnām rāśin uddhritya vargaśāḥ | chatasraḥ saṁhitās ohakre mantrair manigānāḥ iva | tāśāṁ sa chaturaḥ śishyān upāhūya mahāmatiḥ | Ekaikām saṁhitām brahman ekaikasmād dadau vibhuḥ | Pailāya saṁhitām adyām bahvrichākhyām uvācha ha | Vaiśampāyana-sanjñāya nigadākhyām yajur-ganām | sāmnām Jaiminaye prāha tathā chhandoga-saṁhitām | Atharvāṅgirasiṁ nāma sva-śishyā Sumantave |

"Sūta speaks: 'From the ether of the supreme Brahma's heart, when he was plunged in meditation, there issued a sound, which is

perceived [by the devout] when they close their organs of sense. By adoring this sound, devotees destroy the soul's threefold taint, extrinsic, inherent, and superhuman,<sup>45</sup> and become exempt from future birth. From this sound sprang the *oṁkāra*, composed of three elements, self-resplendent, of imperceptible origin, that which is the emblem of the divine Brahma, the supreme spirit. He it is who hears this sound (*sphoṭa*), when the ears are insensible and the vision inactive,—(this *sphoṭa* or *oṁkāra*) through which speech is revealed, and which is manifested in the ether, from the Soul.<sup>46</sup> This [*oṁkāra*] is the sensible exponent of Brahma, the self-sustained, the supreme spirit; and it is the eternal seed of the Vedas, including all the Mantras and Upanishads. In this [*oṁkāra*] there were, o descendant of Bṛigu, three letters, A and the rest, by which the three conditions, the [three] qualities, the [three] names, the [three] significations, the [three] states<sup>47</sup> are maintained. From these [three letters] the divine and unborn being created the traditional system of the letters of the alphabet, distinguished as inner (*y, r, l, v*), ushmas (*ś, sh, s, h*), vowels, long and short, and consonants. With this [alphabet] the omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the functions of the four classes of priests, [created] from his four mouths the four Vedas with the three sacred syllables (*vyāhrītis*) and the *oṁkāra*.<sup>48</sup> These he taught to his sons, the brahmashis, skilled in sacred lore; and these teachers of duty, in turn declared them to their sons. The Vedas were thus received by each succeeding generation of devout pupils from their

<sup>45</sup> *Dravya-kriyā-kāraka*, which the scholiast interprets as answering to *adhibhūta*, *adhyātmā*, and *adhidaiva*. See the explanation of these terms in Wilson's *Sankhyā-kārikā*, pp. 2 and 9.

<sup>46</sup> I quote the scholiast's explanation of this obscure verse: *Ko'sau paramātmā tam āha 'srinoti' iti | imam sphoṭam avyaktam oṁkāram | nanu jīvāḥ eva taṁ srinoti | na ity āha | supta-śrotre karna-pidhānādinā avṛittike 'pi śrotre sati | jīvas tu karāṇādinatvād na tadā śrotā | tad-upalabdhis tu tasya paramātmā-dvārikā eva iti bhāvaḥ | īvaraś tu naivam | yataḥ śūnya-dṛik śūnye 'pi indriya-varge dṛik jnānam yasya | tathā hi nupto yadā śabdāṁ śrutvā prabuddhyate na tadā jīvāḥ śrotā tinen-driyatvāt | ato yas tadā śabdāṁ śrutvā jīvam prabodhayati sa yathā paramātmā eva taṭavat | ko 'sā oṁkāras taṁ viśinashṭi sārdhena yena vāg brihatī vyajayate yasya oha hrīdayākāśe ātmanāḥ sakāśād vyaktir abhivyaktiḥ.* The word *sphoṭa* will be explained below, in a future section.

<sup>47</sup> These the scholiast explains thus: *Guṇāḥ sattvādayāḥ | nāmāni rig-yajuḥ-sā-māni | arthaḥ bhūr-bhuvaḥ-svar-lokāḥ | vrittayo jāgrat-ādyāḥ |*

<sup>48</sup> If I have translated this correctly, the *oṁkāra* is both the source of the alphabet, and the alphabet of the *oṁkāra*!

predecessors, and in each of the systems of four yugas were divided by great sages at the beginning of the Dvāpara.<sup>49</sup> The Brahmarshis, impelled by Achyuta, who resided in their hearts, divided the Vedas, because they perceived that men had declined in age, in power, and in understanding. In this manvantara also,<sup>50</sup> the divine and omnipresent Being, the author of the universe, being supplicated by Brahmā, Īśa (Siva), and the other guardians of the world, to maintain righteousness, became partially incarnate as the son of Parāśara and Satyavatī, and divided the Veda into four parts. Selecting aggregates of Rich, Atharvan, Yajush, and Sāman verses, and arranging them in sections (*vargas*), he formed four *sanhitās* (collections) of the hymns, as gems [of the same description are gathered together in separate heaps]. Having summoned four disciples, the wise lord gave to each of them one of these *sanhitās*. To Paila he declared the first *sanhitā*, called that of the Bahvṛichas; to Vaiśampāyana the assemblage of Yayush verses, called Nigada; to Jaimini the Chhandoga collection of Sāman verses; and to his pupil, Sumantu, the Atharvāngirasī."

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, however, is not consistent in the account which it gives of the division of the Vedas. In a passage already quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 158, it speaks of that division as having been the work of the monarch Purūravas, and as having taken place in the beginning of the Tretā age. From the importance of this text I will extract it here again at greater length.

The celestial nymph Urvaśī, the Purāṇa tells us, had been doomed, in consequence of a curse, to take up her abode upon earth. She there

<sup>49</sup> *Dvāparādau* can only mean the "beginning of the Dvāpara;" but the scholiast undertakes by the following process of reasoning to show that it means the *end* of that yuga: *Dvāparādau dvāparam ādir yasya tad-antyāñśa-lakshanasya kālasya | tasmin dvāparānto veda - vibhāga - prasiddheḥ S'antanu-sama-kāla - Vyāsāvatāra-prasiddheḥ cha | vyastā vibhaktāḥ |* "Dvāparādau means the period of which the dvāpara was the beginning, i.e. the time distinguished as the concluding portion of that yuga; since it is notorious that the Vedas were divided at the end of the Dvāpara, and that the incarnation of Vyāsa was contemporaneous with S'antanu. *Vyastāḥ=vibhaktāḥ*, divided."

<sup>50</sup> From this it appears that hitherto the account had not referred to the present manvantara. The scholiast remarks: *Evaṁ sāmānyato veda-vibhāga-kramam uktaū vaivasvata-manvantare viseshato nirūpayitum āha |* "Having thus [in the preceding verses] generally described the manner in which the Vedas are divided, [the author] now states [as follows], with the view of determining particularly [what was done] in the Vaivasvata manvantara."

fell in love with King Purūravas, the report of whose manly beauty had touched her heart, even before she had been banished from paradise. After spending many happy days in the society of her lover, she forsook him in consequence of his having infringed one of the conditions of their cohabitation, and Purūravas was in consequence rendered very miserable. He at length, however, obtained a renewal of their intercourse, and she finally recommended him to worship the Gandharvas, who would then re-unite him with her indissolubly.

The Purāṇa then proceeds (ix. 14, 43 ff.):

*Tasya sañstuvatas tushṭāḥ agnisthālin dadur nripa | Urvaśīm manyamānas tāṁ so 'budhyata charan vane | Sthālin nyasya vane gatvā grihān ādhyāyato niśi | Tretāyāṁ sampravrittāyāṁ manasi trayy avarittata | Sthālin-sthānaṁ gato 'svatthaṁ śamī-garbhāṁ vilakshya saḥ | Tena dve aranī kṛitvā Urvaśī-loka-kūmyayā | Urvaśīm mantrato dhyāyann adhārā-ranīm uttarām | Ātmānam ubhayor madhye yat tat prajananaṁ prabhūḥ | Tasya nirmathanāj jāto jätavedāḥ vibhāvasuḥ | Trayyā cha vidyayā rājnā putravate kalpitās trivrit | Tenāyajata yajneśāṁ bhagavantam adhokshajam | Urvaśī-lokam anvichhan sarva-devamayaṁ Harim | Ekaḥ eva purā vedāḥ pranavaḥ sarva-vāñmayaḥ | Devo nārāyaṇo nānyāḥ eko 'gnir varṇāḥ eva cha | Purūravasa evāśit trayī tretā-mukhe nripa | Agninā prajayā rājā lokāṁ gāndharvam eyivān |*

"The Gandharvas, gratified by his praises, gave him a platter containing fire. This he [at first] supposed to be Urvaśī, but became aware [of his mistake], as he wandered in the wood. Having placed the platter in the forest, Purūravas went home; and as he was meditating in the night, after the Tretā age had commenced, the triple Veda appeared before his mind.<sup>51</sup> Returning to the spot where he had placed the platter, he beheld an *asvattha* tree springing out of a *śamī* tree, and formed from it two pieces of wood. Longing to attain the world where Urvaśī dwelt, he imagined to himself, according to the sacred text, Urvaśī as the lower and himself as the upper piece of wood, and the place of generation as situated between the two.<sup>52</sup> Agni was produced from its

<sup>51</sup> *Karma-bodhakam veda-trayāṁ prūdurabhuḥ* | "The three Vedas, expounders of rites, were manifested to him," as the scholiast explains."

<sup>52</sup> Allusion is here made to a part of the ceremonial for kindling a particular sacrificial fire; one of the formulas employed at which, as given in the Vāj. Sanhitā, 5, 2, is, "thou art Urvaśī" (*Urvaśī asi*), and another, "thou art Purūravas" (*Purūravāḥ*

friction, and, according to the threefold science [Veda], was under his triple form, adopted by the king as his son. With this fire, seeking to attain the heaven of Urvaśī, he worshipped the divine Hari, the lord of sacrifice, Adhokshaja, formed of the substance of all the gods. There was formerly but one Veda, the sacred monosyllable *om*, the essence of all speech; one god, Nārāyaṇa; one Agni, and [one] caste. From Purūravas came the triple Veda in the beginning of the Tretā age. Through Agni, his son, the king attained the heaven of the Gāndharvas.”<sup>53</sup>

On the close of this passage the commentator remarks :

*Nanv anādiri veda-traya-bodhito brāhmaṇādinām Indrādy-aneka-dēva-yajanena svarga-prāpti-hetuḥ karma-mārgaḥ kathāṁ sūdir iva varṇyate | Tatrāḥ “eka eva” iti dvābhyaṁ | Purā kṛita-yuge sarva-vāñmayāḥ sarvāśāṁ vāchāṁ vṛja-bhūtaḥ pranavaḥ eka eva vedāḥ | Devāḥ cha Nārāyaṇaḥ eka eva | Agniḥ cha eka eva laukikāḥ | Varnaḥ cha eka eva haṁso nāma | Veda-trayi tu Purūravasaḥ sakāśūd asit . . . Ayam bhāvah | kṛita-yuge sattva-pradhānāḥ prāyaśāḥ sarve ‘pi dhyāna-niṣṭhāḥ | rājah-pradhāne tu Tretā-yuge vedādi-vibhāgena karma-mārgaḥ prakaṭo babbūva ity arthaḥ |*

“ How is it that the eternal method of works, which is pointed out by the three Vedas, and through which Brāhmans and others, by worshipping Indra and many other gods, attain to paradise, is spoken of [in the preceding verses] as if it had a beginning in time? He [the author of the Purāṇa] answers this in these two verses. Formerly, *i.e.* in the Kṛita age, there was only one Veda, the sacred monosyllable *om*, the essence of all words, *i.e.* that which is the seed of all words; and there was only one god, Nārāyaṇa; only one fire, that for common uses; and

*asi*), the former denoting the lower (*adharārani*), and the latter the upper, piece of wood (*uttarārani*), by the friction of which the fire was to be produced. See Weber's Indische Studien, i. 197, and note; Roth's Illustrations of the Nirukta, p. 154; the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iii. 4, 1, 22, and Kātyāyana's S'rāuta Sūtras, v. 1, 28 ff. The commentator on the Vājanasaneyi Sanhitā explains the formula *Urvaśī asi* thus : *Yaiḥā Urvaśī Purūravo-nṛipasya bhogāya adhastūt īete tadvat tvaṁ adho 'vasthitā 'stī* | “ As Urvaśī lies under King Purūravas for sexual connection, so thou art placed underneath.”

<sup>53</sup> This story is also told in a prose passage in the Vish. Pur. iv. 6. It is there stated that Purūravas divided fire, which was originally one, in a threefold manner (*Eko 'gnir ādāv abhavad Ailena tu atra manvantare traitā pravarttiā*). No mention, however, is there made of his having divided the Vedas, or partitioned society into castes.

only one caste, the Hansa. But the triple Veda came from Purūravas. . . . The meaning is this: in the Kṛita age the quality of goodness predominated in men, who were almost all absorbed in meditation. But in the Tretā age, when passion (*rajas*) prevailed, the method of works was manifested by the division of the Vedas.”<sup>54</sup>

This last quoted passage of the Bhāgavata gives, as I have intimated, a different account of the division of the Vedas from that contained in the other two texts previously adduced from the same work, and in the citations from the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas. The one set of passages speak of the Veda as having been divided by Vyāsa into four parts in the Dvāpara age; while the text last cited speaks of the triple Veda as having originated with Purūravas in the Tretā age; and evidently belonged to a different tradition from the former three. The legend which speaks of three Vedas may possibly have a somewhat more ancient source than that which speaks of four, as it was not till a later date that the Atharva asserted its right to be ranked with the three others as a fourth Veda. The former tradition, however, would appear to have had its origin partly in etymological considerations. The word Tretā, though designating the second Yuga, means a triad, and seems to have been suggested to the writer's mind by the triple fire mentioned in the legend.

*Mahābhārata*.—The following passage from the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan (verses 13,088 ff.), agrees partially in tenor with the last passage from the Bhāgavata, but is silent regarding Purūravas:

*Idam krita-yugām nāma kālah śreshṭhah pravarttitah | Ahiṁsyāḥ yajna-paśavo yuge 'smi na tad anyathā | Chatushpāt sakalo dharmo bhavishyaty atra vai surāḥ | Tatas Tretā-yugām nāma trayī yatra bhavishyati | Prokshitāḥ yajna-paśavo badhaṁ prāpsyanti vai makhe<sup>55</sup> | Yatra*

<sup>54</sup> This legend is borrowed from the Sātapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 1, 1 ff. (pp. 855–858 Weber's ed.), where the motive for its introduction is to describe the process by which fire was generated by Purūravas in obedience to the command of the Gandharvas, as the means of his admission into their paradise. See Professor Müller's translation of this story in the Oxford Essays for 1856, pp. 62, 63, or the reprint in his *Chips from a German Workshop*; and the First Volume of this work, p. 226. The legend is founded on the 95th hymn of the tenth book of the Rig-veda.

<sup>55</sup> Manu (i. 85, 86) differs from this passage of the Mahābhārata in making the Dvāpara the age of sacrifice: *Anye kritayuge dharmaś Tretāyām Dvāpare pare | Anye nṛayuge nṛinām yuga-hṛasānurūpataḥ | Tapah param Kṛitayuge Tretāyām jñānam evayato | Dvāpare yajnam evāhur dānam ekām kalau yuge |* “Different duties are practised by men in the Kṛita age, and different duties in the Tretā, Dvāpara, and

*pādaś chaturtho pai dharmasya na bhavishyati | Tato vai dvāparaṁ nāma  
mīśraḥ kālo bhavishyati |*

" This present Kṛita age is the best of all the yugas ; in it it will be unlawful to slay any animals for sacrifice ; in this age righteousness shall consist of all its four portions and be entire. Then shall follow the Tretā age, in which the triple Veda shall come into existence, and animals fit for sacrifice shall be slaughtered as oblations. In that age the fourth part of righteousness shall be wanting. Next shall succeed the Dvāpara, a mixed period."

The M. Bh. (Sāntip. 13,475) relates that two Asuras, who beheld Brahmā creating the Vedas, suddenly snatched them up and ran off. Brahmā laments their loss, exclaiming :

*Vedo me paramāṁ chakshur vedo me paramam balam | . . . . Vedān  
rite hi kiṁ kuryām lokānām srishtim uttamām |*

" The Veda is my principal eye; the Veda is my principal strength. . . . What shall I do without the Vedas, the most excellent creation in the universe ? " They were, however, recovered and restored to Brahmā (verses 13,506 ff.).

*Vishṇu Purāṇa*.—The following verse, Vish. Pur. iii. 2, 12, refers to the periodical disappearance of the Vedas :

*Chaturyugānte vedānām jāyate kali-viplavaḥ | pravarttayanti tān etyā  
bhūvi saptarshayo divaḥ |*

" At the end of the four ages (*yugas*) the disappearance of the Vedas, incident to the Kali, takes place. The seven rishis come from heaven to earth, and again give them currency." (Compare M. Bh. Sāntip. verse 7660, which will be quoted further on.)

**SECT. VI.—*Accounts in the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas of the schisms between the adherents of the Yajur-veda, Vaiśampāyana and Yājnavalkya; hostility of the Ātharvaṇas towards the other Vedas; and of the Chhandogas towards the Rig-veda.***

The *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, iii. 5, 2 ff., gives the following legend regarding

Kali ages, in proportion to the decline in those yugas. Devotion is said to be supreme in the Kṛita, knowledge in the Tretā, sacrifice in the Dvāpara, and liberality alone in the Kali." See also *Mahābhārata*, Sāntiparvan, verse 8505, which agrees with Manu. See also the First Volume of this work, pp. 39 ff.

the way in which the Yajur-veda came to be divided into two schools, the black and the white :

Yājnavalkyas tu tasyābhūd Brahmarāta-suto dvija | Śishyāḥ parama-  
 dharmā-jno guru-vritti-parāḥ sadā | Rishir yo 'dyā mahāmerūm samāje  
 nāgamishyati | Tasya vai sapta-rātrām tu brahma-hatyā bhavishyati |  
 Pūrvam eva muni-ganaiḥ samayo 'bhūt kṛito dvija | Vaiśampāyana ekas  
 tu tam vyatikrāntavāṁs tadā | Śvaśriyam bälakan̄ so 'tha padā sprish-  
 tam aghātayat | Śishyān āha sa “bhoḥ śishyāḥ brahma-hatyāpahām vrataṁ |  
 Charadvam mat-kṛite sarve na vichāryyam idam tathā” | Athāha  
 Yājnavalkyas tam “kim ebbhir bhagavan dvijaiḥ | Kleśitair alpatejobhir cha-  
 rishye 'ham idam vrataṁ” | Tataḥ kruddho guruh prāha Yājnavalkyam  
 mahāmatiḥ | “Muchyatām yat tvayā 'dhītam matto viprāvamanyaka | Nis-  
 jaso vadasy etān yas tvam brāhmaṇa-pungavān | Tena śishyena nārtho 'sti  
 mamājnā-bhangā-kāriṇā” | Yājnavalkyas tataḥ prāha bhaktau tat te mayo-  
 ditam | Mamāpy alām tvayā 'dhītam yad mayā tad idam dvija | Ity uktvā  
 rudhirāktāni sarūpāṇi yajūṁshi saḥ | Chhardayitvā dadau tasmāi yayaū  
 cha svechhayā munih | yajūṁshy atha visrīshāṇi Yājnavalkyena vai dvija |  
 Jagrihus tittiribhūtvā Taṭṭiriyās tu te tataḥ | Brahma-hatyā-vratam  
 śhēṇam gurunā choditais tu yaiḥ | Charakādhvaryavas te tu charanād  
 munisattamāḥ | Yājnavalkyo 'tha Maitreya prāṇāyāma-parāyanāḥ | tush-  
 tāvā prayataḥ sūryam yajūṁshy abhilashaṁs tataḥ | . . . . Ity evam-  
 ādibhis tena stūyamanāḥ stavaiḥ raviḥ | vāji-rūpa-dharāḥ prāha “vriyā-  
 tām” iti “vānohitam” | Yājnavalkyas tadā prāha pranipatya divā-  
 karam | yajūṁshi tāni me dehi yāni santi na me gurau | Evam ukto da-  
 dau tasmāi yajūṁshi bhagavān raviḥ | ayātayāma-sanjnāni yāni vetti na  
 tad-guruh | Yajūṁshi yair adhītāni tāni viprair dvijottama | vājinās te  
 samākhyātāḥ sūryo 'svaḥ so 'bhavad yataḥ | .

“Yājnavalkya, son of Brahmarāta, was his [Vaiśampāyana's] disciple, eminently versed in duty, and always attentive to his teacher. An agreement had formerly been made by the Munis that any one of their number who should fail to attend at an assembly on Mount Meru on a certain day should incur the guilt of Brahmanicide during a period of seven nights. Vaiśampāyana was the only person who infringed this agreement, and he in consequence occasioned the death of his sister's child by touching it with his foot. He then desired all his disciples to perform on his behalf an expiation which should take away his guilt, and forbade any hesitation. Yājnavalkya then said to him,

'Reverend sir, what is the necessity for these faint and feeble Brahmins? I will perform the expiation.' The wise teacher, incensed, replied to Yājnavalkya, 'Contemner of Brāhmans, give up all that thou hast learnt from me; I have no need of a disobedient disciple, who, like thee, stigmatizes these eminent Brāhmans as feeble.' Yājnavalkya rejoined, 'It was from devotion [to thee] that I said what I did; but I, too, have done with thee: here is all that I have learnt from thee.' Having spoken, he vomited forth the identical Yajush texts tainted with blood, and giving them to his master, he departed at his will. [The other pupils] having then become transformed into partridges (*tittiri*), picked up the Yajush texts, which were given up by Yājnavalkya, and were thence called Taittirīyas. And those who by their teacher's command had performed the expiation for Brahmanicide, were from this performance (*charana*) called Charakādhwaryus. Yājnavalkya then, who was habituated to the exercise of suppressing his breath, devoutly hymned the sun, desiring to obtain Yajush texts. . . . [I pass over the hymn.] Thus celebrated with these and other praises, the sun assumed the form of a horse, and said, 'Ask whatever boon thou desirest.' Yājnavalkya then, bowing down before the lord of day, replied, 'Give me such Yajush texts as my teacher does not possess.' Thus supplicated, the sun gave him the Yajush texts called Ayātayāma, which were not known to his master. Those by whom these texts were studied were called Vājins, because the sun (when he gave them) assumed the shape of a horse (*vājin*)."

I quote also the parallel text from the Vāyu Purāna, as it exhibits some slight variations from the preceding (Aufr. Cat. p. 55):

Kāryam āśid ṛishinām cha kinchid brāhmaṇa-sattamāḥ | Meru-prishṭham samāśādya tais tadā "stv" iti mantritam | Yo no 'tra sapta-rātrena nāgachched dvija-sattamāḥ | sa kuryād brahma-badhyām vai samayo naḥ prakīrtitāḥ | Tatas te sa-ganāḥ sarve Vaiśampāyana-varjītāḥ | Prayayuh saptarātrena yatra sandhiḥ kṛito 'bhavat | Brāhmaṇā-nām tu vachanād brahma-badhyām chakāra saḥ | Sishyān atha samāniya sa Vaiśampāyano 'bravīt | "Brahma-badhyām charadvām vai mat-krite dvijāḥ-sattamāḥ | sarve yūyām samāgamyā brūta me tad-hitām vachaḥ" | Yājnavalkyah uvāoha | Aham eva charishyāmi tishṭhantu munayas tv imo | bālām chotthāpayishyāmi tapasā svena bhāvitāḥ | Evam uktas tataḥ krud-dho Yājnavalkyam athābravīt | uvācha "yat trayā 'dhītam sarvam praty-

*arpayasva me” | Evam uktah sarūpāṇi yajūṁshi pradadāu guroḥ | ru-*  
*dhirena tathā ’ktāni chharditvā brahma-vittamah | Tataḥ sa dhyānam*  
*āsthāya sūryam ārādhayat dvijaḥ | “sūrya brahma yad uchchhinnaṁ*  
*khaṁ gatvā pratitishṭhati” | Tato yāni gatāny ārddhaṁ yajūṁshy*  
*āditya-maṇḍalam | Tāni tasmai dadau tushṭaḥ sūryo vai Brāhmaṛātaye |*  
*Aśva-rūpaś cha mārttando Yājnavalkyāya dhīmate | Yajūṁshy adhīyate*  
*yāni brāhmaṇāḥ yena kenachit (yani kānicchit?) | aśva-rūpāṇi (-rūpena?)*  
*dattāni tatas te Vājino ‘bhavan<sup>66</sup> | brahma-hatyā tu yaiś chīrnā charanāt*  
*charakāḥ smṛitāḥ | Vaiśampāyana-śishyās te charakāḥ samudhṛitāḥ |*

“The rishis having a certain occasion, met on the summit of Mount Meru, when, after consultation, they resolved and agreed together that any one of their number who should fail to attend there for seven nights should become involved in the guilt of brahmanicide. They all in consequence resorted to the appointed place for seven nights along with their attendants. Vaiśampāyana alone was absent, and he, according to the word of the Brāhmans, committed brahmanicide. He then assembled his disciples, and desired them to perform, on his behalf, an expiation for his offence, and to meet and tell him what was salutary for the purpose. Yājnavalkya then said, ‘I myself will perform the penance; let all these munis refrain: inspired by my own austere-fervour I shall raise up the boy (whom thou hast slain).’ Incensed at this speech of Yājnavalkya [Vaiśampāyana] said to him, ‘Restore all that thou hast learned (from me).’ Thus addressed, the sage, deeply versed in sacred lore, vomited forth the identical Yajush texts stained with blood, and delivered them to his teacher. Plunged in meditation, the Brāhmaṇ (Yājnavalkya) then adored the sun, saying, ‘Sun, every sacred text which disappears [from the earth] goes to the sky, and there abides.’ The sun, gratified, and [appearing] in the form of a horse, bestowed on Yājnavalkya, son of Brahmaṛāta, all the Yajush texts which had ascended to the solar region. As all the Yajush texts which these Brāhmans study were given by him in the form of a horse, they in consequence became Vājins. And the disciples of Vaiśampāyana, by whom the expiatory rite was accomplished, were called *Charakas*, from its accomplishment (*charana*).”<sup>67</sup>

<sup>66</sup> I am indebted to Dr. Hall for communicating to me the various readings of this verse in the India Office Library MSS., but some parts of it seem to be corrupt.

<sup>67</sup> In a note to p. 461 (4to. ed.) of his Translation of the Vishnu Purāṇa, Prof. Wilson

It is sufficiently evident from the preceding legend that the adherents of the two different divisions of the Yajurveda (the Taittiriya or black, and the Vājasaneyi or white), must in ancient times have regarded each other with feelings of the greatest hostility—feelings akin to those with which the followers of the rival deities, Vishṇu and Siva, look upon each other in modern days. On this subject I translate a passage from Professor Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 84 :

"Whilst the theologians of the Rich are called Bahvṛichas, and those of the Sāman Chhandogas, the old name for the divines of the Yajush is Adhvaryu : and these ancient appellations are to be found in the Sanhitā of the Black Yajush (the Taittiriya), and in the Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajush (the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa). The latter work applies the term Adhvaryus to its own adherents, whilst their opponents are denominated Charakādhvaryus, and are the objects of censure. This hostility is also exhibited in a passage of the Sanhitā of the White Yajush, where the Charakāchārya, as one of the human sacrifices to be offered at the Purushamedha, is devoted to Dushkrīta or Sin."<sup>58</sup>

In his Indische Studien (iii. 454) Professor Weber specifies the following passages in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa as those in which the Charakas, or Charakādhvaryus are censured, viz. iii. 8, 2, 24; iv. 1, 2, 19; iv. 2, 3, 15; iv. 2, 4, 1; vi. 2, 2, 1, 10; viii. 1, 3, 7; viii. 7, 1, 14, 24. Of these I quote one specimen (iv. 1, 2, 19) :

mentions the following legend illustrative of the effects of this schism. "The Vāyu and Matsya relate, rather obscurely, a dispute between Janamejaya and Vaisāmpāyana, in consequence of the former's patronage of the Brāhmans of the Vājasaneyi branch of the Yajur-veda, in opposition to the latter, who was the author of the Black or original Yajush. Janamejaya twice performed the Aśvamedha according to the Vājasaneyi ritual, and established the Trisarvi, or use of certain texts by Āśmaka and others, by the Brāhmans of Anga, and by those of the middle country. He perished, however, in consequence, being cursed by Vaisāmpāyana. Before their disagreement, Vaisāmpāyana related the Mahābhārata to Janamejaya."

<sup>58</sup> Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xxx. 18 (p. 846 of Weber's ed.): *Dushkrītāya charakāchāryyam | (charakāñūm gurum*—Scholiast). Prof. Müller also says (Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 350), "This name Charaka is used in one of the Khilas (the passage just quoted) of the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā as a term of reproach. In the 30th Adhyāya a list of people is given who are to be sacrificed at the Purushamedha, and among them we find the Charakāchārya as the proper victim to be offered to Dushkrīta or Sin. This passage, together with similar hostile expressions in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, were evidently dictated by a feeling of animosity against the ancient schools of the Adhvaryus, whose sacred texts we possess in the Taittiriya-veda, and from whom Vājinavalkya seceded in order to become himself the founder of the new Charanas of the Vājasaneyins."

*Tāḥ u ha Charakāḥ nānā eva mantrābhyaṁ juhvati “prāṇodānau vai  
arya etau | nānā-viryau prāṇodānau kurmaḥ” iti vadantaḥ | Tad u tathā  
na kuryāt | mohayanti ha te yajamānasya prāṇodānau | api id vai enam  
tūshṇīṁ juhuyāt |*

“These the Charakas offer respectively with two mantras, saying thus: ‘These are his two breathings,’ and ‘we thus make these two breathings endowed with their respective powers.’ But let no one adopt this procedure, for they confound the breathings of the worshipper. Wherefore let this libation be offered in silence.”

But these sectarian jealousies were not confined to the different schools of the Yajur-veda; the adherents of the Atharva-veda seem to have evinced a similar spirit of hostility towards the followers of the other Vedas. On this subject Professor Weber remarks as follows in his Indische Studien, i. 296: “A good deal of animosity is generally displayed in most of the writings connected with the Atharvan towards the other three Vedas; but the strongest expression is given to this feeling in the first of the Atharva Pariśiṣṭas (Chambers Coll. No. 112).”

He then proceeds to quote the following passage from that work:

*Bahvṛīcho hanti vai rāshṭram adhvaryur nāśayet sutān | Chhandogo  
dhanām nāśayet tasmād Ātharvāṇo guruḥ | Ajnānād vā pramādād vā  
yasya syād bahvṛīcho guruḥ | deśa-rāshṭra-purāmātya-nāśas tasya na  
saṁśayaḥ | yadi vā ’dhvaryavaṁ rājā niyunakti purohitam | Śastrena  
badhyate kshipram parikshīnārtha-vāhanaḥ | yathaiva pangur adhvānam  
apakshī ḥāñḍa-bhojanam (chāñḍa-jo nabhaḥ?)<sup>69</sup> | evām chhandoga-guruṇā  
rājā vriddhiṁ na gachhati | purodhā jalado yasya maudo vā syāt kathan-  
chana | abdād daśabhyo māsebhyo rāshṭra-bhraṁśām sa gachhati |*

“A Bahvṛīcha (Rig-veda priest) will destroy a kingdom; an Adhvaryu (Yajur-veda priest) will destroy offspring; and a Chhandoga (Sāma-veda priest) will destroy wealth;—hence an Ātharvāṇa priest is the [proper] spiritual adviser. (The king) who, through ignorance or mistake, takes a Bahvṛīcha priest for his guide will, without doubt, lose his country, kingdom, cities, and ministers. Or if a king appoints an Adhvaryu priest to be his domestic chaplain, he forfeits his wealth and his chariots, and is speedily slain by the sword. As a lame man makes no progress on a road, and an egg-born creature which is without wings

<sup>69</sup> For the ingenious conjectural emendation in brackets, I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht. I adopt it in my translation.

cannot soar into the sky, so no king prospers who has a Chhandoga for his teacher. He who has a Jalada or a Mauda for his priest, loses his kingdom after a year or ten months."

"Thus," continues Professor Weber, "the author of the *Parīśiṣṭā* attacks the adherents of certain Sākhās of the Atharva-veda itself, for such are the Jaladas and the Maudas, and admits only a Bhārgava, a Paippalāda, or a Saunaka to be a properly qualified teacher. He further declares that the Atharva-veda is intended only for the highest order of priest, the brahman, not for the three other inferior sorts."

The following passage is then quoted:

*Atharvā srijate ghoram abbhutam̄ śamayet tathā | atharvā rakshate  
yajnam yajnasya patir Angirāḥ | Divyāntariksha-bhaumānām utpātānām  
anekadhbā | śamayitā brahma-veda-jnas tāsmād dakshinato Bhriguḥ |  
Brahmā śamayed nādhvaryur na chhandogo na bahvrichaḥ | rakshāṁsi  
rakshati brahmā brahmā tasmād atharva-vit |*

"The Atharva priest creates horrors, and he also allays alarming occurrences; he protects the sacrifice, of which Angiras is the lord. He who is skilled in the Brahma-veda (the Atharva) can allay manifold portents, celestial, aerial, and terrestrial; wherefore the Bhrigu [is to be placed] on the right hand. It is the brahman, and not the adhvaryu, the chhandoga, or the bahvricha, who can allay [portents]; the brahman wards off Rakshases, wherefore the brahman is he who knows the Atharvan."

I subjoin another extract from Professor Weber's *Indische Studien*, i. 63 ff., which illustrates the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rig-veda,<sup>60</sup> as well as the mutual hostility of the different schools: "To understand the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rig-veda, we have only to form to ourselves a clear and distinct idea of the manner in which these hymns in general arose, how they were then carried to a distance by those tribes which emigrated onward, and how they were by them regarded as sacred, whilst in their original home, they were either—as living in the immediate consciousness of the people—subjected to modifications corresponding to the lapse of time, or made way for new hymns by which they were pushed aside, and so became forgotten. It is a foreign country which first surrounds familiar things with a sacred charm; emigrants continue to occupy their ancient men-

<sup>60</sup> See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 202 f.

tal position, preserving what is old with painful exactness, while at home life opens out for itself new paths. New emigrants follow those who had first left their home, and unite with those who are already settlers in a new country. And now the old and the new hymns and usages are fused into one mass, and are faithfully, but uncritically, learned and imbibed by travelling pupils from different masters;—several stories in the Brīhad Āranyaka are especially instructive on this point, see Ind. Stud. p. 83;—so that a varied intermixture arises. Others again, more learned, then strive to introduce arrangement, to bring together what is homogeneous, to separate what is distinct; and in this way theological intolerance springs up; without which the rigid formation of a text or a canon is impossible. The influence of courts on this process is not to be overlooked; as, for example, in the case of Janaka, King of Videha, who in Yājnavalkya had found his Homer. Anything approaching to a clear insight into the reciprocal relations of the different schools will in vain be sought either from the Purāṇas or the Charaṇavyūha, and can only be attained by comparing the teachers named in the different Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras, partly with each other and partly with the text of Pāṇini and the gaṇapāṭha and commentary connected therewith (for the correction of which a thorough examination of Patanjali would offer the only sufficient guarantee). For the rest, the relation between the S.V. and the R.V. is in a certain degree analogous to that between the White and the Black Yajush; and, as in the Brāhmaṇa of the former (the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa), we often find those teachers who are the representatives of the latter, mentioned with contempt, it cannot surprise us, if in the Brāhmaṇa of the Sāma-veda, the Paingins and Kaushitakins are similarly treated."

It is sufficiently manifest from the preceding passages of the Purāṇas concerning the division and different Sākhās of the Vedas, that the traditions which they embody contain no information in regard to the composition of the hymns, and nothing tangible or authentic regarding the manner in which they were preserved, collected, or arranged. In fact, I have not adduced these passages for the purpose of elucidating those points, but to show the legendary character of the narratives, and their discrepancies in matters of detail. For an account of the Sākhās of the Vedas, the ancient schools of the Brāhmans, and other matters of a similar nature, I must refer to the excellent work of Professor Müller,

the "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," pp. 119-132 and 364-388 and elsewhere.

**SECT. VII.—*Reasonings of the Commentators on the Vedas, in support of the authority of the Vedas.***

I proceed now to adduce some extracts from the works of the more systematic authors who have treated of the origin and authority of the Vedas, I mean the commentators on these books themselves, and the authors and expositors of the aphorisms of several of the schools of Hindu philosophy.<sup>61</sup> Whatever we may think of the premises from which these writers set out, or of the conclusions at which they arrive,

<sup>61</sup> Although the authors of the different schools of Hindu philosophy (as we shall see) expressly defend (on grounds which vary according to the principles of the several systems) the authority of the Vedas, they do not consider themselves as at all bound to assert that the different portions of those works are all of equal value: nor do they treat their sacred scriptures as the exclusive sources out of which their own theology or philosophy are to be evolved. On the relation of Indian thinkers generally to the Vedas, I quote some remarks from an article of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1862, pp. 310 f. . "It is evident from some of the hymns of the Veda (see Müller's Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 556 ff.) that theological speculation has been practised in India from a very early period. . . . As, therefore, the religious or mythological systems of India became developed, it was to be expected that they should exhibit numerous variations springing out of the particular genius of different writers; and more especially that, whenever the speculative element predominated in any author, he should give utterance to ideas on the origin of the world, and the nature and action of the Deity or deities, more or less opposed to those commonly received. In the stage here supposed, a fixed and authoritative system of belief or institutions had not yet been constructed, but was only in process of construction, and therefore considerable liberty of individual thought, expression, and action would be allowed; as is, indeed, also shown by the existence of different schools of Brähmans, not merely attached to one or other of the particular Vedas, but even restricting their allegiance to some particular recension of one of the Vedas. Even after the Brahmanical system had been more firmly established, and its details more minutely prescribed, it is clear that the same strictness was not extended to speculation, but that if a Brähman was only an observer of the established ceremonial, and an assertor of the privileges of his own order, he might entertain and even profess almost any philosophical opinion which he pleased (Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. i. 379; Müller, Anc. Sansk. Lit. 79). In this way the tradition of free thought was preserved, and speculative principles of every character continued to be maintained and taught without hindrance or scandal. Meanwhile the authority of the Vedas had come to be generally regarded as paramount and divine, but so long as this authority was nominally acknowledged, independent thinkers were permitted to propound a variety of speculative principles, at variance with their general tenor, though perhaps not inconsistent with some isolated

we cannot fail to be struck with the contrast which their speculations exhibit to the loose and mystical ideas of the Purāṇas and Upanishads, or to admire the acuteness of their reasoning, the logical precision with which their arguments are presented, and the occasional liveliness and ingenuity of their illustrations.

I.—The first passage which I shall adduce is from Sāyana's introduction to his commentary on the Rig-veda, the Vedārtha-prakāśa, pp. 3 ff. (Sāyana, as we have seen in the Second Volume of this work, p. 172, lived in the 14th century, A.D.):

Nanu Vedah eva tāvad nāsti | kutas tad-avāntara-viśeshah rigvedah |  
 Tathā hi | ko'yaṁ vedo nāma | na hi tatra lakṣhaṇāṁ pramāṇāṁ vā'sti |  
 nacha tad-ubhaya-vyatirekena kinchid vastu prasidhyati | Lakṣhaṇa-pra-  
 māṇābhyaṁ hi vastu-siddhir iti nyāya-vidām matam | "Pratyakshānu-  
 mānāgameshu pramāṇa-viśesheshv antimo Vedaḥ iti tallakṣhaṇam" iti chet |  
 na | Manv-ādi-smṛitiśv ativyāpteh | Samaya-balena samyak parokṣhā-  
 nubhava-sādhanam ity etasya āgama-lakṣhaṇasya tāsv api sadhbhāvāt |  
 "apaurusheyatve sati iti viśeshanād adosah" iti chet | na | Vedasyāpi  
 parameśvara-nirmitatvena paurusheyatvāt | "S'arīra-dhāri-jīva-nirmitat-  
 vābhāvād apaurusheyatvam" iti chet | [na] | "Sahasra-śirshā purushah"  
 ityādi-śrutibhir īśvarasyāpi śarīritvāt | "Karma-phala-rūpa-śarīra-  
 dhāri-jīva-nirmitatvābhāvā-mātrena apaurusheyatvām vivakshitam" iti  
 chet | na | Jīva-viśeshair Agni-Vāyv-Ādityair vedānām utpāditatvāt |  
 "Rigvedah eva Agner ajāyata Yajurvedo Vāyoḥ Sāmavedah Ādityād" iti  
 śruter īśvarasya agny-ādi-prerakatvena nirmāṭritvām drashṭavyam |  
 "mantra-brāhmaṇātmakah śabda-rāśir vedah" iti chet | na | Īdriśo  
 mantrah | īdriśam brāhmaṇam ity anayor adyāpi anirñitatvāt | Tasmād  
 nāsti kinchid vedasya lakṣhaṇam | Nāpi tat-sadbhāvē pramāṇāṁ paśyā-  
 muḥ | "Rigvedām bhagavo'dhyemi Yajurvedām Sāmavedām Ātharvanām  
 chaturtham" ityādi vākyāṁ pramāṇāṁ iti chet | na | tasyāpi vākyasya  
 vedāntahṛitvena ātmāśrayatva-prasangāt | Na khalu nipiṇo'pi svā-  
 skandham āroḍhūm prabhaved iti | "Vedaḥ eva dvijāśināṁ niḥśreyaa-  
 karah parah" iti ādi smṛiti-vākyāṁ pramāṇām" iti chet | na | tasyāpy  
 ukta-śruti-mūlatvena nirākriticatvāt | pratyakshādikām śankitum apy aye-

portions of their contents. It was only when the authority of the sacred books was not merely tacitly set aside or undermined, but openly discarded and denied, and the institutions founded on them were abandoned and assailed by the Buddhists, that the orthodox party took the alarm."

*gyam | Veda-vishayā loka-prasiddhiḥ sārvajantīnā 'pi "nīlam nabhaḥ"*  
*ityādi-vad bhrāntā | Tasmāl lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇa-rahitasya vedasya sad-*  
*bhāvo na angikarttum śakyate iti pūrva-pakṣaḥ |*

*Atra uohyato | mantra-brāhmaṇātmakaṁ tāvad aduṣṭaṁ lakṣhaṇam |*  
*ata eva Āpastambo yajna-paribhāshāyām evāha "mantra-brāhmaṇayor*  
*veda-nāma-dheyam" iti | tayos tu rūpam uparishthād nirñeshyate | apau-*  
*rusheya-vākyatvam iti idam api yādriśam aṣṭābhīr vivakṣhitām tādriśam*  
*uttaratra spashṭibhavishyati | pramāṇāny api yathoktāni śruti-smṛiti-*  
*loka-prasiddhi-rūpāṇi veda-sadbhāve drashṭavyāni | Yathā ghaṭa-paṭādi-*  
*dravyānām sva-prakāśatvābhāve'pi sūrya-chandrādīnām sva-prakāśatvam*  
*avirudham tathā manushyādīnām sva-skandhārohāsambhave'py akunṭhitā-*  
*sakter vedasya itara-vastu-pratipādakatvā-vat sva-pratipādakatvam apy*  
*astu | Ata eva sampradāya-vido 'kunṭhitām śaktim vedasya darśayanti*  
*"chodanā hi bhūtam bhavishyantaṁ sūkṣhaṁ vyavahitaṁ vīprakṛishtam*  
*ity evaṇyātīyam artham śaknoy avagamayitum" iti | Tathā sati veda-*  
*mūlāyāḥ smṛites tad-ubhaya-mūlāyāḥ loka-prasiddheś cha prāmāṇyaṁ*  
*durvāram | Tasmāl lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇa-siddho vedo na kenāpi chārvākādīnā*  
*'podhūm śakyate iti sthitam |*

*Nanv astu nāma Vedākhyāḥ kaśchit padārthaḥ | tathāpi nāsau vyā-*  
*khyānam arhati apramāṇatvena anupayuktatvāt | Na hi Vedāḥ pramāṇām*  
*tal-lakṣhaṇasya tatra duḥsampādatvāt | tathā hi "samyag anubhava-sā-*  
*dhanām pramāṇam" iti kechil lakṣhaṇam āhuḥ | apare tu "anadhigatār-*  
*tha-gantri pramāṇam" ity āchakṣate | na chaitad ubhayam vede sambha-*  
*vati | mantra-brāhmaṇātmako hi vedāḥ | tatra mantrāḥ kechid abodhakāḥ |*  
*"amyak sā te Indra rishtir" (R.V. i. 169, 3) ity eko mantrah | "Yā-*  
*driśmin dhāyi tam apasyayā vidad" (R.V. v. 44, 8) ity anyāḥ | "Śrīnyā*  
*iva jarbharī turpharītū" (R.V. x. 106, 6) ity aparaḥ | "Āpānta-manyus*  
*tripala-prabharmā" (R.V. x. 89, 5) ity-ādayaḥ udāhāryāḥ | na hy etair*  
*mantraiḥ kaśchid apy artho 'vabudhyate | etoshv anubhavo eva yadā nāsti*  
*tadā tat-samyaktvām tadiya-sādhanatvām cha dūrāpetam | "Adhāḥ evid*  
*asād" (R.V. x. 129, 5) iti mantrasya bodhakatvē 'pi "sthānur vā purusho*  
*vā" ityādi-vākyā-vat sandigdhārtha-bodhakatvād nāsti prāmāṇyaṁ |*  
*"Oshadhe trāyasya enam" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti mantro darbha-*  
*vishayah | "Svadhitē mā enāñ hiṁśīr" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti kshura-*  
*vishayah | "Śrīnotā grāvāṇāḥ" iti pāshāṇa-vishayah | Etoshv ahetanā-*  
*nām darbha-kshura-pāshāṇānām chetana-vat sambodhanām śrūyate | tato*  
*"dvau chandrapasāv" iti vākyā-vad vīparitārtha-bodhakatvād aprāmāṇ-*

*yam | “Ekaḥ eva Rudro na dvitīyo ‘vatasthe” | “sahasrāṇi sahasraśo ye Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyām”<sup>62</sup> ity anayos tu mantrayor “yāvajjivam aham mauni” ity vākyā-vad vyāghāta-bodhakatvād apramānyam | “Āpaḥ undantu” (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti mantra yajamānasya kshaura-kāle jalena śiraśaḥ kledanam brüte | “Subhike śiraḥ āroha śobhayantī mukham mama” iti mantra vivāha-kāle mangalācharanōrtham pushpa-nirmitāyah śubhikāyāḥ vara-badhvoḥ śirasy avasthānam brüte | tayoḥ cha mantrayor loka-prasiddhārthānuvāditvād anadhigatārtha-gantritvaṁ nāsti | tasmād mantra-bhāgo na pramāṇam |*

*Atra uchyate | “Amyag”-ādi - mantrānām artho Yāskena nirukta-granthe ‘vabodhitah | tat-parichaya-rahitānām anavabodho na mantrānām dosham avahati | Ata eva atra loka-nyāyam udāharanti “na esha sthānor aparādho yad enam andho na paśyati | purushāparādho sambhavati” iti | “Adhaḥ svid āśid” iti mantras cha na sandeha-prabodhanāya pravrīttah kiñtarhi jagat-kāranasya para-vastuno ‘tigambhiratvām niśchetum eva pravrīttah | tad-artham eva hi guru-śāstra-sampradāya-rahitair durbo-dhyatvam “adhaḥ svid” ity anayā vacho-bhangyā upanyasyati | Sa eva abhiprāyah uparitaneshu “ko addhā veda” (R.V. x. 129, 6) ity ādi-mantreshu spashṭikritah | “Oshady”-ādi mantreshv api chetanāḥ eva tat-tād-abhimāni-devatās tena tena nāmnā sambodhyante | tāś cha devatāḥ bhagavatā Bādarāyanēna “abhimāni-vyapadeśas tu” iti sūtre sūtritaḥ | *Ekasyāpi Rudrasya sva-mahimnā sahasra-mūrtti-svīkārād nāsti paras-param vyāghātaḥ | Jalādi-dravyena śiraḥ-kledanāder loka-siddhatve ‘pi tad-abhimāni-devatānugrahasya aprasiddhatvāt tad-vishayatvena ajnātārtha-jnāpakatvam | tato lakshana-sadbhāvād asti mantra-bhāgasya pramānyam |**

“But, some will say, there is no such thing as a Veda; how, then, can there be a Rig-veda, forming a particular part of it? For what is this Veda? It has no characteristic sign or evidence; and without these two conditions, nothing can be proved to exist. For logicians hold that ‘a thing is established by characteristic signs and by proof.’ If you answer that ‘of the three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and scripture, the Veda is the last, and that this is its sign;’ then the objectors rejoin that this is not true, for this sign extends too far, and includes also Manu’s and the other Smṛitis; since there exists in them

\* The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xvi. 53, has, *asankhyātā sahasrāṇi ye Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyām* | \*

also this characteristic of Scripture, viz. that in virtue of common consent it is a perfect instrument for the discovery of what is invisible.' If you proceed, 'the Veda is faultless, in consequence of its characteristic that it has no person (*purusha*) for its author,'<sup>63</sup> they again reply, 'Not so; for as the Veda likewise was formed by Parameśvara (God), it had a person (*purusha*) for its author.' If you rejoin, 'It had no person (*purusha*) for its author, for it was not made by any embodied living being;' [they refuse<sup>64</sup> to admit this] on the ground that, according to such Vedic texts as 'Purusha has a thousand heads,' it is clear that Īśvara (God) also has a body. If you urge that *apaurusheyatva* ('the having had no personal author') means that it was not composed by a living being endowed with a body which was the result of works; —the opponent denies this also, inasmuch as the Vedas were created by particular living beings—Agni (fire), Vāyu (wind), and Āditya (the sun); for from the text 'the Rig-veda sprang from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya,' etc., it will be seen that Īśvara was the maker, by inciting Agni and the others. If you next say that the Veda is a collection of words in the form of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas, the objectors rejoin, 'Not so, for it has never yet been defined that a Mantra is so and so, and a Brāhmaṇa so and so.' There exists, therefore, no characteristic mark of a Veda. Nor do we see any proof that a Veda exists. If you say that the text, 'I peruse, reverend sir, the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, and the Ātharvāna as the fourth,' is a proof, the antagonist answers, 'No, for as that text is part of the Veda, the latter would be open to the objection of depending upon itself; for no one, be he ever so clever, can mount upon his own shoulders.' If you again urge that such texts of the Smṛiti as this, 'It is the Veda alone which is the source of blessedness to twice-born men, and transcendent,' are proofs, the objector rejoins, 'Not so; since these too must be rejected, as being founded on the same Veda.' The

<sup>63</sup> Or, the meaning of this may be, "If you urge that, as the Veda has no personal author, there is—in consequence of this peculiar characteristic—no flaw (in the proposed definition), etc."

<sup>64</sup> I have translated this, as if it there had been (which there is not) a negative particle *na* in the printed text, after the *iti chet*, as this seems to me to be necessary to the sense. I understand from Prof. Müller that the negative particle is found in some of the MSS. [I am, however, informed by Prof. Goldstücker that *na* is often omitted, though understood, after *iti chet*.]

evidence of the senses and other ordinary sources of knowledge ought not even to be doubted.<sup>65</sup> And common report in reference to the Veda, though universal, is erroneous, like such phrases as 'the blue sky,' etc. Wherefore, as the Veda is destitute of characteristic sign and proof, its existence cannot be admitted. Such is the first side of the question.

"To this we reply: The definition of the Veda, as a work composed of Mantra and Brähmana, is unobjectionable. Hence Āpastamba says in the Yajnaparibhāshā, 'the name of Mantra and Brähmana is Veda.' The nature of these two things will be settled hereafter.<sup>66</sup> The sense we attach to the expression 'consisting of sentences which had no personal author' will also be declared further on. Let the proofs which have been specified of the existence of the Veda, viz. the Veda (itself), the Smṛiti, and common notoriety, be duly weighed. Although jars, cloth, and other such [dark] objects have no inherent property of making themselves visible, it is no absurdity to speak of the sun, moon, and other luminous bodies, as shining by their own light. Just in the same way, though it is impossible for men or any other beings to mount on their own shoulders, let the Veda through the keenness of its power be held to have the power of proving itself, as it has of proving other things.<sup>67</sup> Hence traditionists set forth this penetrating force of the Veda; thus, 'Scripture is able to make known the past, the future, the minute, the distant, the remote.' Such being the case, the authority of the Smṛiti, which is based on the Veda, and that of common notoriety, which is based on both, is irresistible. Wherefore it stands fast that the Veda, which is

<sup>65</sup> The drift of this sentence does not seem to me clear. From what immediately follows it would rather appear that the evidence of the senses may be doubted. Can the passage be corrupt?

<sup>66</sup> See the First Volume of this work, pp. 2 ff. and the Second Volume, p. 172.

<sup>67</sup> The same thing had been said before by Sankara Achāryya (who lived at the end of the 8th or beginning of the 9th century, A.D. See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 332), in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 1: *Vedasya hi nirapeksham svārthe pramāṇyāṁ raver iwa rūpa-vishaye | purusha-vachasāṁ tu mūlāntarāpekshām svārthe pramāṇyāṁ vaktri-smṛiti-vyavahitāṁ cha iti viprakarshah |* "For the Veda has an independent authority in respect of its own sense, as the sun has of manifesting forms. The words of men on the other hand, have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent upon another source [the Veda], and which is separated [from the authority of the Veda] by the fact of its author being remembered. Herein consists the distinction [between the two kinds of authority]."

established by characteristic sign, and by proof, cannot be overturned by the Chārvākas or any other opponents.

"But let it be admitted that there is a thing called a Veda. Still, the opponents say, it does not deserve explanation, being unsuited for it, since it does not constitute proof. The Veda, they urge, is no proof, as it is difficult to show that it has any sign of that character. Now, some define proof as the instrument of perfect apprehension; others say, it is that which arrives at what was not before ascertained. But neither of these definitions can be reasonably applied to the Veda. For the Veda consists of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa. Of these mantras some convey no meaning. Thus one is *amyak sā te Indra rishtir*, etc.; another is *yādriśmin*, etc.; a third is *śrīnyā iva*, etc. The texts *āpāntu-manyuh*,<sup>68</sup> etc., and others may be adduced as further examples. Now no meaning whatever is to be perceived through these mantras; and when they do not even convey an idea at all, much less can they convey a perfect idea, or be instruments of apprehension. Even if the mantra *adhaḥ svid āśid upari svid āśid*, 'was it below or above?' (R.V. x. 129, 5) conveys a meaning, still, like such sayings as 'either a post or a man,' it conveys a dubious meaning, and so possesses no authority. The mantra, 'deliver him, o plant,' has for its subject grass. Another, 'do not hurt him, axe,' has for its subject an axe (*kshura*). A third, 'hear, stones,' has for its subject stones. In these cases, grass, an axe, and stones, though insensible objects, are addressed in the Veda as if they were intelligent. Hence these passages have no authority, because, like the saying, 'two moons,' their import is absurd. So also the two texts, 'there is one Rudra; no second has existed,' and 'the thousand Rudras who are over the earth,' involving, as they do, a mutual contradiction (just as if one were to say, 'I have been silent all my life'), cannot be authoritative. The mantra *āpah undantu* expresses the wetting of the sacrificer's head with water at the time of tonsure; while the text '*śubhike*', etc. ('garland, mount on my head and decorate my face') expresses the placing of a garland formed of flowers on the heads of the bridegroom and bride, by way of blessing, at the time of marriage. Now, as these two last texts merely repeat a matter of

<sup>68</sup> See Nirukta, v. 12, and vi. 15, and Roth's Illustrations. It is not necessary for my purpose to inquire whether the charge of intelligibility brought against these different texts is just or not.

common notoriety, they cannot be said to attain to what was not before ascertained. Wherefore the Mantra portion of the Veda is destitute of authority.

"To this we reply, the meaning of these texts, 'amyak,' and the others, has been explained by Yāska in the Nirukta.<sup>69</sup> The fact that they are not understood by persons ignorant of that explanation, does not prove any defect in the mantras. It is customary to quote here the popular maxim, 'it is not the fault of the post that the blind man does not see it; the reasonable thing to say is that it is the man's fault.' The mantra '*adhaḥ svid*,' etc. ('was it above or below?') (R.V. x. 129, 5) is not intended to convey doubt, but rather to signify the extreme profundity of the supreme Essence, the cause of the world. With this view the author intimates by this turn of expression the difficulty which persons who are not versed in the deep Scriptures have, in comprehending such subjects. The same intention is manifested in the following mantras *ko addhā veda*, etc. (R.V. x. 129, 6) ('who knows?' etc.) In the texts *oshadhe*, etc. ('o herb,' etc.), the deities who preside over these various objects are addressed by these several names. These deities are referred to by the venerable Bādarāyaṇa in the aphorism *abhimāni-vyapadeśah*. As Rudra, though only one, assumes by his power a thousand forms, there is no contradiction between the different texts which relate to him. And though the moistening, etc., of the head by water, etc., is a matter of common notoriety, yet as the goodwill of the deities who preside over these objects is not generally known, the texts in question, by having this for their subject, are declaratory of what is unknown. Hence the Mantra portion of the Veda, being shown to have a characteristic mark, is authoritative."

Sāyana then, in p. 11 of his Preface, proceeds to extend his argument to the Brāhmaṇas. These are divisible into two parts, Precepts (*vidhi*), and Explanatory remarks (*arthavāda*). Precepts again are either (a) incitements to perform some act in which a man has not yet engaged (*apravritta-pravarttanam*), such as are contained in the ceremonial sections (*Karma-kāṇḍa*); or (b) revelations of something previously unknown (*ajñata-jñāpanam*), such as are found in the portions which treat of sacred knowledge or the supreme spirit (*Brahma-kāṇḍa*). Both these parts

<sup>69</sup> See the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866, pp. 323, 329, 334, and 387.

are objected to as unauthoritative. The former is said (1) to enjoin things afterwards declared to be improper; and (2) to prescribe in some texts things which are prohibited in others. Thus in the Aitareya, Taittirīya, and other Brāhmaṇas, many injunctions given in other places are controverted in such phrases as, "This or that must not be regarded;" "This must not be done in that way" (*tat tad na ādṛityam | tat tathā na kāryyam*).<sup>70</sup> And again prescriptions are given which are mutually contradictory. Another objection is that no result, such as the attainment of paradise, is perceived to follow the celebration of a *jyotiṣṭoma* or other sacrifice; whilst satisfaction never fails to be experienced immediately after eating (*jyotiṣṭomādīshv apy anushṭānānantaram eva cha svargādi-phalaṁ na upalabhyate | na hi bhojanānan-taraṁ tripter anupalambho'sti |*). The answer given to the earlier of these objections is that the discrepant injunctions and prohibitions are respectively applicable to people belonging to different Sākhās or Vedic schools; just as things forbidden to a man in one state of life (*āśrama*) are permitted to one who is in another. It is thus the difference of persons which gives rise to the apparent opposition between the precepts (*tathā jarttilādi-vidhir attra nindymāno'pi kvachit sākhāntare bhaved iti chet | bhavatu nāma | prāmānyam api tach-chhākhādhyāyinam prati bha-vishyati | yathā grihasthāśrāme nishiddham api parāṇā-bhōjanam āśra-māntareshu prāmānikaṁ tad-vat | anena nyāyena sarvattra paraspara-viruddhau vidhi-nishedhau purusha-bhedenā vyavasthāpanīyau yathā man-treshu pāṭha-bhedaḥ |*). In the same way, it is remarked, the different Sākhās adopt different readings in the mantras. As regards the objection raised to the authoritativeness of the revelations of things hitherto unknown, which are made in the Brahma-kānda, that they are mutually contradictory—as when the Aitareyins say, *Ātmā vai idam ekaḥ eva agre āśit*, "This was in the beginning soul only;" whilst the Taittirīyakas on the other hand affirm, *asad vai idam agre āśit*, "This was in the beginning non-existent;"—the answer is given that it is determined by a particular aphorism (which is quoted)<sup>71</sup> that in the latter passage the word *asat* does not mean absolute vacuity or nothingness, but merely an

<sup>70</sup> Compare the quotation given above, p. 54, from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iv. 1, 2, 19.

<sup>71</sup> Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 7, appears to be intended; but the text of it as given by Śāyaṇa does not correspond with that in the Bibliotheca Indica.

undeveloped condition (.... iti sūtre Taittirīya-gata-vākyasya asa�-chhabdasya na śūnya-paratvāñ kintv avyaktāvasthā-paratvam iti nirñitam |).<sup>72</sup> Sāyaṇa accordingly concludes (p. 19 of his Preface) that the authority of the whole Veda is proved.

II.—The second passage which I shall quote is from the Vedārtha-prakāśa of Mādhava Āchāryya on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda (p. 1 ff. in the Bibliotheca Indica). Mādhava was the brother of Sāyaṇa,<sup>73</sup> and flourished in the middle of the 14th century (Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 301) :

*Nanu ko 'yañ vedo nāma ke vā asya vishaya-prayojana-sambandhādhi-kāriṇāḥ kathañ vā tasya prāmīnyam | na khalv etasmin sarvasminn asati vedo vyākhyāna-yogyo bhavati | Atra uchyate | Ishṭa-prāpti-anishṭa-parihārayor alaukikam upāyañ yo grantho vedayati sa vedāḥ | Alaukika-padena pratyakshānumāne vyāvartyete | Anubhūyamānasya srak-chandana-vanitāder ishṭa-prāpti-hetutvam aushadha-sevāder anishṭa-parihāra-hetutvām cha pratyaksha-siddham | Svenānubhavishyamānasya purushāntara-gatasya cha tathātvam anumāna-gamyam | “Evañ tarhi bhāvi-janma-gata-sukhādikam anumāna-gamyam” iti chet | na | tad-viśeshasya anavagamāt | Na khalu jyotiṣṭomādir ishṭa-prāpti-hetuḥ kalanja-bhakshana-varjanādir anishṭa-parihāra-hetuḥ ity amum artham veda-vyatirekena anumāna-sahas-renāpi tarkika-śiromanir apy asyāragantuḥ śaknoti | Tasmād alaukiko-pāya-bodhako vedāḥ iti lakshanasya na ativyāptām | ata evoktam | “Pratyakshenānumityā vā yas tūpāyo na budhyate | Etañ vindanti vedena tasmād vedasya vedatā” iti | sa eva upāyo vedasya vishayah | tad-bodhāḥ eva prayojanam | tad-bodhārthāḥ cha adhikāri | tena saha upakāryyopakāraka-bhāvāḥ sambandhāḥ | nanu “evañ sati strī-sūdra-sahitāḥ sarve vedādhikāriṇāḥ syur ‘ishṭam me syād anishṭam mā bhūd’ iti aśiḥāḥ sārvajā-ninatvāt” | maivam | strī-sūdrayoh saty upāye bodhārthitve hetv-antarena vedādhikārasya pratibaddhatvāt | upanītasya eva adhyayanādhikāram*

<sup>72</sup> Compare with this the passages quoted from the S'atapatha and Taittirīya Brāhmaṇas in the First Volume of this work, pp. 19 f., 24 f., 27 f., and from the Taitt. Sanh. and Brāh. in pp. 52 and 53; and see also the texts referred to and commented upon in the Journ. of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1864, p. 72, and in the No. for 1865, pp. 345–348.

<sup>73</sup> Whether either of these two brothers, who were ministers of state, were the actual writers of the works which bear their names, or whether the works were composed by Pandits patronized by the two statesmen, and called after the names of their patrons, is a point which I need not attempt to decide.

*bruvat śāstram anupanītayoh strī-śūdrayor vedādhyayanam anishṭa-prāpti-hetur iti bodhayati | kathaṁ tarhi tayos tad-upāyāvagamah | purānādibhir iti brūmāḥ | ata evoktam | “strī-śūdra-dvijabandhūnām trayī na śruti-gocharā | iti Bhāratam ākhyānam muninā kripayā kṛitam” (Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 25) | iti | tasmād upanītair eva traivarṇikair vedasya sambandhāḥ | tat-prāmānyām tu bodhakatvāt svataḥ eva siddham | paurusheya-vākyām tu bodhakam api sat purusha-gata-bhrānti-mūlatva-sambhāvanayā tat-parihārāya mūla-pramānam apekshate na tu vedah | tasya nityatvena vaktri-dosha-śāṅkānudayāt | . . . . Nanu vedo 'pi Kālidāsādi-vākyā-vat paurusheyaḥ eva Brahma-kāryyatva-śravaṇāt | “richah sāmāni jajnire | chhandāṁsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata” iti śruteḥ | ata eva Bādarāyanāḥ (i. 1, 3) “śāstra-yonivād” iti sūtrenā Brahmaṇo veda-kāraṇatvam avochat | maivam | śruti-smritibhyām nityatvāvagamāt | “vāchā Virūpa nityayā” (R.V. viii. 64, 6) iti śruteḥ | “anādinidhanā nityā vāg uterishṭā svayambhuwā” iti smṛiteś cha | Bādarāyano 'pi devatādhikarane sūtrayāmāsa (i. 3, 29) “ata eva cha nityatvam” iti | tarhi “paraspara-virodhaḥ” iti chet | na | nityatvāya vyāvahārikatvāt | śrishtēr ūrdhvām saṁhārāt pūrvam vyavahāra-kālas tasmin ut-patti-vināśadarśanāt | kālakāśādayo yathā nityāḥ evaṁ vedo 'pi vyavahāra-kāle Kālidāsādi-vākyā-vat purusha-virachitatvābhāvād nityāḥ | ādi-śrishtau tu kālakāśādi-vad eva Brahmaṇaḥ sakāśād vedotpattir āmnāyate | ato vishaya-bhedād na paraspara-virodhaḥ | Brahmaṇo nirdoshat-vena vedasya vaktri-doshābhāvāt svatas-siddham prāmānyām tad-avastham | tasmāl lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇa-sadbhāvād vishaya-prayojana-sambandhādhikāri-sadbhāvāt prāmānyasya sushatvāḥ cha vedo vyākhyātavyaḥ eva |*

“Now, some may ask, what is this Veda, or what are its subject-matter, its use, its connection, or the persons who are competent to study it? and how is it authoritative? For, in the absence of all these conditions, the Veda does not deserve to be expounded. I reply: the book which makes known (*vedayati*) the supernatural (lit. non-secular) means of obtaining desirable objects, and getting rid of undesirable objects, is the Veda. By the employment of the word “supernatural,” [the ordinary means of information, viz.] perception and inference, are excluded. By perception it is established that such objects of sense, as garlands, sandal-wood, and women are causes of gratification, and that the use of medicines and so forth is the means of getting rid

of what is undesirable. And we ascertain by inference that we shall in future experience, and that other men now experience, the same results (from these same causes). If it be asked whether, then, the happiness, etc., of a future birth be not in the same way ascertainable by inference, I reply that it is not, because we cannot discover its specific character. Not even the most brilliant ornament of the logical school could, by a thousand inferences, without the help of the Vedas, 'discover the truths that the *jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices are the means of attaining happiness, and that abstinence from intoxicating drugs'<sup>24</sup> is the means of removing what is undesirable. Thus it is not too wide a definition of the Veda to say that it is that which indicates supernatural expedients. Hence, it has been said, 'men discover by the Veda those expedients which cannot be ascertained by perception or inference; and this is the characteristic feature of the Veda.' These expedients, then, form the subject of the Veda; [to teach] the knowledge of them is its use; the person who seeks that knowledge is the competent student; and the connection of the Veda with such a student is that of a benefactor with the individual who is to be benefitted.

"But, if such be the case, it may be said that all persons whatever, including women and Sūdras, must be competent students of the Veda, since the aspiration after good and the deprecation of evil are common to the whole of mankind. But it is not so. For though the expedient exists, and women and Sūdras are desirous to know it, they are debarred by another cause from being competent students of the Veda. The scripture (*sāstra*) which declares that those persons only who have been invested with the sacrificial cord are competent to read the Veda, intimates thereby that the same study would be a cause of unhappiness to women and Sūdras [who are not so invested]. How, then, are these two classes of persons to discover the means of future happiness? We answer, from the Purāṇas and other such works. Hence it has been said, 'since the triple Veda may not be heard by women, Sūdras, and degraded twice-born men, the Mahābhārata was, in his benevolence,

<sup>24</sup> *Kalanja-bhakshayam* is mentioned in the Commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, x. 23, 28. In his translation of the Kusumāñjali, p. 81, note, Professor Cowell says: "Some held the *Kalanja* to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow—others hemp or *bhang*,—others a kind of garlic. See Raghunandana's Ekūḍāśī *tattva*."

composed by the Muni.'<sup>76</sup> The Veda, therefore, has only a relation to men of the three superior classes who have obtained investiture.

" Then the authority of the Veda is self-evident, from the fact of its communicating knowledge. For though the words of men also communicate knowledge, still, as they must be conceived to participate in the fallibility of their authors, they require some primary authority to remedy that fallibility. But such is not the case with the Veda; for as that had no beginning, it is impossible to suspect any defect in the utterer. . . .

" A doubt may, however, be raised whether the Veda is not, like the sentences of Kalidāsa and others, derived from a personal being,<sup>77</sup> as it proclaims itself to have been formed by Brahmā, according to the text, 'the Rich and Sāman verses, the metres, sprang from him; from him the Yajush was produced,'<sup>78</sup> in consequence of which Bādarāyaṇa, in the aphorism<sup>79</sup> 'since he is the source of the sāstra,' has pronounced that Brahma is the cause of the Veda. But this doubt is groundless; for the eternity of the Veda has been declared both by itself, in the text, 'with an eternal voice, o Virūpa,'<sup>80</sup> and by the Smṛiti in the verse 'an eternal voice, without beginning or end, was uttered by the Self-existent.'<sup>81</sup> Bādarāyaṇa, too, in his section on the deities (Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 29) has this aphorism; 'hence also [its] eternity [is to be maintained].' If it be objected that these statements of his are mutually conflicting, I answer, No. For [in the passages where] the word eternity is applied to the Vedas, it is to be understood as referring to the period of action [or mundane existence]. This period is that which commences with the creation, and lasts till the destruction of the universe, since, during this interval, no worlds are seen to

<sup>76</sup> See the quotation from the Bhāgavata Purāna, above, p. 42.

<sup>77</sup> This seems to be the only way to translate *paurusheya*, as *purusha* cannot here mean a human being.

<sup>78</sup> R.V. x. 90, 9, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 10; and p. 3, above.

<sup>79</sup> Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3, p. 7 of Dr. Ballantyne's Aphorisms of the Vedānta.

<sup>80</sup> These words are part of Rig-veda, viii. 64, 6: *Tasmai nūnam abhidyave vāchā Virūga nityayā | vrishne chodasva sushṭutim |* "Send forth praises to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, o Virūpa, with an unceasing voice [or hymn]." The word *nityayā* seems to mean nothing more than "continual," though in the text I have rendered it "eternal," as the author's reasoning requires. Colebrooke (*Misc. Ess.* i. 306), however, translates it by "perpetual." I shall again quote and illustrate this verse further on.

<sup>81</sup> This line, from the M.Bh. Sāntip. 8533, has already been cited above, in p. 16.

originate, or to be destroyed. Just as time and æther (space) are eternal,<sup>81</sup> so also is the Veda eternal, because, during the period of mundane existence, it has not been composed by any person, as the works of Kālidāsa and others have been.<sup>82</sup> Nevertheless, the Veda, like time and æther, is recorded in Scripture to have originated from Brahma at the first creation. There is, therefore, no discrepancy between the two different sets of passages, as they refer to different points. And since Brahma is free from defect, the utterer of the Veda is consequently free from defect; and therefore a self-demonstrated authority resides in it. Seeing, therefore, that the Veda possess a characteristic mark, and is supported by proof, and that it has a subject, a use, a relation, and persons competent for its study, and, moreover, that its authority is established, it follows that it ought to be interpreted."

**SECT. VIII.—*Arguments of the Mīmānsakas and Vedāntins in support of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.***

I shall now proceed to adduce some of the reasonings by which the authors of the Pūrva Mīmānsā, and Vedānta, aphorisms, and their commentators, defend the doctrine which, as we have already seen, is held by some of the Indian writers, that the Vedas are eternal, as well as infallible.

I.—*Pūrva Mīmānsā*.—I quote the following texts of the Pūrva Mīmānsā which relate to this subject from Dr. Ballantyne's aphorisms of the Mīmānsā, pp. 8 ff.<sup>83</sup> I do not always follow the words of Dr. Ballantyne's translations, though I have made free use of their substance. (See also Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 306, or p. 195 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) The commentator introduces the subject in the following way :

<sup>81</sup> Passages affirming both the eternity of the æther, and its creation, are given in the First Volume of this work, pp. 130 and 506.

<sup>82</sup> The same subject is touched on by Sāyana, at p. 20 of the introductory portion of his commentary on the Rigveda. The passage will be quoted at the end of the next section."

<sup>83</sup> Since the 1st edition of this Volume was published, the Sanskrit scholar has obtained easy access to a more considerable portion of the Mīmānsā Sūtras with the commentary of Śabara Svāmin by the appearance of the first, second, and part of third, Adhyāyas in the Bibliotheca Indica.

*S'abdārthayor utpatty-anantaram purushena kalpita-sanketātmaka-sambandhasya kalpitavat̄ purusha-kalpita-sambandha-jnānapekshitvāt sabbāsya yathā pratyaksha-jnānam śuktikādau satyatvam vyabhicharati tathā purushādhinatvena śabde pi satyatva-vyabhichāra-sambhavat̄ na dharme chodanā pramānam iti pūrva-pakṣe siddhāntam āha |*

“Since, subsequently to the production of words and the things signified by them, a connection of a conventional character has been established between the two by the will of man, and since language is dependent upon a knowledge of this conventional connection determined by man, [it follows that] as perception is liable to error in respect of mother-of-pearl and similar objects [by mistaking them for silver, etc.], so words also may be exposed to the risk of conveying unreal notions from [their sense] being dependent on human will; and consequently that the Vedic precepts [which are expressed in such words, possessing a merely conventional and arbitrary meaning] cannot be authoritative in matters of duty. Such is an objection which may be urged, and in reply to which the author of the aphorisms declares the established doctrine.”

Then follows the fifth aphorism of the first chapter of the first book of the Mīmānsā :— *Autpattikas tu<sup>(a)</sup> śabdasya<sup>(b)</sup> arthena sambandhas<sup>(c)</sup> tasya<sup>(d)</sup> jnānam<sup>(e)</sup> upadeśo<sup>(f)</sup> vyatirekaś cha<sup>(g)</sup> arthe' nupalabdhē<sup>(h)</sup> tat<sup>(i)</sup> pramānam Bādarāyanasya anapekshatvāt |* which may be paraphrased as follows: “The connection of a word with its sense is coeval with the origin of both. In consequence of this connection the words of the Veda convey a knowledge of duty, and impart unerring instruction in regard to matters imperceptible. Such Vedic injunctions constitute the proof of duty alleged by Bādarāyana, author of the Vedānta Sūtras; for this proof is independent of perception and all other evidence.”

I subjoin most of the remarks of the scholiast as given by Dr. Ballantyne, indicating by letters the words of the aphorism to which they refer :

<sup>(a)</sup> *Autpattikah* | *svābhāvikah* | *nityah* iti *yāvat* | “*Autpattika* (original) means natural, eternal in short.”

<sup>(b)</sup> *S'abdasya* | *nitya-veda-ghātaka-pada* *sya* “*agnihotram juhuyāt svarga-kamah*” *ityādeḥ* | “*S'abda* (word) refers to terms which form part of the eternal Veda, such as, ‘the man who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice.’”

(e) *Sambandha* (connection), "in the nature of power," i.e. according to Dr. Ballantyne, depending on the divine will that such and such words should convey such and such meanings.

(d) *Atas tasya | dharmasya |* "Hence' is to be supplied before 'this,' which refers to 'duty.'"

(e) *Jnānam | atra karane lyut | jnapter yathārtha-jnānasya karaṇam |* "In the word *jñāna* (knowledge) the affix *lyut* has the force of 'instrument,' 'an instrument of correct knowledge.'"

(f) *Upadesah | artha-pratipadānam |* "Instruction, i.e. the establishment of a fact."

(g) *Avyatirekah | avyabhichāri drisyate atah |* "Unerring,' i.e. that which is seen not to deviate from the fact."

(h) *Nanu "vahnimān iti śabda-śravanānantaram pratyakṣhenā vahnīm  
drishṭvā śabde pramātvaṁ grihītāti. iti loke prasiddheḥ pratyakṣhāditara-  
pramāna-sāpekshatvāt śabdasya sa kathaṁ dharme pramāṇam ata āha  
"anupalabdhe" iti | anupalabdhe pratyakṣhādi-pramāṇair ajnāte'rthe |*  
"Since it is a matter of notoriety that any one who has heard the words  
'[the mountain is] fiery' uttered, and afterwards sees the fire with his  
own eyes, is [only] then [thoroughly] convinced of the authority of the  
words, it may be asked how words which are thus dependent [for con-  
firmation on] perception and other proofs, can themselves constitute the  
proof of duty? In reference to this, the word *anupalabdhe* ('in regard  
to matters imperceptible') is introduced. It signifies 'matters which  
cannot be known by perception and other such proofs.'"

(i) *Tat | vidhi-ghaṭita-vākyam dharme pramāṇam Bādarāyanāchāryasya  
sammataṁ | ayam āśayāḥ | 'parvato vahnimān' iti doshavat-purusha-  
prayuktam vākyam arthaṁ vyabhicharati | atah prāmānya-niśchaye praty-  
akṣhādikam apokshate | tathā 'gnihotraṁ juhoti iti vākyam kāla-traye  
'py arthaṁ na vyabhicharati | ata itara-nirapekshañ dharme pramāṇam |*  
"This, i.e. a [Vedic] sentence consisting of an injunction, is regarded  
by Bādarāyaṇa also as proof of duty. The purport is this. The  
sentence, 'the mountain is fiery,' when uttered by a person defective  
[in his organ of vision], may deviate from the reality; it therefore  
requires the evidence of our senses, etc.' to aid us in determining its  
subsistency as proof. Whereas the Vedic sentence regarding the per-  
formance of the Agnihotra sacrifice can never deviate from the truth in  
any time, past, present, or future; and is therefore a proof of duty, in-  
dependently of any other evidence.".

The commentator then proceeds to observe as follows : *Pūrva-sūtre*  
*sabdarthyas sambandho nityah ity uktam | tach cha śabda-nityatvādhīnam*  
*iti tat sisādhyayishur ādau śabdānityatva-vādi-matam pūrva-paksham upā-*  
*dayati |* “ In the preceding aphorism it was declared that the connection  
of words and their meanings [or the things signified by them] is eternal.  
Desiring now to prove that this [eternity of connection] is dependent  
on the eternity of words [or sound], he begins by setting forth the first  
side of the question, viz. the doctrine of those who maintain that\*  
sound is not eternal.”

This doctrine is accordingly declared in the six following aphorisms  
(*sūtras*), which I shall quote and paraphrase, without citing, in the  
original, the accompanying comments. These the reader will find in  
Dr. Ballantyne’s work.

*Sūtra 6.—Karma eke tatra darśanāt |* “ Some, i.e. the followers of  
the Nyāya philosophy, say that sound is a product, because we see that  
it is the result of effort, which it would not be if it were eternal.”

*Sūtra 7.—Asthānāt |* “ That it is not eternal, on account of its  
transitoriness, i.e. because after a moment it ceases to be perceived.”

*Sūtra 8.—Karoti-śabdāt |* “ Because, we employ in reference to it  
the expression ‘making,’ i.e. we speak of ‘making’ a sound.”

*Sūtra 9.—Sattvāntare yaugapadyāt |* “ Because it is perceived by  
different persons at once, and is consequently in immediate contact with  
the organs of sense of those both far and near, which it could not be if  
it were one and eternal.”

*Sūtra 10.—Prakṛiti-vikṛityoś cha |* “ Because sounds have both an  
original and a modified form; as e.g. in the case of *dadhi atra*, which  
is changed into *dadya atra*, the original letter *i* being altered into *y* by  
the rules of permutation. Now, no substance which undergoes a  
change is eternal.”

*Sūtra 11.—Vriddhiś cha kartri-bhūmnā 'syā |* “ Because sound is  
augmented by the number of those who make it. Consequently the  
opinion of the Mimānsakas, who say that sound is merely manifested,  
and not created, by human effort, is wrong, since even a thousand  
manifesters do not increase the object which they manifest, as a jar is  
not made larger by a thousand lamps.”

These objections against the Mimānsaka theory that sound is mani-  
fested, and not created, by those who utter it, are answered in the  
following Sūtras :

*Sūtra 12.*—*Samāñ tu tatra darśanam* | “But, according to both schools, viz. that which holds sound to be created, and that which regards it as merely manifested, the perception of it is alike momentary. But of these two views, the theory of manifestation is shown in the next aphorism to be the correct one.”

*Sūtra 13.*—*Sataḥ param adarśanām vishayānāgamāt* | “The non-perception at any particular time, of sound, which, in reality, perpetually exists, arises from the fact that the utterer of sound has not come into contact with his object, i.e. sound. Sound is eternal, because we recognise the letter *k*, for instance, to be the same sound which we have always heard, and because it is the simplest method of accounting for the phenomenon to suppose that it is the same. The still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air issuing from a speaker’s mouth, and thus sound (which always exists, though unperceived) becomes perceptible.<sup>84</sup> This is the reply to the objection of its ‘transitoriness’ (*Sūtra 7*).”

An answer to *Sūtra 8* is given in

*Sūtra 14.*—*Prayogasya param* | “The word ‘making’ sounds, merely means employing or uttering them.”

The objection made in *Sūtra 9* is answered in

*Sūtra 15.*—*Āditya-vad yaugapadyam* | “One sound is simultaneously heard by different persons, just as one sun is seen by them at one and the same time. Sound, like the sun, is a vast, and not a minute object, and thus may be perceptible by different persons, though remote from one another.”

An answer to *Sūtra 10* is contained in

*Sūtra 16.*—*Varnāntaram avikārah* | “The letter *y*, which is substituted for *i* in the instance referred to under *Sūtra 10*, is not a modification of *i*, but a distinct letter. Consequently sound is not modified.”

The 11th *Sūtra* is answered in

*Sūtra 17.*—*Nāda-vriddhiḥ parā*<sup>85</sup> | “It is an increase of ‘noise,’ not

<sup>84</sup> “Sound is unobserved, though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear; for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended).”—Colebrooke, i. 306.

<sup>85</sup> The text as given in the *Bibliotheca Indica* has *nāda-vriddhi-parā*.

of sound, that is occasioned by a multitude of speakers. The word ‘noise’ refers to the ‘conjunctions and disjunctions of the air’ (mentioned under Sūtra 13) which enter simultaneously into the hearer’s ear from different quarters; and it is of these that an increase takes place.”

The next following Sūtras state the reasons which support the Mi-mānsaka view :

*Sūtra 18.—Nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt* | “Sound must be eternal, because its utterance is fitted to convey a meaning to other persons. If it were not eternal [or abiding], it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist.”

*Sūtra 19.—Sarvatra yaugapadyāt* | “Sound is eternal, because it is in every case correctly and uniformly recognized by many persons simultaneously; and it is inconceivable that they should all at once fall into a mistake.”

When the word *go* (cow) has been repeated ten times, the hearers will say that the word *go* has been ten times pronounced, not that ten words having the sound of *go* have been uttered; and this fact also is adduced as a proof of the eternity of sound in

*Sūtra 20.—Sankhyābhāvāt* | “Because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.”

*Sūtra 21.—Anapekshatvāt* | “Sound is eternal, because we have no ground for anticipating its destruction.”

“But it may be urged that sound is a modification of air, since it arises from its conjunctions (see Sūtra 17), and because the Sikshā (or Vedāṅga treating of pronunciation) says that ‘air arrives at the condition of sound;’ and as it is thus produced from air, it cannot be eternal.” A reply to this difficulty is given in

*Sūtra 22.—Prakhyābhāvāch cha yogyasya* ; “Sound is not a modification of air, because, if it were, the organ of hearing would have no appropriate object which it could perceive. No modification of air (held by the Naiyāyikas to be tangible) could be perceived by the organ of hearing, which deals only with intangible sound.”

*Sūtra 23.—Linga-darśanāch cha* | “And the eternity of sound is established by the argument discoverable in the Vedic text, ‘with an eternal voice, o Virūpa.’ (See above, p. 69.) Now, though this sentence had another object in view, it, nevertheless, declares the eternity of language, and hence sound is eternal.”

"But though words, as well as the connection of word and sense, be eternal, it may be objected—as in the following aphorism—that a command conveyed in the form of a sentence is no proof of duty."

*Sūtra 24.*—*Utpattau vā rachanāḥ syur arthasya a-tan-nimittatvāt |* “Though there be a natural connection between words and their meanings, the connection between sentences and their meanings is a factitious one, established by human will, from these meanings (of the sentences) not arising out of the meanings of the words. The connection of sentences with their meanings is not (like the connection of words with their meanings) one derived from inherent power (see Sūtra 5, remark <sup>(c)</sup>, above, p. 72), but one devised by men; how, then, can this connection afford a sufficient authority for duty?”

An answer to this is given in

*Sūtra 25.*—*Tad-bhutānām kriyārthena samāmnāyo 'rthasya tan-nimit-tatvāt |* “The various terms which occur in every Vedic precept are accompanied by a verb; and hence a perception (such as we had not before) of the sense of a sentence is derived from a collection of words containing a verb. A precept is not comprehended unless the individual words which make it up are understood; and the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is nothing else than the comprehension of the exact mutual relation of the meanings arising out of each word.”

*Sūtra 26.*—*Loke sanniyamūt prayoga-sannikarshāḥ syāt |* “As in secular language the application of words is known, so also in the Veda they convey an understood sense, which has been handed down by tradition.”

The author now proceeds in the next following Sūtras to state and to obviate certain objections raised to his dogmas of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

*Sūtra 27.*—*Vedāṁś cha eke sannikarsham purushākhyāḥ |* “Some (the followers of the Nyāya) declare the Vedas to be of recent origin, i.e. not eternal, because the names of men are applied to certain parts of them, as the Kāṭhaka and Kauthuma.”

This Sūtra, with some of those which follow, is quoted in Sāyana’s commentary on the R.V. vol. i. pp. 19 and 20. His explanation of the present Sūtra is as follows:

*Fatha Raghuvamśādayāḥ idānīntanās tathā vedāḥ api | na tu vedāḥ  
anādayāḥ | etāḥ eva veda-kartṛitvena purushāḥ ākhyāyante | Vaiyāsikam*

*Bhāratām Vālmīkiyam Rāmāyaṇam ity atra yathā Bhāratādi-kartritvena Vyāsādayah akhyāyante tathā Kāṭhakām Kauthumaṁ Taittirīyakam ity evam tat-tad-veda-sūkhā-kartṛitvena Kāṭhadinām akhyātatvāt paurush-oyāḥ | Nanu nityānām eva vedānām upādhyāya-vat sampradāya-pravarttakatvena Kāṭhakādi-sāmākhyā syād ity āśankya yukta - antarām sūtrayati | . . . kā tarhi Kāṭhakādy-ākhyāyikāyāḥ gatir ity āśankya sampradāya-pravarttanāt sā iyam upapadyate |*

“Some say, that as the Raghuvāṁśa, etc., are modern, so also are the Vedas, and that the Vedas are not eternal. Accordingly, certain men are named as the authors of the Vedas. Just as in the case of the Mahābhārata, which is called Vaiyāsika (composed by Vyāsa), and the Rāmāyaṇa, which is called Vālmīkiya (composed by Vālmīki), Vyāsa and Vālmīki are indicated as the authors of these poems; so, too, Kāṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittiri are shown to be the authors of those particular Sākhās of the Vedas which bear their names, viz. the Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, and Taittirīya; and consequently those parts of the Vedas are of human composition. After suggesting that the Vedas, though eternal, have received the name of Kāṭhaka, etc., because Kāṭha and others, as teachers, handed them down; he adduces another objection in the next Sūtra.”

The explanation here indicated is accepted a little further on, in the remarks on one of the following Sūtras: “What, then, is the fact in reference to the appellations Kāṭhaka, etc.? It is proved to have arisen from the circumstance that Kāṭha, etc., handed down the Vedas.” I proceed to

*Sūtra 28.—Anitya-darśanāch cha |* “It is also objected that the Vedas cannot be eternal, because we observe that persons, who are not eternal, but subject to birth and death, are mentioned in them. Thus it is said in the Veda ‘Babara Prāvahāṇi desired,’ ‘Kusuruvinda Audḍalaki desired.’ Now, as the sentences of the Veda, in which they are mentioned, could not have existed before these persons were born, it is clear that these sentences had a beginning, and being thus non-eternal, they are proved to be of human composition” (*‘Babarāḥ Prāvahāṇir akāmayata’ ‘Kusuruvindāḥ Audḍalakir akāmayata’ ityādi (vākyānām?) vedeshu darśanāt teshām jananāt prāg imāni vākyāni nūsann iti sādītvād anityatvam paurusheyatvām cha siddham).*

These objections are answered in the following aphorisms:

*Sūtra 29.—Uktam tu śabda-pūrvatvam |* “But the priority—eternity—of sound has been declared, and, by consequence, the eternity of the Veda.”

*Sūtra 30.—Ākhyā pravaohanāt |* “The names, derived from those of particular men, attached to certain parts of the Vedas, were given on account of their studying these particular parts. Thus the portion read by Kaṭha was called *Kāṭhaka*, etc.”

*Sūtra 31.—Parantu śruti-sāmanya-mātram |* “And names occurring in the Veda, which appear to be those of men, are appellations common to other beings besides men.”

“Thus the words *Babara Pra-vahani* are not the names of a man, but have another meaning. For the particle *pra* denotes ‘pre-eminence,’ *vahana* means ‘the motion of sound,’ and the letter *i* represents the agent; consequently the word *pravahani* signifies that ‘which moves swiftly,’ and is applied to the wind, which is eternal. *Babara* again is a word imitating the sound of the wind. Thus there is not even a semblance of error in the assertion that the Veda is eternal” (*Yadyapi Babarāḥ Prāvahānir ity asti parantu śrutih prāvahany ādi-śabdah sāmānyam | anyārthasyāpi vāchakam | tathā hi | “pra” ity asya utkarshāśrayaḥ | “vahanaḥ” śabdasya gatiḥ | i-kāraḥ karītā | tathā cha utkrishṭāgaty-āśrayo vāyu-parāḥ | sa cha anādīḥ | Babarāḥ iti vāyu-śabdānukaranam | iti na anupapatti-gandho ’pi |*).

Before proceeding to the 32nd Sūtra, I shall quote some further illustrations of the 31st, which are to be found in certain passages of the Introduction to Sāyaṇa’s Commentary on the Rig-veda, where he is explaining another section of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras (i. 2, 39 ff.). The passages are as follows (p. 7):

*Anitya-sāmyogad mantrānarthaḥ kym |* “kim te kriṇvanti Kīkaṭeshu”  
*iti mantere Kīkaṭo nāma janapadaḥ āmnataḥ |* Tathā Naichāśakhaṁ nāma  
*nagaram Pramagando nāma rājā ity ete rthāḥ anityāḥ āmnataḥ |* Tathā  
*sha sati prāk Pramagandād na ayam mantro bhūta-pūrvāḥ iti gamyate |*  
 And in p. 10: *Yad apy uktam Pramagandādy - anityārtha - sāmyogād*  
*mantrasya anādītvām na syād iti tatrottaram sūtrayati |* “ Uktas chā-  
*ntyā-sāmyogaḥ” iti | prathama-pādasya antimādhikarane so ‘yam anitya-*  
*sāmyoga-doshāḥ uktāḥ parihrītāḥ |* Tathā hi | tatra pūrva-pakṣe *Vedā-*  
*nam paurusheyatvām vaktūm Kāṭhakām Kālāpakām ity-ādi-purusha-*  
*amalandhābhidhānam hetūkritya “anitya-darśanāch cha” iti hetv-antaram*

sūtritam | “*Babarāḥ prāvāhanīr akāmayata*” ity anityānām Babarādinām arthānām darśanāt tataḥ pūrvam asattvāt paurusheyo vedah iti tasya uttarām sūtritam “*paraṁ tu śruti-sāmānya-mātram*” iti | tasya ayam arthaḥ | yat Kāṭhakādi-samākhyānām tat *pravachana-nimittam* | yat tu param Babarādy-anitya-darśanām tat śabda-sāmānya-mātram na tu tatra Babarākhyāḥ kaśchit purusho vivakṣitaḥ | kintu “*babara*” iti śabdām kurvan vāyur abhidhīyate | sa cha *prāvāhanīḥ* | *prakarshena* vahana-śīlaḥ | Evam anyatrāpy uhanīyam |

“It is objected that the mantras are useless, because they are connected with temporal objects. Thus in the text, ‘what are thy cows doing among the Kikatas?’<sup>66</sup> a country called Kikata is mentioned, as well as a city named Naichaśākha, and a king called Pramaganda, all of them non-eternal objects. Such being the case, it is clear that this text did not exist before Pramaganda.” The answer to this is given in p. 10 : To the further objection that the mantras cannot be eternal, because such temporal objects as Pramaganda, etc., are referred to in them, an answer is given in the following Sūtra : ‘The connection with non-eternal objects has been already explained.’ In the last section of the first chapter, this very objection of the hymns being connected with non-eternal things has been stated and obviated (see above, Sūtras 28–31). For in the statement of objections, after it has first been suggested as a proof of the human origin of the Vedas, that they bear names, Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., denoting their relation to men, a further difficulty is stated in a Sūtra, viz., that ‘it is noticed that non-eternal objects are mentioned in the Vedas ;’ as, for example, where it is said that ‘Babara Prāvāhanī desired.’ Now, as it specifies non-eternal objects of this kind, the Veda, which could not have existed before those objects, must be of human composition. The answer to this is given in the aphorism, ‘any further names are to be understood as common to other things.’ The meaning is this : the names Kāṭhaka, etc., are given to the Vedas because they are expounded by Kāṭha, etc. ; and the further difficulty arising from the names of Babara and other objects supposed to be non-eternal, is removed by such names being common to other objects [which are eternal in their nature]. No persons called Babara, etc., are intended by those names, but the wind, which makes the sound babara, is so designated. And *prāvāhanī* refers

<sup>66</sup> See the First Volume of this work, p. 342, and the Second Volume, p. 362.

to the same object, as it means that which carries swiftly. The same method of explanation is to be applied in other similar cases.”

I proceed to the 32nd Sūtra. It is asked how the Veda can constitute proof of duty when it contains such incoherent nonsense as the following: “An old ox, in blanket and slippers, is standing at the door and singing benedictions. A Brāhmaṇa female, desirous of offspring, asks, ‘Pray, o king, what is the meaning of intercourse on the day of the new moon?’ or the following: ‘the cows celebrated this sacrifice’” (*Nanu “Jaradgavo kambala-pādukābhyaṁ dvāri sthito gāyati mangalani*<sup>87</sup> | *tam brāhmaṇī prichhati puttra-kūmā rājann amāyāñ labhanasya ko'rthaḥ*” | *iti* | “*gāvo vai etat satram āsata*” *ity-ādinām asambaddha-pralāpanām vede sattvāt kathāñ sa dharme pramāṇam*). A reply is contained in

*Sūtra 32.—Krite vā viniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ sambandhāt* | “The passages to which objection is taken may be applicable to the duty to be performed, from the relation in which they stand to the ceremony” (as eulogistic of it).

As a different reading and interpretation of this Sūtra are given by Sāyana in his commentary, p. 20, I shall quote it, and the remarks with which he introduces and follows it:

*Nanu vede kvachid evām śrūyate “vanaspatayah satram āsata sarpaḥ satram āsata” iti | tatra vanaspatinām achetanatvāt sarpāṇām chetanatvē ‘pi vidyā-rahitatvād na tad-anushṭhānañ sambhavati | Ato “Jaradgavo gāyati madrakāṇi” ityādy-unmatta-bāla-vākyā-sadṛisatvāt kenachit krito vedah ity āśanka uttarañ sūtrayati | “Krite cha aviniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ samatvāt” | Yadi jyotishṭomādi-vākyāñ kenachit purushena kri-yeta tadānīm krite tasmin vākye svarga-sādhanatvē jyotishṭomasya vini-yogaḥ na syāt | sādhyā-sādhana-bhāvasya purushena jnātum āśakyatvāt | śrūyate tu viniyogaḥ | “jyotishṭomena svarga-kāmo yajeta” iti | na oha etat unmatta-vākyā-sadṛiśāñ laukika-vidhi-vākyā-vai bhāvya-karāneti-kartavyatā-rūpāis tribhir amāśair upetāyah bhāvanāyāh avagamāt | loke hi “brāhmaṇān bhojayed” iti vīdhau kiñ kena katham ity ākānkshāyāñ*

<sup>87</sup> In his commentary on the following aphorism Śabara Svāmin gives only a part of this quotation, consisting of the words *Jaradgavo gāyati mattakāni*, “An old ox singing senseless words;” and adds the remark: *kathāñ nāma jaradgavo gāyet*, “How, now, can an old ox sing?” We must not therefore with the late Dr. Ballantyne take *Jaradgava* for a proper name.

*triptim uddiṣya odanena dravyena śāka-sūpādi-pariveshaṇa-prakāreṇa iti  
yathā uchyate jyotiṣṭoma-vidhāv api svargam uddiṣya somena dravyena  
dikṣhanīyādy-angopakāra-prakāreṇa ity ukte katham unmatta-vākyā-  
sadrīśam bhaved iti | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyam api na tat-sudrīśam  
tasya satra-karmano jyotiṣṭomādinā samatvāt | yat-paro hi śabdaḥ sa  
śabdārthaḥ iti nyāya-vidaḥ dhuḥ | jyotiṣṭomādi-vākyasya vidhāyatvād  
anushṭhāne tātparyam | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyasya arthavādatvād  
praśāmsayām tātparyam | sā cha avidyamānenāpi kartuṁ śakyate | ahe-  
tanāḥ avidvāṁso 'pi satram anushṭhitavantāḥ kim punaś chetanāḥ viḍvāṁso  
brāhmaṇāḥ iti satra-stutih |*

“ But it will be objected that the Veda contains such sentences as this: ‘ trees and serpents sat down at a sacrifice.’ Now, since trees are insensible, and serpents, though possessing sensibility, are destitute of knowledge, it is inconceivable that either the one or the other should celebrate such a ceremony. Hence, from its resembling the silly talk of madmen and children, as where it says, ‘ An old ox sings songs (fit only for the Madras?)’ (see the Second Volume of this work, pp. 481 ff.), the Veda must have been composed by some man. The answer to this doubt is contained in the following Sūtra (which I can only render by a paraphrase): ‘ If prescribed by mere human authority, no rite can have any efficacy; but such ceremonies as the jyotiṣṭoma rest on the authority of the Veda; and narrative texts such as that regarding the trees and serpents have the same intention as precepts, i.e. to recommend sacrifice.’ If the sentence enjoining the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice had been composed by any man then, as the sentence was so composed, the sacrifice so enjoined would not have been applicable as a means of attaining paradise; for no man could know either the end, or the means of accomplishing it. But the application in question is prescribed in the Veda by the words ‘ let him, who seeks paradise, sacrifice with the jyotiṣṭoma.’ Now this injunction does not resemble the talk of a madman, since we recognize in it, as in injunctions of a secular kind, the contemplation of the three characteristics of the action to be performed, viz. its end, means, and mode. For, as when a question is put in regard to the object for which, the instrument through which, and the manner in which the precept, ‘ to feed Brahmins,’ is to be fulfilled, we are told that the object is to be their satisfaction, the instrumental substance boiled rice, and the manner, that it is to be served up with

vegetables and condiments;—in the same way, in the Vedic injunction regarding the jyotishṭoma, we are told that paradise is the object, that soma is the instrumental substance, and that the application of the introductory and other portions of the ritual is the manner. And when this is so, how can this precept be compared to the talk of a madman? Nor does the sentence regarding trees, etc., celebrating a sacrifice, admit of such a comparison, since the sacrifice in question is similar to the jyotishṭoma and other such rites. For logicians say that the meaning of a word is the sense which it is intended to intimate. The purport of the sentence regarding the jyotishṭoma, which is of a preceptive character, is to command performance. The object of the sentence regarding trees, etc., attending at a sacrifice, which is of a narrative character, is eulogy; and this can be offered even by a thing which has no real existence. The sacrifice is eulogized by saying that it was celebrated even by insensible trees and ignorant serpents: how much more, then, would it be celebrated by Brāhmans possessed both of sensation and knowledge!"

The following passage from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, a treatise containing a summary of the doctrines of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, by Mādhava Āchāryya, the brother of Sāyaṇa Āchāryya (see above, p. 66) repeats some of the same reasonings contradicting the idea that the Veda had any personal author (i. 1, 25, 26):

*Paurusheyaṁ na vā veda - vākyam syāt paurusheyatā | Kāṭhakādi-samākhyānād vākyatvāch chānya-vākyā-vat | Samākhyā 'dhyāpakatvena vākyatvām tu parāhatam | Tatkartr-anupalambhena syāt tato 'paurusheyatā | Kāṭhakaṁ Kauthumāṁ Taittirīyakam ityādi samākhyā tat-tad-veda-vishayā loke drishṭā | taddhita - pratyayaś cha tena proktam ity ceminn arthe varttate | tathā sati Vyāsena proktam Vaiyāsikam Bhāratam ity-ādāv iva paurusheyatam pratīyate | kinoha | vimatām veda-vāk-yam paurusheyam | vākyatvāt | Kālidāsādi-vākyā-vad iti prāpte brāhmaḥ | adhyayana-samprādya-pravarttakatvena samākhyā upapadyate | Kālidāsādi-grantheshu tat-sargāvasāne karittāraḥ upalabhyante | tathā vedasyāpi paurusheyatve tat-karttā upalabhyeta na cha upalabhyate | ato vākyatvāhetuḥ pratikūla-tarka-parāhataḥ | tasmād apaurusheyo vedah | tathā sati purusha-buddhi-kritasya aprāmānyasya anāśankānyatvād vidhi-vākyasya dharme prāmānyam susthitam |<sup>as</sup>*

<sup>as</sup> I have extracted this passage from Prof. Goldstücker's text of the Nyāya-mālā-

“[Verses] ‘Is the word of the Veda derived from a personal author or not? It must (some urge) be so derived, since (1) it bears the names of Kāṭhaka, etc., and (2) has the characters of a sentence, like other sentences. No (we reply); for (1) the names arose from particular persons being teachers of the Vedas, and (2) the objection that the Vedic precepts have the characters of common sentences is refuted by other considerations. The Veda can have no personal author, since it has never been perceived to have had a maker.’ [Comment] It is objected (1) that the names Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīyaka, etc., are applied in common usage to the different Vedas; and the taddhita affix by which these appellations are formed, denotes ‘uttered by’ [Kaṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittiri] (comp. Pāṇini, iv. 3, 101). Such being the case, it is clear that these parts of the Vedas are derived from a personal author, like the Mahābhārata, which is styled Vaiyāsika, because it was uttered by Vyāsa, etc. And further (2), the sentences of the Veda, being subject to different interpretations, must have had a personal author, because they have the properties of a sentence, like the sentences of Kālidāsa, etc. To this we reply (1), the name applied to any Veda originates in the fact that the sage whose name it bears, was an agent in transmitting the study of that Veda. But (2) in the books of Kālidāsa and others, the authors are discoverable [from the notices] at the end of each section. Now if the Veda also were the composition of a personal author, the composer of it would, in like manner, be discoverable; but such is not the case. Hence, the objection that the Veda partakes of the nature of common sentences is refuted by opposing considerations. Consequently the Veda is not the work of a personal author. And such being the case, as we cannot suspect in it any fallibility occasioned by the defects of human reason, the preceptive texts of the Veda are demonstrated to be authoritative in questions of duty.”

II.—*Vedārtha-prakāśa*. The verses just quoted are repeated in the *Vedārtha-prakāśa* of Mādhaba on the Taittirīya Sanhitā (p. 26), with a various reading at the beginning of the third line, viz. “*samākhyānam pravachanāt*” instead of “*samākhyā dhyāpakatvena*.” The comment by which the verses are explained in the same work, is as follows:

*Vālmīkiyām Vaiyāsikiyam ityādi-samākhyānād Rāmāyanā-Bhāratā-vistara*; and I am indebted to the same eminent scholar for some assistance in my translation of it.

*dikāñ yathā paurusheyam tathā Kāthakañ Kauthumañ Taittirīyam ity-  
ādi-samākhyānād vedah paurusheyah | kincha veda-vākyam paurusheyam  
vākyatvāt Kālidāsi-vedah paurusheyah | maivam | sampradāya-pravṛiti-  
tyā samākhyopapatteḥ | Vākyatva-hetus tv anupalabdhī-viruddha-kālātya-  
yāpadishṭāḥ | Yathā Vyāsa-Vālmiki-prabhṛitayas tad-grantha-nirmāṇā-  
vasare kaiścid upalabdhāḥ anyair apy avichhinna-sampradāyena upa-  
labhyante | na tathā veda-karttā purushāḥ kaścid upalabdhāḥ | prat-  
yuta vedasya nityatvaṁ śruti-smritibhyām pūrvam udāhritam | Parā-  
mātmā tu veda-karttā 'pi na laukika-purushāḥ | tasmāt karttri-doshā-  
bhāvād nāsty aprāmānya-śankā |*

"It may be said (1) that as the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, and other such books, are regarded as the works of personal authors from the epithets Vālmikiya (composed by Vālmiki), Vaiyāsikīya (composed by Vyāsa), etc., which they bear, so too the Veda must have had a similar origin, since it is called by the appellations of Kāthaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīya, etc.; and further (2), that the sentences of the Veda must have had this origin, because they possess the properties of a common sentence, like those of Kālidāsa and others. But these objections are unfounded, for (1) the appellations of those parts of the Veda are derived from the sages who were agents in transmitting the study of them; and (2) the objection about the Veda having the properties of a common sentence is opposed to the fact that no author was ever perceived, and so proceeds upon an erroneous generalization.<sup>89</sup> For though Vyāsa and Vālmiki, etc., when employed in the composition of their respective works, were perceived by some persons to be so en-

<sup>89</sup> This phrase thus translated (*kālātyayāpadishṭā*) is a technical term in the Nyāya philosophy, denoting one of the *hetv-abhāsas*, or "mere semblances of reasons," and is thus defined in the Nyāya-sūtras, i. 49, *Kālātyayāpadishṭāh kālātiṭāḥ*, which Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Nyāya, p. 42) thus explains: "That [semblance of a reason] is mis-timed, which is adduced when the time is not [that when it might have availed]. [For example, suppose one argues that] fire does not contain heat, because it is factitious, [his argument is mis-timed if we have already ascertained by the superior evidence of the senses that fire does contain heat]." It does not, however, appear, how the essential validity of an argument can depend at all on the time when it is adduced, as is justly observed by Professor Goldstucker, who has favoured me with his opinion on the sense of the phrase. After consulting the commentary of Vātsyāyana in loco, he thinks the aphorism (which is not very distinctly explained by the commentators) must denote the erroneous transference of a conclusion deduced from the phenomena happening at one "time," i.e. belonging to one class of cases, to another class which does not exhibit, or only apparently exhibits, the same phenomena; in short, a vicious generalization.

gaged, and are known by others also [in after ages] to be the authors, from the existence of an unbroken tradition to that effect;—no human author of the Veda has ever been perceived. On the contrary, we have formerly shown that the eternity of the Veda is declared both by itself and by the Smriti. And even if the Supreme Spirit be the maker of it, still he is not a mundane person; and consequently, as no defect exists in the maker, there is no reason to suspect fallibility in his work."

No notice has been taken by these commentators of an objection which might have been raised to the validity of this reasoning, viz. that the hymns of the Rich and other Vedas are all set down in the Anukramanis, or indices to those works, as being uttered by particular rishis; the rishis being, in fact, there defined as those whose words the hymns were—*yasya vākyam sa rishiḥ*.<sup>90</sup> (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 26, or p. 12 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) Though, however, this objection has not been alluded to in any of the preceding passages, an answer has been provided to it in the well-known assertion of the orthodox Indian writers that the rishis did not compose, but only saw and afterwards repeated the hymns and other parts of the Vedas, which had in reality pre-existed from eternity.

Thus, in the Vedārtha-prakāsa on the Taittirīya Sanhitā, p. 11, it is said: *Atindriyārtha-drashṭārakṛ rishayah | Teshāṁ veda-drashṭṛtvāṁ smaryate | Yugānte 'ntarhitān<sup>91</sup> Vedān setihāsān maharshayah | Lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujnātāḥ svayambhuvā |* (Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, verse 7660. See above, p. 49.) "The rishis were seers of things beyond the reach of the bodily senses. The fact of their seeing the Vedas is recorded in the Smṛiti: 'The great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, formerly obtained, through devotion, the Vedas and the Itihāsas which had disappeared at the end of the [preceding] Yuga.'

So, too, Manu (as already quoted, Vol. I. p. 394) says, in similar, although more general language: *Prajāpatir idāṁ śāstrām tapasaivā-srijat prabhūḥ | Tathaiva vedān rishayas tapasā pratipedire |* "Prajāpati created this Śāstra (the Institutes of Manu) by austere-fervour (*tapas*); and by the same means the rishis obtained the Vedas."

<sup>90</sup> Some passages from the Nirukta on this subject will be quoted in a later part of this volume.

<sup>91</sup> The text of the Biblioth. Ind. reads *tarhi tān*. I have followed the M. Bh., which evidently gives the true reading.

The following extract from the account of the Pūrva-mīmānsā philosophy, given in the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha of Mādhyava Ācharyya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 127 ff.), contains a fuller summary of the controversy between the Mīmānsakas and the Naiyāyikas respecting the grounds on which the authority of the Veda should be regarded as resting :

*Syād etat | vedasya katham apaurusheyatvam abhidhīyate | tat-prati-pādaka-pramāṇābhāvāt katham manyethāḥ apaurusheyāḥ vedāḥ | sampradāyāvichchhedē saty asmaryyamāna-karttṛikatvād ātma-vad iti | tad etad mandaṁ viśeshanāsiddheḥ | paurusheya-veda-vādibhiḥ pralaye sampradāya - vichchhedasya kakshikaraṇāt | kincha kim idam asmaryyamāna-karttṛikatvān nāma | apratiyamāna - karttṛikatvam asmarāṇa - gochara-karttṛikatvān vā | na prathamaḥ kalpaḥ Paramēśvarasya karttūḥ pramiter abhyupagamāt | na dvitīyo vikalpāsaḥatvāt | tathā hi | kim ekena asmarānam abhipreyate sarvair vā | na ādyah | “yo dharma-ślo jīta-māna-roshah” ityādīshu muktakoktishu vyabhichārāt | na dvitīyah | sarvāsmaraṇasya asarvajna-durjnānatvāt |*

*Paurusheyatve pramāṇa-sambhavāḥ cha veda-vākyāni paurusheyāni | vākyatvāt | Kālidāsādi-vakya-vat | veda-vākyāni āpta-pranītāni | pramāṇatve sati vākyatvād Manv-ādi-vākyā-vad iti |*

*Nanu | “Vedasyādhyayanañ sarvān gurv-adhyayana-pūrvakam | vedādhyayana-sāmānyād adhunā ‘dhyayanañ yathā’” | ity anumānam prati sādhanam pragalbhate iti chet | tad api na pramāṇa-kotim praveshetum iṣṭe | “Bhāratādhyayanañ sarvam gurv-adhyayana-pūrvakam | Bhāratādhyayanatvena sāmpratādhyayanañ yathā” iti ābhāsa-samāna-yoga-kshemavāt | nanu tatra Vyāsaḥ karttā iti smarryate “ko hy anyah Puṇḍarīkākshād Mahābhārata-krid bhavet” ity-ādāv iti chet | tad asāram | “richaḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāñsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata” iti purusha-sūkte vedasya sa-karttṛikatā-pratipādanāt |*

*Kinohā anityāḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyavatte sati asmad-ādi-vāhyendriyagrāhyatvād ghaṭa-vat | nanv idam anumānañ sa evāyañ ga-kāraḥ ity pratyabhijñā-pramāṇa-pratihitam iti chet | tad ati phalgu “luna-punar-jato-keśa-dalita-kund”-ādāv iva pratyabhijñāyāḥ sāmānya-vishayatvena bādhakatvābhāvāt |*

*Nanu aśarīrasya Paramēśvarasya tālv-ādi-sthānābhāvena varṇochchā-ranāsambhavāt kathaṁ tat-praṇītavān vedasya syād iti chet | na tad bhadram svabhāvato 'śarīrasyāpi tasya bhaktanugrahārthām līlā-vigraha-*

*graḥaṇa - sambhavāt | tasmād vedasya apaurusheyatva-vācho yuktir na yuktā iti chet |*

*Tatra samādhānam abhidhīyate | Kim idam paurusheyatvām sisādhayishitam | purushād utpannatva-mātram | yathā asmad-ādibhir ahar ahar uchchāryyamāṇasya vedasya | pramāṇāntareṇa artham upalabhyā tat-prakāśanāya rachitatvān vā | yathā asmad-ādibhir iva nibadhyamāṇasya prabandhasya | prathame na vipratipattiḥ | charame kim anumāna-balāt tat-sādhanam āgama-balād vā | na ādyah | Mālatī-mādhavādi-vākyeshu savyabhichāratvāt | atha pramāṇatve sati iti vīśishyate iti chet | tad api na viपaśchito manasi vaiśadyam āpadyate | pramāṇāntarāgocharārtha-pratipādakaṁ hi vākyām Veda-vākyam | tat pramāṇāntara-gocharārtha-pratipādakam iti sādhyamāne “mama mātā bandhyā” iti vad vyāghātā-pātāt | kincha Parameśvarasya līlā - vīgraha - parigrahābhūyupagame 'py atīndriyārtha-darśanām na sanjāghaṭīti deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛish-tārtha-grahanopāyābhūvāt | na cha tach-chakshur-ādikam eva tādrik-pratiti-janana-kshamam iti mantavyam | drishṭānusārenāira kalpanāyāḥ āśrayanīyatvāt | tad uktām Gurubhiḥ sarvajna - nirākarana - relāyām “yatrāpy atīśayo drishṭāḥ sa svārthānatilanghanāt | dūra-sūkṣmādi-drishṭau syād na rūpe śrotra-vṛittitā” iti | ataḥ eva na āgama-balāt tat-sādhanam | .*

“Tena proktam” iti Pāṇīng-anuśāsane jāgraty api Kāṭhaka-Kālāpa-Taittirīyam ityādi-samākhya adhyayana-sampradāya-pravarttaka-vishayatvena upapadyate | tad-vad atrāpi sampradāya-pravarttaka-vishayatvenāpy upapadyate | na cha anumāna-balāt śabdasya anityatva-siddhiḥ | pratyabhijñā-virodhāt | . . . .

Nanv idam pratyabhijñānām gatvādi-jāti-vishayaṁ na gādi-vyakti-vishayaṁ tāsām prati-purusham bhedopalambhād | anyathā “Somaśarmā ‘dhīte” iti vibhāgo na syād iti chet | tad api śobhām na bibhartti gādi-vyakti-bhede pramāṇābhūvena gatvādi-jāti-vishaya-kalpanāyām pramāṇābhavāt | Yathā gatvam ajānataḥ ekam eva bhinna-deśa-parimāṇa-saṁsthāna-vyakty-upadhāna-vasād bhinna-deśam iva alpam iva mahād iva dirgham iva vāmanam iva prathate tathā ga-vyaktim ajānataḥ ekā 'pi vyanjaka-bhedāt tat-tad-dharmānubandhinī pratibhāṣatे | etena virudhā-dharmādhyāsād bheda - pratibhāṣah iti pratyuktam | tatra kiṁ svābhāviko viruddha-dharmādhyāśo bheda-sādhakatvena abhimataḥ prāttīkī vā | prathame asiddhiḥ | aparathā svābhāvika-bhēdābhūyupagame daśa ga-kārān udachārayat Chaitra iti prattipattiḥ syād na tu daśa-

*kṛitvo ga-kāraḥ iti | dovitīye tu na svābhāvika-bheda-siddhiḥ | na hi paropādhi-bhedena svābhāvikam aikyaṁ vihanyate | mā bhūd nabhaso 'pi kumbhādy-upādhi-bhedaḥ svābhāviko bhedaḥ | . . . . tad uktam āchāryayaiḥ | 'prayojanaṁ tu yaj jātes tad varṇād eva labhyate | vyakti-labhyam tu nādebhyaḥ iti gatvādi-dhīr vṛithā' iti | tathā cha "pratyabhijñā yadā śabde jāgarti niravagrahā | anityatvānumānāni saiva sarvāṇi bādhate" | . . . . tatas cha vedasya apaurushyatayā nirasta-samasta-śankūkalankānkuratvena svataḥ siddhaṁ dharmo prāmānyam iti sushitim |*

"Be it so. But how [the Naiyāyikas may ask] is the Veda alleged to be underived from any personal author? How can you regard the Vedas as being thus underived, when there is no evidence by which this character can be substantiated? The argument urged by you Mi-mānsakas is, that while there is an unbroken tradition, still no author of the Veda is remembered, in the same way as [none is remembered] in the case of the soul (or self). But this argument is very weak, because the asserted characteristics [unbrokenness of tradition, etc.] are not proved; since those who maintain the personal origin [*i.e.* origin from a person] of the Veda, object that the tradition [regarding the Veda] was interrupted at the dissolution of the universe (*pralaya*).<sup>92</sup> And further: what is meant by the assertion that no author of the Veda is remembered? Is it (1) that no author is believed? or (2) that no author is the object of recollection? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since it is acknowledged [by us] that God (*Parameśvara*) is proved to be the author. Nor can the second alternative be admitted, as it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, viz. Is it meant (*a*) that no author of the Veda is recollected by some one person, or (*b*) by any person whatever? The former supposition breaks down, since it fails when tried by such detached stanzas as this, 'he who is religious, and has overcome pride and anger,' etc.<sup>93</sup> And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever.

<sup>92</sup> This objection occurs in a passage of the *Kusumānjali*, which I shall quote further on.

<sup>93</sup> I do not know from what work this verse is quoted, or what is its sequel. To prove anything in point, it must apparently go on to assert that such a saint as is here described remembers the author of the Veda, or at least has such superhuman faculties as would enable him to discover the author.

" And moreover, [the Naiyāyikas proceed], the sentences of the Veda must have originated with a personal author, as proof exists that they had such an origin, since they have the character of sentences, like those of Kālidāsa and other writers. The sentences of the Veda have been composed by competent persons, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

" But [ask the Mīmānsakas] may it not be assumed that, ' All study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character, which was the same in former times as now; ' " and that this inference has force to prove [that the Veda had no author or was eternal]? Such reasoning [the Naiyāyikas answer] is of no force as proof, [for it might be urged, with an equal show of reason, that] ' All study of the Mahābhārata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Mahābhārata, from the mere fact of its being such, [must have had the same character in former times] as it has now; ' and the advantage of such an argument is simply illusory. But the [Mīmānsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases of the Veda and the Mahābhārata, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishnu incarnate as] Vyāsa was the author of the latter,—according to such texts as this, ' Who else than Pundarikāksha (the lotus-eyed Vishnu) could be the maker of the Mahābhārata? ' (see above, p. 39),—[whilst nothing of this sort is recorded in any Sāstra in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is powerless, since it is proved by these words of the Purushasūkta, ' From him sprang the Rich and Sāman verses and the metres, and from him the Yajush verses,' (above, p. 3) that the Veda had a maker.

" Further [proceed the Naiyāyikas] we must suppose that sound [on the eternity of which the eternity and uncreatedness of the Veda depend] is not eternal, since, while it has the properties belonging to a

<sup>44</sup> The purport of this verse is, that as every generation of students of the Veda must have been preceded by an earlier generation of teachers, and as there is no reason to assume any variation in this process by supposing that there ever had been any student who taught himself; we have thus a *regressus ad infinitum*, and must of necessity conclude that the Vedas had no author, but were eternal.

genus, it can, like a jar, be perceived by the external organs of beings such as ourselves. But [rejoin the Mīmānsakas], is not this inference of yours refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter G [for example] as the same we have heard before? This argument [replies the Naiyāyika] is extremely weak, for the recognition in question having reference to a community of species,—as in the case of such words as ‘hairs cut and grown again, or of full-blown jasmine,’ etc.,—has no force to refute my assertion [that letters are not eternal].

“But [asks the Mīmānsaka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara (‘God’), who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot be conceived to have pronounced the letters [of which it is composed]? This objection [answers the Naiyāyika] is not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet, by way of sport, assume a body, in order to shew kindness to his devoted worshippers. Consequently, the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive.

“I shall now [says the Mīmānsaka] clear up all these difficulties. What is meant by this *paurushayatva* (‘derivation from a personal author’) which it is sought to prove? Is it (1) mere procession (*utpannatva*) from a person (*purusha*), like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, in the sense in which persons like ourselves compose a treatise? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute. If the second sense be meant, I ask whether the Veda is proved [to be authoritative] in virtue (*a*) of its being founded on inference, or (*b*) of its being founded on supernatural information (*āgama-balāt*)? The former alternative (*a*) [*i.e.* that the Veda derives its authority from being founded on inference] cannot be correct, since this theory breaks down, if it be applied to the sentences of the Mālatī Mādhava or any other secular poem [which may contain inferences destitute of authority]. If, on the other hand, you say (*b*), that the contents of the Veda are distinguished from those of other books by having authority, this explanation also will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the word of the Veda is [defined to be] a word which proves things that are not

provable by any other evidence. Now if it could be established that this Vedic word did nothing more than prove things that are provable by other evidence, we should be involved in the same sort of contradiction as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we conceded that Parameśvara might in sport assume a body, it would not be conceivable that [in that case] he should perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature. Nor is it to be thought that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, since men can only attain to conceptions corresponding with what they have perceived. This is what has been said by the Guru (Prabhākara) when he refutes [this supposition of] an omniscient author : ‘ Whenever any object is perceived [by the organ of sight] in its most perfect exercise, such perception can only have reference to the vision of something very distant or very minute, since no organ can go beyond its own proper objects, as e.g. the ear can never become cognizant of form.’ Hence the authority of the Veda does not arise in virtue of any supernatural information [acquired by the Deity in a corporeal shape].

“ Without any contravention<sup>95</sup> of the rule of Pāṇini (iv. 3, 101; see above, p. 83) that the grammatical affix with which the words Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taittiriya are formed, imparts to those derivatives the sense of ‘ uttered by ’ Kāṭha, Kalāpa, etc., it is established that the names first mentioned have reference [not to those parts of the Veda being composed by the sages in question, but] to the fact that these sages instituted the practice of studying those parts of the Veda. Hero also these appellations ought to be understood in the same manner, as referring to the fact of those sages being the institutors of the study of the Veda; and we are not to think that the eternity of sound [or of the words of the Veda] is disproved by the force of any inference [to be drawn from those names], since this would be at variance with the recognition [of letters as the same we knew before] (see above, Mimānsa Sūtras, i. 19 f., p. 75). . . .

“ But [the Naiyāyikas will ask] does not the recognition [of G and other letters as the same we knew before] refer to them as belonging to the [same] species, and not as being the [same] individual letters, since, in fact, they are perceived to be different [as uttered by] each

<sup>95</sup> Literally “ although the rule of Pāṇini be awake.”

person,—for otherwise it would be impossible for us to make any distinction [between different readers, as when we say], ‘Somaśarman is reading?’ This objection, however, shines as little as its predecessors, and has been answered in this way, viz. that as there is no proof of any distinction of individuality between G’s, etc., there is no evidence that we ought to suppose any such thing as a species of G’s, etc. [*i.e.* of G’s and other letters each constituting a species]. Just as to the man who is ignorant that G’s constitute a species, [that letter], though one only, becomes, through distinction of place, magnitude, form, individuality, and position, variously modified as distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, or as short, in the same way, to the man who is ignorant of an individuality of G’s, [*i.e.* of G’s being numerically different from each other], this letter, though only one, appears, from the distinction existing between the different persons who utter it, to be connected with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way erroneously ascribed [to the letter G], there is a fallacious appearance of distinctness [between different G’s]. But does this ascription of contrary characters which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between G’s] result from (1) the nature of the thing, or (2) from mere appearance? There is no proof of the first alternative, as otherwise an inherent difference being admitted between different G’s, it would be established that Chaitra had uttered ten (different) G’s, and not [the same] G ten times. But on the second supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction [between G’s]; for inherent oneness (or identity) is not destroyed by a difference of extrinsic disguises [or characteristics]. We must not conceive, from the merely apparent distinctness [occasioned by the separation of its parts] by jars, etc., that there is any inherent distinctness in the atmosphere itself. . . . It has been said by the Āchāryya ‘The object which the Naiyāyikas seek, by supposing a species, is in fact gained from the letter itself; and the object at which they aim by supposing an individuality in letters, is attained from audible sounds (*i.e.* the separate utterances of the different letters), so that the hypothesis of species, etc., is useless.’ And he thus reaches the conclusion that, ‘since, in respect of sounds (letters), recognition has so irresistible a power, [literally, wakes, unrestrained], it alone repels all inferences against the eternity [of sound, or the Veda].’ After some further

argumentation the Mīmānsaka arrives at the conclusion that “as every imputation of doubt which has germinated has been set aside by the underived character of the Veda, its authority in matters of duty is shewn to be self-evident.”

I shall not attempt to carry further my translation of this abstruse discussion, as the remainder of it contains much which I should find great difficulty in comprehending.<sup>96</sup>

[Although not directly connected with the subject in hand, the following passage from Sankara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, iii. 2, 40,<sup>97</sup> will throw some further light on the doctrines of the Mīmānsā. In the two preceding Sūtras, as explained by Sankara, it had been asserted, both on grounds of reason and on the authority of the Veda, that God is the author of rewards. In the 40th Sūtra a different doctrine is ascribed to Jaimini :

*Dharmaṁ Jaiminir ataḥ eva | Jaiminis tv āchāryyo dharmam phalasya dātāram manyate | ata eva hetoḥ śruter upapatteḥ cha | śrūyate tāvad ayam arthah “svarga-kāmo yajeta” ity evam ādīshu vākyeshu | tatra cha vidhi-śruter vishaya-bhāvopagamād yāgah<sup>98</sup> srargasya utpādakah iti gam-yate | anyathā hy ananushṭhātriko yāgah apadyeta tatra asya upadeśasya vaiyarthyaṁ syat | nanv anukshana-vinaśinah karmāṇah phalaṁ na upapadyade iti parityakto 'yam pakṣah | na esha doshaḥ śruti-prāmānyat | śrutiś chet pramāṇaṁ yathā 'yam karma-phala-sambandhah śrutaḥ upapadyate tathā kalpayitavyah | na cha anutpādya kimapy apūrvam karma vinaśyat kälāntaritam phalaṁ dātuṁ śaknoti ity ataḥ karmano vā sūkshmā kāchid uttarāvasthā phalasya vā pūrvāvasthā apūrvam nāma asti iti tark-yate | upapadyate cha ayam arthaḥ uktena prakārena | Īśvaras tu phalaṁ dadāti ity anupapannam avichitrasya kāraṇasya vichitra-kāryyānupat-teḥ vaishamya-nairghṛinya-prasangād anushṭhāna-vaiyarthyāpatteḥ cha | tāsmād dharmād eva phalam iti |*

“‘Jaimini says that for this reason virtue [is the giver of reward].’ The Āchāryya Jaimini regards virtue [*i.e.* the performance of the prescribed rites and duties] as the bestower of reward. ‘For this reason,’

<sup>96</sup> In fact I have left out some pages of the translation which I had given in the first edition, as well as the corresponding portion of the text. I am indebted to the kindness of Professor Goldstücker for various suggestions towards the improvement of my translation. But two of the passages on which he had favoured me with his opinion are, to my own apprehension, so obscure, that I have omitted them.

<sup>97</sup> It is partly quoted in Prof. Banerjea's work on Hindu Philosophy.

.and because it is proved by the Veda. This is the purport of the Vedic text, ‘Let the man who seeks paradise, sacrifice,’ and others of the same kind. As from this Vedic injunction we must infer the existence of an object [to be sought after] it is concluded that sacrifice has the effect of producing heavenly bliss; for otherwise we should be involved in the absurdity of a sacrifice without a performer [since no one would care to sacrifice without an object], and thus the injunction would become fruitless. But may it not be said that it is not conceivable that any fruit should result from a ceremony which perishes every moment, so that this view must be abandoned? No, this defect does not attach to our Mīmānsaka statement, since the Veda is authoritative. If the Veda be authority, this connection of the reward with the ceremony must be supposed to exist just as is proved by the Veda. But as a ceremony which perishes without generating any unseen virtue, cannot produce a reward at a distant time, it must be concluded that there is either a certain subtle ulterior form of the ceremony, or a certain subtle anterior form of the reward, which is called ‘unseen virtue.’ And this result is established in the manner before mentioned. But it is not proved that God bestows rewards, because it is inconceivable that a uniform Cause [such as He is] should produce various effects, and because the performance of ceremonies would be useless, owing to the partiality and unmercifulness which would attach [to the supposed arbiter of men’s deserts]. Hence it is from virtue alone that reward results.”

How far this passage may be sufficient to prove the atheism of the Mīmānsā, I will not attempt to say. Before we could decide on such a question, the other Sūtras of that school which refer to this question (if there be any such) would have to be consulted.

Professor Banerjea also quotes the following text from the popular work, the Vidvan-modā-taranginī, in which the Mīmānsakas are distinctly charged with atheism:

*Devo na kaścid bhuvanasya karttā bharttā na harttā ’pi cha kaścid  
āste | karmānurūpāni śubhāśubhāni prāpnoti sarvo hi janāḥ phalāni |  
vedāsyā karttā na cha kaścid āste nityāḥ hi śabdāḥ rachanaḥ hi nitya |  
prāmānyam asmin svataḥ eva siddham anādi-siddheḥ parataḥ kathām tat |*

“There is no God, maker of the world; nor has it any sustainer or destroyer; for every man obtains a recompence in conformity with his

works. Neither is there any maker of the Veda, for its words are eternal, and their arrangement is eternal. Its authoritativeness is self-demonstrated, for since it has been established from eternity, how can it be dependent upon anything but itself?"

I learn from Professor Banerjea that the Mīmānsaka commentator Prabhākara and his school treat the Pūrva Mīmānsā as an atheistic system, while Kumārila makes it out to be theistic. In fact<sup>\*</sup> the latter author makes the following complaint at the commencement of his Vārttika, verse 10 : *Prāyenaiva hi Mīmānsā loke lokāyatikritā | tām āstika-pathe karttum ayaṁ yatnah kṛito mayā |* "For in practice the Mīmānsā has been for the most part converted into a Lokāyata<sup>\*\*</sup> (atheistic) system; but I have made this effort to bring it into a theistic path." See also the lines which are quoted from the Padma Purāṇa by Vijnāna Bhikshu, commentator on the Sāṅkhya aphorisms, in a passage which I shall adduce further on.]

It appears from a passage in Patanjali's Mahābhāṣya, that that great grammarian was of opinion that, although the sense of the Veda is eternal, the order of the words has not continued uniform; and that it is from this order having been variously fixed by Kaṭha, Kalāpa, and other sages, that different portions of the Indian scriptures are called by their names.

The following passages from the Mahābhāṣya, and from the Commentaries of Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa thereon, are extracted from the fuller quotations given by Professor Goldstücker in pp. 147 f. of the Preface to his Mānava-kalpa-sūtra.

Patanjali : *Nanu cha uktām "na hi chhandāṁsi kriyante nityāni chhandaṁsi" iti | yadyapy artho nityaḥ | yā tv asau varṇānupūrvī sā anityā tad-bhedāch cha etad bhavati Kāṭhakām Kālāpakam Maudakam Paippalādakam ityādi . . . . |* Kaiyyaṭa : "Nityāni" iti | karttur asmaranāt teshām iti bhāvah | "yā tv asāv" iti | mahāpralayādishi varṇānupūrvī-vināśe punar utpadya rishayah saṁskārātiśayād vedārthaṁ smṛitvā sabda-rachanāḥ vidadhati ity arthaḥ | "tad-bhedād" iti | anupūrvī-bhedād ity arthaḥ | tataś cha Kāṭhādayo vedānupūrvyāḥ karttāraḥ eva ityādi | Nāgojibhaṭṭa : *Aṁśena vedasya nityatvām svīkṛitya aṁśena anityatvam āha "yadyapy arthaḥ" iti | anena vedatvam sabdārthobhaya-vrittī-dhvanitvam | nanu "dhātā yathā pūrvam akalpayad" ityādi-śruti-balena*

<sup>\*</sup> See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 402 ff., or p. 259 ff. of Williams and Norgate's ed.

*ānupūrvī api sā eva iti navya-pūrva-mīmāṃsā-siddhāntāt sā nityā iti ayuktam. ata dha “mahāpralayādīshv” iti | ānupūrvyās tat-tat-kshana-ghatitatvena anityatvam iti bhāvah iti kechit | tan na | “yadyapy artha nityah” ityādi-vākya-śesha-virodhāt | arthasyāpi jyotiṣṭomāder anityatvāt | pravāhāvichchedena nityatvām tu ubhayor api tasmād manvantara-bhedena ānupūrvī bhinnā eva “prati-manvantaram chaishā śrutir anyā vidhiyate\* ity ukter ity anye | pāre tu | “artha nityah” ity atra kṛita-katva-virodhy-anityatvasya eva abhyupagamaḥ pūrva-pakshinā tādriśā-nityatvasya eva chhandassu ukteḥ | evām cha artha-śabdena atra iśvarāḥ | mukhyat�ā tasya eva sarva-veda-tatparyya-vishayatvāt | “vedais̄ cha sarvair aham eva vedyah” iti G<sup>o</sup>-tokter ity āhūḥ | varṇānupūrvyāḥ anityatvē mānam āha “tat-bhedāch cha” iti | anityatva-vyāpya-bhedena tat-siddhiḥ | bhedo 'tra nānātvam | Iśvare tu na nānātvam | bhede mānam vyavakāram āha | “Kāṭhaka” ityādi | arthaikye 'py ānupūrvī-bhedād eva Kāṭhaka-kālāpakādi-vyavahārah iti bhāvah | atra ānupūrvī anityā ity ukteḥ padāni tāny eva iti dhvanitvam | tad āha “tataś cha Kāṭhādayah” ityādi |*

As Professor Goldstücker has only given (in p. 146 of his Preface) a translation of the above extract from Patanjali, and has left the passages from Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa untranslated, I shall give his version of the first, and my own rendering of the two last.

*Patanjali* : “Is it not said, however, that ‘the Vedas are not made, but that they are permanent (*i.e.* eternal)?’ (Quite so); yet though their sense is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same; and it is through the difference in this latter respect that we may speak of the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kalāpas, Mudakas, Pippalādakas, and so on.” *Kaiyyaṭa on Patanjali* : “‘Eternal;’ by this word he means that they are so, because no maker of them is remembered. By the words, ‘the order of their letters,’ etc., it is meant that, the order of the letters being destroyed in the great dissolutions of the universe, etc., the rishis, when they are again created, recollecting, through their eminent science, the sense of the Veda, arrange the order of the words. By the phrase, ‘through the difference of this,’ is meant the difference of order. Consequently, Kaṭha and the other sages [to whom allusion was made] are the authors of the order of the Veda.” *Nāgojibhaṭṭa on Patanjali and Kaiyyaṭa* : “Admitting in part the eternity of the Veda, he, Patanjali, declares in

the words, ‘though the sense is eternal,’ etc., that it (the Veda) is also in part not eternal. By this clause it is implied that the character of the Veda as such is constituted both by the words and by the sense.<sup>99</sup> But is not the order also eternal, since it is a settled doctrine of the modern Mīmānsakas, on the strength of such Vedic texts as this, ‘the creator made them as before,’ etc., that the order also is the very same? No; this is incorrect, and in consequence, he (Kaiyyata) says, ‘in the great dissolutions,’ etc. Some say the meaning of this is, that the order is not eternal, inasmuch as it is formed in particular moments. But this is wrong, because it is opposed to the conclusion of the sentence, ‘though their sense is eternal,’ etc., and because the objects signified also, such as the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, are not eternal. Others say that both the sense and the order of the words are eternal [or permanent], owing to the continuity of the tradition; and that, consequently, it is in different manvantaras that the order of the words is different, according to the text, ‘in every manvantara this śruti (Veda) is made different.’ Others again think that in the words, ‘the sense is eternal,’ etc., an admission is made by an objector of an eternity opposed to the idea of production, since it is only such a [qualified] eternity that is mentioned in the Veda; and that thus the word ‘sense,’ or ‘object’ (*arthaḥ*), here refers to Iśvara, because he is the principal object which is had in view in the whole of the Veda, according to the words of the Bhagavad-gītā (xv. 15), ‘It is I whom all the Vedas seek to know.’ He next states the proof of the assertion that the order of the letters is not eternal, in the words, ‘through the difference of this,’ etc. The difference in the order is proved by the difference in the things included under the category of non-eternity. Difference here means variety. But in Iśvara (God), there is no variety. He declares current usage to be the proof of difference, in the words ‘Kāṭhaka,’ etc., which mean that, though the sense is the same, we use the distinctions of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., in consequence of the difference of arrangement. Here by saying that the order is not eternal, it is implied that the words are the same. And this is what is asserted in the words [of Kaiyyata], ‘consequently Kāṭha and the other sages,’ ” etc.

<sup>99</sup> I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for a correction of my former rendering of this sentence, and of several others in this passage of Nāgojibhāṭṭa.

After quoting these passages at greater length than I have given them, Professor Goldstücker goes on to remark in his note: "I have quoted the full gloss of the three principal commentators, on this important Sūtra [of Pāṇini] and its Vārtikas, because it is of considerable interest in many respects. . . . We see Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa writhing under the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of the Veda with the differences of its various versions, which, nevertheless, maintain an equal claim to infallibility. Patanjali makes rather short work of this much vexed question; and unless it be allowed here to render his expression *varṇa* (which means 'letter'), 'word,' it is barely possible even to understand how he can save consistently the eternity or permanence of the 'sense' of the Veda. That the modern Mīmānsists maintain not only the 'eternity of the sense,' but also the 'permanence of the text,' which is tantamount to the exclusive right of one single version, we learn, amongst others, from Nāgojibhaṭṭa. But as such a doctrine has its obvious dangers, it is not shared in by the old Mīmānsists, nor by Nāgoji, as he tells us himself. He and Kaiyyaṭa inform us therefore that, *amongst other* theories, there is one, according to which the order of the letters (or rather words) in the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas or destructions of the worlds; and since each manvantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of, the Vaidik texts, the various versions known to these commentators represent these successive revelations, which were 'remembered,' through their 'excessive accomplishments,' by the Rishis, who in this manner produced, or rather reproduced, the texts current in their time, under the name of the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kalāpas, and so on. In this way each version had an equal claim to sanctity. There is a very interesting discussion on the same subject by Kumārila, in his *Mīmānsa-vārttika* (i. 3, 10)."

III. *The Vedānta*.—I proceed to adduce the reasonings by which Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma, Sārīraka, or Vedānta Sūtras, as expounded by Sankara Āchāryya in his *Sārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*, or commentary on those Sūtras, defends the eternity and authority of the Veda. His views, as we shall see, are not by any means identical with those of Jaimini and his school. After discussing the question whether any persons but men of the three highest tribes are qualified for divine knowledge, the author of the Sūtras comes to the conclusion

that Sūdras, or persons of the fourth tribe, are incompetent, while beings superior to man, the gods, are competent<sup>100</sup> (Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 348, or p. 223 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) In Sūtra, i. 3, 26, the author determines that the gods have a desire for final emancipation, owing to the transitoriness of their glory, and a capacity for attaining it, because they possess the qualities of corporeality, etc.; and that there is no obstacle which prevents their acquiring divine knowledge. A difficulty, however, having been raised that the gods cannot be corporeal, because, if they were so, it is necessary to conceive that they would be corporeally present (as priests actually are) at the ceremonial of sacrifice, in which they are the objects of worship,—a supposition which would not consist with the usual course of such ceremonies, at which the gods are not seen to be corporeally present, and would, in fact, involve an impossibility, since Indra, for example, being but one, could not be corporeally present at numerous sacrifices at once;—this difficulty is solved (under Sūtra i. 3, 27) in two ways, either by supposing (1) that the gods assume different forms, and are present at many sacrifices at once, although invisible to mortals; or by considering (2) that, as a sacrifice is offered to (and not, by) a deity, many persons may present their oblations to that deity at once, just as one Brāhmaṇa may be saluted by many different persons at the same time. It is, therefore, concluded that the corporeal nature of the gods is not inconsistent with the practice of sacrifice. Having settled these points, Sankara comes to Sūtra i. 3, 28 :

“*S'abde iti chet | na | atah prabhavat | pratyakshānumānābhyaṁ*” |

*Mā nāma vigrahavattve devādīnām abhyupagamyamāne karmani kaśchid virodhaḥ prasanji | śabde tu virodhaḥ prasajyeta | katham | Aut-pattikām hi śabdasya arthena sambandham āśritya “anapekshatvād” iti vedasya prāmānyaṁ sthāpitam | Idānīm tu vigrahavatī devatā 'bhyupagamyamānā yadyapy aiśvaryya-yogād yugapad aneka-karma-sambandhīni haviṁshi bhunjīta tathāpi vigraha-yogād asmad-ādi-vaj janana-maranavatī sā iti nityasya śabdasya anityena arthena nitya-sambandhe pralīyamāne yad vaidike śabde prāmānyaṁ sthitām tasya virodhaḥ syād iti chet | na ayam apy asti virodhaḥ | kasmād “ataḥ prabhavat” | Ataḥ era*

<sup>100</sup> For a discussion of the different question whether the gods can practise the ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas, see the First Volume of this work, p. 365, note.

hi vaidikat̄ śabdād devādikām jagat̄ prabhavati | Nanu “janmādi asya yataḥ” (Brahma Sūtris i. 1, 2) iti brahma-prabhavatvam jagato ’vadhāritam katham iha śubda-prabhavatvam uchyate | Apicā yadi nāma vaidikat̄ śabdād asya prabhavo ’bhupagataḥ katham etāvatā virodhaḥ śabde parihrītaḥ | yāvatā Vasavo Rudrāḥ Ādityāḥ Viśvedevāḥ Marutāḥ ity etc ’rthāḥ anityāḥ eva utpattimattvāt | Tad-anityatvē cha tad-vāchakānām vaidikānām Vasv-ādi-śabdānām anityatvām kena vāryyyate | Prasiddham hi loke Devadattasya putre utpanne Yajnadattaḥ iti tasya nāma kriyate iti | Tasmād virodhāḥ eva śabde iti chet | na | Gavādi-śabdārtha-sambandha-nityatva-darśanāt | Na hi gavādi-vyaktinām ulpattimattvē tad-ākritinām apy utpattimattvām syād dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām hi vyaktayah eva utpad-yante na ākritayah | Ākritibhiḥ cha śabdānām sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ | vyaktinām ānanyat sambandha-grahaṇānupapatteḥ | Vyaktishu utpadya-mānāsv apy ākritinām nityatvād na gavādi-śabdeshu kaścid virodhō driś-yate | Tathā devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhupagane ’pi ākriti-nityatvād na kaścid Vasv-ādi-śabdeshu virodhāḥ iti drashṭavyam | Ākriti-viśeshas tu de-vādinām mantrārthavādādibhyo vigrahavattvādy-avagamād avagantavyaḥ | Sthāna-viśesa-sambandha-nimittāḥ cha Indrādi-śabdāḥ senāpatyādi-śabda-vat | Tataś cha yo yas tat tat sthānam adhitishṭhati sa sa Indrādi-śabdair abhidhīyate iti na dosho bhavati | Na cha idāṁ śabda-prabhavat-vam Brahma-prabhavatra-vad upādāna-karaṇatvābhīprāyeṇa uchyate | katham tarhi sthiti-vāchakātmanā nitye śabde nityārtha-sambandhini śabda-ryavāhāra-yogyārtha-vyakti-nishpattir “ataḥ prabhavaḥ” ity uch-yate | katham punar avagamyate śabdāt prabhavati jagad iti | “pratyakshānumānābhyām” | Pratyakṣham śrutiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati anape-kshatrāt | anumānām smṛtiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati sāpekshatvāt | Te hi śabda-pūrvām sṛiṣṭim darśayataḥ | “Ele” iti vai prajāpatir devān asrijata “asrīgram” iti manushyān “indavaḥ” iti pitṛīḥ “tiraḥ pavi-tram” iti grahān “āśavāḥ” iti stotram “viśvāni” iti śastram “abhi saubhagā” ity anyāḥ prajāḥ iti śrutiḥ | Tathā “nyatrāpi “sa manasā vācham mithunām samabhavad” (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa x. 6, 5, 4, and Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 50) ityādinā tatra tatra śabda-pūrvikā sṛiṣṭih śrāvyate | Smritir api “anādi-nidhanā nityā vāg utsṛiṣṭā svayambhuvaḥ | ādau vedamayī dīryā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravrīttayah” ity utsargo ’py ayaśc vāchāḥ sampradāya-pravarttanātmako drashṭavyaḥ anādi-nidhanā-yāḥ anyādriśasya utsargasya asambhavat | Tathā “nāma rūpām cha bhū-tānām karmaṇām cha pravarttanam | Veda-śabdebhya evādau nirmame sa

*maheśvaraḥ*" iti | "sarveshāṁ cha sa nāmāni karmāṇī cha prīthak prīthak | Veda-śabdebhya evādau prithak saṁsthāś cha nirmame" iti cha | Apicha chikirshitam artham anutishṭhan tasya vāchakaṁ śabdam pūrvam smṛitvā paśchāt tam artham anutishṭhati iti sarveshāṁ naḥ pratyuksham etat | Tathā prajāpater api srashṭuh sriṣṭeh pūrvam vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ manasi prādurbabbhūruḥ paśchāt tad-anugatān arthān sasarja iti gamyate | Tathā cha śrutiḥ "sa bhūr iti vyāharan bhūmim asrijata" <sup>101</sup> ity-evam-ādikā bhūr-ādi-śabdebhyaḥ eva manasi prādurbhbūtebhyo bhūr-ādi-lokān prādurbhūtān sriṣṭān darśayati | kim-ātmakam punaḥ śabdam abhipretya idāṁ śabda-prabhavatvam uchyate | sphoṭam ity āha | . . . Tasmād nityāt śabdāt sphoṭa-rūpād abhidhāyakāt kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakṣaṇāṁ jagad abhidhēya-bhūtam prabhavatvāt | . . . Tataś cha nityebhyah śabdebhyo devādi-vyaktinām prabhavaḥ ity aviruddham |

Sūtra i. 3, 29. "Ata eva cha nityatvam" | svatantrasya karttuḥ smaranād eva hi sthite vedasya nityatve devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhyupagamena tasya virodham āśankya "ataḥ prabhavād" iti pārihṛitya idānīm tad eva veda-nityatvān sthitān draḍhayati "ata eva cha nityatvam" iti | atah eva cha niyatākriter derāder jagato veda-śabda-prabhavatvād eva veda-śabda-nityatvam api pratyetavyam | Tathā cha mantra-varṇaḥ "yajnenu vāchāḥ padavīyam āyan tām anvavindann rishishu pravishṭām" iti sthitām eva vācham anuvinnām darśayati | *Vedavyāsaś cha evam eva smarati* (Mahābhārata, Vanap. 7660) | "yugānte 'ntarhitān redān setihäsān maharshayaḥ | lebhire tapasā pūrrvam anujnātāḥ svayambhuvā". iti |

"Sūtra i. 3, 28 : 'But it is said that there will be a contradiction in respect of sound (or the word); but this is not so, because the gods are produced from it, as is proved by intuition and inference.'

"Be it so, that though the corporeality of the gods, etc., be admitted, no contradiction will arise in respect of the ceremonial. Still [it will be said that] a contradiction will arise in regard to the word. How? [In this way.] By founding upon the inherent connection of a word with the thing signified, the authority of the Veda had been established by the aphorism 'anapekshatvāt,' etc. (Mīmānsā Sūtras i. 2, 21; see above, p. 75.) But now, while it has been admitted that the deities are corporeal, it will follow that (though from their possession of divine power they can at one and the same time partake of the oblations

<sup>101</sup> Compare S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 1, 6, 3.

offered at numerous sacrifices), they will still, owing to their corporeality, be subject, like ourselves, to birth and death; and hence, the eternal connection of the eternal word with an object which is non-eternal being lost, a contradiction will arise in regard to the authority proved to belong to the word of the Veda; [for thus the word, not having any eternal connection with non-eternal things, could not be authoritative]. But neither has this supposed contradiction any existence. How? 'Because they are produced from it.' Hence the world of gods, etc., is produced from the Vedic word. But according to the aphorism (*Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2*) 'from him comes the production, etc., of all this,' it is established that the world has been produced from Brahma. How, then, is it said here that it is produced from the word? And, moreover, if it be allowed that the world is produced from the Vedic word, how is the contradiction in regard to the word thereby removed, inasmuch as all the following classes of objects, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Viśvedevas, Maruts, are non-eternal, because produced; and when they are non-eternal, what is there to bar the non-eternity of the Vedic words Vasu, etc., by which they are designated? For it is a common saying, 'It is only when a son is born to Devadatta, that that son receives the name of Yajnadatta,' [*i.e.* no child receives a name before it exists]. Hence a contradiction does arise in regard to [the eternity of] the word. To this objection we reply with a negative; for in the case of such words as cow we discover an eternal connection between the word and the thing. For although individual cows, etc., come into existence, the species to which they belong does not begin to exist, as it is individual substances, qualities, and acts, which begin to exist, and not their species. Now it is with species that words are connected, and not with individuals, for as the latter are infinite, such a connection would in their case be impossible. Thus as species are eternal (though individuals begin to exist) no contradiction is discoverable in the case of such words as cow, etc. In the same way it is to be remarked that though we allow that the individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist, there is no contradiction [to the eternity of the Vedic word] in the [existence of the] words Vasu, etc. [which denote those individual gods], since the species to which they belong are eternal. And the fact that the gods, etc., belong to particular species may be learned from this, that we discover their corporeality and other attributes in

the hymns and arthavādas (illustrative remarks in the Vedas), etc. The words Indra, etc., are derived from connection with some particular post, like the words 'commander of an army' (*senāpati*), etc. Hence, who-soever occupies any particular post, is designated by the words Indra, and so forth; [and therefore Indra and the other gods belong to the species of occupants of particular posts]. Thus there is no difficulty. And this derivation from the word is not, like production from Brahma, meant in the sense of evolution from a material cause. But how, since language is eternal and connected with eternal objects, is it declared in the phrase 'produced from it' that the production of individual things, corresponding to the ordinary sense of words, is effected by a thing (sound or language), the very nature of which it is to denote continuance [and not such change as is involved in the idea of production?]<sup>102</sup> How, again, is it known that the world is produced from the word? The answer is, [it is known] 'from intuition and inference.' 'Intuition' means the Veda, because it is independent of any (other authority). 'Inference' means the smṛiti, because it is dependent on another authority (the Veda). These two demonstrate that the creation was preceded by the word. Thus the Veda says, 'at (or with) the word *ete* (these) Prajāpati created the gods; at *asrīgram* (they were poured out) he created men; at *indavaḥ* (drops of soma) he created the pitṛis; at *tirah pavitram* (through the filter) he created the libations; at *āśavah* (swift) he created hymns; at *viśvāni* (all) he created praise; and at the words *abhi saubhagā* (for the sake of blessings) he created other creatures.'<sup>103</sup> And in another place it is said 'with his

<sup>102</sup> This sentence is rather obscure.

<sup>103</sup> According to Govinda Ānanda's Gloss this passage is derived from a Chhandoga Brāhmaṇa. It contains a mystical exposition of the words from Rig-veda, ix. 62, 1 (=Sāma-veda, ii. 180) which are imbedded in it, viz. *ete asrīgram indavaḥ tirah pavitram āśavah | viśvāni abhi saubhagā* | "These hurrying drops of soma have been poured through the filter, to procure all blessings." (See Benfey's translation.) It was by the help of Dr. Pertzsch's alphabetical list of the initial words of the verses of the Rig-veda (in Weber's Indische Studien, vol. iii.) that I discovered the verse in question in the Rig-veda. Govinda Ānanda gives us a specimen of his powers as Vedic exegete in the following remarks on this passage: *Ity etan-mantra-sthaiḥ padaih smritā Brahma devādīn asrījata | tatra "ete" iti padam sarvanāmatvād devānām smūrakam asrīg rūdhīrām tat pradhāne dehe ramante iti "asrīgrāḥ" manushyāḥ | chandra-sthānām pitrīnām indu-sabdāḥ smārakāḥ ityādi |* "Brahmā created the gods, etc., in conformity with the recollections suggested by the various words in this verse. The word *ete* ('these') as a pronoun suggested the gods. The beings who disport

mind he entered into conjugal connection with Vāch (speech).' (S. P. Br. x. 6, 5, 4, Brih. Ār. Up. p. 50.) By these and other such texts the Veda in various places declares that creation was preceded by the word. And when the Smṛiti says, 'In the beginning a celestial voice, eternal, without beginning or end, co-essential with the Vedas, was uttered by Svayambhū, from which all activities [proceeded]' (see above, p. 16), the expression 'utterance of a voice' is to be regarded as employed in the sense of the origination of a tradition, since it is inconceivable that a voice which was 'without beginning or end,' could be uttered in the same sense as other sounds. Again, we have this other text, 'In the beginning Maheśvara created from the words of the Veda the names and forms of creatures, and the origination of actions;' and again, 'He created in the beginning the several names, functions, and conditions of all creatures from the words of the Veda.' (See above, pp. 16 and 6.) And it is a matter of common observation to us all, that when any one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accomplish, he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, and then proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the case of Prajāpati the creator, we conclude that before the creation the words of the Veda were manifested in his mind, and that afterwards he created the objects which resulted from them. Thus the Vedic text which says, 'uttering *bhūḥ*, he created the earth (*bhūmi*), etc.', intimates that the different worlds, earth, and the rest, were manifested, i.e. created from the words *bhūḥ*, etc., manifested in his mind. Of what sort, now, was this word which is intended, when it is said that the world was produced from the word? It was *sphoṭa* (disclosure or expression), we are told."

I shall not quote the long discussion on which Sankara here enters, regarding this term. (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 305 ff.; Ballantyne's Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, pp. 192 ff.; the same author's translation of the commencement of the Mahābhāshya, p. 10; and Professor Müller's article on the last-named work in the Journal of the German Or. Soc. vii. 170). Sankara states his conclusion themselves in bodies of which blood (*asrik*) is a predominant element, were *asrigrahā*, 'men.' The word *indu* (which means both the soma plant and the moon) suggested the fathers who dwell in the moon," etc., etc. The sense of *asrigram*, as given above in the text, is "were poured out." Govinda Ananda, no doubt, understood it correctly, though he considered it necessary to draw a mystical sense out of it.

to be that “from the eternal word, in the form of *sphota*, which expresses [all things], the object signified by it, viz. the world, under the three characters of action, causer, and the results of action, is produced,” and finishes his remarks on this Sūtra (i. 3, 28) by observing: “Consequently there is no contradiction in saying that the individual gods, etc., are derived from eternal words.” He then proceeds to Sūtra i. 3, 29 : “‘Hence results the eternity of the Vedas.’” On this he observes, “The eternity of the Veda had been established by the fact of its being described in the Smṛiti as the work of a Self-dependent Maker. But a doubt had been suggested that this eternity is inconsistent with the admission that individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist. This doubt, however, having been set aside by the preceding aphorism, ‘Since they are produced from it,’ he now confirms the eternity of the Veda (which had been already proved) by the words of the Sūtra before us, which mean that as a result of this very fact that the world, consisting of gods and other beings belonging to fixed species, was produced from the words of the Vedas, the eternity of these Vedic words themselves also must be believed. Accordingly, the words of the hymn, ‘by sacrifice they followed the path of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis’ (R.V. x. 71, 3 ; see the First Volume of this work p. 254, and Volume Second, p. 220) prove that Vāch already existed when she was discovered. And in the very same way Vedavyāsa records that, ‘formerly the great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained through devotion the Vedas and Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding yuga.’”

Sāyana refers to the Sūtra just quoted (i. 3, 29), as well as to another of the Vedānta aphorisms (i. 1, 3) in p. 20 of the introduction to his Commentary on the Rig-veda in these words : ●

*Nanu bhagavatā Bādarāyaṇena Vedasya Brahma-kāryyatvam sūtritam | “śāstra-yonitvād” iti | rigvedādi-śāstra-kāraṇatvād Brahma sarvajnam iti sūtrārthaḥ | bādhām | na etavatā paurushyatvam bhavati | manushyā-nirmitatvābhāvāt | idṛīsam apaurusheyatvam abhipretya vyavahāra-dasā-yām ākāśadi-vad nityatvam Bādarāyaṇenaiva devatādhikarane sūtritam | “ata evacha nityatvam” iti |*

“But it is objected that the venerable Bādarāyaṇa has declared in the aphorism ‘since he is the source of the śāstra (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3), that the Veda is derived from Brahma; the meaning of the aphorism being, that since Brahma is the cause of the Rig-veda and other Śāstras,

he is omniscient. This is true; but it furnishes no proof of the human origin of the Veda, since it was not formed by a man. Bādarāyaṇa had in view such a superhuman origin of the Veda, when in the [other] aphorism ‘hence also [its] eternity is to be maintained,’ (which is contained in the section on the deities), he declared it to be, like the æther, etc., eternal, during the period of mundane existence.”<sup>104</sup>

The remarks of Sankara on the Brahma Sūtra (i. 1, 8) above referred to, begin as follows :

*Mahataḥ rig-vedādēḥ śāstrasya aneka-vidyā-sthānopabṛiṁhitasya pradrīpa-vat sarvārtha-dyotinas sarvajna-kalpasya yonih kāraṇam Brahma | na hi ṛdriśasya śāstrasya ṛigvedādī-lakṣhaṇasya sarvajna-guṇānvitasya sarvajnād anyataḥ sambhavo ’sti | Yad yad vistarārthaṁ śāstraṁ yasmāt purusha-viśeshāt sambhavati yathā vyākaranādī Pāṇiny-āder jneyaika-deśar�ham api sa tato ’py adhikatara-vijnānah iti prasiddhaṁ loke | kim u vaktavyam aneka-śākhā-bhedā-bhinnasya deva-tiryāñ-manushya-varṇā-śramādi-pravibhāga-hetor ṛig-vedādy-ākhyasya sarva-jnānākarasya aprayatnena eva lilā-nyāyena purusha-niśvāsa-vad yasmād mahato bhūtaḥ yoneḥ sambhavaḥ (“asya malato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad ṛig-vedaḥ” ity-ādēḥ śrutes) tasya mahato bhūtasya niratiśayaṁ sarvajnatvaṁ sarvaśaktitvaṁ cha iti |*

“Brahma is the source of the great Śāstra, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., augmented by numerous branches of science, which, like a lamp, illuminates all subjects, and approaches to omniscience. Now such a Śāstra, distinguished as the Rig-veda, etc., possessed of the qualities of an omniscient being, could not have originated from any other than an omniscient being. When an extensive treatise on any subject is produced by any individual, as the works on Grammar, etc., were by Pāṇini and others,—even although the treatise in question have for its subject only a single department of what is to be known,—it is a

<sup>104</sup> See the quotation from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, at the top of p. 70, above. The æther (ākāśa) is uncreated according to the Vaiśeṣikas (Kanāda’s Sutras, ii. 1, 28, with Sankara Miśra’s commentary, and Sankara Āchāryya on Vedānta Sūtra, ii. 3, 3 : *Na hy ākāśasya utpattiḥ sambhāvayitum śakyā śrīmat-Kanabhuṣ-abhiprāyānusūriṣu jivatuḥ* | “The production of the æther cannot be conceived as possible, so long as those who follow Kanāda’s view retain their vitality”). The Vedānta Sūtras, ii. 3, 1-7, on the other hand, assert its production by Brahma, in conformity with the text of the Taittiriyakas which affirms this : *Tasmād vai etasmād ātmānaḥ ākāśah sam-bhūtaḥ* | “From that Soul the æther was produced.”

matter of notoriety that the author is possessed of still greater knowledge than is contained in his work.<sup>105</sup> What then need we say of the transcendent omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being from whom issued without effort, as an amusement, like a man's breathing (according to the Vedic text 'the Rig-veda is the breathing of that great Being'), that mine of universal knowledge called the Rig-veda, etc., which is divided into many sākhās, and which gave rise to the classes of gods, beasts, and men, with their castes and orders?"<sup>106</sup>

It is clear from the aphorism last quoted that there is a distinction between the doctrine of the Pūrva Mīmānsā, and the Uttara Mīmānsā, or Vedānta, regarding the origin of the Veda, in so far as the former is silent on the subject of its derivation from Brahma, which the latter asserts. It is also to be observed that Sāyaṇa understands the eternity of the Veda as laid down in the Brahma Sūtras in a qualified sense (as limited to the duration of the mundane period) and not as an absolute eternity.

I may remark that in their treatment of the Vedic passages which they cite, the practice of Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma Sūtras, and of his commentator, Sunkara Āchāryya, corresponds to their theory of the infallibility of the sacred text. The doctrines inculcated in the Sūtras, and expounded and vindicated by the commentator, profess to be based on the Veda; and numerous texts are cited in their support. Such passages as coincide with the theories maintained in the Sūtras are understood in their proper or literal (*mukhya*) sense;

<sup>105</sup> Dr. Ballantyne (*Aphorisms of the Vedānta*, p. 8) renders the last words thus: . . . "that man, even in consideration of *that*, is inferred to be exceedingly knowing." Govinda Ānanda's note, however, confirms the rendering I have given. Part of it is as follows: *Yad yach chhāstram yasmād ūptat sambhavati sa tataḥ sīstrād adhikārtha-jnānah iti prasiddham* | "It is well known that the competent author from whom any treatise proceeds has a knowledge of more than that treatise (contains)." The idea here is somewhat similar to that in the second of Bishop Butler's Sermons "Upon the love of God": "Effects themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect notions of wisdom and power; much less of his Being in whom they reside." . . . "This is no more than saying that the Creator is superior to the works of his hands."

<sup>106</sup> An alternative explanation of the aphorism is given by the commentator, according to which it would mean: "The body of Scripture, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., is the source, the cause, the proof, whereby we ascertain exactly the nature of this Brahma" (*athavā yathoktam rigvedādi-sāstraṁ yonih kāraṇam pramāṇam asya Brahmano yathāvat svarūpādhigame*).

whilst other texts which appear to be at variance with the Vedantic dogmas, and to favour those of the other philosophical schools, are explained as being merely figurative (*gauna* or *bhākta*); or other interpretations are given. See, for example, the Brahma sūtras, i. 1, 6; ii. 4, 2 f., etc., with Sankara's comments. The supposition of any real inconsistency between the different statements of the sacred volume is never for a moment entertained.<sup>107</sup> As, however, the different authors of the Vedic hymns, of the Brāhmaṇas, and even of the Upanishads, gave free expression to their own vague and unsystematic ideas and speculations on the origin of all things, and the relation of the Deity to the universe, and recognized no fixed standard of orthodox doctrine to which they were bound to conform,—it was inevitable that they should propound a great variety of opinions which were mutually irreconcilable. But as, in later times, the Vedas came to be regarded as supernatural and infallible books, it was necessary that those systematic theologians who sought to deduce from their contents any consistent theory of being and of creation, should attempt to shew that the discrepancies between the different texts were only apparent.

**SECT. IX.—*Arguments of the followers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeshika, and Sāṅkhya Systems in support of the authority of the Vedas, but against the eternity of sound.***

I. *The Nyāya.*—The eternity of sound is, as we have already discovered from the allusions of the Mīmānsaka commentator, (above p. 73), denied by the followers of the Nyāya school. The consideration of this subject is begun in the following way in the Nyāya aphorisms of Gotama, as explained by Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya in the Nyāya-sūtravṛitti, ii. 81 :

<sup>107</sup> See Sankara on the Br. Sūtras, iii. 31 (p. 844 of Bibl. Indica), where he says, *yadi punar ekasmin Brahmani bahūni vijnānāni vedāntontareshu pratipipādayishitāni teshām ekam abhrāntam bhrāntāni itarāṇi ity anaśvāsa-prasango vedānteshu tasmād nātāv prativedāntam Brahma-vijnāna-bhedaḥ āśankitūm śakyate |* “If, again, in the different Vedāntas (i.e. Upanishads) a variety of conceptions regarding the one Brahma be sought to be established, one of these (conceptions) will be correct, and the others erroneous, and thus the objection of being untrustworthy will attach to the Upanishads. It must not, therefore, be suspected that there is in each of the Upanishads a different conception of Brahma.”

*Vedasya prāmānyam āpta-prāmānyāt siddham | na cha idam yujyate  
vedasya nityatvād ity āśankāyām varnānām anityatvāt kathaṁ tat-samu-  
dūya-rūpasya vedasya nityatvam ity āśayena śabdānityatva-prakaranam  
ārabhate | tatra siddhānta-sūtram | “Ādimattvād aindriyakatvāt krita-  
katvād upachārāch cha” | 81. S'abdo 'nityaḥ ityādiḥ | ādimattvāt sakā-  
raṇakatvāt | nanu na sakāraṇakatvaṁ kanṭha-tūlv-ādy-abhighātāder  
vyanjakatvenāpy upapatter atāḥ āha aindriyakatvād iti sūmānyavatthe  
sati vahir-indriya-janya-laukikika-pratyaksha-vishayatvād ity arthaḥ |  
.... Aprayojakatvam āśankya āha kritaketi | kritake ghaṭādau yathā  
upachāro jnānaṁ tathaiva kāryyatva-prakāraka-pratyaksha-vishayatvād  
ity arthaḥ | tathā cha kāryatvena anāhāryya-sārvalaukika-pratyaksha-  
balād anityatvam eva siddhati |*

“It has been proved (in the 68th Sūtra, see below) that ‘the authority of the Veda follows from the authority of the competent person who made it.’ But it may be objected that this is not a proper ground on which to base the authority of the Veda, since it is eternal. With the view of proving, in opposition to this, that since letters are not eternal, the Veda, which is a collection of letters, cannot be so either, the author of the Sūtras commences the section on the non-eternity of sound.. The Sūtra laying down the established doctrine, is as follows : ‘ Sound cannot be eternal, as (1) it had an origin, as (2) it is cognizable by sense, and (3) it is spoken of as factitious.’ Sound is non-eternal, etc., because (1) it had a beginning, i.e. because it had a cause. But it may be said that it had no cause, as, agreeably to the doctrine of the Mīmānsakas (see above, p. 74), the action of the throat and palate in pronunciation may merely occasion a manifestation of sound [without creating it]. In reply to this it is said (2) that sound is cognizable by sense, i.e. that though it belongs to a genus, it is an object of ordinary perception through an external sense.” [A different explanation given by other interpreters is next quoted, which I omit.] .... “Then surmising that the preceding definition may be regarded as not to the point, the author adds the words ‘since it is spoken of as factitious,’ i.e. as jars and other such objects are spoken of as—are known to be—products, so, too, sound is distinguishable by sense as being in the nature of a product. And in consequence of this incontrovertible and universal perception of its being produced, it is proved that it cannot be eternal.” [Two other explanations of this last clause of the Sūtra are then added.]

Leaving the reader to study the details of the discussion in Dr. Ballantyne's aphorisms of the Nyāya (Part Second, pp. 77 ff.), I will pass over most of the Sūtras, and merely quote the principal conclusions of the Nyāya aphorist. In Sūtra 86 he says in opposition to the 13th Sūtra of the Mīmānsā (above, p. 74) :

86. “*Prāg uchchāraṇād anupalambhād āvaraṇādy - anupalabdeḥ*” |  
*S'abdo yadi nityaḥ syād uchchāraṇāt prāg apy upalabhyeta śrotra-sanni-karsha-sattvāt | na cha atra pratibandhakam asti ity āha āvaraṇetī āvaraṇādeḥ pratibandhakasya anupalabdhyā abhāva-nirnayāt | deśāntara-gamanaṁ tu śabdasya amūrttiatvād na sambhāvyate | atīndriyānanta-pratibandhakatva-kalpanām apekshya śabdānityatva-kalpanā eva laghi-yasī iti bhāvah |*

“‘Sound is not eternal, because it is not perceived before it is uttered, and because we do not perceive anything which should intercept it.’ If sound were eternal, it would be perceived even before it was uttered, from its being in contact with the ear. [Sound, as Dr. Ballantyne explains, is ‘admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading æther.’] And in the next words the aphorist says that there is no obstacle to its being so heard, since the non-existence of any hindrance, such as an intercepting medium, is ascertained by our not perceiving anything of that sort. And it is not conceivable that sound should have gone to another place [and for that reason be inaudible], since it has no defined form. The supposition that sound is non-eternal, is simpler than the supposition that there are an infinity of imperceptible obstacles to its perception.”

The 89th and 90th Sūtras, with part of the comments on them, are as follows :

89. “*Asparśatvāt*” | *śabdo nityaḥ | asparśatvād gagana-vad iti bhāvah |*  
 90. “*Na karmānityatvāt*” *asparśatvām na śabda-nityatva-sādhakaṁ karmāni vyabhichārāt |*

89. “It may be said that sound is eternal, from its being, like the sky, intangible. 90. But this is no proof, for the intangibility of sound does not establish its eternity, since these two qualities do not always go together; for intangibility, though predictable, e.g. of action, fails to prove its eternity.”

The 100th and following Sūtras are as follows :

100. “*Vināśa-kāraṇānupalabdeḥ*” | 101. “*Āśravana-kāraṇānupalab-*

*dheḥ satata-śravāna-prasangaḥ*" | *Yady apratyakshād abhāva-siddhis tadaḥ śravāna-kāraṇasya apratyakshatvād aśravānam na syād iti satata-śravāna-prasangaḥ iti bhāvah* | 102. "*Upalabhyamāne cha anupalabdher asattvād anapadeśah*" | *Anumānādinā upalabhyamāne vināśa-kāraṇe anupalabdher abhāvāt tvadīyo hetur anapadeśah asādhakaḥ asiddhatvāt janya-bhāvātvena vināśa-kalpanam iti bhāvah* |

"It is said (100) that 'sound must be eternal, because we perceive no cause why it should cease.' The answer is (101), first, 'that if the non-existence of any such cause of cessation were established by the mere fact of its not being perceived, such non-perception would occasion our hearing continually, which is an absurdity.' And (102), secondly, 'since such non-perception is not a fact, inasmuch as [a cause of the cessation of sound] is perceived, this argument falls to the ground.' Since a cause for the cessation of sound is discovered by inference, etc., and thus the non-perception of any cause is seen to be untrue, this argument of yours proves nothing, because its correctness is not established. The purport is that we suppose, from sound being produced, that it must also be liable to perish."

Sūtras 106–122 are occupied with a consideration of the question (above treated, pp. 73, 74, in Sūtras 10 and 16 of the Mīmānsā) whether letters can change or not. The conclusion at which Gotama arrives is, that the substance of letters cannot undergo any alteration, though they may be said to change when they are modified in quality by being lengthened, shortened, etc.

In a preceding part of the Second Book (Sūtras 57–68) Gotama treats of the Veda, and repels certain charges which are alleged against its authority. I shall quote most of these aphorisms, and cite the commentary more fully than Dr. Ballantyne has done. (See Ballantyne's Nyāya Aphorisms, Part ii. pp. 56 ff.)

*S'abdasya drishṭādrishṭārthakatvena dvaividhyam uktam tatra cha adriṣṭārthaka-śabdasya vedasya prāmānyam parikshitum pūrvā-pakshayati* | 57. "*Tad-aprāmānyam anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ*" | *Tasya drishṭārthaka-vyatirikta-śabdasya vedasya aprāmānyam* | *kutah* | *anṛitatrādi-doshāḥ* | *tatra cha putreshṭi-kāryādau kvachit phalānutpatti-darśanād anṛitatvam* | *vyāghātaḥ pūrvāpara-virodhaḥ* | *yathā "udite juhoti anudite juhoti samayādhyushite juhoti* | *śyāvo'sya āhutim abhyava-harati ya udite juhoti śavalo 'sya āhutim abhyavaharati yo 'nudite juhoti*

śyāva-śavalāv asya āhutim abhyavaharato yaḥ samayādhyushite juhoti”  
 atra cha uditādi-vākyānām nindānumitānishṭa-sādhanatā-bodhaka-vākyā-  
 virodhāḥ | paunaruptyād aprāmāṇyam | Yathā “trīḥ prathamām anvāha |  
 trīr uttamām anvāha” | ity atra uttamavasya prathamatva-paryavasānāt  
 trīḥ kathanena cha paunaruptyam | eteshām aprāmāṇye tad-dṛishṭāntena  
 tad-eka-karttṛikatvena tad-eka-jātīyatvena vā sarva-vedāprāmāṇyāñ sādha-  
 nīyam iti bhāvāḥ | siddhānta-sūtram | 58. “Na karma-karttri-sādhana-  
 vaigunyaṭ” | Na vedāprāmāṇyāñ karma-karttri-sādhana-vaigunyaṭ pha-  
 labhāvopapatteḥ | karmanāḥ kriyāyāḥ vaigunyaṁ ayathāvidhitvādi | kart-  
 tur vaigunyaṁ aridvatvādi | sādhanasya havir-āder vaigunyaṭ īprokshi-  
 tatvādi | Yathokta-karmanāḥ pnalabhāve hy anṛitatvam | na cha evam  
 asti iti bhāvāḥ | vyāghātaṁ pariḥarati | 59. “Abhyupetya kāla-bhede  
 dosha-vachanāt” | na vyāghātaḥ iti śeshaḥ | Agny-ādhāna-kāle uditā-  
 homādikam abhyupetya svīkritya anudita-homādi-karaṇe pūrvokta-dosha-  
 kathanād na vyāghātaḥ ity arthaḥ | paunaruptyam pariḥarati | 60.  
 “Anuvādopapatteś cha” | chaḥ punar-arthe | anuvādopapatteḥ punar na  
 paunaruptyam | nishprayojanatve hi paunaruptyāñ doshaḥ | ukta-sthale  
 tv anuvādasya upapatteḥ prayojanasya sambhavāt | ekādaśa-sāmidheninām  
 prathamottamayos trīr abhidhāne hi panchadaśatvāñ sambhavati | tathā-  
 cha panchadaśatvāñ śrūyate | “Imam aham bhrātrivyam panchadaśāva-  
 reṇa vāg-vajrena cha bādhe yo 'smān dreshṭi yañ cha vayañ dvishmaḥ”  
 iti | Anuvādasya sārthakatvāñ loka-prasiddham iti āha | 61. “Vākyā-  
 vibhāgasya cha artha-grahanāt” | Vākyā-vibhāgasya | anuvādatvena  
 vibhakta-vākyasya artha-grahaṇāt prayojana-svīkārāt | śishṭair iti  
 śeshaḥ | śishṭāḥ hi vidhāyakānuvādakādi-bhedena vākyāñ vibhajya anu-  
 vādakasyāpi saprayojanatvam manyante | Vede 'py evam iti bhāvāḥ | . . .  
 Evam aprāmāṇya-sādhakaṁ nirasya prāmāṇyāñ sādhayati | 68. “Man-  
 trāyurveda-vach cha tat-prāmāṇyam īpta-prāmāṇyāt” | īptasya veda-  
 karttuḥ prāmāṇyād yathārthopadeśakatvād vedasya tad-uktatvam arthāl  
 labdham | tena hetunā vedasya prāmāṇyam anumeyam | tatra dṛishṭāntam  
 āha mantrāyurveda-vad iti | mantro vishādi-nāśakah | īyurveda-bhāgaś  
 cha veda-sthāḥ eva | tatra saṁvādena prāmāṇya-grahāt tad-dṛishṭāntena  
 vedatvāvachchedena prāmāṇyam anumeyam | īptām grihītam prāmāṇyam  
 yatra sa vedas tādriṣena vedatvena prāmāṇyam anumeyam iti kechit |

“It had been declared (Nyāya Sūtras, i. 8) that verbal evidence is of  
 two kinds, (1) that of which the subject-matter is seen, and (2) that of  
 which the subject-matter is unseen. With the view, now, of testing

the authority of that verbal evidence which refers to unseen things, viz. the Veda, Gotama states the first side of the question. Sūtra 57. ‘The Veda has no authority, since it has the defects of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology.’ That verbal evidence, which is distinct from such as relates to visible objects, *i.e.* the Veda, has no authority. Why? Because it has the defects of falsehood, etc. Of these defects, that of ‘falsehood’ is established by the fact that we sometimes observe that no fruit results from performing the sacrifice for a son, or the like. ‘Self-contradiction’ is a discrepancy between a former and a later declaration. Thus the Veda says, ‘he sacrifices when the sun is risen; he sacrifices when the sun is not yet risen; he sacrifices’ [I cannot explain the next words]. ‘A tawny [dog?] carries away the oblation of him who sacrifices after the sun has risen; a brindled [dog?] carries off the oblation of him who sacrifices before the sun has risen; and both of these two carry off the oblation of him who sacrifices.’ . . . Now here there is a contradiction between the words which enjoin sacrifices, and the words which intimate by censure that those sacrifices will occasion disastrous results. Again, the Veda has no authority, owing to its ‘tautology,’ as where it is said, ‘he repeats the first thrice, he repeats the last thrice.’ For as the lastness ultimately coincides with [?] the firstness, and as there is a triple repetition of the words, this sentence is tautological. Now since these particular sentences have no authority, the entire Veda will be proved by these specimens to stand in the same predicament, since all its other parts have the same author, or are of the same character, as these portions.”

Here follows the Sūtra which conveys the established doctrine. “58. ‘The Veda is not false; it is owing to some fault in the ceremonial, or the performer, or the instrument he employs, that any sacrifice is not followed by the promised results.’ Faults in the ceremonial are such as its not being according to rule. Faults in the performer are such as ignorance. Faults in the instrument, *i.e.* in the clarified butter, etc., are such as its not being duly sprinkled, etc. For falsehood might be charged on the Veda, if no fruit resulted from a sacrifice when duly performed as prescribed; but such failure never occurs.”

Gotama next repels the charge of self-contradiction in the Vedas. “59. ‘There is no self-contradiction, for the fault is only imputed in case the sacrifice should be performed at a different time from that

at first intended.' The fault imputed to these sacrifices in the text in question would [only] be imputed if, after agreeing, at the time of placing the sacrificial fire, to perform the sacrifice after sunrise, one were to change it to a sacrifice before sunrise; there is, therefore, no self-contradiction in the passage referred to."

He next rebuts the charge of tautology. "60. 'The Veda is not tautological because repetition may be proper.' The particle *cha* means 'again.' 'Again, since repetition may be proper, there is no tautology.' For repetition is only a fault when it is useless. But in the passage referred to, since repetition is proper, its utility is apparent. For when the first and the last of the eleven *sāmidhenīs* (forms of prayer used on throwing fuel into the fire) are each repeated thrice, the whole number of verses will be made up to fifteen."<sup>108</sup> Accordingly, this number of fifteen is mentioned in these words of the Veda, 'I smite this enemy who hates us, and whom we hate, with the last of the fifteen verses, and with the thunderbolt of my words.'"

He next observes that the advantage of repetition is commonly recognised. "61. 'And the Veda is not tautological, because the utility of this division of discourse is admitted,' i.e. because the necessity for such a division of language, that is, of a description of language characterized as reiterative, is acknowledged, viz. by the learned. For by dividing language into the different classes of injunctive, reiterative, etc., learned men recognise the uses of the reiterative also. And this applies to the Veda."

The author of the aphorisms then proceeds to state and to define (in Sūtras 62–67) the different sorts of discourse employed in the Veda, and to defend the propriety of reiteration. "Having thus refuted the arguments which aim at showing that the Veda is of no authority, he goes on to prove its authority. 68. 'The authority of the Veda, like that of the formulas, and the Āyur-veda (treatise on medicine) follows from the authority of the competent [persons from whom they proceeded].' Since the competent maker of the Veda possesses authority, i.e. inculcates truth, it results from the force of the terms that the Veda was uttered by a person of this character; and by this reasoning the au-

<sup>108</sup> If there are in all eleven formulas, and two of these are each repeated thrice, we have  $(2 \times 3 =)$  six to add to the nine (which remain of the original eleven), making  $(6 + 9 =)$  fifteen. See Müller's *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* pp. 89 and 393.

thority of the *Veda* is to be inferred. He illustrates this by the case of the formulas and the *Āyur-veda*. By formulas (*mantra*) are meant the sentences which neutralize poison, etc., and the section containing the *Āyur-veda* forms part of the *Veda*. Now as the authority of these two classes of writings is admitted by general consent, the authority of everything which possesses the characteristics of the *Veda* must be inferred from this example. Some, however, explain the aphorism thus: a *Veda* is that in which authority is found or recognised. From such vedicity (or possession of the character of a *Veda*) the authority of any work is to be inferred."

I add the greater part of the more detailed and distinct exposition of this aphorism given by the commentator *Vātsyāyana* (*Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 91):<sup>109</sup>

*Kim punar āyurvedasya prāmānyam | yad āyurvedena upadiśyate idāṁ kṛitvā iṣṭam adhigachchhati idāṁ varjyayitvā 'nishṭāṁ jahāti tasya anuṣṭhīyamānasya tathā - bhāvaḥ satyārthatā - 'viparyyyaḥ | mantra - padānūṁ cha visha - bhūtāṣāni - pratishedhārthānām prayoge 'rthasya tathā-bhāvaḥ etat prāmānyam | kiṁ-kṛilam etat | āpta-prāmānya-kṛitam | kim punar āptānām prāmānyam | sākshāt-kṛita-dharmaṭā bhūta-dayā yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishā iti | āptāḥ khalu sākshāt-kṛita-dharmānah idāṁ hātaryam ayam asya hāni-hetur idam asya adhigantavyam ayam asya adhigamana-hetur iti bhūtāny anukampante | teshāṁ khalu vai prāṇa-bhṛitāṁ svayam anavabudhyamānānām na anyad upadeśād aravodha-kāraṇam asti | na cha anavabodhe samīhā varjjanaṁ vā | na vā alṛitvā svasti-bhāvaḥ | nā 'py asya anyaḥ upakārako'py asti | hanta vayam ebbho yathā-darśanāṁ yathā-bhūtam upadiśāmaḥ | te ime śrutvā pratipadyamānāḥ heyaṁ hāsyanty adhigantavyam eva adhigamishyanti iti | evam āptopadeśaḥ etena tri-vidhena āpta-prāmānyena parigṛihīto 'nusṭhīyamāno 'rthasya sūdhako bhavati | evam āptopadeśaḥ pramānam evam āptāḥ pramānam | dṛishṭārthena āptopadeśena āyurvedena adrishi-tārtha veda-bhāgo 'numātavyaḥ pramānam iti | āpta-prāmānyasya hetoḥ samānatvād iti | asya api cha eka-deśo "grāma-kāmo yajeta" ity evam-ādi-dṛishṭārthas tena anumātavyam iti | loko cha bhūyān upadeśśrayo vyavahāraḥ | laukikasya apy upadeshtur upadeśtavyārtha-jnānenā parānujighrikshaya yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishayā cha prāmānyam | tat-pari-*

<sup>109</sup> A small portion of this comment, borrowed from Professor Banerjea's Dialogues on Hindu philosophy, was given in the 1st edition of this vol. p. 210.

*grahād āptopadeśah pramāṇam iti | drashṭri-pravaktri-sāmānyāch cha  
anumānam ye eva āptāḥ vedārthānām drashṭarāḥ pravaktūraś cha te eva  
Āyurveda-prabhṛitīnām | ity Āyurveda-prāmāṇya-vad veda-prāmāṇyam  
anumātavyam iti | nityatvād veda-vākhyānām pramāṇatvē tat-prāmāṇ-  
yam āpta-prāmāṇyād ity ayuktam | śabdasya vāchakatvād artha-prati-  
pattau pramāṇatvām na nityatvāt | nityatvē hi sarvasya sarvena vachanāch  
chhabdārtha-vyavasthā 'nupapattiḥ | na anityatvē vāchakatvam iti chet |  
na | laukikeshv adarśanāt | te 'pi nityāḥ iti chet | na | anāptopadeśād  
artha-visaṇivādo 'nupapannaḥ | . . . Manvantara-yugāntareshu cha ati-  
tānāgateshu sampradāyābhyaśa-prayogāvichhedo vedānām nityatvam āpta-  
prāmāṇyāch cha prāmāṇyam | laukikeshu śabdeshu cha etat samānam |*

"On what then does the authority of the Āyur-veda depend? The Āyur-veda instructs us that to do so and so, is the means of attaining what is desirable, and to avoid so and so is the means of escaping what is undesirable: and the fact of such action having been followed by the promised result coincides with the supposition that the book declares what is true. So, too, the authority of the formulæ for neutralizing poison, repelling demons, and arresting lightning, is shewn by their application fulfilling its object. How is this result obtained? By the authoritativeness of competent persons. But what is meant by the authoritativeness of competent persons? It means their intuitive perception of duty, their benevolence to all creatures, and their desire to declare the truth of things. Competent persons are those who have an intuitive perception of duty; and they shew their benevolence to all creatures by pointing out that so and so is to be avoided, and that such and such are the means of avoiding it, and that so and so is to be attained, and that such and such are the means of attaining it. 'For these creatures,' they reflect, 'being themselves unaware of such things, have no other means of learning them except such instruction; and in the absence of information they can make no effort either to attain or avoid anything; whilst without such action their welfare is not secured; and there is no one else who can help in this case: come let us instruct them according to the intuition we possess, and in conformity with the reality; and they hearing, and comprehending, will avoid what should be avoided, and obtain what should be obtained.' Thus the instruction afforded by competent persons according to this threefold character of their authoritativeness [viz. (1) intuition, (2)

benvolence, and (3) desire to teach], being received, and acted upon, effects the object desired. And so the instruction given by competent persons is authority, and these competent persons are authorities. From the Āyur-veda, which conveys instruction given by competent persons in reference to objects perceptible by the senses, it is to be inferred that that part also of the Veda which is concerned with imperceptible objects<sup>110</sup> is authoritative, since the cause, the authoritativeness of competent persons, is the same in both cases; and the same inference is to be drawn from the fact that a portion of the injunctions of the last mentioned part of the Veda also have reference to perceptible objects, as in the case of the precept, 'Let the man who desires landed property sacrifice,' etc., etc. In common life, too, men usually rely upon instruction. And the authority of an ordinary instructor depends (1) upon his knowledge of the matter to be taught, (2) upon his disposition to shew kindness to others, and (3) upon his desire to declare the truth. From its being accepted, the instruction imparted by competent persons constitutes proof. And from the fact that the seers and declarers are the same in both cases, viz. that the competent seers and declarers of the contents of the (rest of the) Veda are the very same as those of the Āyur-veda, etc., we must infer that the authoritativeness of the former is like that of the latter. But on the hypothesis that the authority of the Vedic injunctions is derived from their eternity, it will be improper to say that it arises from the authoritativeness of competent persons, since the authority of words as exponents of meanings springs from their declarative character, and not from their eternity. For on the supposition of the eternity of words, every (word) would express every (thing), which would be contrary to the fixity of their signification. If it be objected that unless words are eternal, they cannot be declarative, we deny this, as it is not witnessed in the case of secular words. If it be urged again that secular words also are eternal, we must again demur, since the discrepancy of purport arising from the injunctions of incompetent persons would be at variance with this." After some further argumentation Vātsyāyana concludes: "The eternity of the Vedas [really] consists in the unbroken continuity of their tradition, study, and application, both in the Manvantaras and

<sup>110</sup> Compare the commentator's remarks introductory to the Nyāya aphorism ii. 57, quoted above, p. 112.

Yugas which are past, and those which are to come; whilst their authority arises from the authoritativeness of the competent persons (who uttered them). And this is common to them with secular words."

The phrase *sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇah*, "possessing an intuitive perception of duty," which is employed by Vātsyāyana in the preceding extract as a definition of *āptāḥ*, "competent persons," is one which had previously been applied by Yāska (Nirukta, i. 20) to describe the character of the rishis: *Sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇah rishayo babbūvuh | te 'varebhyo 'sākshāt-kṛita-dharmabhyah upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilma-grahanāya imāṁ granthaṁ samāmnāśishur vedāṁ cha vedāṅgāni cha |* "The rishi, who had an intuitive perception of duty, handed down the hymns by (oral) instruction to men of later ages, who had not that intuitive perception. These, declining in their power of giving instruction, compiled this work (the Nirukta), the Veda, and the Vedāngas, in order to facilitate the comprehension of details."

*The Vaiśeṣika.*—Among the aphorisms of this system also there are some which, in opposition to the Mīmānsakas, assert, 1st, that the Vedas are the product of an intelligent mind; and 2nd (if the interpretation of the commentator is to be received) that they have been uttered by God.<sup>111</sup>

The second aphorism of the first section of the first book is as follows:

*Yato 'bhūdaya-niśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ |*

"Righteousness is that through which happiness and future perfection<sup>112</sup> are attained."

After explaining this the commentator proceeds to introduce the next aphorism by the following remarks:

*Nanu nivritti-lakshano dharmas tattva-jnāna-dvārā niśreyasa-hetur ity*

<sup>111</sup> Of the aphorisms, which I am about to quote, the first has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne (who published a small portion of these Sūtras with an English version in 1851); and it, as well as the others, is briefly commented upon by the Rev. Prof. Banerjee, in his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, pp. 474 ff., and Pref. p. ix., note. See my article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. xx. for 1862, entitled "Does the Vaiśeṣika philosophy acknowledge a Deity or not?" from which the translations now given have been transferred with but little alteration and a few additions. And compare Dr. Roer's German translation of the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms in the Journal of the German Oriental Society for 1867, pp. 309 ff.

<sup>112</sup> The Commentator explains *abhūdaya* as = *tattva-jnānam*, "a knowledge of the reality," and *niśreyasa* as *ātyantikī duḥkha-nivṛttiḥ*, "the complete cessation of suffering."

attra śrutiḥ prāmānam | śruter eva prāmānye vayaṁ vipratipadyāmahe  
 “anrita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ” | . . . na oha āmnāya-pra-  
 tipādakaṁ kinchid asti nityavate viprattipattau | nitya-nirdoshatvam api  
 sandigdham | paurusheyavate tu bhrama-pramāda-vipratipatlī-karaṇāpā-  
 tavādi-sambhāranayā ḥptoktavam api sandigdham eva iti na niśsreyasaṁ<sup>113</sup>  
 na vā tatra tattva-jnānaṁ dvāraṁ na vā dharmah iti sarvam etad āku-  
 lam | atah āha “tad-vachanād āmnāyasya prāmānyam” | “tad” ity  
 anupakrāntam api prasiddhi-siddhatayā īśvaram parāmṛiṣati | yathā  
 “tad-aprāmānyam anrita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ” iti Gauta-  
 miya-sūtre tach-chhabdena anupakrānto ‘pi vedah parāmṛiṣyate | tathā  
 cha tad-vachanāt tena īśvareṇa pranayanād āmnāyasya vedasya prāmān-  
 yam | yadvā “tad” iti sannihitam dharmam eva parāmṛiṣati | tathā cha  
 dharmasya “vachanāt” pralipādanād “āmnāyasya” vedasya prāmān-  
 yam | yad hi vākyam prāmāṇikam artham pratipādayati tat pramānam  
 eva yataḥ ity arthaḥ | īśvaras tad-āptatvam cha sādhayishyate |

“But may it not be objected here that it is the Veda which proves that righteousness, in the form of abstinence from action, is, by means of the knowledge of absolute truth, the cause of future perfection; but that we dispute the authority of the Veda because it is chargeable with the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology<sup>113</sup> . . . . And further, there is nothing to prove the authority of the Veda, for its eternity is disputed, its eternal faultlessness is doubted, and if it have a personal author, the fact of this person being a competent utterer is questioned, since there is an apprehension of error, inadvertence, contradiction, and want of skill in composition attaching to him. Thus there is neither any such thing as future perfection, nor is either a knowledge of absolute truth the instrument thereof, or righteousness. Thus everything is perplexed.”

In answer to all this the author of the aphorism says:

“The authority of the sacred record arises from its being uttered by Him.”

“Here,” says the commentator, “the word *tad* (His) refers to īśvara (God); as, though no mention of Him has yet been introduced, He is proved by common notoriety to be meant; just as in the aphorism of Gautama: ‘Its want of authority is shown by the faults of falsehood,

<sup>113</sup> Here the same illustrations are given as in the commentary on the Nyāya aphorisms, quoted above, pp. 113 ff.

contradiction, and tautology,' the Veda, though not previously introduced, is intended by the word *tad*.<sup>114</sup> And so [the meaning of the aphorism is that] the authority of the sacred record, i.e. the Veda, is proved by its being spoken by Him, composed by Him, by Īśvara. Or, *tad* (its)<sup>114</sup> may denote *dharma* (duty) which immediately precedes; and then [the sense will be that] the authority of the sacred record, i.e. the Veda, arises from its declaring, i.e. establishing, duty, for the text which establishes any authoritative matter must be itself an authority. The proof of Īśvara and his competence will be hereafter stated." The commentator then goes on to answer the charges of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology alleged against the Veda.

The next aphorism which I shall quote (vi. 1, 1) is thus introduced by the commentator :

*Buddhi-pūrvā vākyā-kritir vede | saṃsāra-mūla-kāraṇayor dharmādharmayoh parikshā shashīhādhyāyārthaḥ | dharmādharmau cha "svarga-kāmo yajeta" "na kalanjam bhakshayed" ityādi-vidhi-nishedha-bala-kalpaniyau vidhi-nishedha-vākyayoh prāmāṇye sati syātām | tat-prāmāṇyañ cha vaktur yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnāna-lakshana-guna-pūrvakatvād upapadyate | svataḥ prāmāṇyasya nishedhāt | atah prathamaṁ veda-prāmāṇya-prayojaka-guna-sādhanaṁ upakramate | "vākyā-kritir" vākyā-rachanā | sā buddhi-pūrvā vaktri-yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnāna-pūrvā | vākyā-rachanātvāt | "nadi-tire pancha phalāni santi" ity asmad-ādi-vākyā-rachanā-vat | "vede" iti vākyā-samudāye ity arthaḥ | tatra samudāyinām vākyānām kritih pakshah | na cha asmad-ādi-buddhi-pūrvakā-*

<sup>114</sup> For the sake of the reader who does not know Sanskrit, it may be mentioned that *tad* being in the crude, or uninflected form, may denote any of the three genders, and may be rendered either 'his,' 'hers,' or 'its.' I may observe that the alternative explanation which the commentator gives of the Aphorism, i. 1, 3, viz. that the authority of the Veda arises from its being declarative of duty, is a much less probable one than the other, that its authority is derived from its being the utterance of God; for it does not clearly appear how the subject of a book can establish its authority; and, in fact, the commentator, when he states this interpretation, is obliged, in order to give it the least appearance of plausibility, to assume the authoritative character of the precepts in the Veda, and from this assumption to infer the authority of the book which delivers them. I may also observe that Jayanūrayana Tarkapanchāhana, the author of the Gloss on S'ankara Miśra's Commentary, takes no notice of this alternative interpretation; and that in his comment on the same aphorism when repeated at the close of the work (x. 2, 9) S'ankara Miśra himself does not put it forward a second time. Dr. Roer (Journ. Germ. Or. Soc. for 1867, p. 310) argues in favour of the former of the two interpretations as the true one.

*tvena anyathā-siddhiḥ | “svarga-kāmo yajeta” ityādāv iṣṭā-sādhana-tāyāḥ kāryyatāyāḥ vā oṣmad-ādi-buddhy-agocaravāt | tena svatantra-purusha-pūrvakatvāṁ vede siddhyati | vedatvāṁ cha śabda-tad-upajīvi-pramāṇatirikta-pramāṇa-janya-pramity-avishayārthakatve sati śabda-janya-vākyārtha-jnānājanya-pramāṇa-śabdatvam |*

“An examination of righteousness and unrighteousness, which are the original causes of the world,<sup>115</sup> forms the subject of the 6th section. Now, righteousness and unrighteousness are to be constituted by virtue of such injunctions and prohibitions as these: ‘The man who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ ‘Let no one eat garlic,’ etc., provided these injunctions and prohibitions be authoritative. And this authoritative-ness depends upon the fact of the utterer [of these injunctions or prohibitions] possessing the quality of understanding the correct meaning of sentences, for the supposition of inherent authoritativeness is untenable. The author, therefore, first of all enters upon the proof of that quality which gives rise to the authoritativeness of the Veda.

“Aphorism vi. 1. 1.—‘There is in the Veda a construction of sentences which is produced (*lit. preceded*) by intelligence.’”

“The ‘construction of sentences,’ the composition of sentences, ‘is produced by intelligence,’ *i.e.* by a knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences on the part of the utterer [of them]; [and this is proved] by the fact of these sentences possessing an arrangement like the arrangement of such sentences as ‘There are five fruits on the river side,’ composed by such persons as ourselves. ‘In the Veda,’ *i.e.* in the collection of sentences (so called). Here the construction of the sentences composing the collection is the subject of the proposition which is asserted. And this construction must not be ascribed to a wrong cause by assuming that it was the work of a [limited] intelligence such as ours. [Because it was not a limited intelligence which produced these sentences]. For it is not an object of apprehension to the understandings of persons like ourselves that such injunctions as, ‘He who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ are the instruments of obtaining what we desire, or that they are obligatory in themselves. Hence in the case of the Veda the agency of a self-dependent person is

<sup>115</sup> This, I suppose, means that the existence of the world in its present or developed form, is necessary in order to furnish the means of rewarding righteousness and punishing unrighteousness.

established [since these matters could be known by such a person alone.] And while the contents of the Veda are not the subjects of a knowledge produced by any proof distinct from verbal proof and the proofs dependent thereon, Vedicity, or the characteristic nature of the Veda, consists in its being composed of (authoritative) words, whose authority does not spring from a knowledge of the meaning of sentences arising from words [but depends on the underived omniscience of its author]."

"Or, Vedicity consists in being one or other of the four collections, the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, or Atharvan."<sup>116</sup>

I will introduce the next aphorism (x. 2, 9) which I propose to cite (and which is a repetition of aphorism i. 1, 3), by adducing some remarks of the commentator on the one which immediately precedes it, viz. x. 2, 8 :

*Nanu śruti-prāmānye sati syād evam | tad eva tu durlabham | na hi mīmāṃsakānām ṣaṇa nitya-nirdoshatvena śruti-prāmānyām tvayā ishyate paurushheyatvenābhuyupagamāt purushasya cha bhrama-pramāda-vipralip-sādi-sambhavāt | atah āha “drishṭabhāvē” iti | drishṭam purushāntare ‘smad-ādau bhrama-pramāda- [vprati?] lipsādikām purusha-dūshāṇām tad-abhāve sati ity arthaḥ | kshiti-kartṛitvena veda-vakṛitvena vā ‘numitasya purusha-dhaureyaṣya nirdoshatvena eva upasthitēḥ | tathā cha tad-vachasām na nirabbhidheyatū na viparītabhidheyatū na nishprayojanābhīdhoyatā | bhūtendriya-manaśām doshād bhrama-pramāda-kārāṇāpāṭavādi-prayuktāḥ eva vachasām aviśuddhayāḥ sambhāvyante | na cha iṣvara-vachasi tādām sambhavāḥ | tad uktam “rāgājnānādibhir vaktā grastatvād anritām vadet | te cheśvare na vidyante sa brūyat katham anyathā” | nanu tona iṣvareṇa vedāḥ pranītaḥ ity atra eva viprapattir atah āha | “tad-vachanāt āmnāyasya prāmānyam” | iti sāstra-parisamāptau “tad-vachanāt” tona iṣvareṇa vachanāt pranayanād “āmnāyasya” vedasya prāmānyam | tathā hi | vedās tāvat paurusheyāḥ vākyatvād iti sādhitam | na oha aṣmad-ādayas teshām sahasra - sākhāvachchhinnānām vaktāraḥ sambhāvyante atīndriyārthatāvāt | na oha atīndriyārtha-darśino ‘smad-ādayāḥ | kinchā aptoktāḥ vedāḥ mahājana-parigṛihitāt | yad na aptoktām na tad mahājana-parigṛihitām | mahājana-parigṛihitām cha idam | tasmād aptoktam | eva-tantra-purush- pranītavām cha aptoktavām | mahājana-parigṛihitavām oha sarva-darśanāntahpāti-purushānushṭhig- mārūpātām | kaṭchit phalabhbhāvāḥ karma-kartri-sādhana-vaigunyaād*

<sup>116</sup> The last words are a translation of the conclusion of Jayanārāyaṇa's gloss.

*ity uktam | karttri-smaraṇābhavād na evam iti chet | na | karttri-smaraṇasya pūrvam eva sūdhitatvāt | tat-pranītatvām cha sva-tantra-purusha-pranītatvād eva siddham | na tv asmad-ādinām sahasra-sākha-veda-pranayane svātantryām sambhavati ity uktatvāt | kincha pramāyāḥ gunajanyatvena vaidika-pramāyāḥ api guna-janyatvam āvaśyakam | tattva cha guno vaktṛi-yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnānam eva vāchyāḥ | tathā cha tādṛiṣāḥ eva vede vaktā yaḥ svargāpūrvādi-vishayaka-sākshātkāravān | tādṛiṣāś cha na iśvarād anyāḥ iti sushṭhu |*

"Now all this will be so, provided the Veda is authoritative : but this condition is the very one which is difficult to attain ; for you do not hold, like the Mīmānsakas, that the authority of the Veda arises from its eternal faultlessness; since you admit that it has a personal author, and error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive are incident to such a person. It is with a view to this objection that the writer says in his aphorism, 'In the absence of what is seen,' i.e. in the absence of those personal faults which are seen in other persons like ourselves,<sup>117</sup> such as error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive : for the Supreme Person who is inferred from the creation of the world, or the authorship of the Veda, can only exist in a state of freedom from fault ; and, consequently, neither want of meaning, nor contradiction of meaning, nor uselessness of meaning, can be predicated of his words. Incorrectnesses in words are to be apprehended as the results of error, inadvertence, or unskilfulness in composition, arising from some defect in the elements, the senses, or the mind. But none of these things is to be imagined in the word of Iśvara (the Lord). And this has been expressed in the following verse : 'A speaker may utter falsehood, from being possessed by affection, ignorance, and the like ; but these [defects] do not exist in God ; how then can he speak what is otherwise [than true] ? '

"But may not the fact that the Veda is composed by God be disputed ? In consequence of this, the author says (in the next aphorism) :

x. 2, 9. 'The authority of the Vedic record arises from its being uttered by Him.'

<sup>117</sup> A different interpretation is given by the commentator to this phrase *drishṭā-bhāṣa*, in an earlier aphorism in which it occurs, viz. vi. 2, 1. He there understands it to mean that where there is no visible motive for a prescribed action, an invisible one must be presumed (*yatra drishṭam prayojanām nopalabhyate tattva adrishtam prayojanām kalpanīyam*).

"Thus at the end of his treatise [the writer lays it down that] the authority of the Veda is derived from its being His word, viz. from its being spoken, *i.e.* composed by Him, *i.e.* by Īśvara. As thus: The Vedas are derived from a person, because they are formed of sentences. This has been proved. And persons like ourselves cannot be conceived as the utterers of these Vedas, which are distinguished by having thousands of Sākhās (recensions), because their objects are such as lie beyond the reach of the senses; and persons like us have no intuition into anything beyond the reach of the senses. Further, the Vedas [are not only derived from a personal author, but they] have been uttered by a competent author (*āptā*), because they have been embraced by great men. Whatever has not been uttered by a competent person is not embraced by great men: but this (book) is embraced by great men: therefore it has been uttered by a competent person. Now, composition by a self-dependent person is utterance by a competent person; and the reception (of the Veda) by great men is the observance of its contents by persons who are adherents of all the different philosophical schools: and (the infallibility of the Veda is defended by that which) has been already said, viz. that any occasional failure in the results (of ceremonies prescribed in the Veda) is owing to some defect in the rite, or in the performer, or in the instruments employed [and not to any fallibility in the Veda].

"If it be objected to this reasoning, that no author (of the Veda) is recollect, we rejoin, that this is not true, because it has been formerly proved that the author is remembered. And that it was composed by Him is proved by the simple fact of its being composed by a self-dependent person; and because it has been said that the self-dependence [or unassisted ability] of people like us in the composition of the Veda, consisting, as it does, of a thousand Sākhās, is inconceivable. And since authority (in a writing in general) springs from a quality [in its author], it necessarily follows that the authority of the Veda also springs from a quality. And there the quality in question must be declared to be the speaker's knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences. And thus (we have shewn that) there is such an utterer of the Veda, who possesses an intuitive knowledge of paradise, and of the yet unseen consequences of actions, etc., and such an utterer is no other than Īśvara. Thus all is satisfactory."

The ultimate proofs, then, of the binding authority of the Veda are, according to the commentator, 1st, its extent and subject-matter, and 2ndly, its unanimous reception by great men, adherents of all the different orthodox systems. Of course these arguments have no validity except for those who see something supernatural in the Veda, and on the assumption that the great men who embraced it were infallible; and therefore as against the Buddhists and other heretics who saw nothing miraculous in the Vedas, and consequently regarded all their adherents as in error, they were utterly worthless. But possibly it was not the object of the commentator (for the greater part of the argumentation is his, not that of the author of the Aphorisms) to state the ultimate reasons on which the authority of the Vedas would have to be vindicated against heretics, but merely to explain the proper grounds on which the orthodox schools who already acknowledged that authority ought to regard it as resting; *i.e.* not, as the Mimānsakas held their eternal faultlessness, but the fact of their being uttered by an intelligent and omniscient author; whose authorship, again, was proved by the contents of the Vedas having reference to unseen and future matters of which only an omniscient Being could have any knowledge; while the fact of these revelations in regard to unseen things having actually proceeded from such a Being, and being therefore true, was guaranteed by the unanimous authority of the wisest men among the faithful.

As it is a matter of some interest to know what is the nature of inspiration, or supernatural knowledge, as conceived by the Vaiśeshikas, I shall quote some passages bearing on this subject from the aphorisms, or from their expounder, Sankara Miśra. In his remarks on Aphorism viii. 1, 2 (p. 357), the commentator states that opinion (*jñāna*) is of two kinds, true (*vidyā*) and false (*avidyā*); and that the former (*vidyā*) is of two descriptions, arising from perception, inference, recollection, and the infallible intuition "peculiar to rishis" (*Tach cha jñānam avividhaṁ vidyā cha avidyā cha | vidyā chaturvidhā pratyaksha-laingikā-smṛity-ārsha-lakshanā*). Perception or intuition, again, is of different kinds or degrees (Aphorism ix. 1, 11-15, pp. 385 ff.). Aphorism ix. 1, 11 (p. 386), is as follows :

*Tad evam bhāvabhāva-vishayakām laukika-pratyakshām nirūpya yogi-pratyakshām nirūpayitum prakaranāntaram ārabhate | ix. 1, 11. "Ātmany ātma-manasoh sañyoga-viśeshād ātma-pratyaksham" | jñānam ut-*

*padyate iti śeshāḥ | dvividhāś tāvad yogināḥ samāhitāntahkaranāḥ ye “yuktāḥ” ity abhidhīyante asamāhitāntahkaranāś cha ye “viyuktāḥ” ity abhidhīyante | tatra yuktāḥ sākshātkartavye vastuny ādareṇā mano nidhāya nidiḍhyāsanavantāḥ | teshām ātmani svātmani parātmani cha jnānam utpadyate | “ātma-pratyakṣham” iti | ātmā sākshātkāra-vishayo yattra jnāne tat tathā | yadyapy asmad-ādīnām api kadāchid ātma-jnānam asti tathāpy avidyā-tiraskritatvāt tad asat-kalpam ity uktam | “ātma-manasos sannikarsha-viśeshād” iti yoga-ja-dharmānugrahāḥ ātma-manasoh sannikarsha-viśeshas tasmād ity arthaḥ |*

“Having thus defined ordinary perception which has for its objects existence and non-existence, the author, with the view of determining the character of the intuition of yogins, says: ‘From a particular concentration of both the soul and the mind<sup>118</sup> on the soul, arises the perception (or intuition) of soul.’ On this the commentator remarks: ‘There are two kinds of *yogins* (intent, or contemplative, persons), (1) those whose inner sense is fixed *samāhitāntahkaranāḥ*, who are called (*yuktāḥ*) united (*i.e.* with the object of contemplation), and (2) those whose inner sense is no longer fixed, and who are called disunited (*viyuktāḥ*).<sup>119</sup> Of these the first class, who are called ‘united,’ fix their minds with reverence on the thing which is to be the object of intuition, and contemplate it intently. In this way knowledge arises in their souls regarding their own souls, and the souls of others. ‘Intuition of soul,’ that is, a knowledge in which soul is the perceptible object of intuition. Now, although persons like ourselves have sometimes a knowledge of soul, yet from this knowledge being affected by ignorance, it has been said to be like what is unreal. ‘From a particular concentration of the soul and the mind;’ that is, from a particular conjunction of the soul and the mind which is effected by means of the virtue derived from *yoga*.” See also Aphorism xv. p. 390.

At the conclusion of his remarks (Bibl. Ind. p. 408) on the third sort of true knowledge (referred to in p. 357, Bibl. Ind.), viz. recollection, the commentator remarks that the author of the aphorisms does not make any separate mention of the fourth kind of knowlege, viz. infallible intuition:

<sup>118</sup> The “mind” (*manas*) is regarded by the Indian philosophers as distinct from the soul, and as being merely an internal organ.

<sup>119</sup> This class is the more perfect of the two, as appears from the gloss of Jayanā-rayana: *ayam api viśeṣha-yogavattvād viyuktāḥ ity uchyata*.

ix. 2, 6. . . . Ārshaṁ jnānam sūtra-kṛitaṁ prithaṁ na lakshitam | yogi-pratyakṣhāntarbhāvitam | padārtha-pradeśākhye tu prakarane tad uktam | tad yathā | “āmnāya-vidhātrīnām rishīnām atītānāgata-varttā-māneshv atīndriyārtheshv artheshu dharmādīshu granthopanibaddhesu vā lingādy-anapekshād ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharma-viśeshāch cha prātibhaṁ jnānaṁ yad utpadyato tad ārsham iti | tach cha kadāchil laukikānām api bhavati yathā kanyakā vadati “śvo me bhrātā gantā iti hṛidayam me kathayati” iti |

“Rishis’ (*ārsha*) knowledge,” he says, “is not separately defined by the author of the aphorisms, but is included in the intuition of *yogins*.<sup>120</sup> But the following statement has been made (in reference to it) in the section on the categories: ‘Rishis’ (*ārsha*) knowledge is that which, owing to a conjunction of the soul and the mind, independent of inference, etc., and owing to a particular species of virtue, illuminates those rishis who have composed the record of the Vedas (*āmnāya-vidhātrīnām*), in reference to such matters, whether past, future, or present, as are beyond the reach of the senses, or in reference to matters of duty, etc., recorded in books,’ etc. And this sort of knowledge is also sometimes manifested by ordinary persons, as when a girl says, ‘my heart tells me that my brother will go to-morrow.’” See also Aphorism ix. 2, 13 (Bibl. Ind. pp. 414, 415).

The Tarka-sangraha, another Vaiśeshika work, also affirms the divine authorship of the Veda in these words :<sup>121</sup> *Vākyāṁ dvividhaṁ laukikāṁ vaidikāṁ cha | vaidikam Īśvaroktavāt sarvam eva pramāṇam laukikāṁ tu āptoktam pramāṇam anyad apramāṇam |* “Sentences are of two kinds, Vedic and secular. Vedic sentences, from being uttered by Īśvara, are all proof [or authoritative]. Of secular sentences, those only which are uttered by competent persons (*āpta*) are proof; the rest are not proof.”

In this text, the authority of the Veda is founded on its being uttered by Īśvara; and this characteristic is regarded as limited to the Veda.

<sup>120</sup> It had been already noticed by Professor Max Müller in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vii. p. 311, that “the Vaiśeshikas, like Kapila, include the intuition of enlightened rishis under the head of *pratyakṣha* (intuition), and thus separate it decidedly from *aitiḥya*, ‘tradition.’” He also quotes the commentator’s remark about a similar intuition being discoverable among ordinary persons, which he thinks is not “without a certain irony.”

<sup>121</sup> See Dr. Ballantyne’s ed. with Hindi and English Versions, p. 40 of the Sanskrit.

On the other hand, such secular works as proceed from competent persons (*āpta*) are also declared to possess authority. Here, therefore, a distinction is drawn between the authority of the Veda and that of all other writings, however authoritative, inasmuch as the former was uttered by Īśvara, while the latter have only been uttered by some competent person (*āpta*). But in the Nyāya aphorism, ii. 68, quoted and commented upon above (p. 114), the authority of the Veda itself is made to rest on the authority of the wise, or competent persons (*āpta*), from whom it proceeded.<sup>122</sup> In this aphorism, therefore, either the word “*āpta*” must mean “Īśvara,” or we must suppose a difference of view between the author of the aphorism on the one hand, and the writers of the Vaiśeshika aphorisms and the Tarka-sangraha on the other. We shall see from the next extract that the Kusumānjali coincides with the latter.

I quote from the work just named (of which Udayana Āchārya is the author), and its commentary,<sup>123</sup> some statements of the doctrine maintained by the author regarding the origin and authority of the Veda. Mr. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 263, or p. 166 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) speaks of this treatise as being accompanied by a commentary of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha; but the one which is printed in the Calcutta edition, as well as in Professor Cowell’s, is by Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya. The object of the work is to prove the existence of a personal god (Īśvara), in opposition to various other antagonistic theories.

I. Kusumānjali, 2nd Stōvaka, at the commencement: *Anyathā 'pi paraloka-sādhanānushṭhāna-sambhavād iti dvitīya-vipratipattiḥ | Anyathā Īśvaraṁ vinā 'pi paraloka-sādhanā-yāgādy-anushṭhānaṁ sambhavati yāgā-deḥ svarga-sādhanatasya veda-gamyatvāt | nitya-nirdoshata�ā cha veda-sya prāmānyam | mahājana-parigrahāch cha prāmānyasya grahāḥ iti veda-kāraṇatayā na īśvara-siddhiḥ | yogardhi-sampādita-sārvajnya-Kapi-*

<sup>122</sup> The following words are put by the author of the Vishṇu Purāṇa (iii. ch. 18; Wilson, vol. iii. p. 212) into the mouth of the deluder who promulgated the Baudhā and other heresies: *Na hy āpta-vādāḥ nabhaso nipatanti malasurūḥ | yuktimad vachanāṁ grāhyam mayā 'nyais' cha bhavad-vidhaiḥ |* “Words of the competent do not, great Asuras, fall from the sky. It is only words supported by reasons that should be admitted by me and others like yourselves.”

<sup>123</sup> This book was published at the Sanskrit Press, Calcutta, in the S’aka year, 1769. A new edition was published by Professor Cowell in 1864, accompanied by an English translation. I have availed myself of this excellent version to correct a good many mistakes in my own.

lādi-pūrvakah eva vā vedo 'stv ity atra āha | “pramāyāḥ paratantratvāt  
 sarga-pralaya-sambhavāt | tad-anyasmīn aviśvāśād na vidhāntara-sam-  
 bhavaḥ” | Śābdī pramā vaktri-yathārtha-vakyārtha-dhī-rūpa-guṇa-janyā  
 iti guṇādhāratayā Īśvara-siddhiḥ | nanu sakartrike 'stu yathārtha-vāk-  
 yārtha-dhīr guṇaḥ | akartrike cha vede nirdoshatvam eva prāmānya-pra-  
 yojakam astu mahājana-parigrahanē cha prāmānya-grahaḥ ity ata āha |  
 “sarga-pralaya-sambhavād” iti | pralayottaram pūrva-veda-nūśūduttara-  
 vedasya katham prāmānyam mahājana-parigrahasyāpi taddā abhāvāt |  
 śabdasya anityatvam utpanno ga-kāraḥ iti pratīti-siddham | pravāhāvich-  
 chheda-rūpa-nityatvam api pralaya-sambhavād nāsti iti bhāvāḥ | Kapilā-  
 dayaḥ eva sargādau pūrva-sargābhyaṣṭa-yoga-janya-dharmānubhavāt  
 sākshāt-krīta-sakalārthāḥ karttāraḥ santu | ity ata āha | “tad-anyas-  
 minn” iti | viśva-nirmāna-samarthāḥ animādi-śakti-sampannāḥ yadi  
 sarvajñās taddā lāghavād eka eva tādriṣaḥ svikriyatām | sa eva bhagavān  
 Īśvarah | anityāsarva-vishayaka-jnānavati cha viśvāsaḥ eva nāsti | iti  
 vaidika-ryavahāra-vilopah | iti na vidhāntara-sambhavaḥ Īśvarānangi-  
 kartri-naye iti śeshāḥ |

“The second objection is that [there is no proof of an Īśvara], since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such Being. That is to say, the celebration of sacrifices, etc., which are the instruments of obtaining paradise, can take place otherwise, *i.e.* even without an Īśvara (God). For the fact that sacrifices, etc., are the instruments of obtaining paradise is to be learned from the Veda, while the authority of the Veda rests upon its eternal faultlessness; and the [immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illustrious men. Now in this way there is no proof of the existence of a God to be derived from the idea that he is the cause of the Veda. Or let it be supposed that the Veda was preceded [composed] by Kapila and other sages, who by their wealth in devotion had acquired omniscience.

“In answer to all this the author says: [verse] ‘Since truth depends on an external source, since creation and dissolution occur, and since there is no confidence in any other than God, therefore no other manner can be conceived [in which the Veda originated, except from God].’ [Comment] Verbal truth [or authoritativeness] is derived from the attribute, possessed by its promulgator, of comprehending the true sense of words [*i.e.* in order to constitute the Veda an authoritative

rule of duty, it must have proceeded from an intelligent being who understood the sense of what he uttered]; and since God is the substratum of this attribute [of intelligence], there is proof of his existence.

"But it may be said that if the Veda had a maker, then, indeed, such comprehension of the true sense of words as you insist upon may be a quality belonging to him; but if the Veda had no maker, let it be its faultlessness which imparts to it its authority, while the [immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illustrious men.

"In answer to this the author says: 'Since creation and dissolution occur.' Since the previous Veda [the one which existed during the former mundane period] perished after the dissolution of the universe, how can the subsequent Veda [*i.e.* the one supposed by our opponents to have existed during the dissolution] be authoritative, since there was not then even any reception of it by illustrious men [who also had all become extinct at the dissolution]. And further, the non-eternity of sound is proved by the conviction we have that letters such as G are produced, [and not eternal]: and even that eternity (or perpetuity) of the Veda which consists in unbroken continuity of tradition, does not exist, as there is probable proof of a dissolution.<sup>124</sup> But, again, it is urged that Kapila and other saints—who, from their perception of duty, springing from the practice of devotion during the former mundane period, had acquired an intuitive knowledge of every subject—may at the creation have been the authors of the Veda. This is answered in the words, 'since there is no confidence in any other but God.' If persons capable of creating the universe and possessing the faculty of minuteness be omniscient, then, for the sake of simplicity, let one such person only be admitted, namely, the divine Ishvara.<sup>125</sup> And no confidence can be reposed in any person who is not eternal, and who is not possessed of a knowledge which extends to all objects. Thus the Vedic tradition disappears. And so he concludes that no other manner [of the origination of the Veda] can be conceived [except

<sup>124</sup> The writers on the other side seem to reply to this Naiyayika objection about the interruption of the tradition of the Veda through the dissolution of the universe, by saying that the Veda was retained in the memory of Brahmā or the Rishis during the interval while the dissolution lasted. See Kulluka on Manu, i. 23, above, p. 6; and the passage of Kaiyyata on the Mahābhāshya, above, p. 96.

<sup>125</sup> "The law of parsimony bids us assume only one such," etc.—Cowell.

from Īśvara]; that is, in the system of those who deny an Īśvara [no way is pointed out].”

II. Kusumānjali, iii. 16.—“*Na pramānam anāptoktir nādrishṭe kvachid āptatā | adriṣya-drishṭau sarvajno na cha nityāgamah kshamaḥ*” | ayam hi sarva-kartritvābhāvāvedakah śabdah anāptoktaś ched na pramānam | āptoktaś ched etad-artha-gochara-jnānavato nitya-sarva-vishayaka-jnānavat-tvam indriyādy-abhāvāt | āgamasya cha nityatvam dūshitam eva prāg iti veda-kāro nityah sarvajnah siddhyati |

[Verse] “The word of an incompetent person is not authoritative; nor can there be any competency in regard to a thing unseen [by the speaker]. To perceive invisible things, a person must be omniscient; and an eternal scripture is impossible. [Comment] This [supposed] scriptural testimony, denying the fact of there being a creator of all things, if uttered by an incompetent person, would be no proof. If it was uttered by a competent person, then the person who possessed an acquaintance with this circumstance [that there was no creator] would be master of a knowledge which was eternal, and universal in its range, since he would not be limited by any bodily organs. And we have previously disproved the eternity of any scripture (see the first extract from the Kusumānjali, above). Consequently an omniscient and eternal author of the Veda is established.”

III. Kusumānjali, v. 1.—“*Kāryyāyojana-dhṛityādeḥ padāt pratyaya-tah śruteḥ | vākyāt sankhyā-viśeshāch cha sādhyo viśvavid avyayah*” | . . . *Pratyayataḥ prāmānyāt | veda-janya-jnānam kāraṇa-guṇa-janyam pra-mātvāt | pratyakshādi-pramā-vat | śruter vedāt | vedāḥ paurushayo veda-tvād āyurveda-vat | kincha vedāḥ paurushayo vākyatvād bhāratādi-vat | veda-vākyāni paurusheyāni vākyatvād asmad-ādi-vākyā-vat |*

[Verse] “An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from [the existence of] effects, from the conjunction of [atoms], from the support [of the earth in the sky], etc., from ordinary usages, from belief [in revelation], from the Veda, from sentences, and from particular numbers.”

The following is so much of the comment as refers to the words *pratyaya*, *śruti*, and *vākyā*: “From belief, i.e. from authoritativeness. The knowledge derived from the Veda is derived from the attributes of its Cause; since it is true knowledge, like the true knowledge derived from perception. From the *śruti*, i.e. the Veda. The Veda is [shewn

to be] derived from a person, by its having the characters of a Veda, like the Āyur-veda. It is also [shewn to be] derived from a person, by having the character of sentences, like the Mahābhārata. The words of the Veda are [shewn to be] derived from a person, by their having the character of sentences, like the sentences of persons such as ourselves."

IV. Kusumānjali, v.16.—“*Syām*” “*abhūvam*” “*bhavishyāmī*” *tyādau sankhyā pravaktri-gā | samākhyā 'pi cha sākhānām nādyā-pravachanād rite | Vaidikottama-purushena svatantrochchārayituh sankhyā vāchyā | “tad aikshata eko 'ham bahu syām” ityādi-bahushu uttama-purusha-śruteḥ | sankhyā-padarthatm anya n āha “samākhyā” ityādi | sarvāśām sākhānām hi Kāṭhaka-Kālāpakaḍyāḥ samākhyāḥ sanjnā-viśeshāḥ śrūyante | te cha na adhyayana-mātra-nibandhanāḥ | adhyetṛīnām ānanyat | ādāv anyair api tad-adhyayanat | tasmād atīndriyārtha-darśi bhagavān eva Īśvaraḥ kārunkih sargādāv asmad-ādy-adriṣṭākṛishta-kāṭhakādi-sarira-viśesham adhiṣṭhāya yām sākhām uktavāns tasyāḥ sākhāyās tan-nāmnā vyapadeśāḥ iti siddham Īśvara-mananam moksha-hetuḥ |*

[Verse] “In the phrases ‘let me be,’ ‘I was,’ ‘I shall be,’ [which occur in the Veda], personal designations have reference to a speaker; and the names of the Sākhās could only have been derived from a primæval utterance. [Comment] The first person (I), when it occurs in the Veda, must be employed to denote a self-dependent utterer. Now there are many instances there of such a use of the first person, as in the words, ‘It reflected, I am one, let me become many.’ The author then specifies another signification of the term *sankhyā* in the clause, ‘and the designations,’ etc. For all the Sākhās of the Veda traditionally bear the names, the special names, of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc. And these names cannot be connected with the mere study [of these Sākhās by Kāṭha, Kalāpa, etc.] from the infinite multitude of students, since they must have been studied before by others besides the persons just mentioned. Wherefore the particular Sākhās which Īśvara, the beholder of objects beyond the reach of the senses, the compassionate Lord, himself uttered at the beginning of the creation, when he assumed the bodies of Kāṭha, etc., which were drawn on by the destiny (*adriṣṭa*) of beings like ourselves—these Sākhās, I say, were designated by the names of the particular sages [in whose persons they were promulgated]. And so it is proved that the contemplation of Īśvara is the cause of final liberation.”

I am unable to say if the ancient doctrine of the Nyāya was theistic, as that of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (at least as interpreted by Śankara Miśra) appears to be, and as that of the Kusumānjali, the Tarka-saṅgraha,<sup>126</sup> and the Siddhānta Muktāvali undoubtedly is (p. 6 of Dr. Ballantyne's ed., or p. 12 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy," and p. 13 of Dr. Röer's Bhāṣā-parichchheda, in Bibl. Ind.). The remarks of Dr. Röer on the subject, in pp. xv., xvi., of the introduction to the last named work, may be consulted. The subject is also discussed by Professor Banerjea in his work on Hindu philosophy, pp. 144–153. The solution of the question may depend much on the interpretation to be given to the aphorisms of Gotama, 19–21 of the fourth book.

III. *The Sāṅkhya*.—The opinions of the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms in regard to the authority of the Veda and the principles on which that authority depends, are contained in the 45th to the 51st aphorisms of the Fifth Book, which I extract with the comments of Vijnāna Bhikshu :<sup>127</sup>

45. " *Na nityatvāñ Vedānāñ kāryatva-śruteḥ*" | " *Sa tapo 'tapyata tasmāt tapas tepānāt trayo vedā ajāyanta*" ity ādi-śruter vedānāñ na nityatvam ity arthaḥ | *veda-nityatā-vākyāni cha sajātiyānupūrvī-pravāhanuchohheda-parāṇi* | *Tarhi kim paurushayāḥ vedāḥ* | *na ity āha* | 46. " *Na paurushayatvāñ tat-kartuḥ purushasya abhāvāt*" | *īśvara-pratisheshād iti śeshāḥ* | *sugamam* | *aparaḥ karttā bhavatv ity ākānkshāyām āha* | 47. " *Muktāmuktayor ayogyatvāt*" | *Jīvan-mukta-dhuriṇo Viṣṇur viśuddha-sattvatayā niratiṣaya-sarvajno 'pi vīta-rāgatvāt sahasra-śākha-veda-nirmāṇayogaḥ* | *amuktas tv asarvajnatvād eva ayogyaḥ* ity arthaḥ | *nanv evam apaurushayatvād nityatvam eva āgatam* | *tatrāha* | 48. " *Na apaurushayatvād nityatvam ankurādi-vat*" | *Spashṭam* | *nanv ankurādiśv api ryaḥ* *vena ghaṭādi-vat* *purusheyatvam anumeyam* | *tatrāha* | 49. " *Teshām api tad-yoge drishṭa-bādhādi-prasaktih*" | *Yat paurushayām tach chha-*

<sup>126</sup> *Jnānādhikaraṇam ātmā* | *sa dvividho jīvātmā paramātmā cha* | *tatra īśvaraḥ sarvajnah paramātmā eka eva* | *jīvātmā prati śarīram bhinno vibhur nityaścha* | "The substratum of knowledge is soul. It is of two kinds, the embodied soul, and the supreme soul. Of these the supreme soul is the omniscient īśvara, one only. The embodied soul is distinct in each body, all-pervading, and eternal."

<sup>127</sup> Compare Dr. Ballantyne's translation of the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, books v. and vi., published at Mirzapore in 1856, pp. 26 ff., as well as that which subsequently appeared in the *Bibliotheca Indica* (in 1865), pp. 127 ff.

*rīra-janyam iti vyāptir loke dṛishṭā tasyāḥ bādhādir evāṁ sati syād iti arthaḥ | nanv Ādi-purushochcharitavād Vedāḥ api paurusheyāḥ eva ity āha | 50. “Yasmin adṛishṭe’pi krita-buddhir upajāyate tat paurusheyam” | Drishtे iva adṛishṭe’pi yasmin vastuni krita-buddhir buddhi-pūrvakatva-buddhir jāyate tad eva paurusheyam iti vyavahriyate ity arthaḥ | etad uktam bhavati | na purushochcharitatā-mātrena paurusheyatvāṁ śvāsa-praśvāsayoḥ sushupti-kālinayoḥ paurusheyatva-vyavahārā-bhāvāt kintu buddhi-pūrvakatvena | Vedās tu niḥśvāsa-vad eva adṛishṭa-vaśād abuddhi-pūrvakāḥ eva Svayambhuvaḥ sakāśat svayam bhavanti | ato na te paurusheyāḥ | tathā cha śrutiḥ “tasyaitasya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad rigvedo ity adīr” iti | nanv evam yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnānāpūrvakatvāt śuka-vākyasyeva vedānām api prāmāṇyaṁ na syūt tatrāḥ | 51. “Nija-śakty-abhivyakteḥ svataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ” | Vedānām nijā svābhāvīkī yā yathārtha-jnāna-janana-śaktis tasyāḥ mantrāyurvedādāv abhivyakter upalambhād akhila-vedānām eva svataḥ eva prāmāṇyaṁ siddhyati na vaktri-yathārtha-jnāna-mūlakatvādinā ity arthaḥ | tathā cha Nyāya-sūtram | “mantrāyurveda-prāmāṇya-vach cha tat-prāmāṇyaṁ” iti |*

“Sūtra 45. ‘Eternity cannot be predicated of the Vedas, since various texts in these books themselves declare them to have been produced.’ The sense is this, that the Vedas are proved not to be eternal by such texts as the following: ‘He performed austerity; from him, when he had thus performed austerity, the three Vedas were produced.’ [See above, p. 4.] Those other texts which assert the eternity [or perpetuity] of the Vedas refer merely to the unbroken continuity of the stream of homogeneous succession [or tradition]. Are the Vedas, then, derived from any personal author? ‘No,’ he replies in Sūtra 46. ‘The Vedas are not derived from any personal author (*paurusheyāḥ*), since there is no person to make them.’ We must supply the words, ‘since an *Īśvara* (God) is denied.’ The sense is easy. In answer to the supposition that there may be some other maker, he remarks, Sūtra 47, ‘No; for there could be no fit maker, either liberated or unliberated.’ Vishnu, the chief of all those beings who are liberated even while they live,<sup>128</sup> although, from the pure goodness of his nature, he is possessed of perfect omniscience, would, owing to his impassiveness, be unfit to compose the Veda consisting of a thousand sākhās (branches),

<sup>128</sup> See Colebrooke's Essays, i. 369, or p. 241 of Williams and Norgate's ed.

while any unliberated person would be unfit for the task from want of omniscience. (See Sankara's comment on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3; above, p. 106.) But does not, then, the eternity of the Vedas follow from their having no personal author? He replies (48), 'Their eternity does not result from their having no personal author, as in the case of sprouts, etc.' This is clear. But is it not to be inferred that sprouts, etc., since they are products, have, like jars, etc., some personal maker? He replies (49), 'If such a supposition be applied to these (sprouts, etc.) it must there also be exposed to the objection that it is contrary to what we see, etc.' Whatever is derived from a personal author is produced from a body; this is a rule which is seen to hold invariably. But if we assert that sprouts are derived from a personal author, we contradict the rule in question, [since they evidently did not spring from any embodied person].' But are not the Vedas, too, derived from a person, seeing that they were uttered by the primeval Purusha? He answers (50), 'That object only (even though it be an invisible one), which its maker is conscious of having made, can be said to be derived from [or made by] such a person.' It is only those objects, be they seen or unseen, in regard to which a consciousness of design arises, that are ordinarily spoken of as made by a person. The sense is, that it is not mere utterance by a person which constitutes formation by that person (since we do not ordinarily speak of the inspirations and expirations of any person during the time of sleep, as being formed by that person), but only utterance with conscious design. But the Vedas proceed of their own accord from Svayambhū (the self-existent), like an expiration, by the force of *adṛishṭa* (destiny), without any consciousness on his part. Hence they are not formed by any person. Thus the Veda says, 'This Rig-veda, etc., is the breath of this great Being, etc.' [See above, p. 8.] But will not the Vedas, also, be in this way destitute of authority, like the chatter of a parrot, since they did not result from any knowledge of the correct meaning of the words of which they are made up? In reference to this, he says (51), 'The Vedas have a self-proving authority, since they reveal their own inherent power.' The self-evidencing authority of the entire Vedas is established by the perception of a manifestation in certain portions of them, viz. in the formulas and the Āyur-veda, etc., of that inherent power which they (the Vedas) possess of generating correct knowledge, and does not depend on

its being shown that they (the Vedas) are founded on correct knowledge in their utterer,<sup>120</sup> or on any other ground of that sort. And to this effect is the Nyāya Sūtra, that 'their authority is like the authority of the formulas and the Āyur-veda.' (See above, p. 114.)

In reference to the 46th Sūtra I add here the 98th aphorism of the 1st book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed :

*Nanu chet sadā sarvajnah iśvaro nāsti tarhi vedānta-mahāvākyārthasya vivekasya upadeśe 'ndha - paramparāsankayā apramānyam prasajyeta | tatra āha | 98. Siddha-rūpa-boddhṛitvād vākyārthopadeśah | Hiranyagarbhādinām siddha-rupānām<sup>120</sup> yathārthārthasya boddhṛitvāt tad-vaktrikāyurvedādi - prāmānyena avudhṛitāch cha eshāmū vākyārthopadeśah pramānam iti śeshah |*

"But may it not be said that if there be no eternally omniscient Iśvara, the charge of want of authority will attach to the inculcation of discriminative knowledge which is the subject of the great texts of the Upanishads, from the doubt lest these texts may have been handed down by a blind tradition. To this he replies : 86. 'From the fact that beings perfect in their nature understood them, it results that we have an (authoritative) inculcation of the sense.' As Hiranyagarbha (Brahmā) and other beings who were perfect in their nature understood the true sense, and are ascertained to have done so by the authoritativeness of the Āyur-veda, etc., which they uttered, their inculcation of the sense of the texts is authority ;—such is the complete meaning of the aphorism."

In the 57th and following Sūtras of the fifth book, Kapila denies that sound has the character of *sphoṭa*, or that letters are eternal :

57. "Pratity-apratitibhyām na sphoṭātmakah śabdaḥ" | Pratyekavarṇebhīyo 'tiriktaṁ kalaśah ityādi-rūpam akhandam eka-padam sphotah iti yogair abhyupagamyate | kambu-grivādy-avayavebhyo 'tirikto ghaṭādy-avayavīva | sa cha śabda-viśesho padākhyo 'rtha-sphuṭikaranāt sphoṭah ity uchyate | sa śabdo 'prāmāṇikah | kutah | "pratity-apratitibhyām" | sa śabdaḥ kim pratīyate na vā | ādye yena varṇa-samudāyenā ānupurvi-

<sup>120</sup> This directly contradicts the doctrine enunciated in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras and the Kusumānjali. See above, pp. 121, 123, and 129 f.

<sup>120</sup> This is a various reading given by Dr. Hall in the appendix to his edition of the Sankhya-pravachana-bhāṣya; and I have adopted it in preference to *siddha-nāyaka* which he gives in his text, as the former seems to afford a better sense.

*viśeṣha-viśiṣṭena so 'bhivyajyate tasya eva artha-pratyāyakatvam astu | kim antar-junā tena | antye tv ajanāta-sphoṭasya nāsty artha-pratyāyanā-saktir iti vyarthā sphoṭa-kalpanā ity arthaḥ | Pūrvam̄ vedānām̄ nityatvam̄ pratishiddham̄ | idanīm̄ varṇa-nityatvam̄ api pratishedati | 58. “Na śabda-nityatvam̄ kāryatā-pratiteḥ” | Sa eva ayaṁ ga-kāraḥ ityādi-pratyabhijnā-balād varṇa-nityatvam̄ na yuktam̄ | utpanno ga-kāraḥ ityādi-pralyayena anityatra-siddher ity arthaḥ | pratyabhijnā taj-jatiyatā-vishayinī | anyathā ghaṭader api pratyabhijnāyāḥ nityatāpatter iti | śankate | 59. “Pūrva-siddha-sattva-sya abhivyaktir dīpenera ghaṭasya” | Nanu pūrva-siddha-sattākasyaiva śabdasya dhvany-ādibhir yā 'bhivyaktis tan-mātram̄ utpattiḥ pratīter vishayah | abhivyaklau drishṭānto dīpenera ghaṭasya iti | Pariharati | 60. “Sat-kāryya-siddhāntā chet siddha-sādhānam” | Abhivyaktir yady anāgatāvasthā - tyāgena varttamānāvasthā-lābhah ity uchyate tadā sat-kāryya-siddhāntaḥ | tādriśa-nityatvam̄ cha sarva-kāryānām̄ eva iti siddha-sādhanam̄ ity arthaḥ | yadi cha varttamānatayā satuḥ eva jnāna-mātra-rāpiṇy abhivyaktir uchyate tadā ghaṭādīnām̄ api nityatvāpattir ityādi |*

“Sound has not the character of *sphoṭa*, from the dilemma that the latter must be either apparent or not apparent.’ A modification of sound called *sphoṭa*, single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words like *kalaśa* (jar), distinguished also from parts of words like *kambu-grīva* (striped-neck) and forming a whole like the word *ghaṭa* (jar), is assumed by the Yogas. And this species of sound called a word (*pada*) is designated *sphoṭa* from its manifesting a meaning. But the existence of this form of sound is destitute of proof. Why? ‘From the dilemma that it must be either apparent or not apparent.’ Does this form of sound appear or not? If it appears, then let the power of disclosing a meaning [which is ascribed by our opponents to *sphoṭa*] be regarded as belonging to that collection of letters, arranged in a particular order, by which the supposed *sphoṭa* is manifested. What necessity is there then for that superfluous *sphoṭa*? If, on the contrary, it does not appear, then that unknown *sphoṭa* can have no power of disclosing a meaning, and consequently it is useless to suppose that any such thing as *sphoṭa* exists.

“The eternity of the Vedas has been already denied. He now denies the eternity of letters also. 58. ‘Sound is not eternal, since it is clear that it is a production.’ The meaning is, that it is not reasonable to

infer on the strength of the recognition of the letter G as the same that we knew before (see Mīmānsa Aphorisms i. 13; above, p. 74), that letters are eternal; since it is clear that G and other letters are produced, and therefore cannot be eternal. The recognition of these letters has reference to their being of the same species as we have perceived before; since otherwise we are landed in the absurdity that, because we recognize a jar or any other such object to be the same, it must therefore be eternal.

"He expresses a doubt: 59. 'What we hear may be merely the manifestation of a previously existing thing, as a jar is manifested (not created) by the light of a lamp' (See Mīmānsa Aphorisms i. 12, 13; above, p. 74.) Is it not the fact that it is merely the manifestation of previously existing language by sounds, etc., which we perceive as originating? An illustration of such manifestation is that of a jar by means of a lamp.

"He repels this doubt: 60. 'If the axiom that an effect exists in its cause be here intended, this is merely proving what is already admitted.' If by manifestation is meant the relinquishment by any substance of its past (?) condition, and the attainment of its present state, then we have merely the recognized principle of an effect virtually existing in its cause (see Sāṅkhya Kārikā Aph. ix.); and as such eternity is truly predicable of all effects whatever, it is proving a thing already proved to assert it here. If, on the other hand, by manifestation be merely meant the perception of a thing actually existing, then we shall be involved in the absurdity of admitting that jars, etc., also are eternal, etc."

**SECT. X.—*On the use which the authors of the different Darśanas make of Vedic texts, and the mode of interpretation which they adopt.***

I have already (in p. 107) touched on the mode of interpretation applied by the author of the Brahma Sūtras, or his commentator Sāṅkara Āchāryya, to the Vedic texts, derived chiefly from the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, on which the Vedāntic doctrines are based, or by which they are defended, or with which, at least, they are asserted to be consistent. It will, however, be interesting to enquire a little more in detail into the extent to which the Indian scriptures are appealed to, and the manner in which they are treated by the authors or expounders of the different

Darśanas. The object proposed by the Pūrva-mīmānsā is an enquiry into duty (*dharma-jijnāsā*—Aph. i.). Duty is defined as something enjoined by the Veda (*chodanā-lakshano'rtha dharmah*—Aph. ii.); and which cannot be ascertained to be duty except through such injunction.<sup>131</sup> The first six lectures of the Mīmānsā, according to Mr. Colebrooke, “treat of positive injunction;” the remaining six concern “indirect command.” “The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts, . . . and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next. . . . The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth. The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferable changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth.” . . . . “Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main topic or its exceptions” (Misc. Essays, i. 304 f.). It appears, therefore, that the general aim of the Pūrva-mīmānsā is (1) to prove the authority of the Veda, and then to (2) deduce from it the duties, whether enjoined directly or indirectly, which are to be performed, the manner and conditions of their performance, and their results. It is also termed the Karma-mīmānsā, “as relating to works or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends” (Colebrooke, i. 296, 325).

The Brahma-mīmānsā, or Vedānta, is, according to the same author, the complement of the Karma-mīmānsā, and “is termed *uttara*, later, contrasted with *pūrva*, prior, being the investigation of proof deducible from the Vedas in regard to *theology*, as the other is in regard to *works* and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mīmānsā is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as well as a philosophical view” (Misc. Ess. i. 325). In fact the Brahma-mīmānsā proceeds upon a depreciation of the value of the objects aimed at by the Karma-mīmānsā,

<sup>131</sup> See Ballantyne's Mīmānsā aphorisms, p. 7.

since the rewards which the latter holds out even in a future state are but of temporary duration; and according to Sankara it is not even necessary that the seeker after a knowledge of Brahma should first have studied the Karma-mīmānsā before he conceives the desire to enter upon the higher enquiry (*nanv iha karmāvabodhānantaryyaṁ viśeṣaḥ | na | dharma-jījnāsāyāḥ prāg apy adhīta-redāntasya Brahma-jījnā-sopapatteḥ*). (Sankara on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 1, p. 25 of Bibl. Ind.) This is distinctly expressed in the following passage, p. 28 :

*Tasmāt kim api vaktavyam yad-anantaram Brahma-jījnāsā upadiṣyate iti | uchyate | nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ iḥāmutrārtha-phala-bhoga-virāgaḥ śama-damādi-sādhana-sampaṭ mumukshatraṁ cha | teshu hi satsu prāg api dharma-jījnāsāyāḥ ūrddhvāṁ cha śakyate Brahma jījnāsayitum jnātuṁ cha na viparyyyaye | tasmād “atha” śabdena yathokta-sādhana-sampatty-ānantaryyam upadiṣyate | “ataḥ” śabdo hetv-arthaḥ | yasmād vedāḥ eva agnihotrādināṁ śreyas-sādhānānām anitya-phalatāṁ darśayati “tad yathā iha Karma-chito lokāḥ kshīyate evam eva amuttra punya-chito lokāḥ kshīyate” ity-ādi | tathā Brahma-vījnānād api param purushārthaṁ darśayati Brahma-vid āpnoti param” ity-ādi | tasmād yathokta-sādhana-sampatty-anantaram Brahma-jījnāsā kartavyā | .*

The author is explaining the word *atha* ‘now,’ or ‘next,’ with which the first Sūtra begins; and is enquiring what it is that is referred to as a preliminary to the enquiry regarding Brahma : “What, then, are we to say that that is after which the desire to know Brahma is enjoined?” The answer is, ‘it is the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substance, indifference to the enjoyment of rewards either in this world or the next, the acquisition of the means of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire for final liberation. For if these requisites be present, a knowledge of Brahma can be desired, and Brahma can be known, even before, as well as after, an enquiry has been instituted into duty. But the converse does not hold good (*i.e.* without the requisites referred to, though a man may have a knowledge of duty, *i.e.* of ceremonial observances, he possesses no preparation for desiring to know Brahma). Hence by the word *atha* it is enjoined that the desire in question should follow the possession of those requisites.’ The next word *ataḥ*, ‘hence,’ denotes the reason. Because the Veda itself,—by employing such words as these, ‘Wherefore just as in this life the world which has been gained by works

perishes, so too in a future life the world gained by merit perishes'—points out that the rewards of the agnihotra sacrifice and other instruments of attaining happiness are but temporary. And by such texts as this, 'He who knows Brahma attains the highest exaltation,' the Veda further shews that the highest end of man is acquired by the knowledge of Brahma. Hence the desire to know Brahma is to be entertained after the acquisition of the means which have been already referred to."

In the *Mimānsā Sūtras*, i. 1, 5, as we have seen above (p. 71), *Bādarāyana*, the reputed author of the *Brahma Sūtras*, is referred to as concurring in the doctrine there laid down. But in many parts of the *Brahma Sūtras*, the opinions of Jaimini are expressly controverted, both on grounds of reason and scripture, as at variance with those of *Bādarāyana*.<sup>132</sup>

I adduce some instances of this difference of opinion between the two schools :

We have seen above, p. 99, that according to the *Brahma Sūtras* the gods possess the prerogative (*adhikāra*) of acquiring divine science. This, however, is contested by Jaimini (see *Brahma Sūtras*, i. 3, 31), who objects (1) that in that case (as all divine sciences possess the characteristic of being science) the gods would also have the prerogative of becoming adepts in the science called *Madhuvidyā*, etc., which would be absurd, because the sun (*Āditya*), being the virtual object of worship in the ritual connected with that science, could not be worshipped by another sun, who, according to the supposition, would be one of the deities skilled in it, and one of the worshippers. Similar difficulties are furnished by other cases, as, for instance, that on the hypothesis referred to, the Vasus, Rudras, and three other classes of gods, would be at once the objects to be known and the knowers. In the next *Sūtra* the further objection is made (2) that the celestial luminaries, commonly called gods, are in reality destitute of sensation and desire; and on this ground also the prerogative in question is denied to the supposed deities. *Bādarāyana* replies in the 33rd *Sūtra* (1) that although

<sup>132</sup> Dr. Ballantyne refers to the *Mimānsakas* as being the objectors alluded to by Śankara in his remarks which introduce and follow *Brahma Sūtra*, i. 1, 4; but as Jaimini is not expressly mentioned there, I shall not quote this text in proof of my assertion. See Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Vedānta*, p. 12.

the gods cannot concern themselves with such branches of knowledge as the Madhuvidyā, with which they themselves are mixed up, yet they do possess the prerogative of acquiring pure divine science, as that depends on the desire and capacity for it, and the non-existence of any obstacle to its acquisition (*tathāpy asti hi śuddhāyām brahma-vidyāyām sambhavo 'rthitva-sāmarthyāpratishedhādy-aprekshatvād adhikārasya*). An exception in regard to a particular class of cases cannot, he urges, set aside a rule which otherwise holds good ; for if it did, the circumstance that the generality of men belonging to the three highest castes are excluded from the performance of particular rites, such as the Rājasūya, would have the effect of rendering them incapable of performing any sacrifice whatever. And he goes on to cite several Vedic texts which prove that the gods have both the capacity and the desire for divine knowledge. Thus : *Tad yo yo devānām pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhavat tathā rishinām tathā manushyānām* | “ Whosoever, whether of gods, rishis, or men, perceived That, he became That.” Again : *Te ha uchur “hanta tam ātmānam anvichāmo yam ātmānam anvishya sarvān lokān āpnoti sarvāṁś cha kāmān” iti | Indro ha vai devānām abhi praravṛīja Virochano ‘surānām iti |* “ They said, ‘ come, we shall enquire after that Soul, after investigating which, one obtains all worlds, and all objects of desire.’ Accordingly Indra among the \*gods, and Virochana among the Asuras, set out ” (“ to go to Prajāpati the bestower of divino knowledge,” according to Govinda Ānanda). And in reply to the second objection, Sankara maintains that the sun and other celestial luminaries are each of them embodied deities possessed of intelligence and power ; an assertion which he proceeds to prove from texts both of the Veda and the Smṛiti. He then replies to a remark of the Mīmānsakas, referred to under Sūtra 32, that allusions in the Vedic mantras and arthavādās (illustrative passages) cannot prove the corporeality of the gods, as these texts have another object in view : and his reply is that it is the evidence, or the want of evidence, derivable from any texts which occasions us to believe or disbelieve in the existence of anything ; and not the circumstance that such a text was or was not primarily intended to prove that particular point. The Mīmānsaka is represented as still unsatisfied : but I need not carry my summary further than to say that Sankara concludes by pointing out that the precepts which enjoin the offerings to certain gods imply that these gods have a particular form which the wor-

shipper can contemplate; and that in fact such contemplation is enjoined in the text, "Let the worshipper when about to repeat the Vashaṭkara meditate on the deity to whom the oblation is presented" (*yasyai devatāyai harir grihitaṁ syāt tāṁ dhyāyed vashaṭkarishyan*).<sup>138</sup>

In Brahma Sūtras, iii. 4, 1, it is laid down as the principle of Bādarāyaṇa that the knowledge of Soul, described in the Upanishads, is the sole means of attaining the highest end of man, i.e. final liberation; that it is not to be sought with a view to, and that its operation is altogether independent of, ceremonial observances (*ataḥ | asmāt vedāntavīhitād ātma-jnānāt svatantrāt purushārthaḥ siddhyati iti Bādarāyaṇaḥ ācharyyo manyate*). This he proves by various texts (*ity-evāṁ-jātiyakā śrutir vidyāyāḥ kevalāyāḥ purushārtha - hetutvāṁ śrāvayati*), such as *Tarati śokam ātma-rit | sa yo ha vai tat param Brahma veda-Brahma eva bhavati | Brahma-vid āpnoti param |* "He who knows soul overpasses grief" (Chhāndogya Up. see above, p. 33); "He who knows that Brahma becomes Brahma;" "He who knows Brahma obtains the highest (exaltation);" etc. In the following Sūtra (2) Jaimini is introduced as contesting this principle, and as affirming that the knowledge of soul is to be acquired with a view to the performance of ceremonial works. The Sūtra in question, as explained by Sankara, means that "as the fact that soul is an agent in works implies an ultimate regard to works, the knowledge of soul must also be connected with works by means of its object" (*karttrilvena ātmanāḥ karma-śeshatvāt tad-vijñānam api . . . vishaya-dvārena karma-sambandhy eva iti*). The same view is further stated in the following Sūtras 3-7, where it is enforced by the example of sages who possessed the knowledge of Brahma and yet sacrificed (Sūtra 3), by a text which conjoins knowledge and works (Sūtra 5), by a second which intimates that a person who knows all the contents of the Veda has a capacity for ceremonial rites (Sūtra 6), and by others (7). Sankara replies under Sūtra 8 to the view set forth in Sūtra 2, which he declares to be founded on a mistake, as "the soul which is proposed in the Upanishads as the object of knowledge is not the embodied soul, but the supreme Spirit, of which agency in regard to rites is not predictable. That knowledge, he affirms, does not promote, but on the

<sup>138</sup> The passage in which Sankara goes on to answer the objection that in cases like this the Itihāsas and Purāṇas afford no independent evidence, will be quoted below.

contrary, ‘puts an end to all works’ (*na cha tad-vijnānam karmāṇam pravartakam bhavati pratyuta tat karmāṇy uchchhinatti*), and under Sūtra 16 he explains how this takes place, viz. by the fact that “knowledge annihilates the illusory conceptions of work, worker, and reward, which are caused by ignorance, and are necessary conditions of capacity for ceremonial observances” (*Api cha karmādhikāra-hetoh kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakṣaṇasya samastasya prapanchasya avidyā-kritasya vidyā-sāmarthyāt svarūpopamarddam āmananti*). To Sūtra 3 Bādarāyaṇa replies that the ceremonial practice of sages is the same whether they do or do not acquire knowledge with a view to works; to Sūtra 5, by saying that in the text in question works and knowledge are not referable to one and the same person, but works to one and knowledge to another; and to Sūtra 6, by declaring that it is merely the reading of the Veda, and not a knowledge of all its contents that is referred to in the text in question. Another reason assigned in Sūtra 17 to shew that divine knowledge is not dependent on, or subservient to works, is that ascetics who practise no Vedic ceremonies are yet recognized in the Veda as competent to acquire it (*ūrdhvaretassu cha āśrameshu vidyā śrūyate na cha tatra karmāṅgatvām vidyāyāḥ upapadyate karmābhāvāt | na hy agnihotrādīni vai-dikāni karmāṇi teshāṁ santi*). In the following Sūtra (18) Jaimini is introduced as questioning the validity of this argument on the ground that the Vedic texts, which are adduced in support of it, merely allude to the existence of ascetics, and do not recognize such an order as consistent with Vedic usage, or that they have another object, or are ambiguous; while another text actually reprehends the practice of asceticism. To this Bādarāyaṇa rejoins in Sūtra 19, that the texts in question prove the recognized existence of the ascetic order as much as that of any other; and that the alleged ambiguity of one of the passages is removed by the consideration that as two of the three orders referred to, viz. those of the householder and brahmachārin, are clearly indicated, the third can be no other than that of the ascetic. The subject is further pursued in the next Sūtra 20, where the author and his commentator (who adduces additional texts) arrive at the conclusion that the practice of asceticism is not only alluded to, but enjoined in the Veda, and that consequently knowledge, as being inculcated on those who practise it, is altogether independent of works (*tasmāt siddhā ūrdhvaretasah āśramā siddhāṁ oha ūrdhvaretassu vidhānād vidyāyāḥ svātantryam*).

Again in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 3, 7–14, the question is discussed whether the words *sa etān Brahma gamayati*, “He conducts them to Brahman,” refer to the supreme Brähmā, or to the created Brähmā. Bādari (Sūtra 7) holds that the latter is meant, whilst Jaimini (in Sūtra 12) maintains that the former is intended. The conclusion to which the commentator comes at the close of his remarks on Sūtra 14 is that the view taken by Bādari is right, whilst Jaimini’s opinion is merely advanced to display his own ability (*tasmāt “kāryyam Bādarir” ity esha eva pakṣaḥ sthitāḥ | “param Jaiminir” iti cha pakṣāntara-pratipā-dana-māṭra-pradarśanam prajnā-vikāśanāya iti drashṭavyam*).

Further, in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 4, 10, it is stated to be the doctrine of Bādari\* that the sage who has attained liberation no longer retains his body or bodily organs, but his mind (*manas*) alone, whilst in the following Sūtra (11) it is declared to be Jaimini’s opinion that he retains his body and senses also. In the 12th Sūtra it is laid down as the decision of Bādarāyaṇa that either of the two supposed states may be assumed at will by the liberated spirit.

Jaimini and his opinions are also mentioned in Brahma Sūtras i. 2, 28, and 31; i. 4, 18; and iv. 4, 5.

I shall now adduce some illustrations of the claims which the founders of the other philosophical schools put forward on behalf of their own principles as being in conformity with the Vedas. I begin with a passage on this subject from Sankara’s note introductory to Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 5 ff.:

*Brahma cha sarvajnaṁ sarvaśakti jagad-utpatti-sthiti-nāśa-kāraṇam ity uktam | Sāṅkyādayas tu parinishṭhitaṁ vastu pramāṇāntara-gamyam eva iti manyamānāḥ pradhānādīni kāraṇāntarāṇi anumimānās tat-parataya ēva vedānta-vākyāni yojayanti | sarveshv eva tu vedānta-vākyeshu srishṭi-vishayeshu anumānenā eva kāryyeṇā kāraṇam lilakshayishitam | Pradhāna-purusha-saṁyogāḥ nityānumeyāḥ iti Sāṅkyāḥ manyante | Kāṇḍādās tv etebhyaḥ eva vākyebhyaḥ Īśvaraṁ nimitta-kāraṇam anumimāte anūmās cha samavāyi-kāraṇam | evam anye’pi tārkikāḥ vākyābhāsa-yukty-ābhāsāvashṭumbhāḥ pūrva-pakṣa-vādināḥ iha uttishṭhante | tattva pada-vākyā-pramāṇa-jnena ḫohāryyena vedānta-vākyānām Brahmarūgati-paratvu-pradarśanāya vākyābhāsa-yukty-ābhāsa-pratipattayah pūrvapakṣi-kritya nirākriyante | tattva Sāṅkyāḥ pradhānam triguṇam achetanām jagataḥ kāraṇam iti manyamānāḥ dhur “yāni vedānta-vākyāni sarvajna-*

sya sarvaśakter Brahmano jagat-kāraṇatvam pratipādayanti ity avochas  
 tāni pradhāna-kāraṇa-pakṣe 'pi yojayitum śakyante | sarvaśaktitvam  
 tāvat pradhānasyāpi sva-vikāra-vishayam upapadyate | evam sarvajna-  
 tvam upapadyate | katham | yat tvam jnānam manyase sa sattva-dharmaḥ  
 “sattvāt sanjāyatे jnānam” iti smriteḥ | tena cha sattva-dharmena  
 jnānenā kāryya-kāraṇavantah purushāḥ sarvajnāḥ yogināḥ prasiddhāḥ |  
 sattvasya hi niratiśayotkarshe sarvajnatvam prasiddham | na cha kevalasya  
 akāryya-kāraṇasya purushasya upalabdhī-māttrasya sarva-jnatvam kin-  
 chij-jnatvam vā kalpayitum śakyam | trigunatvāt tu pradhānasya sarva-  
 jnāna-kāraṇa-bhūtaṁ sattvam pradhānāvasthāyām api vidyate iti pradhā-  
 nasya achetanasya eva sataḥ sarvajnatvam upacharyyate vedānta-vākyeshu |  
 avaśyam cha tvayā 'pi sarvajnam Brahma abhyupagachhatā sarva-jnāna-  
 śaktimattvena eva sarvajnatvam abhyupagantavyam | na hi sarva-vishayam  
 jnānam kurvad eva Brahma varitate | tathā hi jnānasya nityatve jnāna-  
 kriyām prati svātantryam hīyeta | atha anityam tad iti jnāna-kriyāyāḥ  
 uparamē uparameta api Brahma | tadā sarva-jnāna-śaktimattvena eva  
 sarvajnatvam āpatati | api cha prāg utpatteḥ sarva-kāraka-śūnyam Brahma  
 iṣhyate tvayā | na cha jnāna-sādhanānām śārirendriyādīnām abhāve  
 jnānotpattiḥ kasyachid upapannā | api cha pradhānasya anekātmakasya  
 parināma-sambhavāt kāraṇatvopapattir mṛid-ādi-vat | na asaṁhatasya  
 ekātmakasya Brahmanāḥ | ity evam prāpte idam sūtram ārabhyate | 5. “Īk-  
 shater na aśabdām” | na Sāṅkhya-parikalpitam achetanam pradhānām ja-  
 gataḥ kāraṇām śakyām vedānteshv āśrayitum | aśabdām hi tat | katham  
 aśabdām | “īkshiteḥ” | īkshīrtitva-śravaṇāt kāraṇasya | katham | evam hi  
 śrūyate “Sad eva saumya idam agre āśid ekam eva advitīyam” ity upakra-  
 mya “tad aikshata ‘bahu syām prajāyeya’ iti tat tejo ‘srijata’” iti | tatra  
 idam-śabda-vāchyām nāma-rūpa-vyākṛitaṁ jagat prāg utpatteḥ sad-āt-  
 manā ‘vadhāryya tasya eva prakṛitasya sach-chhabda-vāchyasya īkshana-  
 pūrvakām tejaḥ-prabhriteḥ srashīrtitvām darśayati | tathā cha anyatra  
 “ātmā vai idam ekaḥ eva agre āśit | na anyat kinchana miśhat | sa aik-  
 shata ‘lokān nu srijai’ iti sa imān lokān asrijata” iti īkshā-pūrvikām eva  
 śrīshṭim āśhashṭe | . . . ity-evam-ādīnī api sarvajneśvara-kāraṇa-parāṇi  
 vākyāny udāharttavyānī | yat tu uktam “sattva-dharmena jnānenā sar-  
 vajnam pradhānam bhavishyati” iti tad na upapadyate | na hi pradhā-  
 nāvasthāyām guna-sāmyāt sattva-dharmo jnānam sambhavati | nanu  
 uktam “sarva-jnāna-śaktimattvena sarvajnam bhavishyati” iti tad api na  
 upapadyate | yadi guna-sāmye sati sattva-vyapāśrayām jnāna-śaktim

āśritya sarvajnam pradhānam uchyeta kāmaṁ rajas-tamo-vyapāśrayām  
 api jnāna-pratibandha-śaktim āśritya kinchij-jnatvam uchyeta | api cha  
 na asākshikā sattva-vrittir jānāti na abhidhīyate | na cha ahetanasya  
 pradhānasya sākshitvam asti | tasmād anupannam pradhānasya sarvajna-  
 tvam | yoginām tu chetanatvāt sarvotkarsha-nimittaṁ sarvajnatvam upa-  
 pannam ity anudāharanam | atha punah sākshi-nimittam īkshītritvam  
 pradhānasya kalpyeta yathā agni-nimittam ayah-pindāder dagdhritvām  
 tathā sati yan-nimittaṁ īkshītritvam pradhānasya tad eva sarvajnam mukh-  
 yam Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti yuktam | yat punar uktam Brahmano  
 'pi na mukhyam sarvajnatvam upapadyate nitya-jnāna-kriyatve jnāna-  
 kriyām prati svātantryāsambhavād ity attra uchyate | idam tāvad bhavān  
 prashṭavyaḥ “katham nitya-jnāna-kriyatve sarvajnatva-hānir” iti | yasya  
 hi sarva-vishayāvabhāsana-kshamaṁ jnānam nityam asti so 'sarvajnah iti  
 vīpratishiddham | anityatve hi jnānasya kadācīj jānāti kadāchid na jānāti  
 ity asarvajnatvam api syāt | na asau jnāna-uityatve dosho 'sti | jnāna-  
 uityatve jnāna-vishayah svātantrya-vyapadeśo na upapadyate iti chet |  
 na | pratataushna-prakāśe'pi savitari dahati prakāśayati iti svātantrya-  
 vyapadeśa-darśanāt | nanu savitir dāhya-prakāśya-saṁyoge sati dahati  
 prakāśayati iti vyapadeśah syāt | na tu Brahmanah prāg utpatter jnāna-  
 karma-saṁyogo'sti iti vishamo drishṭāntah | na | asaty api karmani savitā  
 prakāśate iti kartṛitva-vyapadeśa-darśanāt | evam asaty api jnāna-kar-  
 mani Brahmanas “tad aikshata” iti kartṛitva-vyapadeśopapatter na rai-  
 shamyam | karmāpekshāyām tu Brahmanī īkshītritva-śrutayah sutarām  
 upapannāḥ | kim punas tat karma yat prāg utpatter iśvara-jnānasya  
 vishayābhavati iti | tattvānyatvābhyaṁ anirvachanīye nāma-rūpe avyā-  
 krite vyāchikīrshite iti brūmāḥ | yat-prasādād hi yoginām apy atītānā-  
 gata-vishayam pratyakshaṁ jnānam icchanti yoga-sāstra-vidah kimu vak-  
 tavyām tasya nitya-śuddhasya iśvarasya śrīshṭi-sīhiti-sāṁhṛiti-vishayaṁ  
 nitya-jnānam bhavati iti | yad apy uktam prāg utpatter Brahmanah śāri-  
 rādi-sambandham antareṇa īkshītritvam anupannam iti nātāch chodyam  
 avatarati savitṛi-prakāśa-vad Brahmano jnāna-svarūpa-nityatrena jnāna-  
 sādhanāpekshānupapatteḥ | . . . . yad apy uktam “pradhānasya anekāt-  
 makatvād mṛid-ādi-vat kāraṇatvopapattir na asaṁhatasya Brahmanah”  
 iti tat pradhānasya asabdatvena eva pratyuktam | yathā tu tarkenāpi Brah-  
 manah eva kāraṇatvām nirvoḍhuṁ śakyate na pradhānādīnām tathā pra-  
 panchayishyate “na vilakṣaṇatvād asya” ity-evam-ādinā (Brahma Sū-  
 traḥ ii. 1, 4) |

*Attra āha yad uktam “na achetanam pradhānam jagat-kāraṇam īkshī-  
trīva-śravaṇād” iti tad anyathā ‘py upapadyate | achetane ‘pi chetana-  
vad upachāra-darśanāt | pratyāsanna-pātanatām kūlasya ālakshya kūlam  
pipatishtati ity achetane ‘pi kūle chetana-vad upachāro dṛishṭas tad-vadache-  
tane ‘pi pradhāne pratyāsanna-sarge chetana-vad upachāro bhavishyati  
“tad aikshata” iti | yathā loke kaśchich chetanaḥ snātvā bhuktvā cha  
“aparāhne grāmaṁ rathena gamishyāmi” iti īkshītvā anantaram tathaiva  
niyamona pravarttate tathā pradhānam api mahad-ādy-ākārenā niyamona  
pravarttate | tasmāk chetana-vad upachāryyate | kasmāt punaḥ kāraṇād  
vihāya mukhyam īkshītrīvam aupachārikaṁ kalpyate | “tat tejaḥ aik-  
shata” “tāḥ āpaḥ aikshanta” iti oha achetanayor apy ap-tejasoś chetana-  
vad upachāra-darśanāt | tasmāt sat-karitrikam api īkshāṇam aupachāri-  
kam iti gamyate upachāra-prāye vachanād ity evam prāpte idam sūtram  
ārabhyate | 6. “Gauṇāś chet | na | ātma-śabdāt” | yad uktam pradhānam  
achetanām sach-ohabda-vāchyam tasminn aupachārikī īkshītir ap-tejasor  
iva iti tad asat | kasmāt | ātma-śabdāt | “sad eva saumya idam agre  
asid” ity upakramya “tad aikshata tat tejo ‘spijata” iti oha tejo ‘b-annā-  
nām śrīshṭim uktivā tad eva prakṛitām sad īkshītri tāni cha tejo ‘b-annāni  
devatā-śabdē parāmṛiṣya āha “sā iyaṁ devatā aikshata hanta aham  
imās tiero devatāḥ anena jivona ātmānā ‘nupraviṣya nāma-rūpe vyākara-  
vāṇi” iti | tattva yadi pradhānam ahetanām guna-vṛittiā īkshītri kal-  
pyeta tad eva prakṛitatvāt sā iyaṁ devatā parāmṛiṣyeta | na tadā devatā  
jīvam ātma-śabdē abhidhīyat | jīvo hi nāma chetanāḥ śarīrūdhyakshāḥ  
prāṇānām dhārayitā prasiddher nirvachanāch cha | sa katham ahetanasya  
pradhānasya ātma bhavet | ātma hi nāma svarūpam | na ahetanasya  
pradhānasya chetano jīvāḥ svārūpam bhavitum arhati | attra tu che-  
tanām Brahma mukhyam īkshītri parigṛihyate | tasya jīva-vishayaḥ  
ātma-śabda-prayogaḥ upapadyate | tathā “sa yaḥ esho ‘nimā etadāt-  
myam idam sarvāt tat satyām sa ātmā tat tvam asi Svetaketō” ity  
attra “sa ātmā” iti prakṛitām sad-apimānam ātmānam ātma-śabdēna  
upadīsyā “tat tvam asi Svetaketō” iti ahetanasya Svetaketor ātmatevēna  
upadīsatī | ap-tejaso tu vishayatvād ahetanatvām nāma - rūpa - vyā-  
karāṇādāu cha prayojyatvena eva nirdesāt | na oha ātma-śabda-vat  
kimcid mukhyātva kāraṇam asti iti yuktāt kūla-vad gauṇatvam īkshī-  
trīvāya | tayor api oha sad-adhishṭhitatvāpoksham eva īkshītrīvam  
nātās tv ātma-śabdād na gauṇam īkshītrīvam ity uktam | atha uchyato  
achetane ‘pi pradhāne bhavaty ātma-śabdāḥ | ātmānah sarvārtha-kāritvāt |*

yathā rājnah ṣarvārtha-kāriṇi bhṛitye bhavaty ātmā-śabdo mama ātmā Bhadrasenah” iti | pradhānam hi purushātmano<sup>134</sup> bhogāpavargau kurvad upakaroti rājnah iva bhṛityah sandhi-vigrahādīshu varttamānah | athavā ekaḥ eva ātmā-śabdaś chetanāchetana-vishayo bhavishyati “bhūtātmā” “indriyātmā” iti cha prayoga-darśanād yathā ekaḥ eva jyotiḥ-śabdaḥ kratu-jvalana-vishayah | tattra kutaḥ etad ātmā-śabdādīkshiter agaunatvam ity attra uttaram paṭhati | 7. “Tan-niṣṭhasya mokshopadeśat” | na pradhānam achetanam ātmā-śabdālambanam bhavitum arhati “sa ātmā” iti prakṛitām sad anīmānam ādāya “tat tvam asi Śvetaketo” iti chetanasya Śvetaketor mokshayitavyasya tan-niṣṭhām upadiṣṭya “Āchāryyavān purusho veda tasya tāvad eva chiraṁ yāvad na vimokṣye atha sampatsye” iti mokshopadeśat | yadi hy achetanam pradhānam sāch-chhabda-vācḥyām “tad asi” iti grāhayed mumukshūm chetanām santam “achetano ‘si” iti tadā vipariṭa-vādi śāstram purushasya anarhāya ity apramāṇām syāt | na tu nirdoshām śāstram apramāṇām kalpayitum yuktam | yadi cha ajnasya sato mumukshor achetanam anātmānam “ātmā” ity upadiṣṭet pramāṇa-bhūtaṁ śāstraṁ sa śraddadhānatayā ‘ndha-go-lāṅgūla-nyāyena tad-ātmā-dṛiṣṭim na parityajet tad-vyatiriktaṁ cha ātmānam na prati-padyeta | tathā sati purushārthād vihanyeta anarthaṁ cha richhet | tasmād yathā svargādy-arthino’gnihotrādi-sādhanām yathā-bhūtam upadiṣati tathā mumukshor api “sa atmā | tat tvam asi Śvetaketo” iti yathā- bhūtam eva ātmānam upadiṣati iti yuktam | evaṁ cha sati tapta-parasu-grahaṇa-moksha-dṛiṣṭāntena satyābhīsandhasya moksho-padeśah upapadyate | . . . . tasmād na sad-anīmany ātmā-śabdasya gaunatvam | bhṛitye tu svāmi- bhṛitya- bhedasya pratyakṣhatvād upapanno gaunah ātmā-śabdo “mama ātmā Bhadrasenah” iti | api cha kvaohid gaunah śabdo dṛiṣṭah iti na etāvatā śabda-pramāṇake ’rthe gaunī kalpanā nyāyyā sarvattra anāśvā- prasangāt | yat tu uktam chetanāchetanayoh sādhāraṇāḥ ātmā-śabdaḥ kratu-jvalanayor iva jyotiḥ-śabdaḥ iti | tad na | anekārthatvasya anyāyyatvāt | tasmāch chetana-vishayah eva mulhyah ātmā-śabdās chetanātropaclārād bhūtādīshu prāyuṣyate “bhūtātmā” “indriyātmā” iti cha | sādhāraṇatve ’py ātmā-śabdasya na prakāraṇam upapadaṁ vā kinchid niśchāyakam antareṇa anyatara-vr̄ittitā nirdhārayitum śakyate | na cha atra achetanasya niśchāyakam kinchit kāraṇam asti prakṛitām tu sad ikshitri sannihiṭas cha chetanah Śvetaketuh | na hi chetanasya Śvetaketor achetanah ātmā sam-

<sup>134</sup> The edition printed in Bengali characters reads purushasye ātmānah.

*bhavati ity avochāma | tasmāch chetana-vishayaḥ iha ātma-śabdah iti niśchiyate |*

"And it has been declared that Brahma, omniscient and omnipotent, is the cause of the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world. But the Sāṅkhyas and others, holding that an ultimate (*parinishṭhita*)<sup>125</sup> substance is discoverable by other proofs, and inferring the existence of Pradhāna or other causes, apply the texts of the Upanishads as having reference to these. For (they assert that) all the texts of the Upanishads which relate to the creation, design inferentially to indicate the cause by the effect. The Sāṅkhyas think that the conjunctions of Pradhāna and Purusha (Soul) are to be inferred as eternal. From the very same texts the followers of Kanāda (the Vaiśeshikas) deduce that Īśvara is the instrumental cause and atoms the material cause<sup>126</sup> (of the world). So, too, other rationalizing objectors rise up who rely on fallacies founded on texts or reasoning. Here then our teacher (*āchāryya*), who understood both words and sentences and eyidence, with the view of pointing out that the texts of the Upanishads have for their object the revelation of Brahma, first puts forward and then refutes the fallacies founded by those persons on texts or reasoning. The Sāṅkhyas regarding Pradhāna, consisting of the three qualities (*gunas*, viz. *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, or "Goodness," "Passion," and "Darkness"), and inanimate, as the cause of the world, tell us : (a) 'Those texts in the Upanishads which, as you say, declare that an omniscient and omnipotent Brahma is the cause of the world, can be applied to support the view that Pradhāna is the cause. For omnipotence in regard to its own developments is properly predicateable of Pradhāna also; and omniscience too may be rightly ascribed to it. You will ask, how? We answer (b), What you call knowledge is a characteristic of 'Goodness' (*sattva*), according to the text of the Smṛiti, 'From Goodness springs knowledge.' And (c) through this knowledge, which is a characteristic of Goodness, Yogins, who are men

<sup>125</sup> Compare Sāṅkhya Sūtras, i. 69: *pāramparye 'py ekatra parinishṭhā*, etc., which Dr. Ballantyne renders, "Even if there be a succession, there is a halt (*parinishṭhā*) at some one point," etc.

<sup>126</sup> The phrase so translated is *samavāyi-kārapam*. The word *samavāyi* is rendered by Dr. Bellantyne, in his translation of the Bhāshāparichcheda (published January, 1851), p. 22, by "intimate relation" (the same phrase as Dr. Roer had previously employed in 1850); and in the translation of the Tarka-sangraha (published in September of the same year), pp. 2 and 4, by "co-inherence."

with bodily organs,<sup>157</sup> are reputed to be omniscient; owing to the transcendent excellence of Goodness its omniscience is matter of notoriety. Nor it is only of a person (*purusha*) whose essence is mere perception, and who is devoid of corporeal organs, that either omniscience or partial knowledge can be predicated: but from Pradhāna being composed of the three qualities, Goodness, which is the cause of omniscience, belongs to it too in the condition of Pradhāna. And so in the texts of the Upanishads omniscience is figuratively ascribed to it, although it is unconscious. And (*d*) you also, who recognize an omniscient Brahma, must of necessity acknowledge that His omniscience consists in His possessing the power of omniscience. For He does not continually exercise knowledge in regard to all objects. For (*e*) if His knowledge were continual. His self-dependence (or voluntary action) in reference to the act of knowledge would be lost. But if knowledge be not continual, then when the act of knowledge ceases Brahma must cease (to know). And so omniscience results from the possession of the power of omniscience. Further (*f*) you, too, hold that before the creation Brahma was devoid of any impulse to action. Nor can knowledge be conceived to arise in anyone who has no bodily organs or other instruments of knowledge. Moreover (*g*) causality can properly be ascribed to Pradhāna (as it can to earth, etc.) owing to the variety in its nature,<sup>158</sup> and the consequent possibility of its development, but not to Brahma whose essence is simple and uniform.' These arguments having been urged, the following Sūtra is introduced: 5. 'No; for in consequence of the word 'beholding' being employed, your view is contrary to the Veda.' (*a*) The unconscious Pradhāna, imagined by the Sāṅkhyas as the cause of the world, can find no support in the Upanishads. For it is unscriptural. How so? From its beholding, *i.e.* because the act of 'beholding' (or 'reflecting') is in scripture ascribed to the cause. How? Because the Veda contains a text which begins thus: 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning' 'Existent, one without a second' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 1); and proceeds: 'It beheld, let

<sup>157</sup> The epithet *kāryya-karana-vantāḥ* is rendered *dehendriya-yukta* in the Bengali translation of S'ankara's comment, which forms part of the edition of the S'āriraka-sūtras, with comment and gloss, published at Calcutta in 1784 of the S'aka era. This translation is useful for ascertaining the general sense, but it does not explain all the difficult phrases which occur in the original.

<sup>158</sup> The meaning of this is that Pradhāna, as cause, possesses in its nature a variety corresponding to that exhibited by the different kinds of objects which constitute the visible creation; whilst Brahma is one and uniform.

'me multiply, and be propagated.' 'It created light' (3). By these words the scripture, having first determined that the world, denoted by the word 'this' and now developed as Name and Form, subsisted before the creation in the form of the 'Existent,' then goes on to shew that this very subject of the text, denoted by the word 'Existent,' became, after 'beholding,' the creator of light and other objects. And accordingly another text (Ait. Up. i. 1) declares in the following words that the creation was preceded by 'beholding': 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only: there was nothing else which saw.'<sup>139</sup> It beheld, Let me create worlds; it created these worlds.'" After quoting two other texts Sankara proceeds: "These and other passages may also be adduced which shew that an omniscient Iśvara was the cause (of all things). And (b) the opinion which has been referred to, that Pradhāna will be omniscient in virtue of the knowledge which is an attribute of Goodness, is groundless. For since the three qualities are in a state of equilibrium as long as the state of Pradhāna lasts, knowledge as an attribute of Goodness cannot then belong to it. And the assertion (d) that Pradhāna will be omniscient from possessing the power of omniscience is equally untenable. If (b) in reliance on the power of knowledge residing in Goodness during the state of equilibrium, it be maintained that Pradhāna is then omniscient, a merely partial knowledge may with equal reason be ascribed to it on the strength of the power to obstruct knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness (the other two qualities which constitute it). Besides, no function of Goodness can either be, or be called, knowledge, unless it be accompanied by the power of observing (or witnessing). But Pradhāna, being unconscious, possesses no such power. Consequently the omniscience of Pradhāna is untenable. And the omniscience of Yogins, (e) springing from their eminence in every attribute, becomes possible in consequence of their being conscious creatures; and therefore cannot be adduced as an illustrative argument in the case before us. If, again, you ascribe to Pradhāna a power of reflection derived from an observer (like the power of burning possessed by iron balls, etc., which is derived from fire) then it will be right to say that the source from which that power of reflection comes to Pradhāna, viz. the omniscient Brahma in the proper sense, and nothing else, is the cause of the world. Once more, (e) it is

<sup>139</sup> This is the sense assigned in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon to the word *mishat*. The commentators render it "moving" (*chalat*).

urged that omniscience cannot in the literal sense be properly attributed even to Brahma himself, because if the cognitive acts were continual, His self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to the act of cognition, would be no longer conceivable: we reply, that we must ask you how the supposition that cognitive acts are continual, interferes with the existence of omniscience. Because it is a contradiction to say that he who possesses a perpetual knowledge which can throw light upon all subjects can be otherwise than omniscient. For although on the hypothesis that knowledge is not continual, a negation of omniscience would result, as in that case the person in question would sometimes know and sometimes not know,—the same objection does not attach to the supposition of a perpetuity of knowledge. If you reply that on that supposition, self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to knowledge can no longer be attributed, we deny this, because we observe that spontaneity, in regard to burning and illuminating, is attributed to the sun, although he continually burns and shines. If you again object that this illustration does not hold good, because the power in question is ascribed to the sun only when his rays are in contact with the objects to be burnt or illuminated, whereas before the creation, Brahma has no contact with the object of knowledge;—we reply that the parallel is exact, because we observe that agency in shining is attributed to the sun even when there is no object [for his beams]; and in the same way agency in regard to ‘beholding,’ is justly ascribed to Brahma, even when there is no object of knowledge. But the texts which record the fact of ‘beholding’ will be applicable to Brahma with still greater propriety if that ‘beholding’ have had reference to a positive object. What then is the object which is contemplated by Brahma before the creation? We reply, the undeveloped Name and Form which were not describable either in their essence or differences, and which He wished to develope. For what need we say to prove the perpetual knowledge, relating to the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world, which belongs to Isvara, the perpetually pure, from whose grace it is that the intuitive knowledge of things past and future, which men learned in the Yoga doctrine attribute to Yogins, is derived? And as regards the further objection (*f*) that Brahma, who before the creation was without body or organs of sense, could not be conceived to ‘behold,’—that argument cannot be sustained, as from

Brahma's existence in the form of knowledge being, like the sun's lustre, perpetual, he cannot be supposed dependent upon any (bodily organs as) instruments of knowledge." . . . . "Then as regards the assertion (g) that Pradhāna, from its multiformity of character can (like earth, etc.,) be readily conceived as the cause (of the manifold products which we see around us), whilst such causality cannot be ascribed to the simple and uniform Brahma,—that has been answered by the remark that the existence of Pradhāna is not established by scripture. And that the causality of Brahma, but not that of Pradhāna, etc., can be established by reasoning will hereafter be shewn in the Sūtras, 'Brahma, you say, cannot be the material cause of this world, because it differs from him in its nature,' etc. (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 4 ff.). Here the Sāṅkhyas remark: 'As regards your objection that the unconscious Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world, because the Veda describes that cause as 'beholding,' we observe (h) that that text, if otherwise explained, will be consistent with our view. For we find that even unconscious objects are figuratively spoken of as conscious. Thus we notice that any one who perceives that the bank of a river is on the point of falling, speaks in a figurative way of that unconscious bank as intending to fall.'<sup>140</sup> In the same way when Pradhāna is on the point of creating, it can be figuratively said of it, although unconscious, as of a conscious being, that it 'beheld.'<sup>141</sup> Just as any conscious person, after bathing and eating, resolves that on the following day he will proceed to his village in a car, and afterwards acts according to that plan, so too Pradhāna (becoming developed) in the form of Mahat (intellect), etc., acts according to a law, and therefore is figuratively spoken of as conscious. If you ask us, why we abandon the proper sense of 'beholding,' and adopt a figurative one, we answer that we do so because we find the term figuratively applied to Water and to Light, though unconscious objects, in the Vedic texts, 'The Light beheld,' 'the Waters beheld' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 3f.). Hence from the fact that the expression is for the most

<sup>140</sup> *Kūlam pipatishati*, literally, "The bank wishes to fall;" but, as is well known, a verb, or verbal noun, or adjective, in the desiderative form, often indicates nothing more than that something is about to happen. Here, however, the Sāṅkhyas are introduced as founding a serious argument on this equivocal form of speech.

<sup>141</sup> See Vijnāna Bhikshu's remarks on the Sāṅkhya Sūtra, i. 96, where the same illustration is given.

part figuratively employed, we conclude that the act of beholding,' performed by the 'Existent' also was a figurative one." These objections having been brought forward, the following Sūtra is introduced : 6. "If you say that the act of 'beholding' is figuratively ascribed to Pradhāna, it is not so, because the word Soul also is applied to the cause." (h) "The assertion that the unconscious Pradhāna is designated by the word 'Existent,' and that 'beholding' is figuratively ascribed to it, as to Water and Light, is incorrect. Why? Because the word Soul also is employed. The text which begins with the words, 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning Existent,' and goes on 'It beheld, it created light,' after relating the creation of Light, Water, and Food, refers to that 'Existent,' the 'beholder,' which is the subject of the text, and to Light, Water, and Food, under the appellation of deities, thus : 'This deity beheld (or resolved), come let me enter into these three deities with this living Soul, and make manifest Name and Form' (vi. 3, 2). Here if the unconscious Pradhāna were regarded as being, through the function of the quality (of Goodness), the 'beholder,' it would from the context be referred to in the phrase 'that deity,' and then the deity in question could not denote a 'living being' by the term 'Soul.' For the principle of life is both according to common usage, and interpretation, the conscious ruler of the body, and the sustainer of the vital breaths. How could such a principle of life be the Soul of the unconscious Pradhāna? For Soul means the essential nature, and a conscious principle of life cannot be the essence of the unconscious Pradhāna. But in reality the conscious Brahma is understood in this text as the 'beholder' in the proper sense of the term; and the word Soul, as relating to the principle of life; is rightly applied to Him. And thus in the sentence 'This entire universe is identical with this subtle particle; it is true; it is Soul: Thou art it, o Svetaketu,' (Chh. Up. vi. 8, 6 f.) the author by employing the words 'it is Soul' designates the subtle particle, the Existent, which is the subject of the text, as Soul, by the term Soul, and so in the words 'thou art it, o Svetaketu,' describes the conscious Svetaketu as being Soul. But Water and Fire are unconscious things, because they are objects of sense,<sup>142</sup> and because it is pointed out that they were employed in the manifestation of Name and Form; and so there is no reason, as in the

<sup>142</sup> *Vishayatvāt* = *drīg-vishayatvāt*, "from their being objects of the sense of sight."—Govinda Ānanda.

case of Soul, to describe them as ‘ beholders ’ in the proper sense : that term must be applied to them by a figure, as in the case of the ‘ river bank.’ And their act of ‘ beholding ’ was dependent on their being governed by the ‘ Existent.’ But, as we have said, the act of ‘ beholding ’ is not figurative in the case of the ‘ Existent,’ because the word Soul is applied to it. But it is now urged (*i*), that the term Soul does apply to Pradhāna, though unconscious, because it fulfils all the objects of soul ; just as it is applied by a king to his servant who accomplishes all his designs, when he says ‘ Bhadrasena is my soul.’ For Pradhāna renders aid to a man’s soul by obtaining for it both celestial enjoyment, and final liberation, as a king’s servant assists him by acting in peace and war, etc. Or (*j*) the one word Soul may apply both to conscious and unconscious objects, as we see it employed in the phrases ‘ soul of the elements,’ ‘ soul of the bodily organs ; ’ just as the same word *jyotiṣ* means both sacrifice and light. Why then, the Sāṅkhyas conclude, should you infer from the word ‘ Soul ’ that the term ‘ beholding ’ cannot be figuratively used ?

“ This is answered in the 7th Sūtra (‘ Soul cannot denote Pradhāna ), because it is declared that the man who fixes his thoughts upon it obtains final emancipation.’ Unconscious Pradhāna must not be understood to derive any support from the word ‘ Soul ; ’ for after referring in the words ‘ it is Soul ’ to the ‘ Existent,’ the ‘ very subtile thing,’ which is the subject of the passage, and indicating in the words ‘ thou art it, o Svetaketu,’ that the conscious Svetaketu, who was about to obtain emancipation, was intent upon it, the text above adduced declares his emancipation in the words ‘ the man who has an instructor knows, “ this will only last until I am liberated ; I shall then be perfected.” ’ (Chh. Up. vi. 14, 6) For if the unconscious Pradhāna were denoted by the term ‘ Existent,’ the words ‘ thou art it,’ would cause the conscious person, who was seeking after emancipation, to understand (of himself) ‘ Thou art unconscious ; ’ and in that case the Sāstra which declared what was contradictory would be unauthoritative, because injurious to the person in question. But we cannot conceive a faultless Sāstra to be unauthoritative. And if a Sāstra esteemed authoritative should inform an ignorant seeker after emancipation, that a thing which was not soul was soul, he (the ignorant seeker) would in consequence of his faith, persist in regarding it as soul, as in the case of

\* the blind man and the bull's tail,<sup>143</sup> and would fail of attaining to soul which was quite different from it; and would in consequence lose the object of its efforts, and suffer injury. It is therefore proper to conclude that just as the Vedic precept, that he who desires paradise should perform the agnihotra sacrifice is conformable to truth, so, too, the text which says to the man seeking after emancipation, 'this is soul, thou art that, o Svetaketu,' declares to him soul in conformity with the reality. And so,—as in the case of the man (charged with theft) who takes into his hand the red-hot axe, and (in consequence of the truth of his protestation of innocence) is delivered (Chh. Up. vi. 16, 2),—the promise of final emancipation will hold good in the case of the man whose thoughts are fixed on the true Brahma. . . . Consequently the application of the word 'soul' to the 'existent subtle thing' is not figurative. Whereas (*i*) the use of the same word when applied to a servant (as when it is said 'Bhadrasena is my soul'), is shown to be figurative by the manifest distinctness of a servant from his master. And the fact that a word is sometimes observed to be employed figuratively does not justify the supposition that it is so used in cases where the (proper) sense is established by the words; because that would give rise to doubt in every instance. Again, (*j*) it is incorrect to say that the word soul is common to things conscious and unconscious, (as the term *jyotiś* means both sacrifice and flame), because the assertion that it has a variety of significa-

<sup>143</sup> The story or fable here alluded to is told at length by Ānanda Giri, and more briefly by Govinda Ānanda as follows: *Kaschit kila dushṭātmā mahāranya-mārge patitam andham sva-bandhu-nagaram jīgamishum babhāshe "kim atra āyushmetā duḥkhitena sthīyate" iti | sa cha andhāḥ eukha-vāṇīm ākaryya tam āptam matvā wāche "aho mad-bhāgadheyam yad altra bhavān mām dīnām svābhishṭa-nagara-prāptya-asamartham bhāshate" iti | sa cha vīpralipsur dushṭa-go-yuvānam āniya tadīya-lāngūlam andham grāhayāmāsa upadidesa cha enam andham "esha go-yuvā tvām nagaram neshyati mā tyaja lāngūlam" iti sa cha andhāḥ śraddhāluteyā tād atyajan svābhishṭam aprāpya anartha-paramparām prōptas tena nyāgena ity arthāt | "A certain malicious person said to a blind man who was lying on the road through a forest, and wishing to proceed to the city of his friends, 'Why, distressed old man, do you stay here?' The blind man hearing the agreeable voice of the speaker, and regarding him as trustworthy, replied: 'O how great is my good fortune that you have accosted me who am helpless, and unable to go to the city which I desire to reach!' The other, wishing to deceive him, brought a vicious young bull, and made the blind man lay hold of his tail, and told him that the young bull would conduct him to the city, enjoining him not to let go the tail. Trusting to the speaker, the blind kept his hold, but did not attain the object of his desire, and encountered a series of mishaps;—such is the illustration."*

tions is unreasonable. Hence the word soul, which properly refers to conscious things, is applied to the elements, etc., by a figurative ascription to them of consciousness, as when we say, ‘the soul of the elements,’ or ‘the soul of the bodily organs.’ And even if it were admitted that the word soul was common to different things, it could not be ascertained whether it had reference to one thing or another unless the context or some auxiliary word determined the point. But in the case before us there is nothing to determine that it denotes anything unconscious; on the contrary, the subject of the sentence is the ‘Existent, the beholder,’ and in immediate connection with it is the conscious Svetaketu; for as we have already said an unconscious thing cannot be conceived as the soul of the conscious Svetaketu. Thus it is settled that the word ‘soul’ refers to a conscious being,” etc.

In the fourth section (*pāda*) of the 1st Book, the author of the Sūtras returns to his controversy with the Sāṅkhyas, and Sankara, after alluding to the aphorisms in which they had previously been combated, proceeds as follows (p. 334):

*Idam tv idānīm avaśiṣṭam āśankyate | yad uktam pradhānasya aśabdatvam tad asiddham kāsucit sākhāsu pradhāna-samarpanabhāsānām śabdānām śrūyamānatvāt | atah pradhānasya kāraṇatvam veda-prasidham eva mahadbhiḥ paramarshibhiḥ Kapilādhibhiḥ parigṛihītam iti prasajyate | tad yāvat teshām śabdānām anya-paratvam na pratipādyate tāvat sarvajnam Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti pratipāditam apy ākulibhavet | atas teshām anya-paratvam darśayitum parah sandarbhaḥ pravarttate | “ānumānikam api” (Br. Sūtra i. 4, 1) anumāna-nirūpitam api pradhānam “ekeshām” sākhinām śabdavad upalabhyate | Kāṭhake hi paṭhyate “mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktat purushaḥ parah” iti | tatra ye eva yan-nāmāno yat-kramakāś cha mahadavyakta-purushaḥ smṛiti-prasiddhāḥ te eva iha pratyabhijñāyante | tatra “avyaktam” iti smṛiti-prasiddheḥ śabdādi-hinatvāch cha na vyaktam avyaktam iti vyutpatti-sambhavāt smṛiti-prasiddham pradhānam abhidhīyate | atas tasya śabdavattvād aśabdatvam anupapannam<sup>146</sup> | tad eva cha jagataḥ kāraṇām śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhibhyaḥ iti chet | na etad evam | na hy etat Kāṭhaka-vākyām smṛiti-prasiddhayor mahadavyaktayor astitva-param | na hy attra yādrīśām smṛiti-prasiddham svatantrām kāraṇām trigunām pradhānam*

<sup>146</sup> The text given in the Bibl. Indica has *upapannam*, but I follow the old edition in Bengali characters in reading *anupapannam*, which seems required by the sense.

tādriśam *pratyabhijñayate* | śabda-māttraṁ hy attra avyaktam iti *pratyabhijñayate* | sa cha śabdo na vyaktam avyaktam iti yaugikatvād anyasminn api sūkshme durlakshye cha *prayujyate* na cha ayaṁ kasmīśohid rūḍhaḥ | yā tu pradhāna-vādinām rūḍhiḥ sā teshām eva pāribhāshikī satī na vedārtha-nirūpane kārana-bhāvam *pratipadyate* | na cha krama-māttra-sāmarthyāt samānārtha-pratipattir bhavaty asati tad-rūpa-pratyabhijñāne | na hy aśva-sthāne gām paśyann aśvo 'yam ity amūḍho 'dhyavasyati | *prakarana-nirūpanāyām* cha attra na para-parikalpitam pradhānam *pratiyate* śarīra-rūpaka-vinyasta-gṛihiteḥ | śarīram hy attra ratha-rūpaka-vinyastam avyakta-śabdena parigṛihyate | kutaḥ | *prakaranāt* pariśehāch cha | tathā hy anantarālito granthah ātmā-śarīrādinām rathi-rathādi-rūpaka-kṛiuptim darśayati | (Kaṭha Upanishad, i. 3, 3 f.) “ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi śarīraṁ ratham eva cha | buddhim cha sārathim viddhi manah *pragraham* eva cha + 4. *Indriyāṇi* hayān āhur vishayāṁs teshu gocharān | ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhoktety āhur maniṣināḥ” | taiś chaindrīyādibhir asaṁyataiḥ saṁsāram adhigachchhati | saṁyatais tv adhvanaḥ pāram tad *Vishṇoḥ* paramam padam āpnoti iti darśayitvā kiṁ tad adhvanaḥ pāram *Vishṇoḥ* paramam padam ity asya ākānkshāyāṁ tebhyaḥ eva *prakritebhyaḥ* *indriyādibhyaḥ* paratvena paramātmānam adhvanaḥ pāram tad *Vishṇoḥ* paramam padam darśayati | Kaṭha Up. i. 3, 10 f.) “*indriyebhyaḥ* parāḥ hy arthāḥ arthebhyaś cha param manah | *manasas* tu *parā buddhir buddher* ātmā mahān parāḥ | 11. *Mahataḥ* param avyaktam avyaktāt *purushaḥ* parāḥ | *purushād* na param kinchit sā kāshṭhā sā *parā gatir*” iti | . . . . “*Buddher* ātmā mahān parāḥ” yaḥ sa “ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi” iti rathitvena upakṣiptaḥ | kutaḥ | ātmā-śabdād bhoktuś cha bhogopakaranāt paratvopapatteḥ | mahattvāṁ cha asya svāmitvād upapannam | . . . . yā *prathamajasya Hiranyagarbhasya* buddhiḥ sā sarvāśām buddhīnām paramā *pratishṭhā* sā iha “mahān ātmā” ity uchyate | sā cha pūrvattra buddhi-grahanena eva grihitā satī hirug iha upadiṣyate tasyāḥ apy asmadīyabhyo buddhibhyaḥ paratvoupatteḥ | . . . . tad evāṁ śarīram eva ekam pariśishyate | teshu<sup>145</sup> itarāṇi *indriyādīśi* *prakritāny* eva *parama-pada-didarśayishayā* samanukrāman pariśishyamāṇena iha anena avyakta-śabdena pariśishyamāṇam *prakṛitāṁ* śarīram darśayati iti gamyate | . . . . tad evam pūrvāparālochanāyāṁ nāsty attra *para-parikalpitasya* *pradhānasya* avakāśaḥ | 2. “*Sūkshmaṁ* tu *tad-arhatvāt*” | uktam etat *prakarana-*

<sup>145</sup> The earlier edition above referred to omits *teshu*.

pariśeshābhyaṁ śarīram avyakta - śabdaṁ na pradhānam iti | idam  
 idānīm āśankyatē katham avyakta - śabdārhatvam śarīrasya yāvatā sthū-  
 latvāt spashṭataram idāṁ śarīraṁ vyakta-śabdārham aspashṭa-vachanas  
 tv avyakta - śabdah iti | atah uttarām uchyate | sūksham tv iha kāra-  
 nātmanā śarīraṁ vivakshyate sūkshmasya avyakta-śabdārhatvāt | yady-  
 api sthālam idāṁ śarīraṁ na svayam avyakta-śabdām arhati tathāpi  
 tasya tv ārambhakam bhūta - sūksham avyakta - śabdām arhati | . . .  
 attra āha yadi jagad idam anabhivyakta - nāma - rūpaṁ vijātmakam  
 prāg - avastham avyakta - śabdārham abhyupagamyeta tad - ātmanā cha  
 śarīrasyāpy avyakta-śabdārhatvam pratijñāyeta sa eva tarhi pradhāna-  
 kārana - vādah evam saty āpadya eto asya eva jagataḥ prāg - avasthāyāḥ  
 pradhānatvena abhyupagarād iti | attra uchyate | yadi vayām svatantrām  
 kānchit prāg - avasthām jagataḥ kāranaatvena abhyupagachchema prasānja-  
 yema tadda pradhāna - kārana - vādam | Parameśvarādhinā tv iyam asmā-  
 bhiḥ prāg - avasthā jagato 'bhyupagamyate na svatantrā | sūcha avaśyam  
 abhyupagantavyā | arthavat hi sū | na hi tayā vinā Parameśvara asya  
 srashṭritvām siddhyati śakti - rahitasya tasya pravṛitti - anupapatteḥ muk-  
 tānām cha punar - utpattir vidyayā tasyāḥ vīja - śakteḥ dāhāt | avidyātmikā  
 hi sā vīja - śaktir avyakta - śabda - nirdesyā Parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayaḥ  
 mahāsushuptir yasyām svarūpa - pratibodha - rahitāḥ śeratē saṁśeरino<sup>र</sup>  
 jīvūḥ | tad etad avyaktam kvachid ākāśa - śabda - nirdishṭam | “ etasmīn  
 nu khalo akshare Gārgi ākāśāḥ otaś cha protas̄ cha ” iti śruteḥ | kvachid  
 akshara - śabdoditam “ āksharāt paralāḥ paraḥ ” iti śruteḥ | kvachid māyā  
 iti sūchitam “ māyām tu prakritim vidiyād māyinaṁ tu mahēśvaram ” iti  
 mantra - varṇāt | avyaktā hi sā māyā tattvānyatva - nirūpanasya asākya-  
 vāt | tad idam “ mahataḥ param avyaktam ” ity uktam avyakta - prabha-  
 valvād mahato yadā Hairanyagarbhi buddhir mahān | yadā tu jīvo ma-  
 hāṁs iadā ‘py avyaktādhiṇatvāj jīva - bhāvasya mahataḥ param avyaktam  
 ity uktam | avidyā hy avyaktam avidyāvattve cha jīvasya sarvāḥ saṁ-  
 vyavahāraḥ santato varttate | tach cha avyakta - gatam mahataḥ paratvam  
 abhedopachārāt tad - vikāre śarīre parikalpyate |

“ But now this doubt still remains. The assertion that the existence  
 of Pradhāna is not supported by the Veda is, say the Sāṅkhyas, desti-  
 tute of proof, as certain Vedic Sākhās contain passages which have the  
 appearance of affirming Pradhāna. Consequently the causality of Pra-  
 dhāna has been received by Kapila and other great rishis on the ground  
 that it is established by the Veda; and this is an objection to the state-

ment which you make to the contrary. Until, therefore, it be established that these passages have a different object, the doctrine that an omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world, even though it has been proved, will be again unsettled ; and consequently you bring forward a great array of arguments to shew that these texts apply to something else. In the words ‘it may be deduced also,’ *i.e.* it is determined by inference,—it is shewn that in the opinion of certain schools the doctrine of Pradhāna is scriptural, for in the Kāṭha Upanishad (i. 3, 11) we read the words ‘Above the Great one is Avyakta (the Unmanifested one), and above the Unmanifested one is Purusha (Soul).’ Here we recognize ‘the Great one,’ ‘the Unmanifested one,’ and Purusha, with the same names and in the same order in which they are known to occur in the Smṛiti (*i.e.* the system of Kapila). Here that which is called Pradhāna in the Smṛiti is denoted by the word ‘the Unmanifested one,’ as we learn both from its being so called in the Smṛiti, and from the epithet ‘unmanifested’ (which is derived from the words ‘not’ and ‘manifested’) being properly applicable to it in consequence of its being devoid of sound, and the other objects of sense : wherefore, from its having this Vedic authority to support it, its (*i.e.* Pradhāna’s) unscriptural character is refuted ; and it is proved both by the Veda, the Smṛiti, and common notoriety to be the cause of the world. If the Sāṅkhyas argue thus, we reply that the case is not so ; for this text of the Kāṭha Upanishad does not refer to the existence of the ‘Great one’ and the ‘Unmanifested one,’ which are defined in the Smṛiti (of Kapila); for here we do not recognize such a self-dependent cause, viz. Pradhāna, composed of the three qualities, as is declared in that Smṛiti, but the mere epithet ‘unmanifested.’ And this word ‘unmanifested,’ owing to its sense as a derivative from the words ‘not’ and ‘manifested,’ is also applied to anything else which is subtle or indistinguishable, and has not properly a conventional meaning in reference to any particular thing. As for the conventional use which the assertors of Pradhāna make of it, that is a technical application peculiar to themselves, and does not afford any means for determining the sense of the Vedas. Nor does the mere identity of the order (of the three words) furnish any proof of identity of meaning unless we can recognise the essential character of the things to be the same. For no man but a fool, if he saw a cow in the place where he expected to see a horse, would falsely

ascribe to it the character of a horse. And if we determine the sense of the context, it will be found that the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents finds no place here, since it is the 'body' which is indicated in the preceding simile. For here the body as represented under the figure of a chariot, etc., is to be understood by the word 'the Unmanifested.' Why? From the context and the remainder of the sentence. For the context which immediately precedes sets forth the soul, the body, etc., under the figure of a rider, a chariot, etc., as follows: 'Know that the soul is the rider, the body the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses are called the horses, and the objects of sense the roads on which they go. The soul accompanied by the senses and the mind is the enjoyer;<sup>146</sup> so say the wise.' After pointing out (in the following verses) that with these senses, etc., if uncontroled, the soul gains only this world, but if they are kept under controul, it attains to the highest state of Vishṇu, which is the end of its road; the author (in answer to the question 'What is that highest state of Vishṇu which is the end of the road?') shews in the following verses that it is the supreme Spirit who transcends the senses, etc. (which form the subject of the context), who is alluded to as the goal, and the highest state of Vishṇu: 'The objects of sense are higher than the senses; the mind is higher than the objects of sense; the intellect is higher than the mind; the Great soul is higher than the intellect; the Unmanifested one is higher than the Great soul; the spirit (Purusha) is greater than the Unmanifested: there is nothing higher than Spirit, that is the end, that is the highest goal.'" After observing that the various terms in these lines are the same which had been previously introduced in the simile of the chariot, charioteer, rider, horses, etc., Sankara assigns the reason of the superiority attributed to each succeeding object over that which precedes it, and then goes on to say in regard to intellect and soul: "'The Great soul is higher than the intellect,' that soul, namely, which is figuratively described as a rider, in the words 'Know the soul to be the rider.' But why is the Soul

<sup>146</sup> The words of the original, both as given here and in the text of the Kāṭha Upanishād are ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhoktā, which are not very clear. The commentators understand ātmā at the beginning of the compound as denoting body, and supply ātmānam as the subject. See Dr. Roer's translation of the Upanishads (Bibl. Ind. p. 107).

superior to the intellect? Both from the use of the word Soul and because it aids the enjoyment of the enjoyer, it is shewn to be superior. Its character as the Great soul is proved by its being the master. . . The intellect of Hiranyagarbha, the first-born, is the highest basis of all intellect; and it is that which is here called the 'Great soul.' It had been previously comprehended under the word 'intellect,' but is here separately specified, because it also is superior to our intellects. . . . Thus the body alone remains of the objects referred to in the passage. After going over all the others in order, with the view of pointing out the highest state to be attained, he indicates by the one remaining word, the 'Unapparent,' the one remaining subject of the text, viz. the body—such is our conclusion. . . . Hence after examining both the earlier and later portions of the passage, we find that there is no place for the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents." Going on to interpret the next aphorism (i. 4, 2) 'But the subtle body may also be properly called 'unmanifested,' Sankara begins :

" We have declared that, looking to the context and the only word which remained to be explained, the body, and not Pradhāna, is denoted by the word the 'Unapparent.' But here a doubt arises : ' How can the body be properly designated by the word 'unapparent,' inasmuch as from its grossness it is very distinctly perceptible, and therefore should rather be denoted by the word 'apparent,' while the word 'unapparent' signifies something that is not perceptible? We answer : In this passage the subtle body in its character of cause is intended, since what is subtle is properly designated by the term 'unapparent.' Although this gross body itself cannot properly be described by the word 'Unapparent,' still this term applies to the subtle element which is its originator" . . . . Sankara begins his interpretation of the next aphorism (i. 4, 3) as follows : " Here the Sāṅkhyas rejoin : ' If you admit that this world in its primordial condition, before its name and form had been manifested, and while it existed in its rudimentary form, could be properly designated by the word 'Unapparent,' and if the same term be declared applicable to body also while continuing in that state, then your explanation will exactly coincide with our doctrine of Pradhāna as the cause of all things; since you will virtually acknowledge that the original condition of this world was that of Pradhāna. To this we reply : If we admitted any self-dependent original

condition as the cause of the world, we should then lay ourselves open to the charge of admitting that Pradhāna is the cause. But we consider that this primordial state of the world is dependent upon the supreme Deity (Parameśvara) and not self-dependent. And this state to which we refer must of necessity be assumed, as it is essential. For without it the creative action of the supreme Deity could not be accomplished, since, if he were destitute of his Sakti (power), any activity on his part would be inconceivable. And so, too, those who have been emancipated from birth are not born again, because this germinative power (on the destruction,—which implies the previous existence,—of which emancipation depends) is consumed by knowledge.<sup>147</sup> For that germinative power, of which the essence is ignorance, and which is denoted by the word ‘Unapparent,’ has its centre in the supreme Deity, and is a great illusive sleep, during which mundane souls repose unconscious of their own true nature. This ‘Unapparent one’ is in some places indicated by the term æther (*akāśa*), as in the text (Bṛih. Ār. Up. iii. 8, 11) ‘On this undecaying Being, o Gārgī, the æther is woven as warp and woof;’ in other places by the word ‘undecaying’ (*akshara*), as in the text, ‘Beyond the Undecaying is the Highest;’ and is elsewhere designated by the term ‘illusion’ (*māyā*) as in the line (Svetaś. Up. 4, 10) ‘Know that Prakṛiti (or matter) is illusion, and the great Deity the possessor of illusion.’ For this ‘illusion’ is ‘unapparent,’ because it cannot be defined in its essence and difference. This is the ‘Unapparent’ which is described as above the ‘Great one,’ since the latter, when regarded as identical with the intellect of Hiranyagarbha, springs from the former. And even if the ‘Great one’ be identified with the embodied soul (*jīva*), the ‘Unapparent’ can be said to be above it, as the condition of the embodied soul is dependent upon the ‘Unapparent.’ For the ‘Unapparent’ is ignorance, and it is during its condition of ignorance that the entire mundane action of the embodied soul is car-

<sup>147</sup> Govinda Ānanda explains this clause as follows: *Bandha-mukti-vyavasthārtham* api sā svikāryyā ity āha “muktānām” iti | yan-nāśād muktiḥ sā svikāryyā tāṁ vinā eva sphoṣṭas muktānām punar bandhāpattir ity arthaḥ | “In the words ‘Those who had been emancipated,’ etc., he tells us that this ignorance must be admitted, in order to secure the permanence of emancipation from the bondage (of birth): that is, that ignorance by the destruction of which emancipation is obtained must be admitted; as without it those who had been emancipated would at the creation be again involved in bondage,” [because to be released at all, they must be released from something].

ried on. And that superiority of the ‘Unapparent’ over the ‘Great one’ is by a figurative description of body as identical with the former attributed to body also.”

By these subtle and elaborate explanations Sankara scarcely appears to make out his point. But I cannot follow further the discussion of this question, and now go on to the eighth aphorism (i. 4, 8) where the purport of another Vedic text is investigated :

“*Chamasa-vad avīśeshāt*” | *punar api pradhāna-vādī aśabdatvam pradhānasya asiddhaṁ ity āha* | *kasmāt* | *mantra-varṇat* | (Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, iv. 5) “*ajāṁ ekāṁ lohita-śukla-kṛiṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sri-jamānām svarūpāḥ*<sup>148</sup> | *ajo hy eko jushamāno’nuṣete jahāty enām bhukta-bhogām ajo’nyāḥ*” *iti* | *attrā hi mantre lohita-śukla-kṛiṣṇa-śabdaiḥ rajaḥ-sattva-tamāṁsy abhidhīyante* | *lohitāṁ rajo ranjanātmakatvāt śuklaṁ sattvam̄ prakāśātmakatvāt kṛiṣṇām tamāḥ āvaraṇātmakatvāt* | *teshām sūmyāvasthāvayava-dharmair vyapadiṣyate lohita-śukla-kṛiṣṇā iti* | *na jāyate iti cha “ajā” syād “mūla-prakritir avikṛitir” ity abhyupagamāt* | *nanv ajā-śabdāḥ chhāgāyām rūḍhaḥ* | *vāḍham* | *sā tu rūḍhir iha na āśrayitum̄ śakyā vidyā-prakaranāt* | *sā cha bahvīḥ prajāḥ traigunyānvitāḥ janayati . . . tasmāt śruti-mūlā eva pradhānādi-kalpanā Kāpilānām ity evam prāptē brūmaḥ* | *na anena mantrēna śruti-mūlatvam̄ Sāṅkhyā-vādasya śakyam āśrayitum* | *na hy ayam mantrāḥ svātantryena kanchid api vādaṁ samarthyitum utsahate* | *svavatṛāpi yayā kayāchit kalpanayā ajātvādi-sampādanopapatteḥ Sāṅkhya-vādāḥ eva iha abhipretāḥ iti viśeshāvadhāraṇa-kāraṇābhāvāt* | “*chamasa-vat*” |

“Because, as in the case of the spoon, there is nothing distinctive.’ The assertor of Pradhāna again declares that Pradhāna is not proved to be unscriptural. Why? From the following verse (Śv. Up. iv. 5): ‘One unborn male, loving the unborn female of a red, white, and black colour, who forms many creatures possessing her own character, unites himself with her: another unborn male abandons her after he has enjoyed her.’ For in this verse the words ‘red,’ ‘white,’ and ‘black,’ denote (the three Qualities) Passion, Goodness, and Darkness; —Passion, from its stimulating character, being designated by the term

<sup>148</sup> The text of Dr. Röer’s ed. of the Upanishad (Bibl. Ind. vol. vii.) has two various readings in this line, viz. *lohita-kṛiṣṇa-varṇām* for *lohita-śukla-kṛiṣṇām* (which latter, however, is the reading referred to by Sankara in his commentary on that work), and *sarūpām* for *svarūpāḥ*.

'red,' Goodness, from its illuminating character, by 'white,' and Darkness, from its enveloping character, by 'black.' The unborn female is described as red, white, and black, with reference to the characteristics of the three components which make up the state of equilibrium. She must be called 'unborn' (*Ajā*), because she is not produced, since it is admitted that 'original matter' (*Mūla-Prakṛiti* = *Pradhāna*) is not a modification (of any other substance—*Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, verse 3). But is not *ajā* the conventional name for 'she-goat?' True (reply the *Sāṅkyas*), but that conventional sense cannot be adopted here, because knowledge is the subject of the context. And this unborn female produces many creatures characterized by the three Qualities . . . . And from this it is concluded that the theory of Kapila's followers regarding *Pradhāna*, etc., is based upon the *Veda*. We reply: that it cannot be admitted on the strength of this verse that the theory of the *Sāṅkhyas* is founded on the *Veda*. For the verse in question, if regarded independently, is powerless to sustain any hypothesis whatever; and the reason is that, as this description of the state of the unborn female may be rendered applicable on any hypothesis whatever, there is no ground for determining specifically that the *Sāṅkhya* theory is here intended—'as in the case of the spoon.' This aphorism refers to a verse quoted in the *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad*, ii. 2, 3 (Bibl. Ind. p. 413 of the Sanskrit, and p. 174 of Dr. Roer's translation), and beginning 'a cup with its mouth down, and its bottom upwards,' which, as Sankara remarks, cannot, without some further indication, be applied to any one cup in particular; and in the same way, he argues, the unborn female in the passage under discussion cannot, in the absence of anything to restrict the application in any special way be understood as denoting *Pradhāna* (*evam iḥāpy avīśesho jām ekām ity asya mantrasya | na asmin mantre Pradhānam eva ajā 'bhīpṛetā iti śakyate niyatam*). The question then arises what is meant by this 'unborn female.' To this the author of the aphorisms and Sankara reply, that the word denotes the material substance of a four-fold class of elements, viz. light, heat, water, and food, all derived from the supreme Deity (*Paramāśvād utpannā jyotiḥ-pramukhā tejo 'b-anna-lakṣhaṇā chatur-vidha-bhūta-grāmaśya prakṛiti-bhūtā iyam ajā pratipattavyā*). These four elements he however seems (p. 357) to identify with three, in the words: *bhūta-traya-lakṣhaṇā eva iyam ajā vijneyā na guna-traya-lakṣhaṇā |* 'This

unborn female is formed by three elements, not by the three qualities;’ and the ascription of the three colours in the text to these three elements is supported by a quotation from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vi. 4, 1, which is as follows: *Yad agneḥ rohitam rūpam tejasas tad rūpam yat śuklam tad apām yat krishnam tad annasya* | “The red colour of fire is that of heat; its white colour is that of water; and its black colour is that of food (which here means earth, according to the commentator on the Chhāndogya Upanishad).<sup>149</sup> In this way, he adds, the words denoting the three colours are used in the proper sense, whereas if applied to the three qualities they would be figuratively employed (*rohitādināṁ cha śabdānāṁ rūpa-viśesheshu mukhyatvād bhāktatvāch cha guna-vishayatvasya*). Sankara concludes that this verse, descriptive of the unborn female, does not denote any self-dependent material cause called Pradhāna, but is shewn from the context to signify the Divine Power in its primordial state before Name and Form were developed (*na svatantrā kāohit prakṛitiḥ pradhānam nāma ajā-mantraṇā āmnāyate iti śakyate vaktum | prakaraṇāt tu sā eva daivī śaktir avyākṛita-nāma-rūpā nāma-rūpayoh prāg avasthānenāpi mantraṇā āmnāyate ity uchyate*).

Passing over the further questions, which are raised on this subject, I go on to the 11th Sūtra and the comment upon it, from which we learn that the words ‘knowing him by whom the five times five men, and the æther are upheld, to be Soul,’ etc. (*yasmin pancha-pancha-janāḥ akāśāḥ cha pratishthitāḥ | tam evānyah ātmānam vidvān ityādi*), are adduced by the Sāṅkyas in support of their system, as the number of the principles (*tattva*), which it affirms (see Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 3, and Sāṅkhya Sūtras, i. 61), corresponds to the number twenty-five in this text; while the applicability of the passage is denied by the Vedāntins on the ground that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya are not made up of five homogeneous sets of five each (p. 362); that if the Soul and æther mentioned in the text are added, as they must be, to the twenty-five, the aggregate number will exceed that of the Sāṅkhya ‘principles,’ among which both Soul and æther are comprehended (pp. 364 f.); that the fact of the correspondence of the numbers, if admitted, would not suffice to shew that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya were referred to, as they are not elsewhere recognized in the Veda, and as the word

<sup>149</sup> See Babu Rajendra Lal Mittra's translation of this Upanishad, p. 106.

'men' (*janāḥ*) is not usually applied to denote 'principles' (p. 365); and further that the phrase 'the five five men,' signifies only 'five,' and not 'five times five' (p. 366), etc. The conclusion arrived at in the twelfth aphorism is that the breath, and other vital airs, are referred to in the passage under consideration; and that although the word 'men' (*janāḥ*) is not generally applied to 'breath,' etc., any more than to 'principles,' the reference is determined by the context. Others, as Sankara observes, explain the term 'the five men' (*panchajanāḥ*) of the gods, fathers, gandharvas, asuras, and rakshases, and others again of the four castes, and the Nishādas.<sup>150</sup> The Vedāntic teacher (Bādarāyaṇa) however, as his commentator adds, has decided that the breath, etc., are intended.

If we now turn to the Sāṅkhya aphorisms themselves, we shall find that their author constantly refers to texts of the Veda as supporting, coinciding with, or reconcileable with his dogmas. I have noticed the following instances, viz. Sūtras i. 5, 36, 51, 54, 78, 84, 148, 155; ii. 20-22; iii. 14, 15, 80; iv. 22; v, 1, 12, 15, 21; vi. 32, 34, 51, 58, 59, which may be consulted in Dr. Ballantyne's translation. I can only refer more particularly to a few of these with the commentator's remarks.

I begin with Sūtra i. 155,<sup>151</sup> in which the author of the Aphorisms maintains that the great distinctive dogma of the Vedānta, the oneness of Soul, is not supported by the Veda. In Sūtra 150 he had laid it down as his own conclusion, established by the fact of the variety observable in the conditions of birth, etc., that there is a multitude of souls, and he now defends this as conformable to Scripture.

"*Na advaita-śruti-virodho jāti-paratvāt*" | *ātmaiκya-śrutiñāṁ virodhas tu nāsti tāsāṁ jāti-paratvāt* | *jātiḥ sāmānyam eka-rūpatvāṁ tatra ad-vaita-śrutiñāṁ tātparyyād na tv akhaṇḍavte prayojanābhāvād ity arthaḥ* | . . . . *yathā-śruta-jāti-śabdasya ādare tv "ātmā idam ekaḥ eva agre asīt"* "sad eva saumya idam agre āśid ekam eva advitīyam" (Chhānd. Up. vi. 2, 1) *ity-ādy-advaita-śruty-upapādakatayā eva sūtrāṁ vyākheyam* | "*jāti-paratvāt*" | *vijātīya-dvaita-niṣedha-paratvād ity arthaḥ* | *tatra ādyā-vyākhyāyām ayam bhāvaḥ* | *ātmaiκya-śruti-smṛitishv ekādi-śabdāś chid-*

<sup>150</sup> See the First Volume of this work, pp. 176 ff.

<sup>151</sup> i. 154 in Dr. Hall's edition in the Bibl. Ind.

*ekarūpatā-māttra-parāḥ bhedādi-śabdāś cha vaidharmya-lakshana-bheda-parāḥ |*

"155. 'This is not opposed to the Vedic doctrine of non-duality, since that merely refers to genus.' Our doctrine that souls are numerous does not conflict with the Vedic texts which affirm the oneness of Soul, since these passages refer to oneness of genus. Genus means sameness, oneness of nature; and it is to this that the texts regarding non-duality relate, and not to the undividedness (or identity) of Soul; since there is no occasion for the latter view. The Sūtra must be explained with due regard to the sense of the word genus as it occurs in the Veda, so as (thereby) to bring out the proper meaning of such texts, expressing non-duality, as these, 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only; ' 'This was in the beginning, o fair youth, Existent, one without a second.' The words 'since that merely refers to genus,' mean 'since that is merely intended to deny a duality denoting a difference of genus.' The first of two interpretations given of the Sūtra is as follows: In the texts of the Sruti and Smṛiti relating to the oneness of Soul, the words 'One,' etc., denote simply that Spirit is one in its nature; whilst the words, 'distinction,' etc., designate a distinction defined as difference of nature." At the close of his remarks the commentator gives a second explanation of the Sūtra.

The author returns to this subject in the 61st Sūtra of the fifth Book:

"*Na advaitam ātmano lingāt tad-bheda-pratīteḥ*" | *yadyapye ātmanām anyonyam bheda-vākyā-vad abheda-vākyāny api santi tathāpi na advaitam | na atyantam abhedaḥ | ajādi-vākyā-sthaib prakṛiti-tyāgātyāgādi-lingair bhedasyaiva siddher ity arthaḥ | na hy atyantabhede tāni lingāny upapadyante |*

"'Soul is not one; for a distinction of souls is apparent from various signs.' Although there are texts affirming that there is no distinction, just as there are others which assert a <sup>\*</sup>distinction, of souls, still non-duality, i.e. an absolute absence of distinction must be denied; because a distinction is established by signs, such as the abandonment and non-abandonment of Prakṛiti, etc., mentioned in such texts as that about the 'unborn female,' etc. (See above, p. 165.) For these signs are inconsistent with the hypothesis of an absolute absence of distinction," etc.

A kindred subject is introduced in the next Sūtra, the 62nd:

"*Na anātmanā 'pi pratyaksha-bādhāt*" | *anātmanā 'pi bhogya-prapan-*

*chena ātmano na advaitam pratyakshena pi bādhāt | ātmāpaḥ sarva-bhog-yābhede ghaṭa-paṭayor apy abhedāḥ syāt | ghaṭādeḥ paṭādy-abhinnātmā-bhedaṭ | sa cha bheda-grāhaka-pratyakṣa-bādhitaḥ |*

“Further, there is not an absence of distinction (*i.e.* identity) between Soul and non-soul, as this is disproved by the evidence of sense.’ That is : non-duality (*i.e.* identity) is not predicable of Soul on the one hand, and non-soul, *i.e.* the perceptible objects by which our senses are affected, on the other, because this is opposed to the evidence of sense. For if soul were identical with all that is perceptible, there would also be no distinction between a jar and cloth, inasmuch as jars, etc., would not be distinct from soul which is not distinct from cloth, etc. ; and such identity (of jars, etc., with cloth, etc.) is opposed to the evidence of sense which obliges us to perceive a distinction.”

But how is this to be reconciled with such Vedic texts as ‘this is nothing but soul’ (*ātmā eva idam*)? An answer is given in Sūtra 64, which seems to admit that the passages in question do at least on a *prima facie* view convey the sense ascribed to them by the Vedāntins :

“*Anya-paratvam avivekānām tatra*” | *avivekānām aviveki-purushān prati tatra advaite 'nya-paratvam upāsanārthakānūvādaḥ ity arthaḥ | loke hi śarīra-śarīrinor bhogya-bhoktroś cha avivekena abhedo vyavahriyate “'haṁ gauro” “mama ātmā Bhadrasenaḥ” ityādih | atas tam eva vyavahāram anūdya tān eva pṛati tathā upāsanām śrutir vidadhāti sattva-suddhy-ādy-artham iti |*

“These texts have another object, with a view to those who have no discrimination.’ That is : in the passages which affirm non-duality another object is intended, viz. a reference (to vulgar ideas) with a view to stimulate devotion. For it commonly occurs that undiscriminating persons confound the body and the soul, the object to be experienced, and the person who experiences it, as when they say ‘I am white,’ ‘Bhadrasena is myself.’ The Veda, therefore, referring to this mode of speaking, inculcates on such undiscerning people the practice of devotion with a view to the promotion of goodness, purity, etc.”

The author returns to the subject of non-duality in Sūtra vi. 51, which is introduced by the remark :

*Nano svam pramāṇādy-anurodhena dvaita-siddhāv advaita-śruteḥ kāgaścīt̄* |

“But if duality be thus established in accordance with proofs, etc., what becomes of the Vedic texts declaring non-duality?”

The answer is as follows :

*“Na śruti-virodho rāgināṁ vairāgyāya tat-siddheḥ” | advaita-śruti-virodhas tu nāsti rāgināṁ purushātirikte vairāgyāya eva śrutibhir advaita-sādhānāt |*

“Our view is not opposed to the Veda, as the texts in question establish non-duality with a view to produce apathy in those who are actuated by desire.’ That is to say : There is in our doctrine regarding non-duality nothing contrary to the Veda, as the passages referred to affirm this principle with the view of producing in those who have desire an indifference in regard to everything except Soul.”

The 12th aphorism of the fifth Book asserts that according to the Veda, Pradhāna, and not Īśvara, is the cause of the world. The details of the reasoning on which this view is founded, as here stated by the commentator, differ in some respects from those which Sankara puts into the mouth of the Sāṅkhyas :

*“Śrutir api pradhāna-kāryyatvasya” | prapanche pradhāna-kāryyatvasya eva śrutir asti na chetana-kāranatve | yathā “ajām ekāṁ lohitā-śukla-krishnām bahvīḥ prajāḥ srijamānām sarūpāḥ” | “tad ha idāṁ tarhy avyākriṭam asit tad nāma-rūpābhyaṁ vyākriyata” ity-adir ity arthaḥ | yā cha “tad aikshata bahu syām” ityādiś chetana-kāraṇatā-śrutiḥ sā sargādāv utpannasya mahat-tattvopādhikasya mahāpurushasya janya-jnāna-parā | kiṁvā bahu-bhavanānurodhāt pradhāne eva “kūlam pipatishati” iti-vad gaunī | anyathā “sākṣī chetāḥ kevalo nirgunaś cha” (Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, vi. 11) ity-adi-śruty-uktāparināmitvasya purushe ‘nupāpatter iti | ayaṁ cha īśvara-pratishedhah aiśvaryye vairāgyārtham īśvara-jnānām vinā ‘pi moksha-pratipādanārthām cha praudhi-vāda-māttram iti prāg eva vyākhyātam |*

“There are also Vedic texts to support the doctrine that the world has sprung from Pradhāna, as its cause.’ That is : There are Vedic texts to shew that the phenomenal world has sprung from Pradhāna, and that it has not had a conscious being for its cause. They are such as these : ‘An unborn female, red, white, and black in hue, producing many creatures like herself, etc.;’ ‘This was once undeveloped : it was developed with Name and Form.’ As regards those other texts which affirm the causality of a conscious being, such as ‘It reflected, let me become many,’ they refer to the knowledge which sprang up in the great Male who was produced at the beginning of the creation pos-

sessing the attributes of the principle of Intellect (*Mahat*). Or, in accordance with the idea of becoming multiplied, the expression (indicating consciousness and will) is figuratively applied to Pradhāna, as when it is said of the bank of a river that it ‘intends to fall.’ For on any other supposition the incapability of any modification which is ascribed to Purusha in such texts as ‘He who is the witness, the conscious, the sole being, free from the Qualities,’ could not properly be applied to him (since if he were the material cause of the creation he must become modified). And it has been before explained<sup>152</sup> that this denial of an Īśvara is a mere display of ingenuity, introduced for the purpose of producing apathy in regard to glory, and of propounding a method of final liberation even independently of the knowledge of an Īśvara.”

The following is the 34th Sūtra of the sixth Book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:

*Nanu “bahvīḥ prajāḥ puruṣāt samprasūtāḥ” ity-ādi-śruteḥ puruṣasya kāraṇatvāvagamād vivarttādi-vādāḥ āśrayanīyāḥ ity āśankya āha | “śruti-virodhād na kutarkāpasadasya ātma-lābhāḥ” | puruṣa-kāraṇatvāt ye ye pakshāḥ sambhāvitās te sarve śruti-viruddhāḥ iti | atas tad-abhyupagantrinām kutarkikādy-adhamānām ātma-svarūpa-jnānām na bhavati ity arthaḥ | etena ātmani sukha-duḥkhādi-gunopādānatva-vādino ’pi kutarkikāḥ eva | teshām apy ātma-yathārtha-jnānām nāsti ity avagantavyam | ātma-kāraṇatā-śrutayaś cha śakti-śaktimad-abhedena upāsanārthāḥ eva “ajām ekām” ity-ādi-śrutiḥ pradhāna-kāraṇatā-siddheḥ | yadi cha ākāsasya abhrādy-adhishṭhāna-kāraṇatā-vad ātmanāḥ kāraṇatvam uchyate tadā tad na nirākurmāḥ parināmasya pratishedhāt |*

“But must we not adopt the theories of an illusory creation, etc., because the causality of Purusha (soul) is to be learned from such texts as the following ‘many creatures have been produced from Purusha?’ To this difficulty he replies: ‘From his opposition to Scripture the illogical outcaste does not attain to Soul.’ The sense of this is, that all the propositions, affirming the causality of Soul, which have been devised, are contrary to the Veda; and consequently the low class of bad logicians, etc., who adopt them have no knowledge of the nature of

<sup>152</sup> See Vijnāna Bhikshu’s remarks, introductory to the Sūtras (p. 5, at the foot), which will be quoted in the next Section, and his comment on Sūtra i. 92. He is, as we shall find, an eclectic, and not a thorough-going adherent of the Sāṅkhya.

Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those also who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities of pleasure and pain, etc., are incompetent reasoners : they too are destitute of the true knowledge of Soul. The Vedic texts which declare its causality are intended to inculcate devotion on the ground that there is no distinction between Power (*S'akti*) and the possessor of Power (*S'aktimat*) ; for the causality of Pradhāna is established by such texts as that relating to the 'one unborn female,' etc. But if it be affirmed that Soul is the cause of the world merely in the same sense in which the æther is the cause of clouds, etc., viz. by affording them a receptacle, we do not object to that, since we only deny the transformation (of Soul into material productions)."<sup>153</sup>

In regard to the question whether the principles of the Vedānta or those of the Sāṅkhya are most in harmony with the most prevalent doctrine of the Upanishads, I shall quote some of the remarks of Dr. Röer, the translator of many of these treatises. In his introduction to the Taittirīya Upanishad he observes that we there find "the tenets peculiar to the Vedānta already in a far advanced state of development; it contains as in a germ the principal elements of this system." "There are, however," he adds, "differences" (Bibliotheca Indica, vol. xv. p. 5). The same nearly is the case with the Aitareya Upanishad (ibid. p. 27). In reference to the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad he remarks: "Sankara in his commentary on this Upanishad generally explains its fundamental views in the spirit of the Vedānta. He is sometimes evidently wrong in identifying the views of some of the other Upanishads with the tenets of the Vedānta, but he is perfectly right to do so in the explanation of an Upanishad which appears to have been composed for the express purpose of making the principle of the Vedānta agreeable to the followers of the Sāṅkhya" (ibid. pp. 43 f.). Of the Kaṭha Upanishad Dr. Röer says (ibid. p. 97): "The standing point of the Kaṭha is on the whole that of the Vedānta. It is the absolute spirit which is the foundation of the world. . . . In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit it deviates, however, from that adopted by the other Upanishads and by the later Vedānta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sāṅkhya. The order is here: The unmanifested (*avyakta*), the great soul (*mahātma*, or *mahat*), intellect

<sup>153</sup> See Dr. Ballantyne's translation, which I have often followed. He does not, however, render in extenso all the passages which I have reproduced.

(*buddhi*), mind, the objects of the senses, and the senses," etc.<sup>154</sup> The reader who wishes to pursue the subject further may consult the same author's remarks on the other Upanishads. On the whole question of the relation of the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhyā respectively to the Veda, Dr. Röer thus expresses himself in his introduction to the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad (p. 36): "The Vedānta, although in many important points deviating from the Vedas, and although in its own doctrine quite independent of them, was yet believed to be in perfect accordance with them, and being adopted by the majority of the Brāhmans, it was never attacked on account of its orthodoxy. The same cannot be said of the Sāṅkhyā; for it was not only frequently in opposition to the doctrine of the Vedas, but sometimes openly declared so. Indeed, the Vedānta also maintained that the acquisition of truth is independent of caste (1) or any other distinction, and that the highest knowledge which is the chief end of man cannot be imparted by the Vedas (vide Katha ii. 23); yet it insisted that a knowledge of the Vedas was necessary to prepare the mind for the highest knowledge (2). This the Sāṅkhyā denied altogether, and although it referred to the Vedas, and especially to the Upanishads, still it did so only when they accorded with its own doctrines, and it rejected their authority (3) in a case of discrepancy."

I make a few remarks on some points in this quotation indicated by the figures (1), (2), and (3). (1) We have already learned above, p. 99, that, according to the Brahma Sūtras (see i. 3, 34 ff., and Sankara's explanation of them), at least, a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge. (2) It appears from Sankara's argument against Jaimini that he does not consider a knowledge of the ceremonial part of the Veda as necessary for the acquisition of divine knowledge, but he seems to regard the Upanishads as the source from which the latter is derived. (3) I do not know on what authority this statement that the Sāṅkhyas ever actually rejected the authority of the Vedas is founded. Their attempts to reconcile their tenets with the letter of the Veda may often seem to be far-fetched and sophistical; but I have not observed that Sankara, while arguing elaborately against the interpretations of the Sāṅkhyas, anywhere charges them either with denying the authority of the Veda, or with insincerity in the appeals which they make to the sacred texts.

<sup>154</sup> See above, p. 161.

On the subject of the Upanishads the reader may also consult Prof. Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

I subjoin in a note some extracts from this work.<sup>155</sup>

The Nyāya and Vaiśeshika Sūtras do not appear to contain nearly so many references to Vedic texts as the Sāṅkhya; but I have noticed the following: Nyāya iii. 32 (= iii. 1, 29 in the Bibl. Ind.); Vaiśeshika ii. 1, 17; iii. 2, 21; iv. 2, 11; v. 2, 10.

The author of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras affirms, in iii. 2, 20, the doctrine that souls are numerous; and in the 21st Sūtra, which I quote, along with the comment of Sankara Miśra, and the gloss of the editor Paṇḍit Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchānana, he claims Vedic authority for this tenet:

21. “*Sāstra-sāmarthyāch cha*” | (Sankara Miśrā) *Sāstrām śrutiḥ* |

<sup>155</sup> “They (the Upanishads) contain, or are supposed to contain, the highest authority on which the various systems of philosophy in India rest. Not only the Vedānta philosopher, who, by his very name, professes his faith in the ends and objects of the Veda, but the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeshika, the Nyāya, and Yoga philosophers, all pretend to find in the Upanishads some warranty for their tenets, however antagonistic in their bearing. The same applies to the numerous sects that have existed and still exist in India. Their founders, if they have any pretensions to orthodoxy, invariably appeal to some passage in the Upanishads in order to substantiate their own reasonings. Now it is true that in the Upanishads themselves there is so much freedom and breadth of thought that it is not difficult to find in them some authority for almost any shade of philosophical opinion.” (p. 316 f.) Again: “The early Hindus did not find any difficulty in reconciling the most different and sometimes contradictory opinions in their search after truth; and a most extraordinary medley of oracular sayings might be collected from the Upanishads, even from those which are genuine and comparatively ancient, all tending to elucidate the darkest points of philosophy and religion, the creation of the world, the nature of God, the relation of man to God, and similar subjects. That one statement should be contradicted by another seems never to have been felt as any serious difficulty.” (p. 320 f.) Once more: “The principal interest of the older Upanishads consists in the absence of that systematic uniformity which we find in the later systems of philosophy; and it is to be regretted that nearly all the scholars who have translated portions of the Upanishads have allowed themselves to be guided by the Brahmanic commentators,” etc. (p. 322). “In philosophical discussions, they (the Brahmans) allowed the greatest possible freedom; and although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mīmāṃsās and the Nyāya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vaiśeshika, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga schools. The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance.” (p. 78 f.).

tayā 'py ātmano bheda-pratipādanāt | śruyate hi . . . (Jayanārāyaṇa) ito 'py jīvasya īśvara-bhinnatvam ity āha | sāstrasya śruteḥ sāmarthyāj jīveśvarayor bheda-bodhakatvāt | tathā hi | “dve brahmaṇī veditavye” (Maitrī Up. vi. 22) | “dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhyā samānaṁ vṛiksham parishasvajāte | taylor anyah pippalaṁ svādu atti anaśnann anyo abhichā-kaśiti” (Rig-veda Sanhitā, i. 164, 20; Svetāśv. Up. vi. 6; Muṇḍaka Up. i. 3, 1, 1) ity-ādi-śruter jīveśvarayor bhedo 'vaśyam angikāryyaḥ | na cha “tat tvam asi Svetaketo” “Brahma-vid Brahma eva bhavati” ity-ādi-śrutiṇām kā gatir iti vāchyam | “tat tvam asi” iti śrutes tad-abhedenā tadiyatva-pratipādanena abheda-bhāvanā-paratvāt | “Brahma-vid Brahma eva” iti śrutiḥ cha nirduhkhatvādinā īśvara-sāmyam jīvasya abhidhatte na tu tad-abhedam | “niranjanāḥ param sāmyam upaiti” iti śruter gaty-antarāsambhavat | asti hi laukika-vākyeshu “sampad-ādhikye purohito 'yam rājā saṁvṛittah” ity-ādīshu sādṛiṣya-pareshv abhedopachāraḥ | na cha moksha-daśyām ajñāna-nirrittāv abhedo jāyate iti vāchyam bhedasya nityatvena nāśāyogād bheda-nāśāngikāre 'pi vyakti-dvayāvasthānasya āvaśyakatvāch cha iti sankshepaḥ | bheda-sādhakāni yukty-antarāṇi śruty-antarāṇi cha grantha-gaurava-bhiyā parityaktāni |

“And this opinion is confirmed by the Sāstra.” (Sankara Miśra) The Sāstra means the Veda; by which also a distinction of Souls is established. For it is said,” etc. [He then quotes two texts which are repeated by Jayanārāyaṇa, the author of the gloss, whose remarks are as follows:] “There is another proof of the Soul being distinct from īśvara; viz. this, that it is confirmed by the Sāstra, the Veda, which declares the distinctness of the two; and this principle must of necessity be admitted from such texts as these: ‘Two Brāhmās are to be known;’<sup>156</sup> and ‘Two birds, united, friends, attach themselves to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fruit of the pippala tree, while the other, without eating, looks on.’ Nor are we to ask what will then become of such other texts as (1) ‘Thou art that, o Svetaketu;’ (2) ‘He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma;’ for the former of these two passages (1) tends to convey the idea of identity by representing as identity with That, the fact of Svetaketu’s entirely belonging to That; whilst

<sup>156</sup> The full text is: Dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabda-brahma param cha yat—śabda-brahmanī nishyātaḥ param brahmādhigachhati | “Two Brāhmās are to be known, the verbal and the supreme. He who is initiated in the former attains the latter.” Here, however, by the verbal Brāhmā, the Veda must be intended.

the second (2) affirms the equality of the Soul with Īśvara, in consequence of its freedom from pain and other weaknesses, and not its identity with Him; for it is shewn by another Vedic text, viz. 'The passionless man attains the highest state of equality,' that any other destiny would be inconceivable. In secular modes of speaking also, such as the following, 'From the abundance of his wealth the domestic priest has become the king,' we find a figurative assertion of identity. Nor can it be said that distinction disappears on the cessation of ignorance in the state of final emancipation, because distinction, from its eternity, cannot be destroyed, and because, even if its destructibility were admitted, two separate personalities must still continue to exist. Such is a summary of our argument: further proofs from reasoning, and further texts of the Veda, are omitted from a dread of making the book too bulky."

The charge of open contempt of the Veda is brought by Sankara against Sāṇḍilya, the author of the Bhāgavata heresy, as the orthodox Vedāntin considers it.<sup>157</sup> Of that doctrine Sankara thus speaks in his remarks on Brahma Sūtra ii. 2, 45:

*Veda-vipratischedhaś cha bhavati | chaturshu vedeshu paraṇ śreyo 'lab-dhvā Sāṇḍilyah id-ṁ sāstram adhigatavān ity-ādi-veda-nindā-darśanāt | tasmād asangatā eshā kalpanā iti siddham |*

"And it also contradicts the Veda: for we see such an instance of contempt of the Vedas as this, that Sāṇḍilya, not finding the means of attaining the highest good in the whole four of them, devised this Sāstra. Hence it is established that these imaginations are absurd."

The points of the Bhāgavata doctrine objected to by Sankara do not however appear to be those which are principally insisted on in the Bhakti Sūtras of Sāṇḍilya, published by Dr. Ballantyne in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1861. I will notice some of these doctrines. The leading principle of the system is that it is not knowledge (*jñāna*) but devotion (*bhakti*) which is the means of attaining final liberation (Sūtra 1). Devotion is defined in the 2nd Sūtra to be a supreme love of God (*sā parā anuraktir Īśvare*). Knowledge cannot, the author considers, be the means of liberation, as it may co-exist with hatred of the object known (Sūtra 4). Neither the study of the Veda nor the acqui-

<sup>157</sup> See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 413: "A passage quoted by Sāṅkara Āchārya seems to intimate that its promulgator was Sāṇḍilya," etc., etc.

sition of such qualities as tranquility of mind is a necessary preliminary to devotion. The only requisite is a desire of emancipation, according to the commentator (remarks on Sūtra 1). Ceremonial works, too, have no bearing upon devotion (Sūtra 7), which may be practised by men of all castes, and even by Chāndālas, since the desire to get rid of the evils of mundane existence is common to all (Sūtra 78). The commentator explains that the authority of the Vedas as the only source of supernatural knowledge is not denied, nor the fact that only the three highest castes have the right to study them : but it is urged that women, Sūdras, etc., may attain by means of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, etc., to knowledge founded on the Vedas, whilst Chāndālas, etc., may acquire it by traditional instruction based on the Smṛiti and the practice of virtuous men. Those whose devotion is not matured in the present world, will find the opportunity of perfecting it in Śvetadvīpa, the world of the divine Being (Sūtra 79). Even the wicked may have a penitential devotion (*ārtti-bhuklāv eva adhikārah*), and after they are freed from their guilt, they may attain to full devotion. The Bhagavad Gītā is much quoted by the commentator on these Sūtras ; but the Veda is also sometimes adduced in proof of their doctrines ; as e.g. the following words of the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 25, 2, are cited to prove that devotion is the chief requisite, and knowledge, etc., subservient to it :

*“Ātmā eva idam sarvam iti | sa vai esha evam paśyann evam manvānah evam vijānann ātma-ratir ātma-kriḍah ātma-mithunah ātmānandaḥ  
sa svaraḍ bhavati” | tatra “ātma-rati-”rūpāyāḥ para-bhakteḥ “paśyann” iti darśanam apriyatvādi-bhrama-nirūsa-mukhena angaṁ bhavati |*

“ ‘All this is Soul. He who perceives this, thinks this, knows this, delights in Soul, sports with Soul, consorts with Soul, takes pleasure in Soul ; he becomes self-resplendent.’ Here the sight expressed in the words ‘perceiving,’ etc., is by removing all errors regarding disagreeableness, etc., an adjunct of supreme devotion in the form of ‘delight in Soul.’ ”

In his remarks on Sūtra 31 the commentator quotes another passage of the same Upanishad, iii. 14, 4, in which a Sāṇḍilya is referred to as the author of a statement. Sankara in his commentary on the Upanishad calls him a rishi. He cannot, however, have been the same person as the author of the Sūtras ; although, even if he had been so reputed,

Sankara would have had little difficulty in denying that they could have been written by a rishi, as we shall see in the next section that he contradicts the opinion that the rishi Kapila, referred to in the Svetâsvatara Upanishad, was the author of the Sâṅkhya aphorisms.

**SECT. XI.—Distinction in point of authority between the *Veda* and the *Smritis* or non-*Vedic Sāstras*, as stated in the *Nyāya-mälā-vistara*, and by the Commentators on *Manu*, and the *Vedānta*, etc.; difference of opinion between Sankara and Madhusūdana regarding the orthodoxy of Kapila and Kanâda, etc.; and *Vijnâna Bhikshu's* view of the Sâṅkhya.**

A distinct line of demarcation is generally drawn by the more critical Indian writers between the *Vedas*, and all other classes of Indian *Sāstras*, however designated. The former, as we have seen, are considered to possess an independent authority and to be infallible, while the latter are regarded as deriving all their authority from the *Veda*, and (in theory at least) as infallible guides only in so far as they coincide with its dicta. This will be clear from the following passages:

I. *Nyāya-mälā-vistara*.—The first text which I adduce has been already quoted in the Second Volume of this work, but is repeated here for facility of reference. It is from the treatise just named, i. 3, 24 :

*Baudhāyanāpastambāśvalayana-kātyāyanādi-nāmānkitāḥ kalpa-sūtrādi-granthāḥ nigama-nirukta-shad-anga-granthāḥ Manv-ādi-smritayas cha apaurusheyāḥ dharma-buddhi-janakatvāt veda-vat | na cha mūla-pramāṇa-sāpekshatvena veda-vaišamyam iti śankariyam | utpannāyāḥ buddheḥ svataḥ-pramāṇyāngikāreṇa nirapekshatvāt | Maivam | uktānumānasya kālatyayāpadishṭatvāt | Baudhāyana-sūtram Āpastamba-sūtram ity evam purusha-nāmnā te granthāḥ uchyante | na cha Kāṭhakādi-samākhya-vat pravachana-nimittatvāṁ yuktam | tad-grantha-nirmāṇa-kāle tadānīntanaiḥ kaiscid upalabdhavat | tach cha avicchinna-pāramparayena anuvarttate | tataḥ Kālidāsādi-grantha-vat paurusheyāḥ | tathāpi veda-mūlatvāt pramāṇam | . . . . kalpasya vedatvāṁ nādyāpi siddham | kintu prayatnena sādhanīyam | na cha tat sādhayitum śakyam | paurusheyatvasya samākhayā tat-kartur upalambhena cha sādhitatvāt |*

“It may be said that the Kalpa Sūtras and other works designated by the names of Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Āśvalayana, Kātyāyana, etc.,

and the Nigama, Nirukta, and six Vedāngas, together with the Smṛitis of Manu and others, are superhuman, because they impart a knowledge of duty, as the Vedas do; and that they should not be suspected of inferiority to the Vedas on the ground that they depend upon a primary authority, since the knowledge which they impart is independent, because it is admitted to be self-evidencing. But this view is incorrect, for the inference in question proceeds upon an erroneous generalization. The books referred to are called by the names of men, as 'the Sūtras of Baudhāyana,' 'the Sūtras of Āpastamba;' and these designations cannot correctly be said to originate in the exposition of the works by those teachers whose names they bear (as is really the case in regard to the Kāṭhaka, and other parts of the Veda); for it was known to some of the contemporaries of these men, at the time when they were composing these Sūtras, Smṛitis, etc., that they were so engaged; and this knowledge has descended by unbroken tradition. Hence these books are, like the works of Kālidāsa and others, of human origin. Nevertheless, they possess authority, as being founded on the Veda." . . . The following additional remarks represent the opinion of the Guru (Prabhākara) on the same question: "It is not yet proved that the Kalpa Sūtras possess the character of the Veda; it would require great labour to prove it; and, in fact, it is impossible to prove it. For the human origin of these books is established by the names which they bear, and by their being observed to have had authors."

II. *Kulluka*.—The same thing is admitted by Kulluka, the commentator on Manu, who (in his remarks on i. 1) thus defines the relation of his author to the Vedas :

*Paurushayatve'pi Manu-vākyānām avigīta-mahājana-parigrahāt śruty-upagrahāch cha veda-mūlakatayā prāmānyam | Tathā cha chhāndogya-brāhmaṇe śrūyate "Manur vai yat kinchid avadat tad bheshajam bheshajatāyai" iti | Vrihaspatir apy āha "Vedārthopanibandhṛitvāt prādhānyām hi Manoḥ smṛitam | Manv-artha-viparitā tu yā smṛitiḥ sā na śasyate | Tāvach chhāstrāṇī śobhante tarka-vyākaraṇāni cha | Dharmārtha-mokshopadeshtā Manur yāvad na dṛiṣyate" | Mahābhārata'py uktam "Purāṇam Mānavo dharmāḥ sāṅgo vedāś chikitsitam | ājnā-siddhāni chatvāri na hantavyāni hetubhiḥ" | viroḍhi-Bauddhādi-tarkair na hantavyāni | anuśūlaś tu mīmāṁsādi-tarkuḥ pravarttanīyah eva | ata eva vakshyati "ārasham dharmopadeśān cha veda-śastrāvirodhindā | yaś tarkenānusandhatto es dharmān veda netarah" iti |*

“Though the Institutes of Manu had a personal author, still, as their reception by illustrious men of unimpeached [orthodoxy], and their conformity to the Veda, prove that they are based upon the latter, they are authoritative. Accordingly it is recorded in the Chhāndogya Brāhmaṇa that, ‘Whatever Manu said is a medicine for remedial purposes.’ And Vṛihaspati says: ‘As Manu depends upon the contents of the Veda, he is traditionally celebrated as pre-eminent. But that Smṛiti which is contrary to the sense of Manu, is not approved. Scriptures and books on logic and grammar are all eclipsed as soon as Manu, our instructor in duty, and in the means of attaining both earthly prosperity, and final liberation, is beheld.’ And it is said in the Mahābhārata: ‘The Purāṇas, the Institutes of Manu, the Veda with its appendages, and treatises on medicine, these four, which are established by authority, are not to be assailed by rationalistic arguments;’ that is, they are not to be attacked by hostile reasonings, such as those of the Baudhāyas. But friendly arguments, such as those of the Mīmāṃsakas, are to be employed. And accordingly we shall find below (Manu xii. 106) that he says, ‘the man who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the rules of duty by reasoning which is agreeable to the Veda, he, and he only, is acquainted with duty.’” (See above, p. 24, note 29.)

III. *Nyāya-mālā-vistara*.—But the precepts of the Smṛiti are not considered useless or superfluous. On the contrary, an authority is attributed to them corresponding to the antiquity, elevated position, and sacred character of their supposed authors. Thus the author of the *Nyāya-mālā-vistara* says (i. 3, 3):

*Vimatā smritir veda-mūlā | vaidika-manv-ādi-pranita-smrititvāt | upanayanādhyayanādī-smṛiti-vat | na cha vaiyarthyaṁ śankānīyam | asmad-ādinām pratyaksheshu paroksheshu nānā vedeshu vīprakīrṇasya anushṭhe-yārthasya ekatra sankhipyamānatvāt |*

“The variously understood Smṛiti is founded on the Veda, because the traditions, such as those regarding investiture, study, etc., have been compiled by Vedic men, such as Manu and others. Nor is it to be surmised that the Smṛiti is useless, since it throws together in a condensed form a variety of injunctions regarding matters to be observed, which are scattered through different Vedas, both such as are visible and such as are invisible to us.” (This last expression appears

to refer to the supposition that some parts of the Veda which Manu and others had before them when compiling their own works have now been lost. See Müller's *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* pp. 103–107.)

Accordingly the Smṛitis have an authority superior to that founded merely on the practice of learned men of modern date, who have no intuition into the past and invisible. Thus the Nyāya-mālā-vistara says (i. 3, 19):

*Na hi idānīntanāḥ śishṭāḥ Manv-ādi-vad deśa-kāla-viprakrishtaṁ vedāṁ divya-jñānena sākshātkarttuṁ śaknuvanti yena śishṭāchāro mūla-vedam anumāpayet |*

"For learned men of the present day do not possess the power, which Manu and others had, of placing before their minds, through divine knowledge, the Veda which is far removed from them both in place and time, so as to justify us in regarding the practice of these moderns as a sufficient ground for inferring the existence of a Veda as its foundation."

But as learned men, in any particular country or at any particular time, may be able to consult some Smṛiti which authorizes their particular observances, "these observances may serve as ground for inferring the existence of some Smṛiti on which they are founded, but not for inferring a Veda (*tasmāch chhishṭāchārena smṛitir anumātuṁ śakyate na tu śrutih*). But a Smṛiti which is thus merely inferred to exist is set aside by any visibly existing Smṛiti of contrary import (*anumitā cha smṛitir viruddhayā pratyakshayā smṛityā bādhyate*)."

**IV. Sankara.**—The above passages, by assuming that Manu and other eminent sages had the power of consulting Vedic texts now no longer accessible, make them practically almost infallible. The same view is taken by Sankara Āchāryya. (See, however, the passage quoted from him above, in note 67, p. 62; but there he has the author of the Sāṅkhya in view, whose tenets he regarded as contrary to the Veda.) In answer to the remark of a Mīmānsaka objector stated in the comment on the Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 32, that the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, being of human origin, have only a derived and secondary authority ('*itihāsa-purāṇam api paurushyatvāt pramāṇāntara-mūlatām ākāṅkshate*'), Sankara argues in his explanation of the following Sūtra (i. 3, 33) that they have an independent foundation:

*Itihāsa-purāṇam api vyākhyātena mārgena sambhavad mantrartha-vāda-*

*mūlatvāt prabhavati devatā-vigrahādi prapanchayitum | pratyaksha-mūlam  
api sambhavati | bhavati hi asmākam apratyaksham api chirantanānām pra-  
tyaksham | tathā cha Vyāsādayo devatābhīḥ pratyakshāṁ vyavaharanti iti  
smaryate | yas tu brūyād idānīntanānām iva pūrveshām api nāsti devādibhir  
vyavaharttūm sāmarthyam iti sa jagad-vaichitryam pratischedet | idānīm  
iva cha na anyadā 'pi sārvabhaumaḥ kshatriyo 'sti iti brūyāt tataś cha rāja-  
sūyādi-chodanāḥ uparundhyāt | idānīm iva cha kālāntare 'py avyavasthitā-  
prāyān varṇāśrama-dharmān pratijānīta tataś cha vyavasthā-vidhāyi śās-  
tram anarthakām kuryāt | Tasmād dharmotkarsha-vaśat̄ chirantanāḥ devā-  
dibhiḥ pratyakshāṁ vyajahrur iti ślishyate | api cha smaranti "svādhyā-  
yādishṭa-devatā-samprayogaḥ" ityādi | *yogo 'py anīmādy-aiśvaryā-prāpti-*  
*phalakāḥ smaryamāṇo na śakyate sāhasa-mātreṇa pratyūkhyaṭum | śrutiḥ*  
*cha yoga-māhātmyam prakhyāpayati | "prithvya-ap-tejo-'nila-khe samut-*  
*thile panchātmake yoga-guṇe pravritte | na tasyo rogo na jarā na mrityuḥ*  
*prāptasya yogād<sup>158</sup> nimishāṁ śarīram" iti | rishīṇām api mantra-brāhma-*  
*nīna-darśinām sāmarthyām na asmadīyena sāmarthyena upamātuṁ yu-  
tam | tasmat̄ sa-mūlam itihāsa-purāṇam |**

"The *Ithihasas* and *Purāṇas* also, having originated in the way which has been explained, have power, as being based on the hymns and *arthavādas*, to evince the corporeality, etc., of the gods. It is also reasonable to suppose that they are founded upon intuition. For there were things palpable through intuition to the ancients, though they are not thus palpable to us.<sup>159</sup> Accordingly it is recorded in the *Smṛiti* that Vyāsa and others associated face to face with the gods.<sup>160</sup> Any man

<sup>158</sup> Instead of *yogād nimisham* the text of the Biblioth. Indica reads *yogāgnimayam*

<sup>159</sup> See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127; and also Prof Müller's article on the *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy* in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. vii. p. 311, where it is remarked that the *Vaiśeṣikas*, like Kapila, include the intuition of rishis under the category of *pratyaksha* (*ārshaṁ jñānaṁ sūtra-kritā prithak na lakṣitam yogi-pratyakshe 'ntar-bhāvāt*).

<sup>160</sup> Compare with this R.V. i. 179, 2 : *Ye chid hi pūrve ritasāpaḥ ṣasan sākaṁ devo-*  
*bhir avadann ritāni | te chid avāsur ityādi |* "The pious sages who lived of old and  
who conversed about sacred truths with the gods,—they led a conjugal life," etc. See  
also the passages quoted from the *Vana-parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, the *S'atapatha*  
*Brāhmaṇa*, and *Plato* in the First Volume of this work, p. 147; and compare *Hesiod*,  
fragment 119 : ξυραὶ γὰρ τότε δάίτες ἔσταν, ξυραὶ δὲ θύωκοι δθανάτοισι θεοῖσι κατα-  
θνήτοις τ'ἀνθρόποις.

"Immortal gods, not unfamiliar, then

Their feasts and converse shared with mortal men."

And Herodotus writes of the Egyptians, ii. 144 : Τὸ δὲ πρότερον τῶν εἰνδρῶν τούτων

who should maintain that the ancients, like his own contemporaries, were destitute of power thus to associate with superhuman beings like the gods, would be denying all variety in the history of the world. Such a person would in like manner affirm that as now there is no Kshattriya possessed of universal sovereignty, so neither was there ever such a prince; and would thus impugn the scriptural injunctions regarding the *rājasūya* sacrifice [which was only to be performed by a universal monarch]. He would also allege that in former times, as now, the dutes of castes and of orders were scarcely at all in force, and would thus render fruitless the scriptures by which the rules relating to them are prescribed. By these considerations it is intimated that the ancients, in consequence of their eminent holiness, were admitted to associate immediately with the gods, etc. And the Smṛiti<sup>161</sup> says that nearness to, and converse with the gods is gained by reading the Veda, etc. Again, when the Smṛiti talks of the practice of Yoga resulting in the acquisition of superhuman faculties, such as minuteness, this association cannot be impugned through mere audacity, [*i.e.* it must have had some good foundation]. The Veda, too, declares the immense power of devotion in these words: ‘When the fivefold influence of Yoga, connected with the elements of earth, water, fire, air, and æther, has begun to act, and a man has attained an æthereal [or fiery] body, he is no longer affected by disease, decay, or death.’ And it is unreasonable to estimate, by the analogy of our own power, the power of the rishis, the seers of the Vedic hymns and Brāhmaṇas. Wherefore the Itihāsas and Purāṇas have an (independent) foundation.’”

Sankara does not, however, treat all the ancients in this way. Like many other systematizers, he finds no difficulty in rejecting or explaining away any authorities which come into conflict with his views. It is thus that he deals with Kapila, the author of the Sāṅkhya. That eminent sage is thus spoken of in the Śvetāśvatara Upāniṣad, v. 2:

*Yo yoniṁ yonim adhitishṭhaty eko viśvāni rūpāṇi yoniś cha sarvāḥ |*

Θεοὶ ζίναι τοὺς ἐν Ἀιγύπτῳ ἔρχοντας δικέοντας ἡμα τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι, “And [the Egyptian priests said] that before these men the gods were the rulers in Egypt, dwelling together with men.”

•<sup>161</sup> It appears from the gloss of Govinda Ānanda that one of the Yoga Sūtras is here quoted. I give the sense according to his explanation: *mantra-japād deva-saṁdhikyāḥ tat-sambhāhanāḥ cha iti sūtrārthaḥ.*

*rishim prasūtaṁ Kapilaṁ yas tam agre jnānair bibhartti jāyamānaṁ cha paśyet |*

"The god who alone superintends every source of production and all forms, who formerly nourished with various knowledge his son the rishi Kapila, and beheld him at his birth, etc."<sup>162</sup>

Towards the close of his comment on Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1, which I shall cite at some length, Sankara makes some remarks on this passage of that Upanishad. After stating the points that had been established in the first Book (*adhyāya*) of the Brahma Sūtras, and alluding to the objections which had been urged against the Sāṅkhya and other hostile doctrines as contrary to the Veda, Sankara goes on to explain the object of the second book, and the purport of the aphorism with which it begins, as follows :

*Idānīn sva-pakṣe smṛiti-nyāya-virodha-parihāraḥ pradhānādi-vādā-nām cha nyāyābhāsopabṛīnhitavat prativedāntāṁ sṛishṭy-ādi-prakri-yāyāḥ avigītavat ity asya artha-jātasya pratipādanāya dvitīyo'dhyāyah ārabhyate | tatra prathamaṁ tāvat smṛiti-virodham upanyasya pariha-rati | yad uktam Brahma eva sarvajnaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ tad ayuktam | kutah "smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangāt" | smṛitiś cha tantrākhyā paramarshi-pranītā śishṭa-parigṛihitā | anyāś cha tad-anusāriṇyāḥ smṛitayah | evāṁ saty anavakāśāḥ prasajyeran | tāsu hy ahetanam pradhā-naṁ svatantraṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam upanibadhyate | Manv-ādi-smṛitayas tāvach chodanā - lakshanena agnihotrādinā dharma-jātena apekshitam arthaṁ samarpayantyāḥ sāvakāśāḥ bhavanti asya varṇasya asmin kāle 'nena vidhānenā upanayanam idrīśāś cha ṛchāraḥ itthām vedādhayanam itthām samāvarttanam itthām saha-dharma-chārīṇī-saṁyogaḥ iti tathā purushārthāṁś chatur-varṇāśrama-dharmān nānā-vidhān vidadhati | na evāṁ kāpilādi-smṛitīnam anuśṭheyē vishaye'vakāśo'sti moksha-sādhanam eva hi samyag-durśanam adhikṛitya tūḥ pranītāḥ | yadi tatra apy anavakāśāḥ syur ānarthakyam eva āśām prasajyeta | tasmāt tad-avirodhena vedāntāḥ vyūkhyātavyāḥ | katham punar "īkshity"-ādibhyo hetubhyo Brahma eva sarvajnaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam ity avadhāritaḥ śruty-arthaḥ | "smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangena" punar ākshipyate | bhaved ayam anākshepaḥ sva-tantra-prajnānām | para-tantra-prajnās tu prāyena janāḥ*

<sup>162</sup> See Sankara's commentary on this passage in Bibl. Ind. vii. 351, and Dr. Röer's translation, p. 62, with the note; also Dr. Hall's note in p. 19 of the preface to his edition of the Sāṅkhya Sāra, in the Bibl. Ind.

evātantryena śruty-artham avadhārayitum aśaknuvantah prakhyāta-pra-  
 netrikāsu smṛitiḥv avalamberan tad-balena cha śruty-artham pratipat-  
 serann asmat-krite oha vyākhyāne na viśvasyur bahu-mānūt smṛitīnām  
 pranetṛishu | kapila-prabhṛitīnām cha ārshaṁ jnānam apratihataṁ sma-  
 ryyate śrutiḥ cha bhavati “rishim prasūtām kapilām yas tam agre jnānair  
 bibhartti jāyamānaṁ cha paśyed” iti | tasmād na eshām matam ayathār-  
 thaṁ śakyām sambhāvayitum | tarkāvashṭambhena cha te 'rtham pratish-  
 thāpayanti | tasmād api smṛiti-balena vedāntāḥ vyākhyeyāḥ iti punar  
 ākshepah | tasya samādhir “na | anya-smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasan-  
 gād” iti | yadi smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangena iśvara-kāraṇa-vādaḥ  
 ākshipyeta evam apy anyāḥ iśvara-kāraṇa-vādinyaḥ smṛityo 'navakāśāḥ  
 prasajyeran | tāḥ udāharishyāmaḥ | . . . . evam anekaśāḥ smṛitiḥv api  
 iśvaraḥ kāraṇatvena upādānatvena cha prakāsyate | smṛiti-balena praty-  
 avatishṭhamānasya smṛiti-balena eva uttaram pravakṣyāmi ity ato 'yam  
 anya-smṛity-anavakāśa-doshopanyāsaḥ | darśitaṁ tu śrūtīnam iśvara-  
 kāraṇa-vādaṁ prati tātparyyam | vīpratipattau oha smṛitīnām avaśya-  
 kartavye 'nyatara-parigrahe 'nyataraśyāḥ parityāge cha śruty-anusārin-  
 yaḥ smṛitayah pramāṇam anapekṣyāḥ itarāḥ | tad uktam pramāṇa-la-  
 kṣhaṇe “virodhe tv anapekṣhaṁ syād asati hy anumānām” iti (Mīmānsā  
 Sūtras i. 3, 3) | na cha atīndriyān arthān śrutiṁ antareṇa kaścid upa-  
 labhato iti śakyān sambhāvayitūm nimittābhāvāt | śakyām kapilādinām  
 siddhānām apratihata-jnānatvād iti chet | na | siddher api sāpekshatvāt |  
 dharmānushṭhānāpekshā hi siddhiḥ sa oha dharmaś chodanā-lakṣhaṇāḥ |  
 tataś cha pūrva-siddhāyāś chodanāyāḥ artho na paśchima-siddha-purusha-  
 vachana-vaśena atīśankitūm śakyate | siddha-vyapāśraya-kalpanāyām api  
 bahutvāt siddhānām pradarśitena prakāreṇa smṛiti-vīpratipattau satyām  
 na śruti-vyapāśrayād anyad nirṇaya-kāraṇam asti | para-tantra-prajna-  
 sya api na akasmāt smṛiti-viśeṣha-vishayaḥ pakṣhapāto yuktaḥ | kasyachit  
 kvachit tu pakṣhapāte sati purusha-mati-vaiśvarūpyena tattvāvasthāna-  
 prasangāt | tasmāt tasya api smṛiti-vīpratipatty-upanyāsenā śruty-anu-  
 sārānanusāra-vivechanena cha san-mārgे prajnā sangrahaṇīyā | Ya tu  
 śrutiḥ Kapilasya jnānātiśayaṁ darśayanti pradarśitā na tayā śruti-  
 viruddham api Kāpilam matām śraddhātūm śakyām “Kāpilam” iti  
 “śruti-sāmānya-mātratvād”<sup>163</sup> anyasya cha Kapilasya Sagara-putrānām  
 prataptur Vāruṇeva-nāmnāḥ emaraṇāt | anyārtha-darśanasya oha prāpti-  
 rāṇasya asūdhakatvāt | Bhavati oha anyā Manor māhātyam prakhyā-

<sup>163</sup> Mīmānsā-sūtra i. 1, 31. See above, pp. 78f.

*payantī śrutiḥ “yad vai kincha Manur avadat tad bheshajam”<sup>164</sup> iti | Manunā cha (xii. 91) “sarva-bhūteshu chātmānaṁ sarva-bhūtāni chātmanī | samam paśyann ātma-yājī svārājyam adhigachchhati” iti sarvātmatva-darśanam praśāmsatā Kāpilam mātaṁ nindye iti gamyate | Kāpilo hi na sarvātmatva-darśanam anumanyate ātma-bhedābhypagamāt | . . . . atas cha ātma-bheda-kalpanayā ‘pi Kāpilasya tantrasya veda-viruddhatvaṁ vedānusāri-Manu-vachana-virudhatvaṁ cha na kevalaṁ svatantra-prakṛiti-parikalpanayā eveti siddham | vedasya hi nirapekṣhaṁ svārthe prāmānyam raver iva rūpa-vishaye purusha-vachasām tu mūlāntarāpekṣhaṁ svārthe prāmānyam vaktri-smṛiti-vyavahitam̄ cha iti viprakarshaḥ | tasmād veda-viruddhe vishaye smṛity-anavakūśa-prasango na*

“But now the second chapter is commenced with the view of effecting the following objects, viz. (a) to refute, in our own favour, the charge of contradicting the reasonings of the Smṛiti, to shew (b) that the doctrines regarding Pradhāna, etc., have nothing more than an appearance of reason, and (c) that the manner in which the subjects of creation, etc., are treated in each of the Upanishads is unimpeachable. First of all then the author states, and removes, the objection of contrariety to the Smṛiti. Our opponents urge that it is incorrect to say that the omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world. Why? Because, (1) as they allege, that doctrine ‘is chargeable with the objection of setting aside the Smṛiti as useless’ (Br. Sūtra, ii. 1, 1). This term ‘Smṛiti’ denotes a systematic treatise (*tantra*) composed by an eminent rishi, and received by the learned; and there are other Smṛitis in conformity with it. And the alleged difficulty is that (on the theory that Brahma is the cause) all these would be set aside as useless; since they propound an unconscious Pradhāna as the self-dependent cause of the world. The Smṛitis of Manu and others, indeed, which affirm that by means of the agnihotra and other enjoined ceremonies, the objects desired (by those who practise these rites) will be accomplished, will still retain their use, viz. of prescribing the objects to be pursued, viz. the various duties of the four castes and orders,—that such and such a caste shall be initiated at such a time and by such a process, and shall follow such and such a mode of life, that the Veda is to be studied, that the cessation of study is to take place, and that union with a woman following the same rites is to

<sup>164</sup> See above, p. 181, and the First Volume of this work, pp. 188, and 510.

celebrated, in such and such ways. But [on the hypothesis of Brahma being the creator] no such room is left for the Smritis of Kapila and others, on the ground of any ceremonies to be performed [in conformity with their prescriptions]; for they have been composed as embodying perfect systems affording the means of final liberation. If in this respect also no place be left for them the difficulty will arise that they are quite useless. And hence the conclusion is reached that the Upanishads should be interpreted so as to harmonize with them. But, such being the case, how, it is again objected, have you determined on the strength of the reasons furnished by the texts about 'beholding,' etc., that it is the meaning of the Veda that Brahma is the omniscient cause of the world, thus exposing yourself to the charge of leaving no place for the Smriti? Although we hold that this charge is harmless as regards those who think for themselves; yet men have for the most part no independent opinion, and are unable by an unassisted act of their own judgment to determine the sense of the Vedas, and will consequently lean upon the Smritis composed by renowned authors, and adopt the sense of the Vedas which they enforce: and from their lofty opinion of these authors they will have no confidence in our interpretations. And it is moreover urged (2) that Kapila and the others are declared by the Smriti to have possessed an unobstructed intuitive (*ārsha*<sup>165</sup>) knowledge; and there is also a Vedic text to the effect 'He who of old sustains with manifold knowledge Kapila when he is produced, and beholds him when born,' etc. (*Svetāsv. Up.* v. 2). Consequently their doctrines cannot be imagined to be untrue. And they further support their tenets by argument. On these grounds also, it is urged, the Upanishads must be interpreted by the aid of the Smritis. The questions thus raised are settled by the concluding words of the Sūtra, 'No; for this conclusion is vitiated by the objection that other Smritis would in this way be rendered useless.' (1) If the doctrine that God is the cause of the world is chargeable with the objection that it leaves no room for the Smriti, in the same way the difficulty will arise (on the other theory) that other texts of the Smriti which affirm that God is the cause will be set aside. These we shall adduce." After quoting some passages, Sankara proceeds: "In the same manner in numerous texts of the Smriti God is shewn to be both the instrumental and the material cause. I must answer on the

<sup>166</sup> See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127.

strength of the Smṛiti the person who opposes me on the same ground, and so I just indicate this objection against his views as having the effect of setting aside other Smṛitis. But it has been shown that the sense of the Vedic texts is in favour of the causality of God. And since, if the Smṛitis are at variance with each other, we must of necessity accept the one set and reject the other, those of them which are conformable to the Veda will be authoritative, and the rest will deserve no attention: for it has been said in the section (of the Pūrva Mīmānsā) on proof (i. 3, 3), that 'if it (the Smṛiti) be contrary (to the Veda) it must be disregarded; but if there be no (contrariety) it must be inferred (that the former is founded on the latter).' And it is inconceivable that anyone should discover things beyond the reach of the senses without the aid of the Veda, since the means of doing so are wanting. If it be urged that we can conceive such discovery (of imperceptible things without the help of the Veda) as possible in the case of Kapila and other perfect persons (*siddhanām*), because there was nothing to obstruct their knowledge;—we reply, No; because perfection (*siddhi*) is dependent upon something else, viz. on the practice of duty. Now duty is defined as something which is enjoined. And the subject-matter of an injunction which was previously promulgated cannot be called into doubt on the strength of the words of a man who became perfect at a subsequent period. And even on the supposition that confidence could be placed in such 'perfect' persons, yet, as they are numerous, and as such a mutual contradiction as we have already pointed out exists between the Smṛitis of different 'perfect' persons, there is no means left of determining the truth, but reliance on the Veda. Causeless partiality to any particular Smṛiti, on the part even of a man who has no independent opinion, is improper; but if anyone ever does exhibit such partiality, the charge of depriving truth of all fixity attaches to his procedure, because the opinions of men (which he takes as the standard of his belief) assume all sorts of forms. Consequently his judgment also should be directed into the right path by indicating the mutual contradictions between the different Smṛitis, and by distinguishing those of them which are conformable to, from those which are at variance with, the Veda. And (2) the Vedic text which has been pointed out, showing the transcendent character of Kapila's knowledge, cannot be a warrant for believing the doctrine of Kapila, though con-

trary to the Veda, since the word Kapila ‘has, in this text, a general sense’ [applicable to others besides the author of the Sāṅkhya] (Mīm. Sūtra, i. 1, 31), and another Kapila called Vāsudeva, the consumer of Sagara’s sons, is also mentioned in the Smṛiti; and since the indication of something which has a different object in view, and is therefore irrelevant to the matter in question, can prove nothing.<sup>166</sup> There is, besides, another text of the Veda which sets forth the eminent dignity of Manu in these terms, ‘Whatever Manu said is medicine.’<sup>167</sup> And Manu—when he employs the words (xii. 91), ‘He who, with impartial eye, beholds himself in all beings, and all beings in himself, thus sacrificing his own personality, attains to self-fulgence;’ and, by saying this commends the tenet that everything is one with the supreme Spirit—must be understood as censuring Kapila’s doctrine. For Kapila does not assent to the identity of Brahma and the universe, since he holds a diversity of souls.” . . . (After quoting one passage from the Mahābhārata, and another from the Veda, to prove that Kapila is wrong, Sankara proceeds): “Hence it is proved that Kapila’s system is at variance with the Veda and with the words of Manu, who follows the Veda, not only in supposing an independent Prakṛiti (nature), but also in supposing a diversity of souls. Now the Veda has an independent authority in regard to its own contents, as the sun has (an inherent power) of manifesting forms; whilst the words of men have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent on another source (the Veda), and which is distinguished (from the authority of the Veda) by the fact of their authors being remembered. Consequently it forms no objection to a doctrine that it sets aside a Smṛiti on a point which is contrary to the Veda.”

<sup>166</sup> The words thus translated are explained as follows in the Gloss of Govinda Ānanda: *Kincha “yah Kapilam jnānair bibharti tam īśvaram paīyed” iti vidhīyatē tathā cha anyārthasya īśvara-pratipatti-seshasya Kapila-sarvajnatvaaya darsanam anuvādas tasya mānāntareṇa prūpti-śūnyasya svartka-sādhakatvāyogaū na anuvāda-mūlātāt sārvajnatva-siddhiḥ ity āha |* “And it is enjoined (in the text of the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad): ‘Let him behold that īśvara who nourishes Kapila with various knowledge;’ and so since this ‘indication’ of, this reference to, the omniscience of Kapila, which has another object in view, and ends in the establishment of an īśvara, and which on other grounds is shewn to be irrelevant, cannot prove its own meaning,—this mere reference does not suffice to evince Kapila’s omniscience:—This is what Sāṅkara means to say.”

<sup>167</sup> See the First Volume of this work, pp. 188 and 510.

See also Sankara's commentary on the Taittiriya Upanishad, Bib. Ind. vii. pp. 136, 137, where he says :

*Kāpila-kāñādādi-tarka-śāstra-virodhah iti chet | na | teshām mūlā-  
bhāve veda-virodhe cha bhrāntyopapatteḥ |*

"If it be objected that this is contrary to the rationalistic doctrines of Kapila and Kāñāda [and therefore wrong], I answer no, since these doctrines are proved to be erroneous, as having no foundation, and as being in opposition to the Veda."

His remarks on a passage of the Praśna Upanishad, which are as follows, afford a curious specimen of the contemptuous manner in which this orthodox Vedāntist treats the heretical Sāṅkhyas, etc. (Praśna Up. vi. 4 ; Bib. Ind. viii. 244) :

*Sāṅkhyās tu avidyā-'dhyāropitam eva purushe kartṛitvāṁ kriyā-kāra-  
kam phalaṁ cha iti kalpayitvā āgama-vāhyatvāt punas tatas trasyantaḥ  
paramārthaḥ eva bhoktritvam purushasya ichchhanti | tattvāntaraṁ cha  
pradhānam purushāt paramārtha-vastu-bhūtam eva kalpayanto 'nya-tār-  
kika-kṛita-buddhi-vishayāḥ santo vihanyante | Tathā itare tōrkikāḥ sān-  
khyair ity evam paraspara-viruddhārtha-kalpanātāḥ āmishārthīnāḥ iva  
prāṇino 'nyonyāṁ viruddhamānāḥ artha-darśitvāt paramārtha-tattvāt  
tad-dūram eva apakrishyante | atas tan-matam anādritya vedāntārtha-  
tattvam ekatva-darśanam prati ādaravanto mumukshavah syur iti tārkika-  
mate dosha-darśanāṁ kinchid uchyate 'smābhīr na tu tārkika-tātparyyena |*

"The followers of the Sāṅkhya imagine that the functions of action, and the enjoyment of reward which causes action, become erroneously attributed to the soul (*purusha*) in consequence of supervening ignorance; but as this doctrine differs from that of Scripture, they become afraid of it, and seek to ascribe to the soul enjoyment in the proper sense. And supposing another principle distinct from soul, viz. Pradhāna (or nature), which they regard as substance in the proper sense, they become the objects of correction by other rationalists, and are crushed. Thus, in consequence of the contrariety between the conceptions of the Sāṅkhyas and those of other freethinkers, the two parties quarrel with each other like animals fighting for flesh; and thus, from their having an (exclusive) regard to (their own) views, they are all drawn away to a distance from the essential truth. Wherefore let men, disregarding their tenets, seek for final liberation by paying honour to the principles of the Vedantic doctrine, which maintains the unity of all being. We

have thus pointed out something of the errors of the rationalists, and have said nothing in accordance with their views."

IV.—In thus depreciating Kapila, Sankara is in direct opposition to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (which, however, may be a work of later date than his<sup>108</sup>), in which the author of the Sāṅkhya is spoken of with the greatest reverence. Thus in Bhāg. Pur. i. 3, 10, he is described as the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu :

*Panchamah Kapilo nāma siddheśah kāla-viplutam | provāchāsuraye sāṅkhyam tattva-grāma-vinirnayam |*

" In his fifth manifestation, he [in the form of] Kapila, and lord of saints, declared to Āsuri the Sāṅkhya which defines the series of principles, and which had been lost through the lapse of time."

And again, in Bhāg. Pur. ix. 8, 12, 13, Kapila is made the subject of eulogy. A legend narrates that the sixty thousand sons of king Sagara, conceiving Kapila to be the robber of a horse which had been carried away from their sacrifice, advanced to slay him, when they were burnt up by fire issuing from his body. The author of the Purāṇa, however, denies that this was in any degree owing to passion on the part of the sage :

*Na sādhu-vādo muni-kopa-bharjitāḥ nrīpendra-putrāḥ iti sattva-dhamani | kathaṁ tamо roshamayaṁ vibhāvya te jagat-pavitrātmani khe rajo bhuvāḥ | yasyeritā sāṅkhyamayī dṛiḍheha naur yayā mumukshus tarate duratyayam | bhavārvṇavam mṛityu-patham vipaśchitāḥ parātma-bhūtasya katham prīthaūmatiḥ |*

" It is not an assertion befitting a good man to say that the king's sons were burnt up by the wrath of the sage ; for how is it conceivable that the darkness (*tamas*) of anger should reside in the abode of goodness (*sattva*), or that the dust (or passion, *rajas*) of the earth should ascend into the sky, the region of purity ? How could that sage, one with the supreme Spirit, by whom the strong ship of the Sāṅkhya was launched, on which the man seeking emancipation crosses the ocean of existence, hard to be traversed, and leading to death,—how could he entertain the idea of any distinction between himself and others [and so treat any one as an enemy]?"

It is not necessary for me to quote any further passages in praise of the author of the Sāṅkhya. There is a great deal about this system

<sup>108</sup> See Wilson's Vish. Pur., preface, pp. xliv. and li.

in the *Mahābhārata*, *Sāntiparvan*, verses 11,037 ff. See Colebrooke's Essays, i. 236 (p. 149 of Williams and Norgate's ed.); Wilson's *Vishnu Purāna*, pref. p. xciv. and text, pp. 18 ff. with notes; *Bhāgavata Purāna*, iii. chapters 24–30; Weber's Ind. Stud. passim; Dr. Röer's Introduction to *Svetāśvatara Upanishad*, Bibl. Ind. xv. 35 ff.; and Dr. Hall's preface to the *Sāṅkhya-sāra* in the Bibl. Ind. p. 19, note.

We have thus seen that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the most accurate and critical of the Indian writers, between the *Śruti*, which they define to be superhuman and independent, and the *Smṛiti*, which they regard as of human origin, and as dependent for its authority on its conformity with the *Śruti*. Sankara, indeed, as we have also observed (above, p. 183 f.), goes very nearly, if not altogether, so far as to assign an independent foundation to the *Smṛitis*; but he confines this distinction to such of these works as coincide in doctrine with the *Śruti* or *Veda*, according to his own Vedāntic interpretation of its principles, while all other speculators are denounced by him as heterodox. It is, however, clear from the *Svetāśvatara Upanishad*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the *Vishnu*, and the *Bhāgavata Purānas*, etc., that the doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya* must have been very prevalent in ancient times, and that Sankara, when he condemned them as erroneous, must have done so in the face of many powerful opponents.<sup>169</sup>

<sup>169</sup> I quote the following passage from Dr. Röer's Introduction to the *Svetāśvatara Upanishad*, pp. 36 f.: "At the time of the composition of the *Svetāśvatara*, the *Sāṅkhya* was not a new system, which had to overcome the resistance of old received opinions, and the prejudices of men in power, whose interest might be opposed to the introduction of a doctrine by which their authority could be questioned. It had found many adherents; it was the doctrine of Manu, of some parts of the *Mahābhārata*, and to its founder divine honour had been assigned by general consent. It was a doctrine whose argumentative portion demanded respect, and as it was admitted by many Brāhmans (*sic*), distinguished for their knowledge of the *Vedas*, it could not be treated as a heresy. The most learned and eminent of the Brāhmans were evidently divided among themselves with reference to the truth of the *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta*, and this must have afforded to the opponents of the *Vedaic* system a most powerful weapon for attacking the *Vedas* themselves. If both the *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* are divine revelations, both must be true; but if the doctrine of the one is true, the doctrine of the other is wrong; for they are contradictory among themselves. Further, if both are derived from the *Vedas*, it is evident that also the latter cannot reveal the truth, because they would teach opposite opinions about one and the same point. Such objections to the *Vedas* had been made already in ancient times, as is clear from the *Upanishads*, from several passages of Manu, from Yāska, etc.; and under these circumstances it cannot be wondered at, if early attempts were made to reconcile the

It is not necessary for me here to inquire with any accuracy what the relation was in which the different philosophical systems stood to each other in former ages. It may suffice to say that the more thorough-going adherents of each—of the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya, etc.—must, according to all appearance, have maintained their respective principles with the utmost earnestness and tenacity, and could not have admitted that any of the rival systems was superior to their own in any particular. It is impossible to study the Sūtras of the several schools, and come to any other conclusion. The more popular systems of the Purāṇas, on the other hand, blended various tenets of the different systems syncretically together. In modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta seems to be generally admitted. But even some who hold this opinion refuse to follow the example of Śankara in denouncing the founders of the rival schools as heretical. On the contrary, they regard them all as inspired Munis, who, by adapting their doctrines to the capacities or tendencies of different students, have paved the way for the ultimate reception of the Vedāntic system. Such is the view taken in the Prasthāna-bheda of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who gives the following lucid summary of the leading principles of the different schools of speculation (Weber's Indische Studien, i. 23):

*Sarveshāṁ cha sankshepena trividhah eva prasthāna-bhedaḥ | tatra ārambha-vādaḥ ekaḥ | parināma-vādo dvitīyah | vivartta-vādas tritīyah | pārthivāpya-taijasa-vāyavīyāś chaturvidhāḥ paramāṇavaḥ dvy-anukādi-kramena brahmāṇḍa-paryantam jagad ārambhante | asad eva kāryyām kāraka-vyāpārad utpadyato iti prathamas tārkikānām mīmāṁsa-kānām cha | sattva-rajas-tamo-guṇātmakam pradhānam eva mahā-hankārādi-kramena jagad-ākārenā parinamate | pūrvam api sūkshma-rūpena sad eva kāryyām kārana-vyāpārenā abhivyajyate iti dvitīyah pakshaḥ Sāṅkhya-Yoga-Pātanjala-Pāśupatānām | Brahmanāḥ pari-nāmo jagad iti Vaishṇavānām | sva-prakāśa-paramāṇandādvitīyam Brahma eva-māyā-vāśād mithyaiva jagad-ākārenā kalpate iti tritīyah paksha*

tenets of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya to save the uniformity of the doctrine, and thereby the sacredness of the Vedas as the Scriptures derived from the immediate revelation of God. So, for instance, it is recorded that Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Brāhma Sūtras, wrote also a commentary to Patanjali's Yoga-Sūtra, which is still extant under his name. In the same manner composed Gaudapāda, the eminent Vedāntist, and teacher of Śankara's teacher, Govinda, a commentary to Īśvara Kṛishṇa's Sāṅkhya Kārikā; and the Bhagavad Gītā has also the same object."

*Brahma-vādinām | sarveshām prasthāna-karttrinām munīnām vivartta-  
vāda-paryavasānena advitīye Paramēśvare eva pratipādye tātparyam | na  
hi te munayo bhrāntāḥ sarvajnatvāt teshām | kintu vahir-vishaya-prava-  
ṇānām āpātataḥ purushārthe praveśo nā sambhavati iti nāstikya-vāra-  
ṇāya taiḥ prakāra-bhedāḥ pradarśitāḥ | tatra teshām tātparyam abuddhvā  
veda-viruddhe 'py arthe tātparyam utprekshamāṇās tan-matam eva upā-  
deyatvena grihnanto janāḥ nānā-patha-jusho bhavanti | iti sarvam ana-*

"The difference in principle between these various schools is, when briefly stated, three-fold. The first doctrine is that of a commencement of the world; the second is that of an evolution; the third is that of an illusion. Atoms of four descriptions—earthy, aqueous, igneous, and aerial—beginning with compounds of two atoms, and ending in the egg of Brahmā (the world), originate the universe: and effects, previously non-existent, come into being from the action of a causer. This is the first theory, that of the Logicians and Mīmānsakas. The second theory, that of the Sāṅkyas, Yogas, Pātanjalas, and Pāśupatas, is that *Pradhāna* (or *Prakṛiti* = nature), consisting of the three *gunas* (qualities), *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, is evolved, through the successive stages of *mahat* (intellect), and *ahankāra* (consciousness), etc., in the form of the world; and that effects, which had previously existed in a subtle form, are [merely] manifested by the action of their cause. Another form of this theory is that of the Vaishṇavas [the Rāmānujas], who hold the universe to be an evolution of Brahma. The third view, that of the Brahma-vādins (Vedāntists), is, that Brahma, the self-resplendent, the supremely happy, and the one sole essence, assumes, unrealistically, the form of the world through the influence of his own illusion (*Māyā*).

The ultimate scope of all the Munis, authors of these different systems, is to support the theory of illusion, and their only design is to establish the existence of one Supreme God, the sole essence; for these Munis could not be mistaken [as some of them must have been, if they were not all of one opinion, or, as those of them must have been who did not hold Vedāntic principles], since they were omniscient. But as they saw that men, addicted to the pursuit of external objects, could not all at once penetrate into the highest truth, they held out to them a variety of theories, in order that they might not fall into atheism. Misunderstanding the object which the Munis thus had in view, and

representing that they even designed to propound doctrines contrary to the Vedas, men have come to regard the specific doctrines of these several schools with preference, and thus become adherents of a variety of systems. Thus all has been satisfactorily stated."

I find that Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sāṅkhya aphorisms, takes very nearly the same view as is here quoted from Maḍhusūdana Sarasvatī, in regard to the superiority of the Brahma Mīmāṁsā or Vedānta over the other Darśanas.

In his Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 3 ff.), he thus writes :

*Syād etat | Nyāya-raiśekikābhyaṁ atra avirodho bhavatu | brahma-mīmāṁsā-yogābhyaṁ tu virodho 'sty eva | tābhyaṁ nityesvara-sūdhanāt | atra cha Iśvarasya pratishidhyamānatvāt | na cha atrāpi vyāvahārika-pāramārthika-bhedenā seśvara-nirīśvara-vādayor avirodho 'stu seśvara-vādasya upāsanā-paratva-sambhavād iti vāchyam | vinigamakābhāvāt | iśvaro hi durjneyah iti nirīśvaratvam api loka-vyavahāra-siddham aiśvaryya-vairāgyāya anuvaditum śakyate ātmāṇah sagunatvam iva | na tu kvāpi śruty-ādān iśvarāḥ sphuṭam pratishidhyate yena seśvara-vādasyaiva vyāvahārikatvam avadhāryeta iti | atra uchyate | atrāpi vyāvahārika-pāramārthika-bhāvo bhavati | "asatyam apratishṭhaṁ te jagad āhur anīśvaram" ityādi-śāstrair nirīśvara-vādasya ninditatvāt | asminn eva śāstre vyāvahārikasyaiva pratishedhasya aiśvaryya-vairāgyādy-ar�am anuvādalvauchityāt | yadi hi laukāyatika-matānusārena nityaiśvaryyaṁ na pratishidhyeta tadā paripūrṇa-nitya-nirdoshaiśvaryya-darśanena tatra chittāvōsato vivekābhya - pratibandhaḥ syād iti sāṅkhyāchāryyānām āśayah | seśvara-vādasya na kvāpi nindādikam asti yena upāsanādi-paratayā tat śāstraṁ sankochyeta | yat tu "nāsti sāṅkhya-samān jnānānām nāsti yoga-samam balam | atra vaḥ samśayo mā bhuj jnānānām sāṅkhyam param emritam" ityādi vākyam tad-vivekānśe eva sāṅkhya-jnānasya darśanāntarebhyāḥ utkarsham pratipādayati na tv iśvara-pratishedāmśe 'pi | tathā Parāśarādy-akhila-siśhīta-saṁvādād api seśvara-vādasyaiva pāramārthikatvam avadhāryate | api cha "Akṣapāda-praṇīte cha Kāṇade sāṅkhya-yogayoh | tyājyāḥ śruti-virudho 'ṁśaḥ śruty-eka-śāraṇair nri-bhīb | Jaiminīye oha Vaiyāsē virudhānśo na kaśhāna | śrutyā vedārtha-vijñāne śruti-pāraṁ gatau hi tāv" iti Parāśaropapurāṇādibhyo 'pi brahma-mīmāṁsāyāḥ iśvarānśe balavattvam | yathā | "nyāya-tantrāṇy anekāni tais tair uktāni vādibhiḥ | hetv-āgama-sadāchārair yad yuktaṁ*

*tad upāsyatām*" iti moksha-dharma-vākyād api Parāśarādy-akhila-śishṭa-vyavahārena brahma-mīmāṃsā-nyāya-vaiśeshikādy-uktaḥ īśvara-sādhaka-nyāyah eva grāhyo balavattvāt | tathā | "Yām na paśyanti yogīndrāḥ sāṅkhyāḥ api maheśvaram | anādi-nidhanam brahma tam eva śaraṇām vraja" ityādi-kaurmādi-vākyaiḥ sāṅkhyānām īśvarājnānasyaiva nārāyaṇādinā proktatvāch oha | kincha brahma-mīmāṃsāyāḥ īśvaraḥ eva mukhyo vishayaḥ upakramādibhir avadhītāḥ | tatrāmśe tasya bādhe śāstrasyaiva aprāmāṇyaṁ syāt | "yat-parah śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ" iti nyāyāt | sāṅkhyā-śāstrasya tu purushārtha-tat-sādhana-prakṛiti-purusha-vivekāv eva mukhyo vishayaḥ | iti īśvara-pratishedhāmśa-bādhe 'pi na aprāmāṇyaṁ | "Yat-parah śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ" iti nyāyāt | ataḥ sāvakāśatayā sāṅkhyam eva īśvara-pratishedhāmśe durbalam iti | na cha brahma-mīmāṃsāyām api īśvāraḥ eva mukhyo vishayo na tu nityaiśvaryam iti vaktum śakyate | "smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasanga"-rūpa-pūrva-pakshasya anupapattiḥ nityaiśvaryya-viśiṣṭatvena eva brahma-mīmāṃsā-vishayatvādhāraṇāt | brahma-śabdasya para-brahmaṇy eva mukhyatayā tu "athātāḥ para-brahma-jījnāsā" iti na sūtritam iti | etena sāṅkhyā-virodhād brahma-yoga-darśanayoh kāryyeśvara-paratvam api na sāṅkanāyam | prakṛiti-svātantryāpattiḥ "rachanānupapatteḥ cha na anumānam" ityādi brahma-sūtra-paramparā-'nupapatteḥ cha | tathā "sa purveshām api guruḥ kālena anavachchedād" iti yoga-sūtra-tadīya-vyāsa-bhāshyābhyaṁ sphuṭam īśanātyatāvagamāch cha iti | taṁśād abhyupagama-vāda-prauḍhi-vādādinā eva sāṅkhyasya vyāvahārikeśvara-pratishedha-paratayā brahma-mīmāṃsā-yogābhyaṁ saha na virodhaḥ | abhyupagama-vādaś cha śāstre drishṭaḥ | yathā *Vishnu-purāne* (i. 17, 54) | "Ete bhinna-drīśām daityāḥ vikalpāḥ kathitāḥ mayā | kritvā'bhyupagamaṁ tatra sankshepaḥ śrūyatām mama" | iti | astu vā pāpinām jnāna-pratibandhārtham āstika-darśaneshu apy amśataḥ śruti-viruddhārtha-vyavasthāpanām teshu teshv amśeshv apramāṇyaṁ cha | śruti-smṛity - aviruddheshu tu mukhya - vishayeshu pramāṇyam asty eva | ataḥ eva Padma-purāṇe brahma-yoga-darśanāti-riktānām darśanānām nindā 'py upapadyate | Yathā tatra Pārvatīm prati īśvara-vākyam | "śrinu devi pravakṣyāmī tāmasāni yathā-kramam | yeshām śravaṇā-mātrenā pātityām jnānīnām api | prathamaṁ hi mayaivoktaṁ S'āivism Pāśupatādikam | mach-chhaktiy-āveśītair vipraiḥ sam-proktāni tataḥ param | Kanādena tu samproktām śāstrām vaiśeshikam mahat | Gautamena tathā nyāyām sāṅkhyām tu Kapilena vai | dvijanām Jaiminīnām pūrvām vedamayārthaataḥ | nirīśvarena vādena kritam

*sāstram mahattaram | Dhishanena tathā proktam chārvākam ati-garhitam | daityānām nāśanārthāya Vishnunū Buddha-rūpinā | bauddha-sāstram asat proktam nagna-nīla-paṭādikam | māyā-vādam asach-chhāstram prachchhannam bauddham eva cha | mayaiva kathitam devi kalau brāhmaṇa-rūpiṇā | apārthaṁ śruti-vākyānām darśayat loka-garhitam | karma-svarūpa-tyājyatvam atra cha pratipādyate | sarva-karma-paribhram-śād naishkarmyam tatra chochyate | parātma-jīvayor aikyam mayā 'tra pratipādyate | brahmaṇo 'sya param rūpaṁ nirgunaṁ darśitam mayā | sarvasya jagato 'py asya nāśanārthaṁ kalau yuge | vedārthavad mahāsāstram māyā-vādam avaidikam | mayaiva kathitām devi jagatām nāśa-kāraṇād" iti | adhikām tu vrāhma-mīmāṁsa-bhāshye prapanchitam asmābhīr iti | tasmād āstika-sāstrasya na kasyāpy aprāmānyam virodho vā svava-vishayeshu sarveshām abādhāt avirodhāt cha iti | nanv evam purushabahutvāṁśe 'py asya sāstrasya abhyupagama-vādatvām syāt | na syāt | avirodhāt | brahma-mīmāṁsāyām apy "aṁśo nānā-vyapadeśād" ityādi-sūtra-jātair jīvātma-bahutvasyaiva nirṇayāt | sāṅkhya-siddha-purushānām ātmavām tu brahma-mīmāṁsayā bādhya te eva | "ātmā iti tu upayanti" iti tat-sūtrena paramātmanah eva paramārtha-bhūmāv ātmavādadhāranāt | tathāpi cha sāṅkhya-sya na aprāmānyam | vyāvahārikātmano jīvasya itara-viveka-jnānasya moksha-sādhanatve vivakshitārthe bādhābhāvāt | etena śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhayor nānātmaikātmatvayor vyāvahārika-pāramārthika-bhedenā avirodhāḥ |*

"Be it so: let there be here no discrepancy with the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika. But it will be said that the Sāṅkhya is really opposed to the Brahma-mīmāṁsa (the Vedānta) and the Yoga [of Patanjali]; since both of these systems assert an eternal Iśvara (God), while the Sāṅkhya denies such an Iśvara. And it must not be said (the same persons urge) that here also [as in the former case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika], owing to the distinction between practical [or conventional, or regulative] and essential truths, there may be no [real] contrariety between the theistic and the atheistic theories, inasmuch as the theistic theory may possibly have a view to devotion [and may therefore have nothing more than a practical end in view];—you are not, it will be said, to assert this, as there is nothing to lead to this conclusion [or, distinction]. For as Iśvara is difficult to be known, the atheistic theory also, which is founded on popular opinion, may, indeed, be adverted to for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity,

(just as it is [conventionally] asserted that soul has qualities); but neither the Veda, nor any other sāstra contains a distinct denial of an Īśvara, by which the merely practical [or conventional] character of the theistic theory could be shewn. [Consequently the theistic theory is not a mere conventional one, but true, and the contradiction between the atheistic Sāṅkhya and the theistic systems is real and irreconcilable].

"To this we reply: in this case also the distinction of practical and essential truths holds. For although the atheistic theory is censured by such texts as the following: 'They declare a world without an Īśvara to be false and baseless;' yet it was proper that in this system (the Sāṅkhya), the merely practical (or conventional) denial [of Īśvara] should be inculcated for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity, and so forth. Because the idea of the author of the Sāṅkhya was this, that if the existence of an eternal Īśvara were not denied, in conformity with the doctrine of the Laukāyatikas, men would be prevented by the contemplation of a perfect, eternal, and faultless godhead, and by fixing their hearts upon it, from studying to discriminate [between spirit and matter]. But no censure on the theistic theory is to be found in any work, whereby [the scope of] that system might be restricted, as having devotion, etc., in view as its only end. And as regards such texts as the following: 'There is no knowledge like the Sāṅkhya, no power like the Yoga; doubt not of this, the knowledge of the Sāṅkhya is considered to be the highest,' they [are to be understood as] proving the superiority of the Sāṅkhya doctrine over other systems, not in respect of its atheism, but only of its discrimination [between different principles]. It is, moreover, established by the concurrence of Parāśara, and all other well instructed persons, that the theistic theory is that which represents the essential truth. Further, such texts as the following of the Parāśara Upapurāṇa, and other works, shew that the strength of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā lies on the side of its theism, viz., 'In the systems of Akṣapāda (Gotama) and Kanāda, and in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga, that part which is opposed to the Veda should be rejected by all persons who regard the Veda as the sole authority. In the systems of Jaimini and Vyāsa (the Vedānta) there is no portion contrary to the Veda, since both these sages have attained to a perfect comprehension of its true meaning. In the same way it results from this text of the Moksha-dharma (a part of the

Sānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata), viz. : ‘ Many systems of reasoning have been promulgated by different authors; [in these] whatever is established on grounds of reason, of scripture and of approved custom, is to be respected; ’ [from this text also, I say, it results] that the theory,—declared in the Brahma-mīmānsā, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, etc., in consonance with the tradition of Parāśara and all other well-instructed men,—which asserts an Īśvara, is alone to be received, in consequence of its strength; and [the same thing follows] from the fact that in such passages as this of the Kaurma-purāna, etc., viz.—‘ Take refuge with that Maheśvara, that Brahma without beginning or end, whom the most eminent Yogins, and the Sāṅkhyas do not behold,’—Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu) and others assert that the Sāṅkhyas are ignorant of Īśvara.

“ Moreover, Īśvara is determined to be the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmānsā by the introductory statement, etc., of that system. If it were open to objection on that side [*i.e.* on the side of its principal subject], the entire system would be without authority. For it is a rule that ‘ the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.’ Whereas the principal subjects of the Sāṅkhya are—(1) the grand object of human pursuit, and (2) the distinction between nature (*prakṛiti*) and spirit (*puruṣa*), which is the instrument of attaining that grand object. Thus this system does not lose its authority, even though it be erroneous in so far as it denies an Īśvara. For it is a rule that ‘ the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.’ Hence, as the Sāṅkhya has a certain applicability of its own, it is weak only in so far as it denies an Īśvara.

“ Nor can it be alleged that it is Īśvara only, and not the eternity of his existence, that is the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmānsā; since, through the disproof of the objection (*pūrvapakṣha*) that the theistic theory ‘ is chargeable with the defect of rendering the Smṛiti inapplicable,’<sup>170</sup> it is ascertained that the assertion of an eternal Īśvara is the main object of the Brahma-mīmānsā. But as the word ‘ Brahma’ is properly employed to denote the supreme Brahma, the first aphorism of the Brahma-mīmānsā does not run thus, ‘ Now follows the enquiry regarding the supreme Brahma; ’ [but thus, ‘ Now follows the

<sup>170</sup> The aphorism here referred to (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1), with most of Śankara’s comment on it, has been already quoted above, pp. 185 ff.

enquiry regarding Brahma.’] Hence we are not to surmise that, as they [would otherwise] contradict the Sāṅkhya, the Brahma-mīmānsā and Yoga systems must aim at establishing [not an eternal Deity] but a [secondary] Īśvara, who is merely an effect. For this is disproved (1) by the series of Brahma Sūtras (ii. 2, 1 ff.) which affirm that ‘an unintelligent cause of the world cannot be inferred, as it is not conceivable that such a cause should frame anything,’ and which would be rendered inconclusive by the assumption of the independent action of Prakṛiti; and (2) by the fact that the eternity of God is clearly understood from the Yoga aphorism [i. 26], viz. ‘He is also the instructor of the ancients, as he is not circumscribed by time,’ as well as from the commentary of Vyāsa thereon.<sup>171</sup> Hence, as the Sāṅkhya, arguing on its own special principles, and at the same time making a great display of ingenuity<sup>172</sup> and so forth, has in view a merely practical denial of an Īśvara, it does not contradict the Brahma-mīmānsā or the Yoga. The method of reasoning on special principles is referred to in the Sāstra. Thus it is said in the Vishṇu Purāṇa [i. 17, 54, Wilson, vol. ii. p. 44], ‘These notions, Daityas, which I have described, are the guesses of persons who look on the Deity as distinct from themselves. Accepting them as partially correct, hear from me a summary (of transcendental truth).

‘Or let it be [supposed] that even orthodox systems, with the view of preventing sinners from attaining knowledge, lay down doctrines which are partially opposed to the Veda; and that in those particular portions they are not authoritative. Still in their principal contents,

<sup>171</sup> I quote the commentary of Bhoja-rājā on this Sūtra, as given by Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Yoga, part first, p. 32): *Pūrvēkham | ādyānām Brahmadinām api sa gurur upadeśṭā yataḥ sa kālena nāvachchhidye anādītvāt | teshām punar ādi-mattvād asti kālena avacchhedāḥ |* “Of the ancients, that is, of the earliest [beings], Brahmā and the rest, he is the *guru*, i.e., the instructor, because He, as having no beginning, is not circumscribed by time; while they, on the other hand, having had a beginning, are circumscribed by time.”

<sup>172</sup> I am indebted to Professor Cowell for a satisfactory interpretation of the first of these two phrases, *abhyupagama-vāda* and *praudhi-vāda*, as well as for various other improvements in my translation of this passage. The phrase *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne “Implied dogma” (Nyāya aphorisms, i. 31, p. 30, as corrected in MS.). Professor Goldstücker s.v. renders it by “implied axiom.” In Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon the phrase *abhyupagama-vāda* is rendered “a discussion in a conciliatory spirit.” In regard to the sense of *praudhi-vāda* see above, p. 172.

which are consonant to the Sruti and the Smṛiti, they possess authority. Accordingly, in the Padma Purāna we find a censure passed even upon the several philosophical systems (*Darśanas*), with the exception of the Brahma (the Vedānta) and the Yoga. For in that work Īśvara (Mahādeva) says to Pārvatī, 'Listen, goddess, while I declare to you the Tāmasa works (the works characterised by *tamas*, or the quality of darkness) in order; works by the mere hearing of which even wise men become fallen. First of all, the Saiva systems, called Pāśupata, etc., were delivered by myself. Then the following were uttered by Brāhmans penetrated by my power, viz. the great Vaiśeṣika system by Kanāda, and the Nyāya, and Sāṅkhya, by Gotama and Kapila respectively. Then the great system, the Pūrva-[mīmāṃsā], was composed by the Brāhman Jaimini on Vedic subjects, but on atheistic principles. So too the abominable Chārvāka doctrine was declared by Dhishana,<sup>173</sup> while Viṣṇu, in the form of Buddha, with a view to the destruction of the Daityas,<sup>174</sup> promulgated the false system of the Baudhāyas, who go about naked, or wear blue garments. I myself, goddess, assuming the form of a Brāhman, uttered in the Kali age, the false doctrine of Māyā [illusion, the more modern form of the Vedānta], which is covert Buddhism, which imputes a perverted and generally censured signification to the words of the Veda, and inculcates the abandonment of ceremonial works, and an inactivity consequent on such cessation. In that system I propound the identity of the supreme and the embodied soul, and show that the highest form of this Brahma is that in which he is devoid of the [three] qualities. It was I myself, goddess, by whom this great sāstra, which, composed of Vedic materials and inculcating the theory of illusion, is yet un-Vedic, was declared in the Kali age for the destruction of this entire universe.' We have entered into fuller explanations on this subject in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya. There is, therefore, no want of authority, nor any contradiction, in any orthodox system, for they are all incapable of refutation in their own especial subjects, and are not mutually discrepant. Does, then, this system (the Sāṅkhya) lay down a theory based only on its own assumptions in respect of the multitude of souls also? It does not. For in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā also it is determined by such a kind of texts

<sup>173</sup> A name of Viśvhaspati, according to Wilson's dictionary.

<sup>174</sup> See Wilson's Viṣṇu Purāna, pp. 334 ff.

as the following (*Brahma Sūtras*, ii. 3, 43), viz. ‘the embodied spirit is a portion<sup>175</sup> of the supreme soul, from the variety of appellations,’ that there is a multitude of embodied spirits. But it is denied by the *Brahmamīmānsā* that the spirits (*puruṣha*) asserted by the *Sāṅkhya* have the character of Soul; for it is determined by the *Brahma Sūtra* (iv. 1, 3), ‘they approach Him as one with themselves,’<sup>176</sup> that, on the ground of transcendental truth, the supreme Soul alone has the character of Soul. But, nevertheless, the *Sāṅkhya* is not unauthoritative; for as the knowledge of its own distinctness from other things, obtained by the embodied spirit in its worldly condition, is instrumental to final liberation, this system is not erroneous in the particular subject matter which it aims at propounding. In this way it results from the distinction of practical and real, that there is no contradiction between the two theories (made known by the *Śruti* and *Smṛiti*), of a multitude of souls, and the unity of all soul.

The view taken by *Madhusūdana*, as quoted above, and partially confirmed by *Vijnāna Bhikshu*, of the ultimate coincidence in principle of all the different schools of Hindu philosophy, however mutually hostile in appearance, seems, as I have remarked, to be that which is commonly entertained by modern Pandits. (See Dr. Ballantyne’s Synopsis of Science, advertisement, p. iv.) This system of compromise, however, is clearly a deviation from the older doctrine; and it practically abolishes the distinction in point of authority between the *Vedas* and the *Smṛitis*, *Darśanas*, etc. For if the *Munis*, authors of the six *Darśanas*, were omniscient and infallible, they must stand on the same level with the *Vedas*, which can be nothing more.

I return, however, from this digression regarding the hostility of *Sāṅkara* to the adherents of the *Sāṅkhya* and other rationalistic schools,

<sup>175</sup> On this, however, *Sāṅkara* (*in loco*) remarks as follows: *Jīvah Īśvarasya aṁśo bhavitum arhati yathā gneḥ visphulingah | aṁśah iva aṁśah | na hi niravayavasya mu-khyo 'mśah sambhavati | kasmāt punar niravayavatvāt sa eva na bhavati | “nānā-vyapadesūt |* “The embodied soul must be ‘a portion’ of Īśvara, as a spark is of fire (and not merely dependent upon him as a servant on his master). ‘A portion’ means, ‘as it were a portion;’ for nothing can be, in the proper sense, ‘a portion’ of that which has no parts. Why, then, as Īśvara has no parts, is not the embodied soul the very same as he? ‘From the variety of appellations,’ etc., etc.”

<sup>176</sup> The original *Sūtra* runs thus: *Ātmā iti tu upagachchhanti grāhayanti cha |* “They approach Him as one with themselves, and [certain texts] cause them to receive Him as one with themselves.” This refers to certain texts which *Sāṅkara* adduces from one of the *Upanishads*, apparently.

and the opinions of later authors concerning the founders of those several systems. The distinction drawn by the Indian commentators quoted in this section between the superhuman Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the other Smṛitis, is not borne out by the texts which I have cited above (pp. 8, 31) from the Brīhadāranyaka (= Satapatha Brāhmaṇa), and Mundaka Upanishads. By classing together the Vedic Sanhitās, and the other works enumerated in the same passages, the authors of both the Upanishads seem to place them all upon an equal footing; and the former of the two authorities speaks of them all as having proceeded from the breathing of the Great Being. If the one set of works are superhuman, it may fairly be argued that the others are so likewise. According to the Mundaka Upanishad, neither of them (if we except only the Vedāntas or Upanishads) can be placed in the highest rank, as they equally inculcate a science which is only of secondary importance.

As, however, Sankara (who, no doubt, perceived that it would be inconsistent with modern theories to admit that any of the works usually classed under the head of Smṛiti had been really breathed forth by the Creator, and that such a directly divine origin could, on orthodox principles, be assigned only to writings coming under the designation of Sruti), maintains in his comment on the text of the Brīhadāranyaka Upanishad that the whole of the works there enumerated, excepting the Sanhitās of the four Vedas, are in reality portions of the Brāhmaṇas, it will be necessary to quote his remarks, which are as follows (Bibl. Ind. ii. 855 ff.):

... Niśvasitam iva niśvasitam | yathā aprayatnenaiva purusha-niśvāso bhavaty evaṁ vā | are kiṁ tad niśvasitam tato jātam ity uchyate | Yad rigvedo yajurvedah sāmavedo 'tharvāngirasaḥ chaturvidham mantra-jātam | itihāsaḥ ity Ūrvaśi-Purūravasor saṁvādādir “Ūrvaśi ha apsarāḥ” ityādi-brāhmaṇam eva | purāṇam “asad vā idam agre āśid” ityādi | vidyā devajana-vidyā “vedaḥ so 'yam” ityādiḥ | upanishadaḥ “priyam ity etad upāsita” ityādyāḥ | ślokāḥ “brāhmaṇa-prabhavāḥ mantrās tad ete ślokāḥ” ity ādayaḥ | sūtrāṇi vastu-sangraha-vākyāni vede yatha “ātmā ity eva upāsita” ityādīni | anuvyākhyānāni mantra-vivaranāni | vyākhyānāni arthavādāḥ | . . . evam ashtavidham brāhmaṇam | evam mantra-brāhmaṇayor eva grahanam | niyata-rachanāvato vidyamānasasyaiva vedasya abhiyaktiḥ purusha-niśvāsa-vat | na cha purusha-buddhi-prayatna-pur-

*vakah | ataḥ pramāṇam nirapekshah eva svārthe | . . . . tena vedasya  
aprāmānyam āśankate | tad-āśankā-nivṛitti-artham idam uktam | puru-  
sha-niśvāsa-vad aprayatnotthitavāt pramāṇam vedo na yathā 'nyo gran-  
thah iti |*

“‘His breathing’ means, ‘as it were, his breathing,’ or it denotes the absence of effort, as in the case of a man’s breathing. We are now told what that breathing was which was produced from him. It was the four classes of mantras (hymns), those of the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvāngirases (Ātharvaṇa); Itihāsa (or narrative), such as the dialogue between Urvaśi and Purūravas, viz. the passage in the Brāhmaṇa beginning ‘Urvaśi the Apsaras,’ etc. [S. R. Br. p. 855]; Purāṇa, such as, ‘This was originally non-existent,’ etc.; Vidyā (knowledge), the knowledge of the gods, as, ‘This is the Veda,’ etc.; Upanishads, such as, ‘Let him reverence this, as beloved,’ etc.; Ślokas, such as those here mentioned, ‘The mantras are the sources of the Brāhmaṇas, on which subject there are these ślokas,’ etc.; Sūtras (aphorisms) occurring in the Veda which condense the substance of doctrines, as, ‘Let him adore this as Soul,’ etc.; Anuvyākhyānas, or interpretations of the mantras; Vyakhyānas, or illustrative remarks.” The commentator adds alternative explanations of the two last terms, and then proceeds: “Here, therefore, eight sorts of texts occurring in the Brāhmaṇas are referred to; and consequently the passage before us embraces merely mantras and Brāhmaṇas. The manifestation of the Veda, which already existed in a fixed form of composition, is compared to the breathing of a person. The Veda was not the result of an effort of the intelligence of any person.<sup>177</sup> Consequently, as proof in respect of its own contents, it is independent of everything else.”

Sankara terminates his remarks on this passage by intimating, as one supposition, that the author of the Upanishad means, in the words

<sup>177</sup> Compare S’ankara’s Comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 3, as quoted above in p. 106, where this same text of the Brīh. Ar. Up. is referred to. As the fact of Brahma being the author of the Vedas is there adduced to prove the transcendent character of his knowledge, and of his power, we must, apparently (unless we are to charge the great commentator with laying down inconsistent doctrines in the two passages), suppose that in the text before us he does not mean to deny that Brahma was conscious of the procession of the Vedas, etc., from himself, and cognizant of their sense (as the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms and his commentator seem to have understood, see above p. 135), but merely that his consciousness and cognizance were not the result of any effort on his part.

on which he comments, to remove a doubt regarding the authority of the Veda, arising from some words which had preceded, and therefore affirms that "the Veda is authoritative, because it was produced without any effort of will, like a man's breathing, and not in the same manner as other books." (See Sāṅkhya Sūtras, v. 50; above, p. 135.)

This attempt to explain the whole of the eight classes of works enumerated in the Upanishad as nothing else than parts of the Brāhmaṇas, cannot be regarded as altogether satisfactory, since some of them, such as the Sūtras, have always been referred to a distinct class of writings, which are regarded as uninspired (see Müller's Anc. Ind. Lit. pp. 75, 86); and the Itihāses and Purāṇas had in all probability become a distinct class of writings at the period when the Upanishad was composed. And Sankara's explanation is rendered more improbable if we compare with this passage the other from the Mundaka Upanishad, i. 1, 5, already quoted above (p. 31), where it is said, "The inferior science consists of the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan Vedas, accentuation (*sikshā*), ritual prescriptions (*kalpa*), grammar, commentary (*nirukta*), prosody (*chhandas*), and astronomy."<sup>178</sup> Here various appendages of the Vedas, which later writers expressly distinguish from the Vedas themselves, and distinctly declare to have no superhuman authority, are yet mentioned in the same category with the four Sanhitās, or collections of the hymns, as constituting the inferior science (in opposition to the knowledge of the supreme Spirit). From this we may reasonably infer that the author of the Brīhad Āranyaka Upanishad also, when he specifies the Sūtras and some of the other works

<sup>178</sup> I take the opportunity of introducing here Sāyana's remarks on this passage in his Commentary on the Rig-veda, vol. i., p. 33: *Atigambhīrasya vedasya artham avabodhayitum sīkshādīni shad-angāni pravrittāni | ata eva teshām apara-vidyā-rūpatvam Mundakopanishady Ātharvaṇikāḥ ūmananti | "dve vidye" ityādi | . . . . sādhana-bhūta-dharma-jnāna-hetutvāt shad-anga-sahitānām karma-kāndānām apara-vidyātvam | parama-purushārtha-bhūta-brahma-jnāna-hetutvād upanishadām para-vidyātvam |* "The Sīkshā and other five appendages are intended to promote the comprehension of the sense of the very deep Veda. Hence, in the Mundaka Upanishad, the followers of the Atharva-veda declare that these works belong to the class of inferior sciences, thus: 'There are two sciences,' etc. [see the entire passage in p. 31.] Since the sections of the Veda which relate to ceremonics [including, of course, the hymns], as well as the six appendages, lead to a knowledge of duty, which is an instrument [of something further], they are ranked as an inferior science. On the other hand the Upanishads, which conduct to a knowledge of Brahma, the supreme object of man, constitute the highest science."

which he enumerates, intended to speak of the Vedāngas or appendages of the Vedas, and perhaps the Smṛitis also, as being the breathing of Brahma. The works which in the passage from the Mundaka are called Kalpa, are also commonly designated as the Kalpa Sūtras.

This conclusion is in some degree confirmed by referring to the passage from the Mahābhārata, Sānti-parvan, 7,660, which has been cited in p. 105, where it is said that the "great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained by devotion the Vedas, and the Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding Yuga." Whatever may be the sense of the word Itihāsa in a Vedic work, there can be no doubt that in the Mahābhārata, which is itself an Itihāsa, the word refers to that class of metrical historics. And in this text we see these Itihāsas placed on a footing of equality with the Vedas, and regarded as having been, like them, pre-existent and supernatural. See also the passage from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1 ff. (Bibl. Ind., vol. iii. pp. 473 ff.), quoted above (p. 33), where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are spoken of as "the fifth Veda of the Vedas." The same title of "fifth Veda" is applied to them in the Bhāg. Pur. iii. 12, 39 : *Itihāsa-purāṇāni panchamāñ vedam Īśvaraḥ | sarvebhyah eva mukhebhyah sasrije sarva-darśanah |* "The omniscient Īśvara (God) created from all his mouths the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as a fifth Veda." See also the passages quoted above in pp. 27–30, from the Purāṇas and Mahābhārata, where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas themselves are placed on an equality with, if not in a higher rank, than the Vedas. The claims put forward by these popular works on their own behalf are not, indeed, recognized as valid by more critical and scientific authors, who, as we have seen at the beginning of this section, draw a distinct line of demarcation between the Vedas and all other works; but it would appear from the passages I have quoted from the Upanishads that at one time the Vedas were, at least, not so strictly discriminated from the other Sāstras as they afterwards were.

**SECT. XII.—Recapitulation of the Arguments urged in the Darśanas, and by Commentators, in support of the Authority of the Vedas, with some remarks on these reasonings.**

As in the preceding sections I have entered at some length into the arguments urged by the authors of the philosophical systems and their

commentators, in proof of the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas, it may be convenient to recapitulate the most important points in these reasonings; and I shall then add such observations as the consideration of them may suggest.

The grounds on which the apologists of the Vedas rest their authority are briefly these: First, it is urged that, like the sun, they shine by their own light, and evince an inherent power both of revealing their own perfection, and of elucidating all other things, past and future, great and small, near and remote (*Sāyana*, as quoted above, p. 62; *Sankara* on *Brahma Sūtras* i. 1, 3, above, p. 190). This is the view taken by the author of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* also, who, however, expressly denies that the Vedas originated from the conscious effort of any divine being (see p. 135). Second, it is asserted that the Veda could have had no (human) personal author, as no such composer is recollected (*Mādhaba*, above, pp. 83 ff), and cannot therefore be suspected of any such imperfection as would arise from the fallibility of such an author (pp. 69 f.; *Sāyana* p. 106). Third, the *Pūrva-mīmānsā* adds to this that the words of which the Vedas are composed are eternal, and have an eternal connection (not an arbitrary relation depending upon the human will) with their meanings, and that therefore the Vedas are eternal, and consequently perfect and infallible<sup>170</sup> (*Mīmānsā Sūtras* and *Commentary*, above, pp. 71 ff., and *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, above, pp. 91 f.) Fourth, the preceding view is either explained or modified by the commentator on the *Taittiriya Saṅhitā* (above, p. 69), as well as by *Sāyana* in his *Introduction to the Rig-veda* (above, p. 106), who say that, like time, aether, etc., the Veda is only eternal in a qualified sense, i.e. during the continuance of the existing mundane system; and that in reality it sprang from *Brahmā* at the beginning of the creation. But this origin cannot according to their view affect the perfection of the Veda, which in consequence of the faultlessness of its author possesses a self-demonstrating authority. Fifth, although the *Vedānta*, too, speaks of the eternity of the Veda (above, p. 105), it also in the same passage makes mention of its self-dependent author; while in another passage (p. 106) it distinctly ascribes the origin of the Indian Scripture to *Brahmā* as its source or

<sup>170</sup> In the *Bṛihad Aranyaka Upanishad* (p. 688 of Dr. Röer's ed.) it is said: *Vā-*  
*chaiva samgād Brahma jnāyate vāg vai samrāt paramam Brahma* | "By speech, o  
*mānushoh*, *Brahmā* is known. Speech is the supreme *Brahmā*."

cause. Brahma here must be taken as neuter, denoting the supreme Spirit, and not masculine, designating the personal creator, as under the fourth head.<sup>180</sup> Sixth, according to the *Naiyāyika* doctrine the authority of the *Veda* is established by the fact of its having emanated from competent persons who had an intuitive perception of duty, and whose competence is proved by their injunctions being attended with the desired results in all cases which come within the cognizance of our senses and experience (*Nyāya Sūtras*, above, pp. 116). Seventh, agreeably to the *Vaiśeshika* doctrine, and that of the *Kusumānjali*, the infallibility of the *Veda* results from the omniscience of its author, who is God (*Vaiśeshika Sūtras*, *Tarka Sangraha*, and *Kusumānjali*, pp. 119 ff., 127, and 129 ff., above).

These arguments, as the reader who has studied all their details will have noticed, are sometimes in direct opposition to each other in their leading principles; and they are not likely to seem convincing to any persons but the adherents of the schools from which they have severally emanated. The European student (unless he has some ulterior practical object in view) can only look upon these opinions as matters of historical interest, as illustrations of the course of religious thought among a highly acute and speculative people. But they may be expected to possess a greater importance in the eyes of any Indian readers into whose hands this book may fall; and as such readers may desire to learn in what light these arguments are regarded by Western scholars, I shall offer a few remarks on the subject.

In regard to the first ground in support of the infallibility of the *Veda*, viz. the evidence which radiates from itself, or its internal evidence, I may observe first, that this is a species of proof which can only be estimated by those who have made the Indian Scripture the object of careful study; and, second, that it must be judged by the reason and conscience of each individual student. This evidence may appear conclusive to men in a certain stage of their national and personal culture, and especially to those who have been accustomed from their infancy to regard the *Vedas* with a hereditary veneration; whilst to persons in a different state of mental progress, and living under different influences, it will appear perfectly futile. It is quite clear that, even in India itself, there existed in former ages multitudes of learned

<sup>180</sup> See note in p. 205, above.

and virtuous men who were unable to see the force of this argument, and who consequently rejected the authority of the Vedas. I allude of course to Buddha and his followers. And we have even found that some of those writers who are admitted to have been orthodox, such as the authors of the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gītā, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, while they attach the highest value to the divine knowledge conveyed by the latest portions of the Veda, deprecate, if they do not actually despise, the hymns and the ceremonial worship connected with them.

In regard to the second argument, viz. that the Vedas must be of supernatural origin, and infallible authority, as they are not known to have had any human author, I observe as follows. The Greek historian, Herodotus, remarks (ii. 23) of a geographer of his own day who explained the annual inundations of the river Nile by supposing its stream to be derived from an imaginary ocean flowing round the earth, which no one had ever seen, that his opinion did not admit of confutation, because he carried the discussion back into the region of the unapparent (*ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνενείκας οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον*). The same might be said of the Indian speculators, who argue that the Veda must have had a supernatural origin, because it was never observed to have had a human author like other books;—that by thus removing the negative grounds on which they rest their case into the unknown depths of antiquity, they do their utmost to place themselves beyond the reach of direct refutation. But it is to be observed (1) that, even if it were to be admitted that no human authors of the Vedas were remembered in later ages, this would prove nothing more than their antiquity, and that it would still be incumbent on their apologists to show that this circumstance necessarily involved their supernatural character; and (2) that, in point of fact, Indian tradition does point to certain rishis or bards as the authors of the Vedic hymns. It is true, indeed, as has been already noticed (p. 85), that these rishis are said to have only “seen” the hymns, which (it is alleged) were eternally pre-existent, and that they were not their authors. But as tradition declares that the hymns were uttered by such and such rishis, how is it proved that the rishis to whom they are ascribed, or those, whoever they were, from whom they actually proceeded, were not uttering the mere productions of their own minds? The whole character of these compositions, and the circumstances under which, from internal evi-

dence, they appear to have arisen, are in harmony with the supposition that they were nothing more than the natural expression of the personal hopes and feelings of those ancient bards by whom they were first recited. In these songs the Aryan sages celebrated the praises of their ancestral gods (while at the same time they sought to conciliate their goodwill by a variety of oblations supposed to be acceptable to them), and besought of them all the blessings which men in general desire—health, wealth, long life, cattle, offspring, victory over their enemies, forgiveness of sin, and in some cases also celestial felicity.

The scope of these hymns is well summed up in the passage which I have already quoted (from Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays* i. 26) in the Second Volume, p. 206: *Arthepsavah rishayo devatās chhandobhir abhyādhāvan* | “The rishis desiring [various] objects, hastened to the gods with metrical prayers.” The *Nirukta*, vii. 1, quoted in the same place, says: *Yat-kāmaḥ rishir yasyām devatāyām arthatpatyam iehhan stutim prayunkte tad-devataḥ sa mantro bhavati* | “Each particular hymn has for its deity the god to whom the rishi, seeking to obtain any object of desire which he longs for, addresses his prayer.” And in the sequel of the same passage from the *Nirukta* (vii. 3), the fact that the hymns express the different feelings or objects of the rishis is distinctly recognized:

*Paroksha-kritāḥ pratyaksha-kritāś cha mantrāḥ bhūyishṭhāḥ alpaśāḥ ādhyātmikāḥ* | *athāpi stutir eva bhavati na āśīrvādāḥ* “*Indrasya nu vīryāṇi pravocham*” iti *yathā etasmin sūkte* | *athāpi āśīr eva na stutih* “*suchakshāḥ aham akshibhyām bhūyāsaṁ suvarchāḥ mukhena suśrut karṇābhyaṁ bhūyāsaṁ*” iti | *tad etad bahulam ādhvaryave yajñeshu cha mantreshu* | *athāpi śapathābhishāpau* | “*adya muriya*” ityādi . . . *athāpi kasyachid bhāvasya āchikhyāsa* | “*na mrityur āśid*” ityādi . . . | *athāpi paridevanā kasmāchchid bhāvāt* | “*sudevo adya prapated anāvrid*” ityādi | *athāpi nindā-praśāmse* | “*kevalāgho bhavati kevalādī*” ityādi | *evam akha-sūkte dyūta-nindā cha kṛishi-prasāmsū cha* | *evam uchchāvachair abhiprāyair rishinām mantra-driṣṭayo bhavanti* |

“[Of the four kinds of verses specified in the preceding section], (a) those which address a god as absent, (b) those which address him as present, and (c) those which address the worshippers as present and the god as absent, are the most numerous, while those (d) which refer to the speaker himself are rare. It happens also that a god is

praised without any blessing being invoked, as in the hymn (R.V.i. 32). ‘I declare the heroic deeds of Indra,’ etc. Again, blessings are invoked without any praise being offered, as in the words, ‘May I see well with my eyes, be resplendent in my face, and hear well with my ears.’ This frequently occurs in the Ādhvaryava (Yajur) Veda, and in the sacrificial formulæ. Then again we find oaths and curses, as in the words (R.V. vii. 104, 15), ‘May I die to-day, if I am a Yātudhāna,’ etc. (See Vol. I. p. 327.) Further, we observe the desire to describe some particular state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 129, 2), ‘Death was not then, nor immortality,’ etc. Then there is lamentation, arising out of a certain state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 95, 14), ‘The beautiful god will disappear and never return,’ etc. Again, we have blame and praise, as in the words (R.V. x. 117, 6), ‘The man who eats alone, sins alone,’ etc. So, too, in the hymn to dice (R.V. x. 34, 13) there is a censure upon dice, and a commendation of agriculture. Thus the objects for which the hymns were seen by the rishis were very various.”<sup>181</sup>

It is to be observed, however, that although in this passage the author, Yāska, speaks of the various desires which the rishis expressed in different hymns, he nevertheless adheres to the idea which was recognized in his age, and in which he doubtless participated, that the rishis “saw” the hymns.

In the Nirukta, x. 42, the form of the metre in particular hymns is ascribed to the peculiar genius of the rishi Paruchhepa :<sup>182</sup> *Abhyūse*

<sup>181</sup> In Nirukta, iv. 6, allusion is made to a rishi Trita perceiving a particular hymn when he had been thrown into a well (*Tritām kūpe 'vahitam etat sūktam prati babbau*).

<sup>182</sup> A Paruchhepa is mentioned in the Taittīriya Sanhitā, ii. 5. 8, 3, as follows: *Nrīmedhas oha Paruohhepaś cha brahmavādīyam avadetām “asmin dārāv ārdre 'gnīm janayāva yatalo nau brahmīyān” iti | Nrīmedho 'bhyavadat sa dhūmam ajanayat | Paruchhepo 'bhyavadat so 'gnim ajanayat | “rishi” ity abravīd “yat samāvadvidva kathā tvam agnim ajījano nāham” iti | “sāmidhenīnām eva ahaṁ varṇām veda” ity abravīt | “yad ghrītavat padam anūchyate sa āsām varṇas ‘tām tvā samidbhīr An-girāḥ’ ity āha sāmidhenīsho eva taj jyotiḥ janayati” | “Nrīmedha and Paruchhepa had a discussion concerning sacred knowledge. They said, ‘Let us kindle fire<sup>1</sup> in this moist wood, in order to see which of us has most sacred knowledge.’<sup>2</sup> Nrīmedha pronounced (a text); but produced only smoke. Paruchhepa pronounced (a text) and generated fire. Nrīmedha said, ‘Rishi, since our knowledge is equal, how is it that thou hast generated fire, while I have not?’ Paruchhepa replied, ‘I know the lustre*

<sup>1</sup> “Without friction.”—Comm.

<sup>2</sup> “In regard to the Sāmidhenī formulas.”—Comm.

*bhūyāṁsam artham manyante yathā “aho darśanīya aho darśanīya” iti | tat Paruchchhepasya śilam |* “Men consider that by repetition the sense is intensified, as in the words ‘o beautiful, o beautiful.’ This is Paruchhepa’s habit.”

In Nirukta, iii. 11, the rishi Kutsa is mentioned as being thus described by the interpreter Aupamanyava : *Rishiḥ Kutso bhavati karttā stomaṇām ity Aupamanyavaḥ |* “‘Kutsa is the name of a rishi, a maker of hymns,’ according to Aupamanyava.”

So too the same work, x. 32, says of the rishi Hiranyakastūpa that “he declared this hymn” (*Hiranyakastūpah rishir idaṁ sūktam provācha*).

I do not, as I have already intimated, adduce these passages of the Nirukta to show that the author regarded the hymns as the ordinary productions of the rishis’ own minds, for this would be at variance with the expression “seeing,” which he applies to the mental act by which they were produced. It appears also from the terms in which he speaks of the rishis in the passage (Nirukta, i. 20) quoted above, p. 120, where they are described as having an intuitive insight into duty, that he placed them on a far higher level than the inferior men of later ages. But it is clear from the instances I have adduced that Yāska recognizes the hymns as being applicable to the particular circumstances in which the rishis were placed, and as being the bonâ fide expression of their individual emotions and desires. (See also the passages from the Nirukta, ii. 10 and 24, quoted in Vol. I. pp. 269 and 338, which establish the same point.) But if this be true, the supposition that these hymns, *i.e.* hymns specifically suited to express the various feelings and wishes of all the different rishis, were eternally pre-existent, and were perceived by them at the precise conjunctures when they were required to give utterance to their several aims, is perfectly gratuitous and unnecessary. It might be asserted with nearly the same shew of reason that the entire stock of ordinary language employed by human beings to express their ideas had existed from eternity.<sup>188</sup>

of the Sāmidhenis. The sentence which contains the word ghrita (butter) forms their lustre. When any one repeats the words, “We augment thee, o Angiras (Agni) with fuel and with butter,” he then generates that lustre in the Sāmidhenis.”

<sup>188</sup> A difficulty of the same nature as that here urged, viz. that men and objects which existed in time are mentioned in the Vedas which are yet said to be eternal, was felt by Jaimini, as we have already seen (pp. 77 ff.). I recur to this subject in p. 215.

In regard to the third argument for the authority of the Vedas, viz. that they are eternal, because the words of which they are composed are eternal, and because these words have an inherent and eternal (and not a merely conventional) connection with the significations or objects, or the species of objects, which they represent, it is to be observed that it is rejected both by the Nyāya and Sāṅkhya schools.<sup>184</sup> And I am unable (if I rightly comprehend this orthodox reasoning) to see how it proves the authority of the Veda more than that of any other book. If the words of the Veda are eternal, so must those of the Bauddha books be eternal, and consequently, if eternal pre-existence is a proof of perfection, the infallibility of these heretical works must be as much proved by this argument as the divine origin of the Vedas, whose pretensions they reject and oppose. Or if the meaning is that the words of the Veda alone are eternal and infallible, this is an assumption which requires proof. If their reception by great rishis be alleged as evidence, it must be remarked that the authority of these rishis is itself a point which cannot be admitted until it has been established.

In regard to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh of the arguments above stated, as put forward by the representatives of different schools or opinions in favour of the authority of the Veda, it may suffice to say that they for the most part assume the point to be proved, viz. that the Veda did proceed from an omniscient, or at least a competent, author. The only exception to this remark is to be found in the reasoning of the Nyāya and Sāṅkhya aphorisms that the infallibility of the Vedas is shown by the fact that the employment of the formulas or prescriptions of those parts of them which deal with temporal results, such as can be tested by experience, is always found to be efficacious; a premiss from which the conclusion is drawn that those other parts of the Veda, which relate to the unseen world, must be equally authoritative, as the authors of these different parts are the same persons. This argument cannot appear convincing to any but those who admit first, the invariable efficacy of all the formulas and prescriptions

See, however, the comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30, regarding the perpetual recurrence of the same things in successive creations from, and to, all eternity, which will be quoted in the Appendix.

<sup>184</sup> See Dr. Ballantyne's remarks on this controversy, in pp. 186, 189, 191, and 192 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy."

of the Veda which relate to such matters as can be tested by experience, and secondly, the identity of the authors of the parts of the Veda which contain these formulas and prescriptions with the authors of the other parts. It would be impossible to prove the former point, and next to impossible to prove the latter.

Against the eternity of the Vedas an objection has been raised, which Jaimini considers it necessary to notice, viz. that various historical personages are named in their pages, and that as these works could not have existed before the persons whose doings they record, they must have commenced to exist in time. This difficulty Jaimini attempts, as we have seen above (pp. 77 ff.), to meet by explaining away the names of the historical personages in question. Thus Babara Prāvahinī is said to be nothing else than an appellation of the wind, which is eternal. And this method, it is said, is to be applied in all similar cases. Another of the passages mentioned by an objector (see above, p. 79) as referring to non-eternal objects is R.V. iii. 53, 14, "What are the cows doing for thee among the Kīkaṭas?" etc. The author of the Mīmānsū Sūtras would no doubt have attempted to show that by these Kīkaṭas we are to understand some eternally pre-existing beings. But Yāska, the author of the Nirukta, who had not been instructed in any such subtleties, speaks of the Kīkaṭas as a non-Āryan nation. (Vol. I. p. 342, and Vol. II. p. 362.) It is difficult to suppose that Jaimini—unless he was an enthusiast, and not the cool and acute reasoner he has commonly proved himself to be—could have seriously imagined that his rule of interpretation could ever be generally received or carried out.<sup>185</sup> The Brāhmaṇas evidently intend to represent the numerous occurrences which they narrate, as having actually taken place in time, and the actors in them as having been real historical personages. See, for instance, the legends from the Satapatha and Aitareya Brāhmaṇas, the Taittarīya Sanhitā, etc., quoted in the First

<sup>185</sup> In Sūyana's Introduction to R.V. vol. i. p. 23, it is said : *Manushya-vrittānta-pratipādakā rīcho nārāśāṁṣyāḥ* | "The Nārāśāṁṣis are verses which set forth the histories of men." Yāska's definition is the same in substance, Nir. ix. 9. If these Nārāśāṁṣis are, as Sūyana says, verses of the hymns (*rīhat*), and if according to his definition their object is to record events in human history, it follows that they must refer to non-eternal objects. See also the explanation of the words *nārāśāṁṣena stomena* in Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, 3, 53, given by the Commentator Mahidhara, which will be quoted further on.

Volume of this work, pp. 182, 192, 194, 328, 355, etc. And it is impossible to peruse the Vedic hymns without coming to the conclusion that they also record a multitude of events, which the writers believed to have been transacted by men on earth in former ages. (See the passages quoted from the Rig-veda in the First and Second Volumes of this work, *passim*; those, for example, in Vol. I. pp. 162 ff., 318 ff., 339 ff., and Vol. II. p. 208.)

We shall, no doubt, be assisted in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the real origin and character of the hymns of the Veda, if we enquire what opinion the rishis, by whom they were confessedly spoken, entertained of their own utterances; and this I propose to investigate in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

I HAVE already shewn, in the preceding pages, as well as in the Second Volume of this work, that the hymns of the Rig-veda themselves supply us with numerous data by which we can judge of the circumstances to which they owed their origin, and of the manner in which they were created. We have seen that they were the natural product and expression of the particular state of society, of the peculiar religious conceptions, and of all those other influences, physical and moral, which prevailed at the period when they were composed, and acted upon the minds of their authors. (Vol. I. pp. 161 f., Vol. II. pp. 205 ff.; and above, pp. 211 f.) We find in them ideas, a language, a spirit, and a colouring totally different from those which characterize the religious writings of the Hindus of a later era. They frequently discover to us the simple germs from which the mythological conceptions current in subsequent ages were derived,—germs which in many cases were developed in so fanciful and extravagant a manner as to shew that the simplicity of ancient times had long since disappeared, to make way for a rank and wild luxuriance of imagination. They afford us very distinct indications of the locality in which they were composed (Vol. II. Pp. 354–372); they shew us the Aryan tribes living in a state of warfare with surrounding enemies (some of them, probably, alien in race and language), and gradually, as we may infer, forcing their way onward to the east and south (Vol. II. pp. 374 ff., 384 ff., 414 ff.); they supply us with numerous specimens of the particular sorts of prayers, viz. for protection and victory, which men so circumstanced would naturally address to the gods whom they worshipped, as well as of those

more common supplications which men in general offer up for the various blessings which constitute the sum of human welfare; and they bring before us as the objects of existing veneration a class of deities (principally, if not exclusively, personifications of the elements, and of the powers either of nature, or of reason) who gradually lost their importance in the estimation of the later Indians, and made way for gods of a different description, invested with new attributes, and in many cases bearing new appellations.

These peculiarities of the hymns abundantly justify us in regarding them as the natural product and spontaneous representation of the ideas, feelings, and aspirations of the bards with whose names they are connected, or of other ancient authors, while the archaic forms of the dialect in which they are composed, and the references which are made to them, as pre-existent, in the liturgical works by which they are expounded and applied, leave no reason for doubt that they are the most ancient of all the Indian Scriptures.

We can also, as I have shewn, discover from the Vedic hymns themselves, that some of them were newer and others older, that they were the works of many successive generations of poets, that their composition probably extended over several centuries, and that in some places their authors represent them as being the productions of their own minds, while in other passages they appear to ascribe to their own words a certain divine character, or attribute their composition to some supernatural assistance. (Vol. I. p. 4, and II. pp. 206 ff., 219 ff.)

I shall now proceed to adduce further proofs from the hymns of the Rig-veda in support of these last mentioned positions; repeating, at the same time, for the sake of completeness, the texts which I have already cited in the Second Volume.

SECT. I.—*Passages from the Hymns of the Veda which distinguish between the Rishis as Ancient and Modern.*

The appellations or epithets applied by the authors of the hymns to themselves, and to the sages who in former times had instituted, as well as to their contemporaries who continued to conduct, the different rites of divine worship, are the following : *rishi*, *kavi*, *medhāvin*, *vipra*,

*vipaśchit*, *vedhas*, *muni*, etc. The rishis are defined in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, to be persons "who, whether singly or in chorus, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others, invoked the gods in artificial language, and in song;" and the word is said to denote especially "the priestly bards who made this art their profession." The word *kavi* means "wise," or "a poet," and has ordinarily the latter sense in modern Sanskrit. *Vipra* means "wise," and, in later Sanskrit, a "Brāhmaṇa;" *medhāvin* means "intelligent;" *vipaśchit* and *vedhas*, "wise" or "learned." *Muni* signifies in modern Sanskrit a "sage" or "devotee." It is not much used in the Rig-veda, but occurs in viii. 17, 13 (Vol. II. p. 397).

The following passages from the Rig-veda either expressly distinguish between contemporary rishis and those of a more ancient date, or, at any rate, make reference to the one or the other class. This recognition of a succession of rishis constitutes one of the historical elements in the Veda. It is an acknowledgment on the part of the rishis themselves that numerous persons had existed, and events occurred, anterior to their own age, and, consequently, in time; and it therefore refutes, by the testimony of the Veda itself, the assertion of Jaimini (above, pp. 77 ff.) that none but eternally pre-existing objects are mentioned in that book.

If, under this and other heads of my inquiry, I have cited a larger number of passages than might have appeared to be necessary, it has been done with the intention of showing that abundant evidence of my various positions can be adduced from all parts of the Hymn-collection.<sup>1</sup>

R. V. i. 1, 2. *Agnih pūrvebhir rishibhir idyo nūtanair uta | sa devān eha vakshati |*

"Agni, who is worthy to be celebrated by former, as well as modern rishis, will bring the gods hither."

The word *pūrvebhiḥ* is explained by Sāyana thus: *Purātanair Bhrigv-angirah-prabhritibhir rishibhiḥ |* "By the ancient rishis, Bhrigu, Angiras," etc.; and *nūtanaiḥ* is interpreted by *idānīntanair asmābhīr api*, "by us of the present day also." See also Nirukta, vii. 16.

<sup>1</sup> I have to acknowledge the assistance kindly rendered to me by Prof. Aufrecht in the revision of my translation of the passages quoted in this and the following sections. As, however, the texts are mostly quite clear in so far as regards the points which they are adduced to prove, any inaccuracies with which I may be chargeable in other respects are of comparatively little importance.

i. 45, 3. *Priyamedha-vad Atri-vaj Jätavedo Virüpa-vat | Angiras-vad mahi-vrata Praskanasya śrudhi havam | 4. Mahi-keravaḥ ūtaye Priyamedhāḥ ahūshata |*

“O (god) of great power, listen to the invocation of Praskanva, as thou didst listen to Priyamedha, Atri, Virüpa, and Angiras. 4. The Priyamedhas, skilled in singing praises, have invoked thee.”

Here Praskanva is referred to, in verse 3, as alive, whilst Priyamedha, Atri, Virüpa, and Angiras belong to the past. In verse 4 the descendants of Priyamedha are however alluded to as existing. The three other names are also, no doubt, those of families. In R.V. iii. 53, 7, (see Vol. I. p. 341) the Virüpas appear to be referred to; while in viii. 64, 6 (which will be quoted below), a Virüpa is addressed. In v. 22, 4, the Atris are spoken of.

i. 48, 14. *Ye chid hi tvām rishayah pürve ūtaye juhure ityādi |*

“The former rishis who invoked thee for succour,” etc.

i. 80, 16. *Yam Atharvā Manush pitā Dadhyāñ dhiyam atnata | tasmin brahmāni pūrvathā Indre ukthā samagmata ityādi |*

“In the ceremony [or hymn] which Atharvan, or our father Manu, or Dadhyanch performed, the prayers and praises were, as of old, congregated in that Indra,” etc.

i. 118, 3 (repeated in iii. 58, 3). *Āhur viprāsaḥ Aśvinā purājaḥ |*

“O Aśvins, the ancient sages say,” etc.

i. 131, 6. *Ā me asya vedhaso navīyasо manma śrudhi navīyasah |*

“Hear the hymn of me this modern sage, of this modern [sage].”

i. 139, 9. *Dadhyāñ ha me janusham pūrvo Angirāḥ Priyamedhāḥ Kanvo Atrir Manur vidur ityādi |*

“The ancient Dadhyanch, Angiras, Priyamedha, Kanva, Atri, and Manu know my birth.”

i. 175, 6. *Yathā pūrvebhyo jaritribhyah Indra mayaḥ iva āpo na triṣhyate babbhūtha | Tām anu tvā nividam johāvīmi ityādi |*

“Indra, as thou hast been like a joy to former worshippers who praised thee, like waters to the thirsty, I invoke thee again and again with this hymn,” etc.

iv. 20, 5. *Vi yo rarapśe rishibhir navebhir vṛiksho na pakvaḥ eriṇyo na jetā | maryo na yoshām abhi manyamāno achhā vivakmi puruhūtam Indram |*

“Like a man desiring a woman, I call hither that Indra, invoked by

many, who, like a ripe tree, like a conqueror expert in arms,<sup>2</sup> has been celebrated by recent rishis."

iv. 50, 1. *Tam pratnāsaḥ rishayo dīdhyānāḥ puro vīprāḥ dadhīre mandra-jīhvam |*

"The ancient rishis, resplendent and sage, have placed in front of them [Bṛihaspati] with gladdening tongue."

v. 42, 6. . . . *Na te pūrve Maghavan na aparāso na vīryām nūtanāḥ kaśchana āpa |*

"Neither the ancients nor later men, nor any modern man, has attained to [conceived] thy prowess, o Maghavan."

x. 54, 3. *Ke u nu te mahimānah samasya asmat pūrve rishayo antam āpuḥ | yad mūtarām cha pitaram oha sākam ajanayathās tanvāḥ svāyāḥ |*

"Who among the rishis who were before us have attained to the end of all thy greatness? for thou didst at once produce from thy own body both the mother and the father (earth and heaven)."

vi. 19, 4. *Yathā chit pūrve jaritārah āsur anedyāḥ anavadyāḥ arishṭāḥ |*

"As [Indra's] former worshippers were, [may we be] blameless, irreproachable, and unharmed."

vi. 21, 5. *Idā hi te revishataḥ purājāḥ pratnāsaḥ āsuḥ purukrit sakhāyah | Ye madhyamāsaḥ uta nūtanāsaḥ utāvamasya puruhūta bodhi |*

"For now, o energetic god, men are thy worshippers, as the ancients born of old and the men of the middle and later ages have been thy friends. And, o much-invoked, think of the most recent of all."<sup>3</sup>

vi. 21, 1. *Sa tu śrudhi Indra nūtanasya brahmaṇyato vīra kārudhāyāḥ |*

"Heroic Indra, supporting the poet, listen to the modern [bard] who wishes to celebrate thee."

vi. 22, 2. *Tam u naḥ pūrve pitaro navagvāḥ sapta vīprāsaḥ abhi vājantāḥ ityādi |*

"To Him (Indra) our ancient fathers, the seven Navagva sages, desiring food, (resorted) with their hymns," etc.

vi. 50, 15. *Eva napāto mama tasya dhibhir Bharadvājāḥ abhyarchanti arkaiḥ |*

"Thus do the Bharadvājas my grandsons adore thee with (my?) hymns and praises."

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Aufrecht thinks *srīnyo na jetā* may perhaps mean, "like a winner of sickles (as a prize)."

<sup>3</sup> This verse is translated in Benfey's Glossary to the Sāma-veda; p. 76, col. i.

vii. 18, 1. *Tve ha yat pitaraś chid naḥ Indra viśvā vāmā jaritāro asan-vann ityādi |*

“Since, in thee, o Indra, even our fathers, thy worshippers, obtained all riches,” etc.

vii. 29, 4. *Uto gha te purushyāḥ id āsan yeshām pūrveshām aśrinor rishīṇām | adha aham tvā Maghavan johavīmi tvāṁ naḥ Indra asi pramatiḥ piteva |*

“Even they were of mortal birth,—those former rishis whom thou didst hear. I invoke thee again and again, o Maghavan; thou art to us wise as a father.”

vii. 53, 1. . . . *Te chid hi pūrve kavayo grinantah puro mahī dadhire devaputre |*

“The ancient poets, celebrating their praises, have placed in the front these two great [beings, heaven and earth] of whom the gods are the children.”

vii. 76, 4. *Te id devānāṁ sadhamādaḥ āsann ritāvānah kavayah pūrvyāsaḥ | gūlhaṁ jyotiḥ pitaro anvavindan satya-mantrāḥ ajanayann ushāsam |*

“They shared in the enjoyments of the gods, those ancient pious sages. Our fathers discovered the hidden light; with true hymns they caused the dawn to arise.”

vii. 91, 1. *Kuvid anga namasū ye vṛidhāsaḥ purā devāḥ anavadyāsaḥ āsan | te Vāyave Manave bādhitāya avāsayann<sup>4</sup> ushasām sūryena |*

“Certainly those gods who were formerly magnified (or grew) by worship were altogether blameless. They lighted up the dawn and the sun to Vāyu (Āyu?) and the afflicted Manu.” (See Vol. I. p. 172.)

viii. 36, 7. *Syāvāśasya sunvatas tathā śriṇu yathā aśrinor Atreḥ karmāṇi kṛiṇvataḥ |*

“Listen to Syāvāśva pouring forth libations, in the same way as thou didst listen to Atri when he celebrated sacred rites.”<sup>5</sup>

ix. 96, 11. *Tvaya hi naḥ pitarah Soma pūrve karmāṇi chakruḥ pava-māna dhīrāḥ |*

“For through thee, o pure Soma, our wise forefathers of old performed their sacred rites.”

<sup>4</sup> See Benfey's Glossary to Sāma-veda, under the word *vas* 2.

<sup>5</sup> Compare viii. 35, 19; and viii. 37, 7.

ix. 110; 7. *Tve Soma prathamāḥ vṛikta-varhisho mahe vājāya śravase dhiyāñ dadhuḥ* |

“The former [priests] having strewed the sacred grass, offered up a hymn to thee, o Soma, for great strength and food.”

x. 14, 15 (=A.V. xviii. 2, 2). *Idam namaḥ rishibhyaḥ pūrvajebhyāḥ pathikridbhyāḥ* |

“This reverence to the rishis, born of old, the ancients, who showed us the road.” (This verse may also be employed to prove that at the end of the Vedic period the rishis had become objects of veneration.)

x. 66, 14. *Vasishṭhāsaḥ pitrīvad vācham akrata devān ilānāḥ rishi-vad | ityādi* |

“The Vasishthas, like the forefathers, like the rishis, have uttered their voice, worshipping the gods.”

x. 67, 1—will be quoted in a following section.

x. 96, 5. *Tvam aharyathāḥ upastutah pūrvebhīr Indra harikesa yajvabhiḥ* |

“Indra, with golden hair, thou didst rejoice, when lauded by the ancient priests.”

x. 98, 9. *Tvām pūrve rishayo gīrbhir āyan tvām adhvareshu puruhūta viśve* |

“To thee the former rishis resorted with their hymns; to thee, thou much invoked, all men [resorted] at the sacrifices.”

Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xviii. 52. *Imau te pakshāv ajarau patatrināu yābhyāñ rakshāñsi apahañsi Agne | tābhyām patema sukritām u lokām yatra rishayo jagmuḥ prathamajāḥ purānāḥ* |

“But these undecaying, soaring pinions, with which, o Agni, thou slayest the Rakshases,—with them let us ascend to the world of the righteous, whither the earliest-born ancient rishis have gone.” (This verse is quoted in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, ix. 4, 4, 4, p. 739.)

The ancient rishis, as Sāyaṇa says in his note on R.V. i. 2, were Bhṛigu, Angiras, and others whom he does not name. In another place we find Atharvan, Manu, Dadhyanch, and others mentioned. I will not here enter into any particulars regarding these ancient sages. For some texts relating to Bhṛigu, I may refer to the First Volume of this work, pp. 443 ff.; and various passages relating to Manu will be found in the same volume pp. 162 ff., and in pp. 324–332 of the Second Volume. In regard to Atharvan, as well as Angiras, Professor Gold-

stücker's Sanskrit and English Dictionary, and in regard to the same personages and Dadhyanch, the Sanskrit and German Lexicon of Boehtingk and Roth, may be consulted.

*Sect. II.—Passages from the Veda in which a distinction is drawn between the older and the more recent hymns.*

From the passages which I propose to bring forward in the present section, it will be found that the hymns which the rishis addressed to the gods are frequently spoken of as new, while others of ancient date are also sometimes mentioned. The rishis no doubt entertained the idea that the gods would be more highly gratified if their praises were celebrated in new, and perhaps more elaborate and beautiful compositions, than if older, and possibly ruder, prayers had been repeated.

The fact that a hymn is called new by its author, does not, however, by any means enable us to determine its age relatively to that of other hymns in the collection, for this epithet of new is, as we shall see, applied to numerous compositions throughout the Veda; and often when a hymn is not designated as new, it may, nevertheless, be in reality of recent date, compared with the others by which it is surrounded. When, however, any rishi characterizes his own effusion as new, we are of course necessarily led to conclude that he was acquainted with many older songs of the same kind. The relative ages of the different hymns can only be settled by means of internal evidence furnished by their dialect, style, metre, ideas, and general contents; and we may, no doubt, hope that much will by degrees be done by the researches of critical scholars towards such a chronological classification of the constituent portions of the Rig-veda.

The hymns, praises, or prayers uttered by the rishis are called by a great variety of names, such as *rishī*, *sāman*, *yajush*, *brahman*, *arka*, *uktha*, *mantra*, *manman*, *mati*, *manīshā*, *sumati*, *dhī*, *dhīti*, *dhishanā*, *stoma*, *stuti*, *sushtuti*, *praśasti*, *śāṁsa*, *gir*, *vāch*, *vachas*, *nītha*, *nivid*, etc.

R. V. i. 12, 11. *Sa nah stavānah abhara gāyatrena navīyasā | rayīm virāvatim isham |*

“Glorified by our newest<sup>4</sup> hymn, do thou bring to us wealth and food with progeny.” (Sāyana explains *navīyasā* by *pūrvakair apy uāampāditena gāyatrena |* “A hymn not formed even by former rishis.”)

<sup>4</sup> Compare Psalms, 83, 3; 40, 3; 96, 1; 98, 1; 144, 9; 149, 1; and Isaiah, 42, 10.

i. 27, 4. *Imam ū shu tvam asmākām saniṁ gāyatraṁ navyāñsam | Agne devešu pravochah |*

“Agni, thou hast announced [or do thou announce] among the gods this our offering, our newest hymn.”

i. 60, 3. *Taṁ navyasi hrīdaḥ ā jāyamānam asmat sukiṛtīr madhu-jīhvam aśyāḥ | yam ritvijo vṛijane mānushāsaḥ prayasvantāḥ ḫyavo jījanāta |*

“May our newest laudation (springing) from (our) heart, reach him, the sweet-tongued, at his birth, (him) whom mortal priests the descendants of Manu, offering oblations, have generated in the ceremonial.” (See iii. 39, 1, in next page, and i. 171, 2 and ii. 35, 2, which will be quoted further on in the next section).

i. 89, 3. *Tān pūrvayā nividā hūmahe vayam Bhagam Mitram Aditiṁ Daksham Asridham ityādi |*

“We invoke with an ancient hymn Bhaga, Mitra, Aditi, Daksha, Asridh [or the friendly],” etc. (*Pūrvakālinayā | nityayā | nividā | vedātmikayā vāchā |* “With an ancient—eternal, hymn—a Vedic text.”—*Sāyana*.)

i. 96, 2. *Sa pūrvayā nividā kavyatā Āyor imāḥ prajāḥ ajanayad manūnām |*

“Through the ancient hymn, the poetic work, of Āyu he (Agni) generated these children of men.”<sup>7</sup>

i. 130, 10. *Sa no navyebhir vrisha-karmann ukthais purām daritāḥ pāyubhiḥ pāhi śagmāḥ |*

“Through our new hymns, do thou, vigorous in action, destroyer of cities, sustain us with invigorating blessings.”

i. 143, 1. *Pra tavyasīm navyasīm dhītim Agnaye vācho matīm sahasāḥ sūnave bhare |*

“I bring to Agni, the son of strength, a new and energetic hymn, a production of thought uttered by the voice (vāchah).”

ii. 17, 1. *Tad asmai navyam Angiras-vad archata ityādi |*

“Utter to him [Indra] that new [hymn] like Angiras.” (“New, i.e. never before seen among other people” *anyeshv adrishta-pūrvam—Sāyana*.)

ii. 18, 3. *Hari nu kaṁ rathe Indrasya yojam āyai sūktena vaahasā navena | mo shu tvām atra bahavo hi viprāḥ ni rīrāman yajamānāśo anye |*

<sup>7</sup> See the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, p. 143 of Prof. Haug's translation; and Vol. I. p. 180.

“With this new and well-expressed hymn I have yoked<sup>6</sup> the steeds in Indra’s car, in order that he may come hither. Let not the other wise sacrificers, who are numerous, stop thee (from coming to me).”

ii. 24, 1. *Sa imām aviddhi prabhritīm yaḥ iśiṣhe | ayā vidhema na-vayā mahā girā |*

“Do thou who rulest receive this, our offering [of praise]: let us worship thee with this new and grand song.”

iii. 1, 20. *Etā te Agne janīmā sanāni pra pūrvyāya nūtanāni vocham |*

“These ancient [and these] new productions I have uttered to thee, Agni, who art ancient.” (Comp. R.V. viii. 84, 5, in the next section.)

iii. 32, 13. *Yaḥ stomebhīr vāvṛidhe pūrvyebhīr yo madhyamebhīr uta nūtanebhīḥ |*

“[Indra] who has grown through (or been magnified by) ancient, intermediate, and modern hymns.”

iii. 39, 1. *Indram matir hrīdah ā vachyamānā achhā patīm stomatashṭā jīgāti | ā jāgrivir vidathe śasyamānā Indra yat te jāyate viddhi tasya | 2. Divaś chid ā pūrvyā jāyamānā vi jāgrivir vidathe śasyamānā | bhadrā vastrāni arjunā vasānā sū iyam asme sanājā pitryā dhīḥ |*

“1. The vigilant hymn, formed of praise, and uttered from the heart, proceeds to Indra the lord, when chaunted at the sacrifice: be cognizant, Indra, of this [praise] which is produced for thee. 2. Produced even before the daylight, vigilant, chaunted at the sacrifice, clothed in beautiful and radiant garments,—this is our ancient ancestral hymn.” (*Pitryā* is rendered by Śāyana as *pitri-kramāgata*, “received by succession from our fathers.”)

iii. 62, 7. *Iyaṁ te Pūshann āghrinē sushtutir deva navyasi | asmābhīs tubhyam śasyate |*

“Divine and glowing Pūshan, this new laudation is recited by us to thee.”

v. 42, 13. *Pra sū māhe susarāṇaya medhāṁ girām bhare navyasīm jāyamānām |*

“I present to the mighty protector a mental production, a new utterance [now] springing up.”

<sup>6</sup> Compare the expressions *vacho-yuजā harī*, “brown horses yoked by the hymn” (R.V. viii. 45, 39; viii. 87, 9); *brahma-yuज*, “yoked by prayer” (i. 177, 2; iii. 36, 4; viii. 1, 24; viii. 2, 27; viii. 17, 2); and *mano-yuज*, “yoked by the mind, or will” (i. 14, 6; i. 51, 10; iv. 48, 4; v. 75, 6; viii. 5, 2).

v. 55, 8. *Yat pūrvyam Maruto yaoḥ cha nūtanāṁ yad udyate Vasavo yaoḥ cha śasyate | viśvasya tasya bhāvatha navedasāḥ |*

“Be cognizant of all that is ancient, Maruts, and of all that is modern, of all that is spoken, Vasus, and of all that is recited.”

vi. 17, 13. . . . *Suvīrañ tvā svāyudhañ suvajram ā brahma navyam avase vavṛityāt |*

“May the new prayer impel thee, the heroic, well-accoutréed, the loud-thundering, to succour us.” (“New, i.e. never made before by others: prayer, i.e. the hymn made by us” *Nūtanam anyair akritā-pūrvam | brahma asmābhiḥ kṛitaṁ stotram—Sāyana.*)

vi. 22, 7. *Tuñ vo dhiyā navyasyā śavishṭham pratnam pratna-vat paritāṁsayadhyai |*

“I seek, like the ancients, to stimulate thee, the ancient, with a new hymn.”

vi. 34, 1. *Sām cha tvē jagmur giraḥ Indra pūrvir vi cha tvad yanti vibhvo manīshāḥ | purā nūnāṁ cha stutayah rishiṇāṁ paspridhre Indre adhi ukthārkāḥ |*

“Many songs, Indra, are collected in thee; numerous thoughts issue forth from thee; both before and now the praises, texts and hymns of rishis have hastened emulously to Indra.”

vi. 44, 13. *Yah pūrvyābhīr uta nūtanābhīr gīrbhīr vāvridhe grīnatām rishiṇām |*

“He (Indra) who grew through the ancient and modern hymns of lauding rishis.” (See R.V. iii. 32, 13, above p. 223.)

vi. 48, 11. *Ā sakhāyah subardughāñ dhenum ajadhvam upa navyasā vachah |<sup>9</sup>*

“Friends, drive hither the milch cow with a new hymn.”

vi. 49, 1. *Stushe janāñ suvratañ navyasibhir gīrbhīr Mitrāvaraṇā sumnayantā |*

“With new praises I celebrate the righteous race, with Mitra and Varuna, the beneficent.” (“The well-acting race, i.e. the divine race, the company of the gods,” *sukarmānām janāñ daiwyām janāñ deva-sangham—Sāyana.*)

vi. 50, 6. *Abhi tyām vīram girvanasam archa Indram brahmaṇā jari-tar navena |*

“Sing, o worshipper, with a new hymn, to the heroic Indra, who delights in praise.”

<sup>9</sup> Compare the words *ni Agne navyasā vachas tanūshu śāṁsam esham*, viii. 39, 2.

vi. 62, 4. *Tā navyaso jaramānasya manma upa bhūshato yuyujāna-saptī ityādi | 5. Tā valgū daśrā puruṣākātamā pratnā navyasā vachasā vivāse |*

“4. These (Aśvins), with yoked horses, approach the hymn of their new worshipper. . . . 5. I adore with a new hymn these brilliant, strong, most mighty, and ancient (gods).”

vii. 35, 14, will be quoted in the next section.\*

vii. 53, 2. *Pra pūrvaje pitarā navyasibhir gīrbhiḥ kṛinudhvam sadane ritasya ityādi |*

“In the place of sacrifice propitiate with new hymns the ancient, the parents” (*i.e.* Heaven and Earth), etc.

vii. 56, 23. *Bhūri chakra Marutah pitryāni ukthāni yā vāḥ śasyante purā chit |*

“Ye have done great things, o Maruts, when our fathers' hymns were recited of old in your honour.”

vii. 59, 4. . . . *abhi vāḥ āvartt sumatir navīyasī<sup>10</sup> tūyañ yāta pipishavah |*

“May the new hymn turn you hither; come quickly, desirous to drink.”

vii. 61, 6. . . . *Pra vām manmāni richase navāni kṛitāni brahma jujuśhann imāni |*

“May the new hymns made to praise you, may these prayers gratify you.”

vii. 93, 1. *S'uchiṁ nu stomaṁ nava-jātam adya Indrāgnī Vṛittra-hanā jushetham | ubhā hi vām suhavā johavīmi ityādi |*

“Indra and Agni, slayers of Vṛittra, receive with favour the pure hymn newly produced to-day. For again and again do I invoke you who lend a willing ear,” etc.

viii. 5, 24. *Tabhir āyātam ātibhir navyasibhiḥ susastibhiḥ yad vām vrishanvasū huve |*

“Come with those same succours, since I invoke you, bountiful [deities], with new praises.” (The epithet *navyasibhiḥ* in this text might possibly be construed with the word *ātibhiḥ*, “aids.”)

viii. 6, 11. *Aham pratnena manmanā girah śumbhāmi Kanva-vat | yena Indrah śushmam id dadhe |*

<sup>10</sup> The same words, *sumatir navīyasī*, occur in viii. 92, 9, where they may not have the same sense as here.

"I decorate my praises with an ancient hymn, after the manner of Kanva, whereby Indra put on strength."

viii. 6, 43. *Imāñ su pūrvyām dhiyam madhor g̃ritasya pipyushīm  
Kanvāḥ ukthena vavṛidhuḥ |*

"The Kanvas with their praise have augmented this ancient hymn, replenished with sweet butter."

viii. 12, 10. *Iyañ te ritviyāvatī dhītir eti navīyasī saparyantī ityādi |*

"This new and solemn hymn advances to honour thee," etc.

viii. 20, 19. *Yūnah ū su navishṭhayā vrishṇah pāvakān abhi Sobhare  
girā | gāya ityādi |*

"Sing, o Sobhari, with a new hymn to these youthful, vigorous, and brilliant (gods).

viii. 23, 14. *S'rushṭi Agne navasya me stomasya vīra viśpate vi mā-  
yinas tapushā rakshaso daha |*

"Heroic Agni, lord of the people, on hearing my new hymn, burn up with thy heat the deluding Rakshases."

viii. 25, 24. . . . *Kaśvantā viprā navishṭhayā matī | maho vājināv  
arvantā sachā asanam |*

"I have celebrated at the same time with a new hymn, these two sage and mighty [princes], strong, swift, and carrying whips."

viii. 39, 6. *Agnir veda marītānām apichyam . . . . Agnir dvārā vyur-  
nute svāhuto navīyasā |*

"Agni knows the secrets of mortals . . . . Agni, invoked by a new [hymn], opens the doors."

viii. 40, 12. *Eva Indrāgnibhyām pitri - vad navīyo Māndhātri - vad  
Angiras - vad avāchi ityādi |*

"Thus has a new [hymn] been uttered to Indra and Agni after the manner of our fathers, and of Māndhātri, and of Angiras."

viii. 41, 2. *Tam ū shu samanā girā pitrīnām cha manmabhiḥ Nābhā-  
kasya praśastibhir yah sindhūnām upa udaye sapta-svasā sa madhyamaḥ |*

"[Worship] him (Varuna) continually with a song, with the hymns of the fathers,<sup>11</sup> and with the praises of Nābhāka. He who dwells at the

<sup>11</sup> The expression here employed, *pitrīnām cha manmabhiḥ*, occurs also in R.V. x. 57, 3 (=Vāj. S. 3, 53): *Mano nu ā huvāmahe nārāśāṁsenā somena pitrīnām cha manmabhiḥ |* "We summon his soul with Soma, accompanied by human praises, and with the hymns of the fathers." The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā reads *stomena*, "hymn," instead of *somena*. The commentator there explains *nārāśāṁsenā somena* as "a hymn

birth-place of the streams, the lord of the seven sisters, abides in the centre." (This verse is quoted in the Nirukta x. 5. Nābhāka is said by Yāska to have been a rishi (*rishir Nābhāko babhūva*). A translation of the passage is given in Roth's Illustrations of the Nir. p. 135, where reference is also made to two verses of the preceding hymn (viii. 40, 4, 5), in which Nābhāka (the ancestor of Nābhāka) is mentioned thus: (verse 4) *Abhyartha Nābhāka-vad Indrāgnī yajasā girā . . . .* (verse 5) *Pra brahmāni Nābhāka-vad Indrāgnibhyām irajyata |* "Worship Indra and Agni with sacrifice and hymn, like Nābhāka . . . . Like Nābhāka, direct your prayers to Indra and Agni." In explanation of the seven sisters, Roth refers to Nir. v. 27 (R.V. viii. 58, 12) where the seven rivers are mentioned. See his Illustrations of Nir. pp. 70, 71.

viii. 44, 12. *Agnih pratnena manmanā śumbhānas tanvāñ svām kavīh viprena vavridhe |*

"The wise Agni, illuminating his own body at [the sound of] the sage and ancient hymn, has become augmented."

viii. 55, 11. *Vayañ gha te apūrvyā Indra brahmāni vrittrahan | purutamāsaḥ puruhūta vajrivo bhrītiñ na pra bharāmasi |*

"Indra, slayer of Vṛittra, thunderer, invoked of many, we [thy] numerous [worshippers] bring to thee, as thy hire, hymns which never before existed."

viii. 63, 7, 8. *Iyañ te navyasi matir Agne adhāyi aṣmad ā mandra sujāta sukrato amūra dasma atithe | sā te Agne śantamā chanishṭhā bhavatu priyā tayā vardhasva sushṭutah |*

"O Agni, joyful, well-born, strong, unerring, and wondrous guest, this new hymn has been offered to (or, made for) thee by us; may it be dear to thee, agreeable and pleasant: lauded by it, do thou increase."

viii. 65, 5, 6. . . . *Indram gṛbhir havāmahe | Indram pratnena manmanā marutvantam havāmahe ityādi |* 12. (=S.V. ii. 340.) *Vācham ashṭāpadīm aham nava-sraktim ṛita-sprisam | Indrāt pari tanvam mame |*

"5. We invoke Indra with songs; we invoke Indra, attended by the Maruts, with an ancient hymn. . . . 12. I compose for the sake of

in which men are praised," and *pitrīñām cha manmabhiḥ*, as hymns "in which the fathers are reverenced" (*pitaro yaḥ stotrair manyante te manmānas tair ityādi*). See Prof. Max Müller's translation of this hymn in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, pp. 449 and 458.

Indra a hymn' of eight feet and nine lines, abounding in sacred truth." (This verse is translated and explained by Professor Benfey, *Sāma-veda*, p. 255.)

ix. 9, 8. *Nu navyase navīyase sūktāya sādhaya pathah | pratna-vad rochaya ruchaḥ |*

"Prepare (o Soma) the paths for our newest, most recent, hymn; and, as of old, cause the lights to shine."

ix. 42, 2. *Esha pratnena manmanā devo devebhyah pari | dhārayā pavate sutah |*

"This god, poured forth to the gods, with an ancient hymn, purifies with his stream."

ix. 91, 5. *Sa pratna-vad navyase viśva-vāra sūktāya pathah kriṇuhi prāchah ityādi |*

"O god, who possessest all good, make, as of old, forward paths for this new hymn."

ix. 99, 4 (= S.V. ii. 983). *Taṁ gāthayā purānyā punānam abhi anūshata | uto kripanta dhitayo devānām nāma bibratih |*

"They praised the pure god with an ancient song; and hymns embracing the names of the gods have supplicated him." (Benfey translates the last clause differently.)

x. 4, 6. . . . *Iyaṁ te Agne navyasi manishā yukshva rathaṁ na śucha-yadbhir angaiḥ |* ●

"This is for thee, Agni, a new hymn: yoke thy car as it were with shining parts."

x. 89, 3. *Samānam asmai anapāvrid archa kshmayā divo asamam brahma navyam ityādi |*

"Sing (to Indra) without ceasing a new hymn, worthy of him, and unequalled in earth or heaven."

x. 91, 13. *Imām pratnāya sushtutim navīyasim vokeyam asmai usate śrinotu nah |*

"I will address to this ancient [deity] my new praises, which he desires; may he listen to us."

x. 96, 11. . . . *Navyaṁ navyaṁ haryasi manma nu priyam ityādi |*

"Thou delightest in ever new hymns, which are dear to thee," etc.

x. 160, 5. *Aśvāyanto gavyanto vājayanto havāmahe tvā upa gantavai u | abhūshantas te sumatau navāyām vayam Indra tvā śunañ huvema |*

"Desiring horses, cattle, and wealth, we invoke thee to approach us.

Paying homage to thee in a new hymn, may we, o Indra, invoke thee auspiciously."

SECT. III.—*Passages of the Rig-veda, in which the rishis describe themselves as the composers of the hymns.*

In this section I propose to quote, first of all, those passages in which the rishis distinctly speak of themselves as the authors of the hymns, and express no consciousness whatever of deriving assistance or inspiration from any supernatural source. I shall then adduce some further texts in which, though nothing is directly stated regarding the composition of the hymns, there is at the same time nothing which would lead the reader to imagine that the rishis looked upon them as anything else than the offspring of their own minds.

I shall arrange the quotations in which the rishis distinctly claim the authorship, according to the particular verb which is employed to express this idea. These verbs are (1) *kri*, "to make," (2) *taksh* (= the Greek *τεκταίνουμαι*), "to fabricate," and (3) *jan*, "to beget, generate, or produce," with others which are less explicit.

I. I adduce first the passages in which (1) the verb *kri*, "to make," is applied to the composition of the hymns. (Compare R.V. vii. 61, 6, already quoted in the last section.)

R.V. i. 20, 1. *Ayaṁ devāya janmane stomo vīprebhīr āsayā<sup>12</sup> | akāri ratna-dhātamah |*

"This hymn, conferring wealth, has been *made* to the divine race, by the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods]."

i. 31, 18. *Etena Agne brahmaṇā vāvridhasva śaktī vā yat te chakrima vidā vā |*

"Grow, o Agni, by this prayer which we have *made* to thee according to our power, or our knowledge."

i. 47, 2. . . . *Kaṇvāśo vām brahma krinvantī adhvare teshāṁ su śrinutāṁ havam |*

"The Kaṇvas make a prayer to you : hear well their invocation."

i. 61, 16. *Eva te hariyojanā svr̥ikti Indra brahmāṇi Gotamāsaḥ akram |*

"Thus, o Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas *made* hymns for thee efficaciously."

<sup>12</sup> See the note on vi. 32, 1, below.

i. 117, 25. *Etāni vām Aśvinā vīryāṇi pra pūrvyāṇi āyavaḥ avochan | brahma krinvanto<sup>13</sup> vrishanā yuvabhyāṁ suvīrāso vidatham ā vadema |*

“These, your ancient exploits, o Aśvins, men have declared. Let us, who are strong in bold men, making a hymn for you, o vigorous gods, utter our offering of praise.”

i. 184, 5. *Esha vām stomo Aśvināv akāri mānebhīr maghavānā suvrikī |*

“This hymn has efficaciously been made to you, o opulent Aśvins, by the Mānas. (Comp. i. 169, 8; 171, 5; 182, 8; 184, 3.)

ii. 39, 8. *Etāni vām Aśvinā vardhanāni brahma stomaṁ Grītsamadāsāḥ akran |*

“These magnifying prayers, [this] hymn, o Aśvins, the Grītsamadas have made for you.”

iii. 30, 20. *Svaryavo matibhis tubhyaṁ viprāḥ Indrāya vāhāḥ Kuśikāsāḥ akran |*

“Aspiring to heaven, the sage Kuśikas have made a hymn with praises to thee, o Indra.” (The word *vāhāḥ* is stated by Sāyanā to be = *stotra*, “a hymn.”)

iv. 6, 11. *Akāri brahma samidhāna tubhyaṁ ityādi |*

“O kindled [Agni], a prayer has been made to thee.”

iv. 16, 20. *Eved Indrāya vrishabhāya vrishne brahma akarma Bhṛīyavo na ratham | . . . . 21. Akāri te harivo brahma navyaṁ dhiyā syāma rathyāḥ sadāsāḥ |*

“Thus have we made a prayer for Indra, the productive, the vigorous, as the Bhṛigus [fashioned] a car. . . . . 21. A new prayer has been made for thee, o lord of steeds. May we, through our hymn (or rite), become possessed of chariots and perpetual wealth.”

vi. 52, 2. *Ati vā yo maruto manyate no brahma vā yaḥ kriyamānam ninitśat | tapūṁshi tasmai vṛijināni santu brahma-dvisham abhi tam soohatu dyauḥ |*

“Whoever, o Maruts, regards himself as superior to us, or reviles the prayer which is being made, may burning injuries be his lot; may the sky scorch the enemy of prayer.”<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> The reader will find Prof. Haug's opinion of the sense of this phrase in p. 11 f. of his German dissertation “on the original signification of the word *brāhma*,” of which the author has been kind enough to send me a copy, which has reached me as this sheet is passing through the press. Prof. Haug mentions R.V. i. 88, 4; vii. 103, 8, as passages (additional to those I have given) in which the expression occurs.

<sup>14</sup> Translated by Prof. Haug in the Dissertation above referred to, p. 6.

vii. 35, 14. *Ādityāḥ Rudrāḥ Vasavo jushanta* (the Atharva-veda has *jushantāṁ*) *idam brahma kriyamānaṁ navīyah | śrinvantu no divyāḥ pārthivāśo gojatāḥ ityādi |*

“The Ādityas, Rudras, and Vasus receive with pleasure this new prayer which is being made. May the gods of the air, the earth, and the sky hear us.”

vii. 37, 4. *Vayaṁ nu te dāśvāṁsaḥ syāma brahma kṛin̄vantah ityādi |*

“Let us offer oblations to thee, *making* prayers,” etc.

vii. 97, 9. *Iyaṁ vām Brahmanaspatē suvṛktir brahma Indrāya vajrine akāri |*

“Brahmanaspati, this efficacious hymn, [this] prayer has been *made* for thee, and for Indra, the thunderer.”

viii. 51, 4. *Āyāhi kṛin̄avāma te Indra brahmāni varddhanā ityādi |*

“Come, Indra, let us *make* prayers, which magnify thee,” etc.

viii. 79, 3. *Brahma te Indra girvanaḥ kriyante anatidbhutā | imā jushasva haryaśva yojanā yā te amanmahi |*

“Unequalled prayers are made for thee Indra, who loveth hymns. Receive favourably, lord of the brown steeds, those which we have thought out for thee, to yoke thy horses.”

x. 54, 6. . . . *Adha priyam śūsham Indrāya manma brahmakṛito<sup>15</sup> Vṛihadukthād avāchi |*

“. . . An acceptable and powerful hymn has been uttered to Indra by Vṛihaduktha, *maker* of prayers.”<sup>16</sup>

x. 101, 2. *Mandrā kṛin̄udhvāṁ dhiyah ā tanudhvāṁ nāvam aritra-paranīṁ kṛin̄udhvam |*

“*Make* pleasant (hymns), prepare prayers, make a ship propelled by oars.”

It is possible that in many of these passages the verb *kri* may have merely the signification which the word *make* has in English when we speak of “*making* supplications,” etc., in which case it of course means to *offer up*, rather than to *compose*. But this cannot be the case in such passages as R.V. iv. 16, 20 (p. 233), where the rishi speaks of making

<sup>15</sup> Compare *rishayo mantrakṛito maniśhiṇaḥ* in Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 8, 8, 5; and R.V. ix. 114, 2: *Rishi mantra-kritāṁ stomaḥ Kasiyapodvardhayam girah | somaṁ namasya rājanāṁ yo jaíne vīrudhām patih |* “Rishi Kasīyapa, augmenting thy words with the praises of the makers of hymns, reverence King Soma, who was born the lord of plants.”

<sup>16</sup> Prof. Haug thinks the word *brahma-krit* here refers to hymns, and mentions other passages in which it occurs: see p. 12 of the Dissertation above referred to.

the hymn as the Bhṛigus made a chariot.<sup>17</sup> And such an interpretation would be altogether inadmissible in the case of the texts which I next proceed to cite.

II. Passages in which the word *taksh*, “to fashion, or fabricate,” is applied to the composition of the hymns.

i. 62, 13. *Sanāyate Gotamah Indra navyam atakshad brahma harijanāya ityādi* |

“Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, *fashioned* this new hymn for [thee], Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds,” etc.

i. 130, 6. *Imām te vāchaṁ vasuyantah āyavo rathaṁ na dhīrah svapāḥ atakshishuh̄ sumnāya tvāṁ atakshishuh̄* |

“Desiring wealth, men have *fashioned* for thee this hymn, as a skilful workman [fabrics] a car; and thus they have disposed (*lit.* fashioned) thee to (confer) happiness.”

i. 171, 2. *Esha vah stomo Maruto namasvān hrīdā tashṭo manasā dhāyi devah̄* |

“This reverential hymn, o divine Maruts, *fashioned* by the heart, has been presented [or, made] by the mind. [According to Sāyana, the last words mean, ‘let it be received by you with a favourable mind’].”

ii. 19, 8. *Evā te Gṛitsamadah̄ śūra manma avasyavo na vayunāni takshuh̄* |

“Thus, o hero, have the Gṛitsamadas, desiring succour, *fashioned* for thee a hymn, as men make works.” (Sāyana explains *vayuna* by “road.”)

ii. 35, 2. *Imām su asmai hrīdāḥ ā sutashṭam mantraṁ vochēma kuvid asya vedat* |

“Let us address to him this *well-fashioned* hymn proceeding from the heart; will he not be aware of it?”

v. 2, 11. *Etaṁ te stomañ tuvi-jāta vipro rathaṁ na dhīrah svapāḥ ataksham* |

“I, a sage, have *fabricated* this hymn for thee, o powerful [deity], as a skilful workman fashions a car.”

v. 29, 15. *Indra brahma kriyamāṇa jushasva yā te śavishṭha navyā akarma | vastreva bhadrā sukṛitā vasūyuh̄ rathaṁ na dhīrah svapāḥ ataksham* |

<sup>17</sup> See also v. 29, 15, and x. 39, 14, which will be quoted a little further on; and in which the verbs *kri* and *taksh* are both employed.

“O mighty Indra, regard with favour the prayers which are *made*, the new [prayers] which we have *made* for thee. Desirous of wealth, I have *fabricated* them like beautiful well-fashioned garments, as a skilful workman [constructs] a car.” (Compare R.V. iii. 39, 2; above, p. 226.)

v. 73, 10. *Imā brahmāṇi vardhanā Aśvibhyāṁ santu śantamā | yā takshāma rathān iva avochāma bṛihad namah |*

“May these magnifying prayers which we have *fashioned*, like cars, be pleasing to the Aśvins: we have uttered great adoration.”

vi. 32, 1 (=S.V. i. 322). *Apūrvyā purutamāni asmai mahe vīrāya tavase turāya | virapsine vajrine śantamāni vachāṁsi āsā<sup>18</sup> sthavirāya*

“To this great hero, vigorous, energetic, the adorable, unshaken thunderer, I have with my mouth *fabricated* copious and pleasing prayers, which have never before existed.”

vi. 16, 47. *Ā te Agne richā havir hrīdā tashṭam bharāmasi |*

“In this verse, Agni, we bring to thee an oblation *fabricated* by the heart.” (Comp. R.V. iii. 39, 1, in p. 226.)

vii. 7, 6. *Ete dyumnebhir viśvam ātiranta mantraṁ ye vā arāṁ naryāḥ atakshan |*

“These manly (Vasishthas), who have skilfully *fabricated* the hymn, have by their energy accomplished all things (?).”

vii. 64, 4. *Yo vāṁ garttam manasā takshad etam ūrddhvāṁ dhītiṁ kriṇavad dhārayach cha |*

“May he who with his mind *fashioned* for you (Mitra and Varuna) this car, make and sustain the lofty hymn.” (The same expression *ūrddhvā dhītiḥ* occurs in R.V. i. 119, 2.)

viii. 6, 33. *Uta brahmanyā vayāṁ tubhyam pravriddha vajrivo vīprāḥ atakshma jivase |*

“O mighty thunderer, we, who are sage, have *fabricated* prayers for thee, that we may live.”

x. 39, 14. *Etaṁ vāṁ stomam Aśvināv akarma atakshāma Phrigavo na ratham | ni amṛikshāma yoshaṇāṁ na maryye nityāṁ na sūnum tanayaṁ dadhānāḥ |*

“This hymn, Aśvins, we have *made* for you; we have *fabricated* it

<sup>18</sup> On the sense of *āsā* see Prof. Müller's article in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, p. 282 f.; and Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v.

as the Bhrigus [constructed] a car; we have decorated it, as a bride for her husband, continuing the series [of our praises] like an unbroken line of descendants." (See iv. 16, 20, above, p. 233.)

(The following is Sāyaṇa's comment on this passage, for a copy of which I am indebted to Professor Müller : *He Aśvinau vām yuvayor etām yathoktaṁ stomaṁ stotram akarma akurma | Tad etad āha | Bṛigavo na Bṛigavah iva ratham atakshāma vayaṁ stotram saṁskritavantah | karma-yogād Ribhavo Bṛigavah uchyante | athavā rathakārāḥ Bṛigavah | kinchā vayaṁ nityām sāśvataṁ tanayaṁ yāgādinām karmanām tanitāraṁ sūnum na aurasaṁ putram iva stotraṁ dadhānāḥ dhārayanto martye manushye nyamṛikshāma yuvayoḥ stutīm nitarām saṁskritavantah | "Aśvins, we have made this preceding hymn or praise of you. He means to say this. Like the Bṛigus, we have made a car, we have carefully constructed a hymn. The Ribhus are, in this passage, . . . styled Bṛigus; or Bṛigus are chariot-makers. Moreover, maintaining praise as a constant perpetuator (like a legitimate son) of sacrifice and other rites, we have polished, i.e. carefully composed a celebration of you among men [?]."* In this comment the word *yoshaṇā* is left unexplained. In verse 12 of this hymn the Aśvins are supplicated to come in a car fleeter than thought, constructed for them by the Ribhus—*ā tena yātā manaso javiyasā rathaṁ yām vām Ribhavaś chakrur Aśvinā | .*)

x. 80, 7. *Agnaye brahma Ribhavas tatakshuh |*

"The Ribhus [or the wise] fabricated a hymn for Agni.

III. I next quote some texts in which the hymns are spoken of as being generated by the rishis. (Comp. R.V. vii. 93, 1, in p. 228.)

iii. 2, 1. *Vaiśvānarāya dhisheṇām ritāvridhe gṛitaṁ na pūtam Agnaye janāmasi |*

"We generate a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni Vaiśvānara, who promotes our sacred rites."

vii. 15, 4. *Navām nu stomam Agnaye divah śyenāya jījanam | vasvah kuvid vanāti nah |*

"I have generated a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky; will he not bestow on us wealth in abundance?"

vii. 22, 9. *Ye cha pūrve rishayo ye cha nūtnāḥ Indra brahmāṇi jana-yanta viprāḥ |*

"Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have generated prayers."

vii. 26, 1. *Na somah Indram asuto mamāda na abrahmāno maghavānam  
sutāsaḥ | tasmai ukthaṁ janaye yaj jujoshad nrivad navīyah śrinavad  
yathā naḥ |*

“The soma exhilarates not Indra unless it be poured out; nor do libations [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a prayer. To him I generate a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may hear our new [production].”

vii. 31, 11. . . . *Suvṛiktim Indrāya brahma janayanta viprāḥ |*

“The sages generated an efficacious production and a prayer for Indra.”

vii. 94, 1, 2 (=S.V. ii. 266). *Iyaṁ vāṁ asya manmanah Indrāgnī  
pūrvya-stutir abhrād vrishṭir iva ajani | śrinutaṁ jaritur havam ityādi |*

“This excellent praise has been generated for you, Indra and Agni, from the soul of this [your worshipper], like rain from a cloud. Hear the invocation of your encomiast.” (Benfey thinks *manman*, “spirit,” is to be understood of Soma, whose hymn, i.e. the sound of his dropping, resembles the falling of rain. The scholiast of the S.V. makes *manman* = *stotri*, “worshipper”.)

viii. 43, 2. *Asmai te pratiharyate Jātavedo vicharshāne Agne janāmi  
sushṭutim |*

“Wise Agni Jātavedas, I generate a hymn for thee, who receivest it with favour.”

viii. 77, 4. *Ā tvā ayam arkaḥ ūtaye vavarttati yaṁ Gotamāḥ ajyajanāḥ |*

“This hymn which the Gotamas have generated, incites thee to succour us.”

viii. 84, 4, 5. *Śrudhi havam Tiraśchyāḥ Indra yas tvā saparyati  
svīryasya gomato rāyah pūrdhi mahān asi | Indra yas te navīyasāṁ  
giram mandrām ajyanat chikitvin-manasāṁ dhiyam pratnām ritasya  
pipyushīḥ |*

“Hear, Indra, the invocation of Tiraśchi, thy worshipper; replenish him with wealth in strong men and in cattle, for thou art great. Indra [do this for him] who has generated for thee the newest exhilarating hymn, springing from an intelligent mind, an ancient mental product, full of sacred truth.”

(These verses occur also in the Sāma-veda ii. 233, 234, and are translated by Professor Benfey, at pp. 230 and 250 of his edition. The hymn referred to in this passage is apparently designated as both

new and old. How can it be both? It may have been an old hymn re-written and embellished; ancient in substance, though new in expression.<sup>19</sup> Compare St. John's Gospel, xiii. 34, and the First Epistle of St. John, ii. 7, 8, and iii. 11.)

ix. 73, 2. . . . *madhor dhārābhīr janayanto arkam it priyām Indra-sya tanvam avīvridhan |*

“Generating the hymn, they have augmented the beloved body of Indra with the honied streams.”

ix. 95, 1 (= S.V. i. 530). . . . *ato matīr janayata svadhābhīḥ |*

“Wherefore generate hymns with the oblations.” (Professor Benfey makes *janayata* the 3rd person singular of the imperfect middle, and applies it to Soma.)

x. 7, 2. *Imāḥ Agne matayas tubhyaṁ jātāḥ gobhir aśvair abhi grinanti rādṛghaḥ |*

“These hymns, Agni, generated for thee, celebrate thy bounty in cows and horses.”

x. 23, 5, 6, 7. *Yo vāchā vivācho mṛidhravāchāḥ purū sahasrā aśivā jaghāna | Tat tad id asya pauñsyāṁ grinīmasi pitā iva yaś tavishīṁ vā-vridhe śavah | 6. \*Stomaṁ te Indra Vimadāḥ ajijanann apūrvyam purutamāṁ sudānave | Vidma hi asya bhojanam inasya yad ā paśūm na gopāḥ karāmahe | 7. Mā kir naḥ enā sakhyā viyaushus tava oha Indra Vimadasya cha risheḥ | Vidma hi te pramatīṁ deva jāmi-vad asme te santu sakhyā*

“5. Who (Indra) with his voice slew many thousands of the wicked uttering confused and hostile cries. We laud his several acts of valour, who, like a father, grew in vigour and strength. 6. For thee, o Indra, who art bountiful, the Vimadas have generated a copious hymn, which never before existed (*apūrvya*); for we know that it is gratifying to this mighty god, when we attract him hither as a cowherd drives his cattle. 7. Indra, may that friendship of ours never be dissolved, which exists between thee and the rishi Vimada: for we know thy wisdom, o god; may thy friendship be favourable to us, like that of a kinsman.”

x. 67, 1. *Imāṁ dhiyaṁ sapta-śirshṇīṁ pitā naḥ ritaprajātāṁ brihatīṁ avindat | turiyāṁ evij janayad viśvajanyo Ayāsyāḥ uktham Indrāya śāsan |*

<sup>19</sup> As Prof. Aufrecht expresses it: “*Gir* is opposed to *dhi*, as form to substance a new utterance, but a primordial homage.”

"Our father hath discovered [or invented] this great, seven-headed hymn, born of sacred truth; Ayāsyā, friend of all men, celebrating Indra, has generated the fourth song of praise." (In his Lexicon, Roth gives Ayāsyā as a proper name; but says it may also be an adjective with the sense of "unwearied.")

x. 91, 14. *Kilāla-pe soma-prishṭāya vedhase hrīdā matīm janaye chārum Agnaye |*

"With my heart I generate a beautiful hymn for Agni, the drinker of nectar, the soma-sprinkled, the wise." (See also R.V. i. 109, 1, 2, which will be quoted below.)

IV. In the following texts the verbal root *ri*, "to move, send forth," etc., used with or without a preposition, is applied to the utterance or (it may even mean) the production of hymns.

i. 116, 1. *Nāsatyābhyaṁ barhir iva pravrinje stomān iyarmi abhrīyā  
iva vātah | yāv arbhagāya Vimadāya jāyām senājūvā niūhatuḥ rathena |*

"In like manner as I spread the sacrificial grass to the Nāsatyas (Aśvins), so do I send forth to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the clouds; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vimada his bride in a chariot swift as an arrow."

vii. 61, 2. *Pra vāṁ sa Mitrā-Varunau ritāvā vipro manmāni dirgha-  
śrud iyartti | Yasya brahmāni sukratū avāthah ā yat kratvā na śaradā  
prinaithe |*

"The devout sage, heard afar off, sends forth his hymns to you, o Mitra and Varuna. Do you, mighty gods, receive his prayers with favour, so that for (many) autumns ye may not be satiated with his fervour." (See Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. *ā + pri.*)

viii. 12, 31. *Imām te Indra eushtutīm viproh iyartti dhītibhiḥ | jāmim  
padā iva pipratīm pra adhvare |*

"In the sacrifice the sage, with praises, sends forth to thee this hymn, which is of kin to thee, and, as it were, supplies the places (of others?)

viii. 13, 26. . . . *Ritād iyarmi te dhīyam manoyujam |*

" . . . From the sacred ceremony I send forth a prayer which will attract thy heart."

x. 116, 9. *Pra Indragnibhyām suvachasyām iyarmi sindhāv iva prara-  
yām nāvam arkaiḥ |*

"I send forth a [hymn] with beautiful words to Indra and Agni; with my praises I have, as it were, launched a ship on the sea."

(Compare R.V. ii. 42, 1, spoken of Indra in the form of the bird called Kapinjala, a sort of partridge: *Iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam |* "It sends forth a voice, as a rower propels a boat." See also R.V. x. 101, 2, quoted above, p. 234.)

x. 4, 1. *Pra te yakshi pra te iyarmi manna bhuvo yathā vandyo no haveshu | dhanvann iva prapā asi tvam Agne iyakshave pūrave pratna rājan |*

"I offer thee worship, I send forth to thee a meditation, that thou mayest be accessible to adoration in our invocations. For thou, Agni, ancient king, art like a trough of water in the desert to the man who longs for thee."

V. In the following passages other verbs are employed to denote the composition or presentation of hymns:

i. 61. 2. *Indrāya hṛidā manasā manīshā pratnāya patye dhiyo marjayanta |*

"To Indra, the ancient lord, they *prepared* [or polished] hymns [or ceremonics] with the heart, mind, and understanding."

i. 61, 4. *Asmai id u stomañ sañhinomi rathañ na tashṭā iva ityādi |*

"To him (Indra) I *send forth* a hymn, as a carpenter a car," etc.

i. 94, 1 (= S.V. i. 66). *Imañ stomañ arhate Jātavedase ratham iva sam mahema manīshayā | bhadrā hi naḥ pramatir asya sañsadi Agne sakhye mā rishāma vayañ tava |*

"Let us with our intellect *construct* (or, *send forth*) this hymn for the adorable Jātavedas like a car, for his wisdom is favourable to us in the assembly. Agni, in thy friendship may we never suffer." (The root *mah* means to honour or worship.<sup>20</sup> The reader may compare Benfey's translation.)

There is to be found in the hymns a great multitude of passages in which the rishi speaks of presenting his hymns and prayers to the various deities who are the objects of his worship, without directly claiming for himself the authorship of those compositions. The natural inference to be drawn from the expressions which we shall find to be employed in most of the cases to which I refer, would, I think, be that the personality of the rishi himself was uppermost in his mind, and that he was not conscious that the praises which he was uttering to

<sup>20</sup> See, however, the various reading suggested by Böhlungk and Roth s.v. *mah* + *sam* and *ah* + *sam*.

the gods proceeded from any other source than his own unaided faculties. Of this description are the following texts, which represent a manner of thinking and speaking very prevalent in the hymns:

i. 60, 5. *Tam tvā vayam putim Agne rayinām praśamsāmo matibhir Gotamāsaḥ |*

“We, the Gotamas, praise with hymns thee, Agni, the lord of riches.”

i. 77, 5. *Eva Agnir Gotamebhīr ritavā viprebbhīr astoshṭa jātavedaḥ |*

“Thus has the holy Agni Jātavedas been celebrated by the sage Gotamas.”

i. 78, 5. *Avochāma Rahūganāḥ Agnaye madhumad vachaḥ | dyumnair abhi pra nonumah |*

“We, the Rahūgaṇas, have uttered to Agni honied speech; we incessantly laud him with eulogies.”

i. 91, 11. *Soma gīrbhis tvā vayaṁ vardhayāmo vacho-vidah | sumṛiličko nah āviṣa |*

“Soma, we who are skilled in speech magnify thee with praises; do thou enter into us, full of kindness.”

i. 102, 1. *Imām te dhiyam prabhare maho mahīm . . . .*

“I present to thee joyfully this great hymn . . . .

i. 183, 6. *Ātarishma tamasas pāram asya prati vām stomo Aśvināv adhāyi |*

“We have crossed over this darkness; a hymn, o Aśvins, has been addressed to you.”

iii. 53, 2. *Pitur na putraḥ sīcham ā rabhe te Indra svādīshṭhayā girā śachīvah |*

“Powerful Indra, I lay hold of thy skirt (as a son does that of his father), with a very sweet hymn.”

iv. 3, 16. *Etā viśvā vidushe tubhyām wedho nīthāni Agne nīnyā vachāmsei | nivachanā kavaye kāvyāni aśāmīsham matibhir vipraḥ ukthaiḥ |*

“Intelligent Agni, to thee, who knowest, [have I uttered] all these songs and mysterious words; to thee, who art a bard, have I, a sage, uttered these hymns, these poems, with meditations and praises.”

iv. 32, 12. *Avīvridhanta Gotamāḥ Indra\*ve sloma-vāhasah |*

“The Gotamas, Indra, bringing hymns to thee, have magnified thee.”

v. 11, 5. *Tubhya idam Agne madhumattamām vachas tubhyam manīshā iyam astu śām hrīde | Tvām giraḥ sindhum iva avanīr mahīr ā prinānti śavaśā vardhayanti cha |*

"Agni, may this sweetest of prayers, may this mental production be pleasant to thy heart. As great rivers fill the ocean, so do the words of praise fill thee, and augment thee with strength."

v. 22, 4. *Agne chikiddhi asya naḥ idaṁ vachaḥ sahasya | Taṁ tvā suśipra dampate stomaḥ vardhanti Atrayo gīrbhiḥ śumbhanti Atrayah |*

"Vigorous Agni, observe these our words; thee, with the beautiful nose, the lord of the house, the Atris magnify with praises, the Atris decorate with hymns."

v. 45, 4. *Sukteḥir vo vachobhir deva-jushtair Indrā nu Agnī avase hu-vadhyai |*

"Let me invoke you for help, o Indra and Agni, with well-spoken words, such as are acceptable to the gods.

vi. 38, 3. *Taṁ vo dhiyā paramayā purājām ajaram Indram abhi anūshi arkaiḥ ityādi |*

"I adore thee, the ancient, imperishable Indra with an excellent hymn and with praises."

vii. 67, 5. *Prāchim ū devā Aśvinā dhiyam me amridhrām sātaye kṛitaṁ vasūyum |*

"O divine Aśvins, bring to fulfilment my unwearied prayer which supplicates wealth."

vii. 85, 1. *Punishe vām arakshasam maniṣhām somam Indrāya Varu-nāya juhwat | ghrīta-pratikām Ushasām na devīm ityādi |*

"Offering soma to Indra and Varuna, I prepare for you twain the sincere hymn, like the goddess Ushas, with glittering face."<sup>21</sup>

viii. 5, 18. *Asmākam adya vām ayaṁ stomo vāhishīḥo antamāḥ | yuvā-bhyaṁ bhūtu Aśvinā |*

"May this hymn of ours approach near to you, to-day, o Aśvins, and be effectual in bearing you hither."

viii. 8, 8. *Kim anye paryāsate asmat stomebhir Aśvinā | putrah Kan-vasya vām rishir gīrbhir Vatso avīvridhat |*

"Aśvins, do others than we sit round you with songs? Vatsa, the son of Kanva, has magnified you by his hymns."

viii. 27, 8. *Ā pra yāta Maruto Viṣṇo Aśvinā Pūshan mākiṇayā dhiyā | 11. Idā hi vaḥ upastutim idā vāmasya bhaktaye upa vo viśva-vedaso namasyur āśrikshī |*

<sup>21</sup> Compare vi. 8, 1. *Vaisivānarāya matir navyasiḥ suchih somāḥ iwa pāvata chārūṣ Agnaye |* "A new and bright hymn is purified, like beautiful soma, for Agni Vais-vānara."

“8. Come, o Maruts, Vishṇu, Aśvins, Pūshan, at my hymn. 11. For now, possessors of all riches, now, in order to obtain wealth, have I, full of reverence, sent forth to you a hymn.”

viii. 44, 2. *Agne stomaṁ jushasva me vārdhasva anena manmanā | prati sūktāni harya naḥ | 22. Uta tvā dhitayo mama giro vārddhantu viśvahā | Agne sakhyasya bodhi naḥ | 26. Yuvānaṁ viśpatīm kaviṁ viśvādām puru-vepasam | Agniṁ śumbhāmi manmabhīḥ |*

“2. Agni, receive my hymn: grow by this product of my thought: rejoice in our beautiful words. 22. And may my thoughts and words always augment thee; Agni, think of our friendship. 26. With my mental productions I adorn Agni, the young, the lord of the people, the sage, the all-devouring, the very restless.”

x. 42, 1. *Astā iva suprataraṁ lāyam asyan bhūshann iva prabhara stomaṁ asmai | vāchā viprāstarata vācham aryo niramaya jaritah some Indram |*

“Like an archer discharging his far-shooting arrow, with zeal present the hymn to Indra. Sages, by your song, overcome the song of the enemy; worshipper, arrest Indra at the soma.” .

x. 63, 17. *Eva Plateḥ sūnur avīvridhad vo viśve Ādityāḥ Adite manīshī | iśānāśo naro amartyena astāvī janō divyo Gayena |*

“Thus, all ye Ādityas, Aditi, and ye ruling powers, has the wise son of Plati magnified you. The celestial race has been lauded by the immortal Gaya.”

x. 111, 1. *Manīshināḥ prabharadvam manīshām yathā yathā mata-yāḥ santi nrīnam | Indram satyair ā īrayāma kritebhīḥ sa hi viro girvanasyur vidānah |*

“Sages, present the prayer, according as are the various thoughts of men. Let us by our sincere rites stimulate Indra, for he is a hero, he is wise and loves our songs.”

In the following verse, from a hymn in praise of liberality, it is said, though no doubt only figuratively, that the *true rishi* is the prince who is bountiful to the priesthood.

x. 107, 6. *Tam eva rishiṁ tam ū brahmānam īhur yañnanyām sāmagām ukthaśasam | sa śukrasya tanvo veda tisro yāḥ prathamo dakshīṇayā rarādhā |*

“He it is whom they call a rishi, a priest, a pious sacrificer, a chaunter of prayers, a reciter of hymns; he it is who knows the three bodies of the brilliant (Agni),—the man who is most prominent in bestowing gifts.”

**SECT. IV.—*Passages of the Rig-veda in which a supernatural character is ascribed to the rishis or the hymns.***

In the present section I propose to collect the most distinct indications which I have noticed in the Vedic hymns of any supernatural attributes attaching, in the opinion of the authors, either to the rishis themselves, or to their compositions. We shall see in the course of this enquiry (1) that a certain superhuman character was ascribed by the later rishis, who composed the hymns, to some of their predecessors; (2) that expressions are occasionally employed by the rishis which appear to ascribe their compositions to a divine influence generally; while there is a still more numerous set of texts in which the hymns are attributed in various forms of phraseology to the agency of one or more particular and specified deities; and (3) that there is a considerable number of passages in which a mysterious or magical power is ascribed to the hymns or metres.

I proceed to furnish specimens of these several classes of quotations.

I. I adduce some passages which ascribe a superhuman character or supernatural faculties to the earlier rishis.<sup>22</sup> These are the following :

R.V. i. 179, 2. *Ye chid hi pūrve ritasāpah āsan sākām devebhir avadann ritāni | te chid avāsur ityādi |*

“The pious sages who lived of old, and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods, led a conjugal life,” etc.

vii. 76, 4. *Te id devānām sadhamādah āsann ritavānah kavayah pūrvyāsah | gūlham jyotiḥ pitaro anvarindan satyamantrāḥ ajanayann ushāsam |*

“They were the associates of the gods, those ancient pious sages. The fathers found out the hidden light; with true hymns they generated the dawn.”

● x. 14, 15. *Yamāya madhumattamaṁ rājne havyaṁ juhotana | idāṁ namah rishiḥyāḥ pūrvajebhyāḥ pūrvebhyāḥ pathikridbhyaḥ |*

“Offer to king Yama a most sweet oblation. (Let) this reverence (be paid) to the rishis born of old, who were the earliest guides.”

<sup>22</sup> Compare A.V. x. 7, 14, quoted above in p. 3.

The sixty-second hymn of the tenth *Mandala* contains the following passage regarding the Angirases (see above, p. 223) :

1. *The Angirases*—x. 62, 1, 3. *Ye yajnena dakshinayā samaktāḥ Indrasya sakhyam amīratatvam ānaśa | tebhyo bhadram Angiraso vah astu prati gribhṇita mānavāṁ sumedhasāḥ | 3. Ye ritena sūryam arohayan divi aprathayan prithivīm mātaram vi ityādi |*

“ 1. Blessings be on you, Angirases, who, sanctified by sacrifice and liberality, attained the friendship of Indra and immortality. Do ye, o sages, graciously receive the man (who addresses you). 3. Ye who by sacrifice caused the sun to ascend the sky ; and spread out our mother earth,” etc.

This is succeeded by the following verses :

x. 62, 4. *Ayaṁ Nābhā vadati valguvo grihe deva-putrāḥ rishayas tat śrinotana . . . | 5. Virūpāsaḥ id rishayas te id gambhīra-vepasāḥ | Angirasaḥ sūnavas te Agneḥ pari jajnire |*

“ This Nābhan addresses you, brilliant beings, within the house. Hear this, ye rishis, sons of the gods. . . . 5. The Virūpas are rishis, profound in emotion ; they are the sons of Angiras ; they have been born from Agni.”

(The fifth verse is quoted in the *Nirukta*, xi. 17. See Roth's illustrations of the passage.)<sup>23</sup>

2. *Vasishṭha*.—A supernatural character is attributed to Vasishṭha also in the following passage (which has been already quoted and illustrated in Vol. I. pp. 318 ff.).

vii. 83, 7 ff. *Trayaḥ kṛinvanti bhuvanasya retas tisrah prajāḥ ḥryāḥ jyotiṣ-agrāḥ | trayo gharmāsaḥ ushasām sachante sarvān it tān anu vidur Vasishṭhāḥ | 8. Sūryasyeva vakshatho jyotiṣ eshām samudrasyeva mahimā gabhīraḥ | vātasyeva prajavo na anyena stomo Vasishṭhāḥ anu etave vah |*

<sup>23</sup> The next verse (which, with the sequel, is quoted in my article “ On the relations of the priests to the other classes of Indian society in the Vedic age,” Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 276) is as follows : 6. *Ye Agneḥ pari jajnire Virūpāś divas pari | Navagvo nu Dasagvo Angirastamaḥ sachū deveshu māñhate |* “ The Virūpas who were produced from Agni, from Dyaus,—the Navagva, the Dasagva, who is a most eminent Angiras, lavished gifts along with the gods.” Here the Virūpas would seem rather to be princes than rishis : and the same is the case in the following passage also : iii. 53, 6. *Ime bhujāḥ Angiraso Virūpāḥ divas putrāś asurasya vīrāḥ | Viśvāmitrāya dadato maghōni sahasrasāv pra tiranta āyuh |* “ These liberal Virūpas of the race of Angiras, heroic sons of the divine Dyaus (the sky), bestowing gifts on Viśvāmitra at the ceremony with a thousand libations, have prolonged their lives.” (See Vol. I. p. 341 f.)

9. *Tē id nīnyam̄ hrīdayasya praketaḥ sahasra-valśam abhi sancharanti | yamena tatam pariḍhiṁ vayantah apsarasaḥ upa sedur Vasishṭhāḥ | 10. Vidyuto jyotiḥ parisanjihānam Mitrā-Varuṇā yad apaśyatāṁ tvā | tat te janma uta ekaṁ Vasishṭha Agastyo yat tvā viśah ājabhāra | 11. Utāsi Maitrāvaruno Vasishṭha Urvaśyāḥ brahmaṇ manaso 'dhi jātaḥ | drapsaṁ skannam brahmaṇā dairyena viśve devāḥ pushkare tvā adadanta | 12. Sa praketaḥ ubhayasya pravidvān sahasra-dānaḥ uta vā sadānaḥ | yamena tatam pariḍhiṁ vayishyan apsarasaḥ pari jajne Vasishṭhāḥ | 13. Satre ha jātāv iśhitā namobhiḥ kumbhe retaḥ sisichitūḥ samānam | tato ha Mānaḥ udīyāya madhyāt tato jātam rishim āhur Vasishṭham |*

" 7. Three [gods] create the fecundating principle in (all) existences ; [there exist] three excellent productions of which light is the first : three fires attend upon the dawn : all these the Vasishṭhas know. 8. The splendour of these [sages] is like the full glory of the sun ; their grandeur is profound as that of the ocean ; like the swiftness of the wind, your hymns, o Vasishṭhas, cannot be followed by any other bard. 9. Through the intuitions of their hearts they seek out the mystery with a thousand branches. Weaving the envelopment extended by Yama [Agni ? see R.V. i. 66, 4] the Vasishṭhas sat near the Apsaras. 10. When Mitra and Varuṇa saw thee quitting the gleam of the lightning, that was thy birth, Vasishṭha, and [thou hadst] one [other], when Agastya brought thee to the people. 11. And, Vasishṭha, thou art the son of Mitra and Varuṇa, born, o priest, from the mind of Urvaśi ; all the gods placed thee—the drop fallen through divine contemplation—in the vessel. 12. He the wise, knowing both [worlds ?], with a thousand gifts, or with gifts, Vasishṭha, being about to weave the envelopment extended by Yama, was produced from the Apsaras. 13. Born at the sacrifice, and impelled by adorations, they [Mitra and Varuṇa] let the same equal procreative energy fall into the jar ; from the midst of this Māna (Agastya) issued forth ; from this men say the rishi Vasishṭha was produced."

Two of these verses are quoted in the Nirukta, verse 8, in xi. 20, and verse 11, in v. 14. See also Prof. Roth's Illustrations of that work, p. 64, where he states his opinion that the foregoing verses which describe the miraculous birth of Vasishṭha in the style of the epic mythology, are a later addition to an older hymn. See the note in p. 321 of the First Volume of this work.

The two following passages also have reference to knowledge supernaturally communicated, or favours divinely conferred on Vasishtha. See Vol. I. p. 325 ff.

vii. 87, 4. *Uvācha me Varuno medhirāya triḥ sapta nāma aghnyā bibhartti | vidvān padasya guhyā na vochad yugāya vipraḥ uparāya śikshan |*

"Varuṇa said to me, the intelligent, 'the cow has thrice seven names.' The wise [god], though he knows them, has not declared the mysteries of the word, which he desires to reveal to a later generation."

vii. 88, 4. *Vasishthaṁ ha Varuno nārī ā adhād rishiṁ chakāra svapāḥ mahobhiḥ | stotāram vīprah sudinative ahnām yād nu dyāvas tatanan yād ushasāḥ |*

"Varuṇa took Vasishtha into the boat; by his mighty acts, working skilfully he (Varuṇa) has made him a rishi; the wise (god) has made him to utter praises in an auspicious time, that his days and dawns may be prolonged." (See Vol. I. p. 325 f.; and compare R.V. x. 101, 2, and x. 116, 9, in pp. 234 and 240, above.)

3. *Viśvāmitra*.—In one or more of the texts which I shall next produce, a superhuman character is ascribed to Viśvāmitra, if not to the Kuśikas.

iii. 29, 15. *Amitrāyudho marutām iva prayāḥ prathamajāḥ brahmaṇo viśvam id viduh | dyumnavad brahma Kuśikāsāḥ erire ekaḥ eko dame Agniṁ samīdhire |*

"Combating their foes, like hosts of Maruts, (the sages) the first-born of prayer are masters of all knowlege; the Kuśikas have uttered an enthusiastic prayer; each of them has kindled Agni in his house." (See Vol. I. p. 347.)

iii. 43, 5. *Kuvid mā gopām karase janasya kuvid rājānam Maghavann rījishan | kuvid mā rishim papivāṁsaṁ sutasya kuvid me vasvāḥ amritasya śikshāḥ |*

"Dost thou not make me a shepherd of the people? dost thou not make me a king, o impetuous Maghavan? dost thou not make me a rishi, a drinker of the soma? wilt thou not bestow upon me imperishable wealth?" (See Vol. I. p. 344.)

iii. 53, 9. *Māhan rishir devajāḥ devajūtāḥ astabhnāt sindhum arṇavām nrīchakshāḥ | Viśvāmitro yad avahat Sudāsam apriyāyata Kuśikebhīr Indrab |*

"The great rishi (Viśvāmitra), leader of men, god-born, god-im-pelled, stemmed the watery current. When Viśvāmitra conducted Sudās, Indra was propitiated through the Kuśikas." (See Vol. I. pp. 342. Indra himself is called a Kauśika in R.V. i. 10, 11. See Vol. I. p. 347.)

According to ix. 87, 3, of which Uśanas is the traditional rishi, certain mysterious knowledge is said to have been possessed by that personage:

*Rishir viprah pura-etā janānām ribhur dhīrah Uśanā kāryena | sa chid viveda nihitam yad āsām apīchyaṁ guhyaṁ nāma gonām |*

"A wise rishi, a leader of men, skilful, and prudent, is Uśanas, through his insight as a seer; he has known the hidden mysterious name applied to these cows."

Again in ix. 97, 7, it is said: *Pra kāryam Uśaneva bruvāno devo devānām janimā vivakti |*

"Uttering, like Uśanas, the wisdom of a sage, the god (Soma) declares the births of the gods."

In a hymn of the tenth Mandala, the rishis are spoken of as "seeing" the objects of their contemplation in a way which seems to imply a supernatural insight (see above, pp. 116, 118, 125 ff.); in this hymn, x. 72, 1, 2, it is said:

*Devānām nu vayaṁ jānā pravochāma vipanyayā | uktheshu śasyamā-neshu yaḥ paśyād uttare yuge | Brahmanaspatir etā saṁ karmārah iva adhamat | devānām pūrvye yuge asataḥ sad ajāyata |*

"Let us, from the love of praise, celebrate in recited hymns the births of the gods,—any one of us who in this later age may see them. Brahmanaspati has kindled these births, as a blacksmith [blows a flame]: in the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent."<sup>24</sup> (See Vol. I. p. 46.)

Another not less decided instance of this use of the verb *to see*, in the sense of supernatural insight, may be found in the verse of the Vālakhilya already quoted in Vol. II. p. 220, which will be cited below. See also x. 130, 6, which will be quoted further on.

The next two passages speak of the *radiance* of the rishis.

viii. 3, 3 (= S.V. i. 250, and Vaj. S. 33, 81). *Imāḥ u tvā purūvaso*

<sup>24</sup> The first of these verses is translated by Prof. Benfey in his Glossary to the Sāma-veda, p. 154.

*giro vardhantu yāḥ mama | pāvaka-varṇāḥ śuchayo vipaśchitāḥ abhi stomaṁr anūshata |*

“Lord of abundant wealth, may these prayers of mine magnify thee! Pure sages of radiant appearance have celebrated thee with hymns.”

viii. 6, 10. *Aham id hi pituḥ pari medhām ritasya jagrabha | aham suryāḥ iva ajani |*

“I have acquired knowledge of the ceremonial from [my] father; I have become like the sun.” (Is Indra the father here referred to?)

The following texts, which occur in the last book of the Rig-veda, speak of *tapas* (“fervour” or “austerity”) being practised by the rishis much in the same way as the later epic literature does. This use of the word is not known in the earlier books of the R.V. (See Boehtingk and Roth’s Lexicon, under the word *tapas*.)

x. 109, 4. *Devāḥ etasyām avadanta pūrve sapta rishayas tapase ye nisheduḥ |*

“The ancient gods spoke of her, the seven rishis who sat down for austere-fervour.” (See my article “On the priests of the Vedic age” in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 270.)

x. 154, 2. *Tapasā ye anādṛiṣyās tapasā ye svar yayuḥ | tapo ye chakrire mahas tāṁs chid eva api gachhatāt | 5. Sahasra-nīthāḥ kavayo ye gopāyanti sūryam rishiṁs tapasvato Yama tapojān api gachhatāt |*

“Let him (the deceased) go to those who through austere-fervour are invincible, who by austere-fervour have gone to heaven, who have performed great austerity. 5. Let him go, Yama, to the sages of a thousand songs who guard the sun (see Wilson, Vish. Pur. vol. ii. pp. 284 ff.), to the devout rishis, born from fervour.” (See my article “On Yama” in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc.)

x. 190, 1. *Ritāṁ cha satyāṁ cha abhiddhāt tapaso adhyajāyata | tato rātri ajāyata tataḥ samudraḥ arnavāḥ |*

“Right and truth sprang from kindled austerity; thence sprang night, thence the watery ocean.”

In x. 167, 1, it is even said that Indra attained heaven by austerity:

*Tvāṁ tapaḥ paritapya ajayaḥ svāḥ |*

“By performing austerity thou didst conquer heaven.”

In some places the gods are said to possess in the most eminent degree the qualities of *rishis*, or *kavis*. This may possibly imply, *e converso*, that the rishis were conscious of a certain affinity with the divine

nature, and conceived themselves to participate in some degree in the superior wisdom and knowledge of the deities.

R.V. i. 31, 1. *Tvam Agne prathamo Angirāḥ rishir devo devānām abhavaḥ śivāḥ sakhaḥ ityādi* | 2. *Tvam Agne prathamo Angirastamaḥ kavir devānām paribhūshasi vrataṁ* |

“1. Thou, Agni, the earliest *rishi* Angiras, a god, hast been the auspicious friend of the gods. . . . 2. Thou, Agni, the earliest and most Angiras-like sage, administerest the ceremonial of the gods.”

i. 66, 2. . . . *Rishir na stubhvā vikshu praśastaḥ ityādi* |

“Like a *rishi*, who praises [the gods], he (Agni) is famous among the people,” etc.

iii. 21, 3. . . . *Rishiḥ śreshṭhaḥ samidhyase yajnasya pra avitā bhava* |

“Thou, Agni, the most eminent *rishi*, art kindled; be the protector of the sacrifice.”

v. 29, 1. . . . *Archanti tvā marutah pūta-dakshas tvam eshām rishir Indra asi dhīrah* |

“The Maruts, endowed with pure dispositions, worship thee; thou, Indra, art their wise *rishi*.” (Sūyana, however, here renders *rishi* by *drashṭā*, “beholder.”)

vi. 14, 2. *Agnir id hi prachetāḥ Agnir vedhastamāḥ rishiḥ* |

“Agni is wise; Agni is a most sage *rishi*.”

viii. 6, 41. *Rishir hi pūrvajā asi ekaḥ iśanāḥ ojasā* | *Indra choesh-kūyase vasu* |

“Thou art an anciently-born *rishi*, who alone rulest by thy might; Indra thou lavishest riches.”

viii. 16, 7. *Indro brahmā Indraḥ rishir Indraḥ puru puru-hūtaḥ* | *māhan mahibhiḥ śachibhiḥ* |

“Indra is a priest, Indra is a *rishi*, Indra is much invoked; he is great through his great powers.”

ix. 96, 18 (= S.V. ii. 526). *Rishi-manā yaḥ rishi-krit evarshāḥ sahas-ranīthāḥ padavīḥ kavinām* |

“Soma, *rishi-minded*, *rishi-maker*, bestower of good, master of a thousand songs, the leader of sages,” etc.

ix. 107, 7. . . . *Rishir vīpro vichakshanaḥ* | *tvaṁ kavir abhavo deva-vitamaḥ ityādi* |

“A *rishi*, a sage, intelligent, thou (Soma) wast a poet, most agreeable to the gods,” etc.

x. 27, 22. . . . *Indrāya sunvad rishaye cha śikshat |*

" . . . Let [men] present libations to Indra, and offerings to the *rishi*."

x. 112. 9. *Ni shu sīda gaṇapate gaṇeshu tvām āhur vīpratamaṁ kavī-nām | na rite wat kriyate kinchana āre mahām arkam Maṅgavanś chitram aroha |*

" Sit, lord of multitudes, among our multitudes; they call thee the greatest of sages [or poets]; nothing is done without, or apart from, thee; sing, Maṅgavan, a great and beautiful hymn."

x. 115, 5. *Agnih kaṇvatamah kaṇva-sakhā ityādi |*

" Agni is the greatest of the Kaṇvas, the friend of Kaṇva," etc.

II. The Vedic rishis, as we have seen, expected to receive from their gods every variety of temporal blessings, strength, long life, offspring, riches, cattle, rain, food, and victory, and they also looked for forgiveness of their offences, and sometimes for exaltation to paradise, to the same benefactors. Hence it would be nothing more than we might have anticipated, if we should further find them asking their different deities to enlighten their minds, to direct their ceremonies, to stimulate their devotion, to augment their powers of poetical expression, and to inspire them with religious fervour for the composition of their hymns. I think the following passages will justify this expectation by showing that the rishis (though, as we have seen, they frequently speak of the hymns as their own work) did also sometimes entertain the idea that their prayers, praises, and ceremonies generally, were supernaturally suggested and directed. One of the modes (if not the most important) in which this idea is expressed is, as we shall discover, the personification of speech under different appellations. The following are the passages to which I refer: they are—

First, such as refer to the gods generally:

R.V. i. 37, 4. *Pra vah śardhāya gṛishhvaye tvesha-dyumnāya śushmine | brahma devattām gāyata |*

" To your vigorous, overpowering, energetic, host [of Maruts] sing the god-given prayer."

S.V. i. 299. *Tvashṭā no daivyaṁ vachah Parjanyo Brahmanaspatih | putrair bhrātriḥbir Aditir nu pātu no dushṭaram trāmaṇaṁ vachaḥ |*

" May Tvashṭri, Parjanya, and Brahmanaspati [prosper] our divine utterance: may Aditi with her [?] sons and brothers prosper our invisible and protective utterance."

In the next passage, the hymn or prayer is spoken of as *inconceivable*.  
 R.V. i. 152, 5. *Achittam brahma jujushur yuvānah ityādi |*  
 “The youths received with joy the incomprehensible prayer,” etc.  
 In R.V. x. 20, 10, Vimada, a rishi, is connected with the immortals :  
*Agne Vimado manishām ūrjonāpād amritebhīḥ sajoshāḥ girāḥ āvakshat sumatīr iyānah ityādi |*

“O Agni, son of strength, Vimada, united with the immortals, hastening, has brought to thee a product of thought, and beautiful hymns.”

In the two following texts the gods are said to have *generated* the hymn or prayer :

x. 61, 7. . . . *Svādhyo ajanayan brahma devāḥ Vāstoshpatiṁ vratapāṁ niratakshan |*

“The thoughtful gods *generated* prayer : they fashioned Vastoshpati the protector of sacred rites.”

x. 88, 8. *Sūkta-vākam prathamam ād id Agnim ād id havir ajanayanta devāḥ | sa eshāṁ yajno abhavat tanūpāḥ tam dyaur veda tam pri-thivi tam āpaḥ |*

“The gods first *generated* the hymn, then Agni, then the oblation. He was their sacrifice, the protector of their life. Him the Sky, the Earth, and the Waters know.”

In the latter of the two following verses, *Vāch* (speech) is said to be divine, and to have been *generated* by the gods. Though speech is here spoken of generally, and nothing is said of the hymns, still these may have already come to be connected with her in the minds of the Vedic bards, as they were afterwards regarded as her most solemn and important expression.

R.V. viii. 89, 10. *Yad vāg vadanti avichetanāni rāshṭri devānāṁ nisha-sāda mandrā | chatasraḥ ūrjaṁ duduhe payāṁsi kva svid asyāḥ paramāṁ jagāma |* 11. *Devīnāṁ vācham ajanayanta devās tāṁ viśvarūpāḥ paśavo vadanti | sā no mandrā isham ūrjaṁ duhānā dhenur vāg asmān upa-sushtutā ā etu |*

“When Vāch, speaking unintelligible things, queen of the gods, sat down, melodious, she milked forth sustenance and waters towards the four quarters : whither has her highest element departed ? The gods *generated* the divine Vāch ; animals of all kinds utter her ; may this melodious cow Vāch, who yields us nourishment and sustenance,—approach us, when we celebrate her praises.

The last verse (as well as R.V. viii. 90, 16, which will be quoted below), derives some illustration from the following passage of the Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 982 (p. 251 English transl.), in which also Vāch is designated as a cow :

*Vāchaṁ dhenum upāsita | tasyāś chatvārah stanāḥ svāhā-kāro vashat-kāro hanta-kārah svadhā-kārah | tasyāḥ dvau stanau devāḥ upajivanti svāhā-kāram cha vashat-kāraṁ cha hanta-kāram manushyāḥ svadhā-kāram pitarah | tasyāḥ prāṇah rishabho mano vatsah |*

“Let a man worship the cow Vāch. She has four udders, the formulæ *svāhā*, *vashat*, *hanta*, and *svadhā*. The gods live upon her two udders, *svāhā* and *vasiṭ*; men upon *hanta*; and the fathers upon *svadhā*. Breath is her bull; the mind, her calf.”

The two verses, R.V. viii. 89, 10, and 11, occur in the Nirukta, xi. 28, 29. Roth (in his Illustrations of that work), p. 152, says the unintelligible utterance of Vāch in verse 10, means thunder. Whether this be the case, or not, the word appears to have a more general signification in the next verse, and to refer to speech in general, personified as a divine being. The speech which all the animals utter cannot of course be thunder.

In some of the preceding verses of this hymn there is a curious reference made to some sceptical doubts regarding the existence of Indra; which I quote here, though unconnected with the present subject.

R.V. viii. 3, 4. *Pra su stomam bharata vājayantam Indrāya satyām yadi satyam asti | na Indro asti iti nemah u traḥ aha kah im ddarśa kam abhi stavāma | Ayam asmi jaritah paśya mā iha viśvā jätāni abhi asmi mahnā ! ritasya mā pradiśo varddhayanti adardiro bhuvanā dardarīm |*

“Present to Indra a hymn soliciting food, a true [hymn] if he truly exists. ‘Indra does not exist,’ says some one: ‘who has seen him? whom shall we praise?’ ‘I am here, worshipper’ [answers Indra]; ‘behold me, I surpass all creatures in greatness; the directors of the sacrifice augment me; crushing, I destroy the worlds.’”

Second: the next set of passages which I shall bring forward either refer to Sarasvatī, Vāch, etc. (various names of the goddess of speech, or different personifications of speech, or of prayer), or at least speak of prayer as *divine*.

R.V. i. 8, 11, 12. *Chodayitri sunritānāṁ chetanti sumatiñām | yajnam dadhe Sarasvatī | . . . . dhiyo viśvā virājati |*

"Sarasvatī, who furthers our hymns, and who is cognizant of our prayers, has sustained our sacrifice. . . . She enlightens all intellects."

i. 22, 10. *Āgnāḥ Agne iha avase Hotrāṁ yavishṭha Bhāratīm | Varūtriṁ Dhishanāṁ vaha |*

"Bring here, youthful Agni, to our help, the wives [of the gods], Hotrā, Bhāratī, Varūtrī, and Dhishanā."

(*Varūtrī*, "the eligible," may be merely an epithet of Dhishanā which, according to Sāyana, at least, is = *vāg-devī*, "the goddess of speech.")

i. 31, 11. *Iḷām akriṇvan manushasya śāsanīm ityādi |*

"The gods made Iḷā to be the instructress of men." (See Professor Wilson's note on this passage, p. 82 of his translation of the R.V. vol. i.)

ii. 3, 8. *Sarasvatī sādhayantī dhiyaṁ nah Iḷā devī Bhāratī viśvatūrtiḥ | Tisro devīḥ svadhayā barhir edam achhidram pāntū śaraṇāṁ ni-shadya |*

"May Sarasvatī, perfecting our hymn, may the divine Iḷā, and the all-pervading Bhāratī; may these three goddesses, seated on the place of sacrifice, preserve by their power the sacrificial grass uninjured." (See Prof. Müller's translation of part of the verse in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, vol. iii. p. 224.)

iii. 18, 3. . . . *Yāvad iṣe brahmaṇā vandamānah imāṁ dhiyaṁ śata-seyāya devīm |*

"Worshipping thee with a prayer according to the best of my power, in this *divine* hymn, to obtain unbounded wealth."

iv. 43, 1. *Ka u śravat katamo yajñiyānāṁ vandāru devāḥ katamo jushāte | kasya imāṁ devīm amṛiteshu preshṭhāṁ hrīdi śreshyāma sush-tutīṁ suhavyām |*

"Who will hear us? which of all the objects of adoration? which of all the gods will be gratified by our praises? In the heart of whom among the immortals can we lodge this our *divine* and dearest hymn of praise and invocation?"

vii. 34, 1. *Pra śukrā etu devī manīshā asmat sutashṭo ratho na vājī |*

"May prayer, brilliant and *divine*, proceed from us, like a well-fabricated chariot drawn by steeds."

vii. 34, 9. *Abhi vo devīm dhiyaṁ<sup>25</sup> dadidhvam pra vo devatrā vāohāṁ kriṇudhvam |*

<sup>25</sup> Compare the same phrase *dhiyam devīm* in A.V. iii. 15, 3, and *daivyā vāchā* in A.V. viii. 1, 3.

"Receive towards you the *divine* hymn ; proclaim the song for yourselves among the gods."

viii. 27, 13. *Devaṁ devaṁ huvema vājasātaye grīnanto devyā dhiyā |*

"Let us invoke each of the gods to bestow riches, praising them with a *divine* hymn."

viii. 90, 16. *Vacho-vidaṁ vācham udīrayantiṁ viśvābhir dhībhir upatishṭhamānām | devīṁ devebhyaḥ pari eyushīṁ gām ā mā avrikta marttyo dabhrachetāḥ |*

"Let not any mortal of little intelligence do violence to the cow, the divine Vāch, who is skilled in praise, who utters her voice aloud, who arrives with all the hymns, and who has come from the gods."

ix. 33, 5. *Abhi brahmīr anūshata yahvīr ritasya mātarō marmrijyante divāḥ śisūm |*

"The great and sacred mothers of the sacrifice have uttered praise : they decorate the child of the sky."

x. 71, 1. *Brihaspate prathamāṁ vācho agrāṁ yat praīrata nāmadheyaṁ dadhānāḥ | yad eshāṁ śreshṭhaṁ yad aripram āśit preṇā tad eshāṁ nihitāṁ guhā āviḥ | 2. Saktum iva titaunā punanto yatra dhrīrāḥ manasā vācham akrata | atra sakhyāyah sakhyāni jānate bhadrā eshāṁ lakshmīr nihitā adhi vāchi | 3. Yajnena vāchah padavīyam āyan tām anvavindann rishishu pravishṭām | tām ābhṛitya vyadadhūḥ purutrā tām sapta rebhāḥ abhi sannavante | 4. Uta tvāḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācham uta tvāḥ śrinvan na śrinoti enām | uto tvasmai tanvāṁ visasre jāyeva patye uśalī suvāsāḥ | 5. Uta tvāṁ sakhye sthirapitam āhur naināṁ hinvanty api vājineshu | adhenvā charati māyayā esha vāchaṁ suśruvān aphalūm apushpām | 6. Yas tityāja sachi-vidāṁ sakhyām na tasya vāchi api bhāgo asti | yad iṁ śrinoti alakaṁ śrinoti na hi praveda sukṛitasya panthām |*

"1. When, o Brihaspati, men sent forth the first and earliest utterance of Vāch (speech), giving a name (to things), then all which was treasured within them, the most excellent and spotless, was disclosed through love. 2. Wherever the wise,—cleansing, as it were, meal with a sieve,—have uttered speech with intelligence, there friends recognize [their] friendly acts; an auspicious fortune is impressed upon their speech. 3. Through sacrifice they followed the track of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis : <sup>28</sup> taking, they divided her into many portions: her the seven poets celebrate. 4. One man, seeing, sees not

<sup>28</sup> See the use made by Śankara of this text, above, p. 105.

Vāch ; another, hearing, hears her not; to another she discloses her form, as an elegantly attired and loving wife displays her person to her husband. 5. They say that one man has a sure defence in [her] friendship; men cannot overwhelm him even in the conflicts (of discussion); but that man consorts with an unprofitable delusion who has [only] heard speech [Vāch] which is [to him] without fruit or flower. 6. He who has abandoned his discerning friend, has no portion in Vāch ; whatever he hears he hears in vain; he knows not the path of virtue."

The second, fourth, and fifth verses of this obscure hymn are quoted in the Nirukta, iv. 10; i. 19, 20; and are explained in Professor Roth's Illustrations. Verses 2 and 4 are also quoted and interpreted in the Mahābhāshya; see pp. 30 and 31 of Dr. Ballantyne's edition. The verse which is of most importance for my present purpose, is, however, the third, which speaks of Vāch having "entered into the rishis." See the First Volume of this work, pp. 254 f. The idea of Vāch being divided into many portions will be found again below in R.V. x. 125, 3.

x. 110, 8 (=Vāj. S. 29, 33). *Ā no yajnam Bhāratī tūyam etu Iḷā manushvad iha chetayanti | tiero devīr barhir āśadam syonām Sarasvatī svapasaḥ sadantu |*

"Let Bhāratī come quickly here to our sacrifice, with Iḷā, who instructs us like Manush [or like a man], and with Sarasvatī: let these three goddesses, skilful in rites, sit down upon this beautiful sacrificial grass."

x. 125, 3. *Ahaṁ rāshṭri sangamanī vasūnām chikitushī prathamā yajniyānām | tūm mā devā vyadadhuh purutrā bhūristhātrām bhūri āveśayantim | 4. Mayā so annam atti yo vipaśyati yah prāniti ya ṛm śrinoti uktam | amantavo mām te upa kshiyanti śrudhi śruta śraddhvām te vadāmi | 5. Aham eva svayam idām vadāmi jushṭām devebhir uta mānusheshbhiḥ | yaṁ kāmaye taṁ tam ugraṁ kṛinomi tam brahmāṇām tam rishiṁ taṁ sumedhām |*

"3. I am the queen, the centre of riches, intelligent, the first of the objects of adoration: the gods have separated me into many portions, have assigned me many abodes, and made me widely pervading. 4. He who has insight, he who lives, he who hears [my] sayings, eats food through me. These men dwell in my vicinity, devoid of understanding. Listen, thou who art learned, I declare to thee what is worthy of belief. 5. It is even I myself who make known this which is agreeable

both to gods and men. Him whom I love I make terrible, [I make] him a priest, [I make] him a rishi, [I make] him intelligent.”<sup>27</sup>

x. 176, 2. *Pra devaṁ devyā dhiyā bharata Jätavedasam havyā no vakshad ānushak |*

“By divine prayer bring hither Jätavedas: may he present our oblations in order.”

x. 177, 1. *Patangam aktam asurasya māyayā hrīdū paśyanti manasā vipaśchitah | sumudre antaḥ kavayo vichakshate marīchīnām padam ichhanti vedhasah |* 2. *Patango vācham manasā bibhartti tūm Gandharvo avadad garbhe antaḥ | tūm dyotamānām svaryam manīshām ritasya pade kavayo nipānti |*

“1. Sages behold with the heart and mind the Bird illuminated by the wisdom of the Asura: the wise perceive him in the (aerial) ocean: the intelligent seek after the abode of his rays. 2. The Bird cherishes speech with his mind: the Gandharva hath uttered her in the womb: the bards preserve in the place of sacred rites this shining and celestial intellect.” (See also x. 189, 3, *vāk patangāya dhiyate*.)

Third: I shall now adduce the passages in which other Vedic deities, whether singly or in concert, are spoken of as concerned in the production of the hymns:

*Aditi.*—In R.V. viii. 12, 14, Aditi is mentioned as fulfilling this function:

*Yad uta svarāje Aditiḥ stomam Indrāya jījanat puru-praśastam ūtaye ityādi |*

“When Aditi generated for the self-resplendent Indra a hymn abounding in praises, to supplicate succour,” etc.

*Agni.*—R.V. i. 18, 6, 7.—*Sadasaspatim abhutam priyam Indrasya kāmyam | sanim medhām ayāśisham | yasmād rite na siddhyati yajno vipaśchitāś chana | sa dhīnām yogam invati |*

“6. I have resorted, for wisdom, to Sadasaspati (Agni), the wonderful, the dear, the beloved of Indra, the beneficent; (7) without whom

<sup>27</sup> This passage, which is commonly understood of Vāch, occurs also in the Atharvaveda, iv. 30, 2 ff., but with some various readings, as *āvesayantaḥ* for *āvesayantim*, and *śraddheyam* for *śraddhivam*, etc. The hymn is translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Ess. i. 32, or p. 16 of Williams and Norgate’s edition. Professor Whitney, as I learn from a private communication with which he has favoured me, is of opinion that there is nothing in the language of the hymn which is specially appropriate to Vāch, so as to justify the ascription of it to her as the supposed utterer.

the sacrifice of the wise does not succeed : he promotes the course of our hymns."

iv. 5, 3. *Sāma dvi-barhāḥ mahi tigma-bhrishṭih sahasra-retāḥ vrishabhas tuvishmān | padaṁ na gor apagūlhaṁ vividvān Agniḥ mahyāṁ pra id u vochad manishām |* 6. *Idam me Agne kiyate pāvaka aminate gurum bhāraṁ na manma | Brihad dadhātha dhrishatā gabhiraṁ yahvam prishṭham prayasā saptadhātu |*

"Agni occupying two positions, the fierce-flaming, the infinitely prolific, the vigorous, the powerful, who knows the great hymn, mysterious as the track of a [missing] cow, has declared to me the knowledge [of it]. 6. To me who am feeble, though innoxious, thou, o Agni, the luminous, hast given, as a heavy load, this great, profound, and extensive Prishṭha hymn, of seven elements, with efficacious oblations."

iv. 6, 1. *Tvaṁ hi viśvam abhi asi manma pra vedhasaś chit tirasi manishām |*

"Thou presidest over all thoughts [or prayers]; thou augmentest the intelligence of the sage."

iv. 11, 3. *Tvad Agne kāvyā tvad manishās tvad ukthā jāyante rādhyāni |*

"From thee, Agni, are generated poetic thoughts; from thee the products of the mind; from thee effective hymns."

x. 21, 5. *Agnir jāto Atharvanā vidad viśvāni kāvyā |*

"Agni, generated by Atharvan, is acquainted with all wisdom."

x. 91, 8. . . . *Medhakāram vidathasya prasādhanam Agnim ityādi |*

"Agni, the giver of understanding, the accomplisher of sacrifice."

x. 4, 5. *Yad vo vayam pramināmo vratāni vidushām devāḥ avidustarāsaḥ | Agnis tad viśvam āprināti vidvān yebhir devān ritubhiḥ kalpa-yāti | Yat pākatrā manasā dāna-dakshāḥ na yajnasya manvate martyā-saḥ | Agnis tad hotā kratuvid vijānan yajishtho devān rituso yajāti |*

"When, o [ye] gods, we, the most unwise among the wise, transgress the ordinances of your worship, the wise Agni completes them all, at the stated seasons which he assigns to the gods. When men, devoted to sacrifice, do not, from their ignorance, rightly comprehend the mode of worship, Agni, the skilful sacrificer, and most eminent of priests, knowing the ceremonial, worships the gods at the proper seasons."

(As rites and hymns were closely united in the practice of the early Indians, the latter finding their application at the former; if Agni was

supposed to be the director of the one, viz., the oblations, he might easily come to be also regarded as aiding in the production of the other—the hymns. Verse 4 occurs also in the A.V. xix. 59, 1, 2, where, however, *āprinātu* is read instead of *āprināti*, and in place of the words *yebhir devān*, etc., at the close of the verse, we have, *somaś oha yo brāhmaṇān ā viveśa !* “and Soma, who entered into the priests.”)

*Brahmanaspati*.—R.V. i. 40, 5, 6. *Pra nūnam Brahmanaspatir mantrām vadati ukthyam | yasmīn Indro Varuno Mitrah Aryamā devāḥ okāṁsi chakrire | Tam id vochēma vidatheshu śambhuvam mantrām devāḥ anehasam ityādi |*

“*Brahmanaspati* (abiding in the worshipper’s mouth, according to the scholiast) utters the hymn accompanied with praise, in which the gods, Indra, Varuna, Mitra, and Aryaman, have made their abode. Let us utter, gods, at sacrifices, that spotless hymn, conferring felicity.” (Roth in his Lexicon considers *okas* to mean “good pleasure,” “satisfaction.” See also his Essay on Brahma and the Brāhmans, Journal of the Germ. Or. Soc. i. 74.)

*Brihaspati*.—R.V. ii. 23, 2. *Usrāḥ iva sūryo jyotishā maho viśveshām ij janitā brahmaṇām asi |*

“As the sun by his lustre instantly generates rays, so art thou (*Brihaspati*) the generator of all prayers.”

x. 36, 5. *Ā Indro barkih sīdatu pinvatām Ilā Brihaspatih sāmabhir rikvo archatu |*

“Let Indra sit upon the sacred grass; let Ilā abound in her gifts; let the bard Brihaspati offer praise with hymns.”

*Gandharva*.—According to Professor Roth (see under the word in his Lexicon) the Gandharva is represented in the Veda as a deity who knows and reveals the secrets of heaven, and divine truths in general; in proof of which he quotes the following texts:

R.V. x. 139, 5. *Viśvāvasur abhi tad no grīnātu divyo Gandharvo rajaso vimānah | Yad vā ghā satyam uta yad na viśma dhiyo hinvāno dhiyah id naḥ aryāḥ*

“May the celestial Gandharva Viśvāvasu, who is the measurer of the atmosphere, declare to us that which is true, or which we know not. May he stimulate our hymns, and may he prosper our hymns.

A.V. ii. 1, 2. *Pra tad voched amṛitasya vidvān Gandharvo dhāma paramān guhā yat |*

"May the Gandharva, who knows the (secret of) immortality, declare to us that supreme and mysterious abode."

*Indra*.—R.V. iii. 54, 17. *Mahat tad vah kavayaś chāru nāma yad ha devāḥ bhavatha viśve Indre | sakhaḥ Ribhubhiḥ puruhūta priyebhir imām dhiyām sātaye takshata nah |*

"Great, o sage deities, is that cherished distinction of yours, that ye are all associated with Indra. Do thou, much invoked (Indra), our friend, with the beloved Ribhus, fabricate (or dispose) this hymn for our welfare." (This may merely mean that Indra was asked to give a favourable issue to the prayer of the worshipper, not to compose his hymn for him. See Roth's Lexicon, under the word *taksh*, 3.)

vi. 62, 3. *Tvāṁ kaviñ chodayaḥ arkasātāv ityādi |*

"Thou (Indra) didst stimulate the poet in the composition of his hymns," etc. (Sāyana renders *arkasātāu*, "for the sake of finding food.")

vi. 18, 15. *Krishva kritno akritaṁ yat te asti ukthaṁ navīyo janayasva yajnaiḥ |*

"Energetic (Indra), do what thou hast never yet done; generate a new hymn with the sacrifices."

vi. 34, 1. *Saṁ cha tve jagmūr girah Indra pūrvir vi cha tvad yanti vibhvo manishāḥ |*

"Many hymns are congregated in thee, o Indra, and numerous products of the mind issue from thee." (This half-verse has been already quoted in p. 227.)

vi. 47, 10. *Indra mrīla mahyām jīvātum ichcha chodaya dhiyam ayaso na dhārām | Yat kincha ahaṁ tvāyur idām vadāmi taj jushasva kridhi mā devavantam |*

"O Indra, gladden me, decree life for me, sharpen my intellect like the edge of an iron instrument. Whatever I, longing for thee, now utter, do thou accept; give me divine protection." (Compare with the word *chodaya* the use of the word *prachodayāt* in the Gāyatrī, R.V. iii. 62, 10, which will be given below.)

vii. 97, 3. *Tam u namasā havirbhiḥ suśevam Brahmanaspatim grīniṣhe | Indram sloko mahi daivyah sishtaku yo brahmaṇo devakṛitasya rājā | 5. Tam ā no arkam amṛitāya jushṭam ime dhāsur amṛitāsaḥ purājāḥ ityādi |*

"3. I invoke with reverence and with offerings the beneficent Brahmanaspati. Let a great and divine song celebrate Indra, who is king

of the prayer *made by the gods.* 5. May these ancient immortals make this our hymn acceptable to the immortal," etc.

viii. 13, 7. *Pratna-vaj janaya girah sriṇudhi jaritur havam |*

" As of old, generate hymns; hear the invocation of thy worshipper."

viii. 52, 4. *Sa pratnathā kavi-vridhāḥ Indro vākasya vakshāṇīḥ |*

"Indra was of old the promoter of the poet, and the augmenter of the song."

viii. 78, 6. *Yaj jāyathā apūrvya Maghavan Vṛittra-hatyāya | tat pri-thivim aprathayas tad astabhnāḥ uta dyām | 7. Tat te yajno ajāyata tad arkaḥ uta haskrītiḥ | tad viśvam abhibhūr asi yaj jātañ yach cha jantvam |*

"When, o unparalleled Maghavan, thou wast born to slay Vṛittra, thou didst then spread out the earth (the broad one) and sustain the sky: then thy sacrifice was produced, *then the hymn*, and the haskrīti: (since) then thou surpassest everything that has been, or shall be, born."

Here therefore the hymn is asserted to be as old as Indra; though nothing more need be meant than that hymns then began to be produced. The hymn in which this verse occurs is not necessarily meant.

x. 112, 9. *Ni shu sida ganapate ganesu tvām āhur vīpratamañ kari-nām | na rite tvat kriyate kinchana āre mahām arkam Maghavan chitram archa |*

"Lord of assemblies, sit amid our multitudes; they call thee the wisest of poets. *Nothing is done without, or apart from thee; sing, o Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn.*" (Already quoted in p. 252.)

*Indra and Vishnu*.—R.V. vi. 69, 2. *Yā viśvāsāñ janitārā matinām Indrā-Vishnū kalaśā soma-dhānā | Pra vāñ girah śasyamānāḥ avantu pra stomāso gīyamānāsaḥ arkaiḥ |*

"Indra and Vishnu, ye who are the *generators* of all hymns, who are the vessels into which soma is poured, may the praises which are now recited gratify you, and the songs which are chanted with encomiums."

*Indra and Varuna*.—The following passage is not, properly speaking, a portion of the Rig-veda, as it is part of one of the Vālakhilyas or apocryphal additions (described in Vol. II. p. 210), which are found inserted between the 48th and 49th hymns of the 8th Mandala. From its style, however, it appears to be nearly as old as some parts of the R.V.

xi. 6. *Indrāvarunā yad rishibhyo manishām vācho matiñ śrutam adattam agre | yāni sthānāny asrijanta dhīrāḥ yajnañ tanvānās tapasā*

“Indra and Varuna, I have seen through austere-fervour that which ye formerly gave to the rishis, wisdom, understanding of speech, sacred lore, and all the places which the sages created, when performing sacrifice.” (See Vol. II. p. 220.)

*The Maruts*.—R.V. viii. 78, 3. *Pra vah Indrāya brihate Maruto brahma archata* |

“Sing, Maruts, your hymn to the great Indra.” (Compare verse 1, of the same hymn, and the words *brahmakṛtā Mārutena ganena* in iii. 32, 2.)

*Pūshan*.—R.V. x. 26, 4. *Māṁśimahi tvā vayam asmākaṁ deva Pūshan matināṁ cha sādhanam viprāṇāṁ cha ādhavam* |

“We have called thee to mind, divine Pūshan, the accomplisher of our hymns, and the stimulator of sages.” (The first clause of this, however, may merely mean that the god gives effect to the wishes expressed in the hymns. Compare vi. 56, 4: *Yad adya tvā purushṭuta bravāma dasra mantumah | tat su no manna sādhaya* | “Accomplish for us the (objects of the) hymn, which we utter to thee to-day, o powerful and wise god.”)

*Savitri*.—R.V. iii. 62 (= S.V. ii. 812, and Vāj. S. iii. 35). *Tat Sat-vitur varenyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi | dhiyo yo naḥ prachodayāt* |

“We have received that excellent glory of the divine Savitri; may he stimulate our understandings [or hymns, or rites].”

(This is the celebrated Gāyatrī, the most sacred of all the texts in the Veda. See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. pp. 29, 30, 127, and 175; or pp. 14, 15, 78, and 109 of Williams and Norgate's ed. Benfey (S.V. p. 277) translates the Gāyatrī thus: “May we receive the glorious brightness of this, the generator, of the god who shall prosper our works.” On the root from which the word *dhīmahi* is derived, and its sense, see also Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.vv. *dhā* and *dhī*; and compare my article “On the Interpretation of the Veda,” Journ. Roy. As. Soc. p. 372.

The Linga Purāna (Part II. sec. 48, 5 ff., Bombay lithographed ed.) gives the following “varieties” of the Gāyatrī, adapted to modern Saiva worship :

*Gāyatrī-bhedāḥ | Tatpurushāya vidmahe vāg-viśuddhāya dhīmahi | Tan naḥ S'ivāḥ prachodayāt | Ganāmbikāyai vidmahe karma-siddhyai cha dhīmahi | Tan no Gaurī prachodayāt | Tatpurushāya vidmahe Mahā-*

*devāya dhīmahi | Tan no Rudraḥ prachodayāt | Tatpurushāya vidmahe  
Vakratundāya dhīmahi | Tan no Dantih prachodayāt | Mahāsenāya vid-  
mahe vāg-viśuddhāya dhīmahi | Tan naḥ Skandah prachodayāt | Tīkshna-  
śringāya vidmahe Vedapādāya dhīmahi | Tan no Vṛishah prachodayād  
ityādi |*

“1. We contemplate That Purusha, we meditate <sup>28</sup> him who is pure in speech; may That Siva stimulate us. 2. We contemplate Ganāmbikā, and we meditate Karmasiddhi (the accomplishment of works); may That Gaurī stimulate us. 3. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Mahādeva; may that Rudra stimulate us. 4. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Vakratunda (Ganeśa); may That Danti (the elephant) stimulate us. 5. We contemplate Mahāsena (Kūrtikeya, and we meditate him who is pure in speech; may That Skanda stimulate us. 6. We contemplate Tīkshṇaśringa (the sharp-horned), and we meditate the Veda-footed; may Vṛisha (the bull) stimulate us.”

*Soma.—R.V. vi. 47, 3. Ayam me pītaḥ udīyartti vācham ayam mani-  
shām uśatīm ajīgaḥ |*

“This [soma], when drunk, stimulates my speech [or hymn]; this called forth the ardent thought.”

It may be said that this and the other following texts relating to Soma, should not be quoted as proofs that any idea of divine inspiration was entertained by the ancient Indian bards, as they can mean nothing more than that the rishis were sensible of a stimulating effect on their thoughts and powers of expression, produced by the exhilarating draughts of the juice of that plant in which they indulged. But the rishis had come to regard Soma as a god, and apparently to be passionately devoted to his worship. See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 470 ff., and especially pp. 474, 475; and my account of this deity in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 135 ff.

Compare what is said of the god Dionysus (or Bacchus) in the *Bacchae* of Euripides, 294 :

Μάντις δ' δαίμων ὅδε· τὸ γὰρ βακχεύσιμον  
Καὶ τὸ μανιῶδες μαντικὴν πολλήν ἔχει.  
Οταν γὰρ δ θεὸς 'eis τὸ σῶμ' ἔλθῃ πολύ,  
Λέγειν τὸ μέλλον τοὺς μεμηνότας ποει.

<sup>28</sup> I retain here this sense of the word, which is probably the most commonly received.

"And this deify is a prophet. For Bacchic excitement and raving have in them much prophetic power. For when this god enters in force into the body, he causes those who rave to foretell the future."

R.V. viii. 48, 3. *Apāma somam amṛitāḥ abhūma aganma jyotir avi-dāma devān | kiṁ nūnam asmān kṛinavat̄ arātiḥ kim u dhūrttīr amṛita martyasya |*

"We have drunk the soma, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known the gods; what can an enemy now do to us? what can the malice of any mortal effect, o immortal god?"<sup>29</sup>

(This passage is quoted in the commentary of Gauḍapāda on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 2, and is translated (incorrectly as regards the last clause), by Prof. Wilson, in p. 13 of his English version.)

A curious parallel to this last Vedic text is to be found in the satirical drama of Euripides, the Cyclops, 578 ff.; though there, of course, the object is merely to depict the drunken elevation of the monster Polyphemus :

'Ο δ' ὅρανός μοι συμμεμιγμένος δοκεῖ  
Τῇ γῇ φέρεσθαι, τοῦ Διὸς τε τὸν θρόνον  
Λεύσσω τὸ πᾶν τε δαιμόνων ἀγνὸν σέβας.

"The sky, commingled with the earth, appears  
To whirl around; I see the throne of Jove,  
And all the awful glory of the gods."

R.V. ix. 25, 5. *Arusho janayan giraḥ Somaḥ pavate āyushāg Indrañ gachchan kavikratuḥ |*

"The ruddy Soma, generating hymns, with the powers of a poet (or with the understanding of a sage), united with men, is purified, resorting to Indra."

ix. 76, 4. . . . *Pilā matinām asamashṭa-kāvyāḥ |*

"[Soma] father of our hymns, of incomparable wisdom."

ix. 95, 2. *Hariḥ srijānaḥ pathyām ritasya iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam | devo devānām guhyāni nāma āvishkrinoti barhishi pravāche |*

<sup>29</sup> This text may be versified as follows:

We've quaffed the soma bright,  
And are immortal grown;  
We've entered into light,  
And all the gods have known.  
What foeman now can harm,  
Or mortal vex us, more?  
Through thee, beyond alarm,  
Immortal god, we soar.

"The golden [Soma] when poured out along the path of the ceremony, sends forth his voice, as a rower propels a boat. A god, he reveals the mysterious natures of the gods to the bard upon the sacred grass." (See R.V. ii. 42, 1, and x. 116, 9, quoted in p. 240.)

ix. 96, 5 (= S.V. ii. 293-5). *Somah pavate janitā matinām janitā divo janitā prithivyāḥ | janitā Agner janitā sūryasya janitā Indrasya janitā uta Vishnoḥ |* 6. *Brahmā devānām padavīḥ kavīnām ṛshir vīprānām mahisho mrigānām | śyeno gridhrāṇām svadhitir vanānām Somah pavi-tram ati eti rebhan |* 7. *Prāvīvipad vāchāḥ ūrmīm na sindhur girāḥ somah pavamāno maniṣhāḥ ityādi |*

"Soma is purified, he who is the generator of hymns, of Dyaus, of Prithivī, of Agni, of Sūrya, of Indra, and of Vishnu. 6. Soma, who is a brāhmān-priest among the gods (or priests),<sup>30</sup> a leader among the poets, a rishi among sages, a buffalo among wild beasts, a falcon among vultures, an axe amid the forests, advances to the filter with a sound. The purified Soma, like the sea rolling its waves, has poured forth songs, hymns, and thoughts," etc. (See Benfey's translation of this passage in his Sāma-veda, pp. 238 and 253; and Nirukta-pariśiṣṭā, ii. 12, 13.)

*Varuna*.—R.V. viii. 41, 5, 6. *Yo dharttā bhuvanānām yaḥ usrānām apīchyā veda nāmāni guhyā | sa kavīḥ kāvyā puru rūpam dyaur ivu pushyati . . . . | Yasmin viśvāni kāvyā chakre nābhīr ivi śritā ityādi |*

"He who is the upholder of the worlds (Varuna), who knows the secret and mysterious natures of the cows, he, a sage [or poet], manifests sage [or poetical] works, as the sky does many forms. . . . In him all sage works abide, as the nave within a wheel," etc. (See R.V. vii. 87, 4, in p. 248, and ix. 95, 2, above, in this page.)

*Varuna, Mitra, and Aryaman*.—R.V. vii. 66, 11. *Vi ye dadhuḥ śaram ad māsam ād ahar yajnam aktum cha ād ṛcham | anāpyam Varuno Mitrah Aryamā kshatram rājānah āsata |*

"The kings, Varuna, Mitra, and Aryaman, who made the autumn, the month, and then the day, the sacrifice, night, and then the Rich, possess an unrivalled power."<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> It appears from Prof. Benfey's note on S.V. ii. 294 (= R.V. ix. 96, 6, quoted here), that the scholiast on that passage makes *devānām* = *ṛitvijām*, "priests."

<sup>31</sup> As this verse ascribes the formation of the Rich to the gods who are named in it, my remark, in p. 3 above, that the Purusha Sūkta contains "the only passage in

The following passage of the Rig-veda has (as we have seen above, p. 69, note 79, and p. 75) been quoted by Indian commentators and aphorists to prove the eternity of the Veda, on its own authority :

R.V. viii. 64, 6. *Tasmai nūnam abhidyave vāchā Virūpa nityayā | vrishne chodasva sushtutim |*

"Send forth praises, Virūpa, to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, with *perpetual voice*." (See i. 45, 3, etc., quoted above, p. 220.)

There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose that the words *nityayā vāchā* mean anything more than *perpetual voice*. There is no ground for imagining that the rishi entertained any such conception as became current among the systematic theologians of later times, that his words were eternal. The word *nitya* is used in the same sense "perpetual" in R.V. ix. 12, 7 (= S.V. ii. 55, 2), where it is said of Soma : *nitya-stotro vanaspatis dhinām antar ityādi |* "The monarch of the woods, *continually-praised*, among the hymns," etc., as well as in the two following texts :

R.V. ix. 92, 3.—*Somah punānah sadah eti nityam ityādi |*

"The pure Soma comes to his *perpetual* abode [or to his abode *continually*], etc.

x. 39, 14 (quoted above, p. 236). *Nityām na sūnum tanayaṁ da-dhānāḥ |*

"Continuing the series like an *unbroken* line of descendants."

The tenor of the numerous texts adduced in this Section seems clearly to establish the fact that some at least of the ancient Indian rishis conceived themselves to be prompted and directed, in the composition of their hymns and prayers, by supernatural aid, derived from various deities of their pantheon. It may add force to the proof derived from these texts, and show that I am the less likely to have misunderstood their purport and spirit, if I adduce some evidence that a similar conception was not unknown in another region of the ancient Indo-European world, and that the expressions in which the early Grecian bards laid claim to an inspiration emanating from the Muses, or from Apollo, were not mere figures of speech, but significant, originally, of a popular belief. Most of the following passages, from Hesiod the hymns of the R.V. in which the creation of the Vedas is described," requires some qualification.

and Homer, in which this idea is enunciated, are referred to in Mr. Grote's History of Greece, i. 478.

Hesiod, Theogony, 22 :

"Αι νύ ποθ' Ἡσίδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδὴν  
Ἄρνας ποιμάνονθ' Ἐλικῶνος ὅπο ζαθέουσι.  
Τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπαν,  
Μοῦσαι· Ολυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς διγυόχοιο.  
Ποιμένες ἄγραντοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες διον,  
Ἴδμεν φεύδεια πολλὰ λέγειν ἐπέμοισιν δμοῖα,  
Ἴδμεν δ', οὐτ' ἀθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα μοθῆσασθαι.  
Ὦς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλον Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαν·  
Καὶ μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον, δάφνης ἐριθηλέος δῖον,  
Δρέψασαι δηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι ἀνδήν  
Θεῖην, ὡς κλείσμι τὰ τ' ἐσπόμενα, πρὸ τ' ἐόντα,  
Καὶ με κέλονθ' ὑμεῖν μακάρων γένος ἀὲν ἐόντων,  
Σφᾶς τ' ἀντὰς πρώτον τέ καὶ ὑστερον ἀὲν δεῖδειν.

"The Muses once conferred the dower  
On Hesiod of poetic power,  
As underneath the sacred steep  
Of Helicon he fed his sheep.  
And thus they spake, 'Inglorious race  
Of rustic shepherds, gluttons base,  
Full many fictions we can weave  
Which by their truthlike air deceive;  
But, know, we also have the skill  
True tales to tell, whence'er we will.'  
They spake, and gave into my hand  
A fair luxuriant laurel wand;  
And breathed into me speech divine,  
That two-fold science might be mine;  
That future scenes I might unveil,  
And of the past unfold the tale.  
They bade me hymn the race on high  
Of blessed gods who never die;  
And evermore begin my lays,  
And end them, with the Muses' praise."

Hesiod, Theogony, 94 :

"Ἐκ γὰρ Μουσάδων καὶ ἐκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος  
Ἄνδρες δοιδοὶ ἔσοντι ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταὶ,  
Ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆes.

"The bards who strike the lyre and sing,  
From Phœbus and the Muses spring:  
From Jove's high race descends the king."

The following are the words in which the author of the Iliad invokes the aid of the Muses, to qualify him for enumerating the generals of the Grecian host (Iliad, ii. 484) :

Ἐστετε γῦ μοι Μοῦσαι Ολύμπια δωμάτ' ἔχουσαι,  
Τμῆς γὰρ θεαὶ ἔστε πάρεστέ τε ἵστε τε πάντα,  
Ημὲis δὲ κλέος διοι δικούομεν δυδέ τι θίμεν.

"Tell me the truth, ye Muses, tell,  
Ye who on high Olympus dwell ;  
For, omnipresent, ye can scan  
Whate'er on earth is done by man,  
Whilst we vague rumours only learn  
And nothing certain can discern."

But the Muses could also take away, as well as impart, the gift of song, as appears from Iliad, ii. 594 ff. :

Ἐνθα τε Μοῦσαι  
'Αντόμεναι Θάμυριν τὸν Θρήικα παῦσαν δοιδῆς·  
Στεῦτο γὰρ ἐνχόμενος νικησέμεν, έπειρ δὲν δυταί  
Μοῦσαι δεῖδοιεν, κοῦραι Διὸς διγιόχοιο.  
'Αι δὲ χολωσάμεναι πηρὸν θέσαν, δυτὰρ δοιδῆν  
Θεσπεσίην αφέλοντο, καὶ ἐκλέλαθον κιθαριστὸν.

" 'Twas there the Muses, we are told,  
Encountered Thamyris of old.  
He boasted that the minstrel throng  
To him must yield the prize of song ;  
Yes, even although, among the rest,  
The Muses should the palm contest.  
Aware of his presumption, they  
Both took his skill in song away,  
And power to wake the tuneful lyre ;—  
And struck him blind, in vengeful ire."

The following passages from the Odyssey refer to Demodocus, the bard who sang at the court of Alcinous, King of the Phaeacians (Odyssey, viii. 43 ff.):

Καλέσασθε δε θεῖον δοιδόν,  
Δημόδοκον τῷ γάρ ῥα θεὸς πέρι δῶκεν δοιδήν,  
Τέρπειν, ὅπῃ θυμὸς ἐποτρύνγσιν δεῖδειν.

" And go, the bard divine invite —  
The god hath given him skill  
By song all others to delight,  
Whenever he may will.

Odyssey, viii. 62 ff. :

Κῆρυξ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἤλθεν ἄγαν ἐριήρον δοιδόν  
Τὸν πέρι Μοῦσ' ἐφίλησε δίδου δ' ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε,  
Οφθαλμῶν μὲν κύμερσε δίδου δ' ἡδεῖαν δοιδήν.

" The herald came, and within him brought  
The bard whom all with longing sought.  
The Muse's darling, he had good  
As well as ill from her received ;  
With power of dulcet song endued,  
But of his eyesight too bereaved."

Here the Muse is described as the arbitress of the bard's destiny in other points besides the gift and withdrawal of song.

*Odyssey*, viii. 73 :

*Μοῦσ' ἡρ' δοιδὸν ἀνῆκεν δειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν κ.τ.λ*

"Stirr'd by the Muse the bard extoll'd  
In song the deeds of warriors bold."

A little further on, Ulysses says of Demodocus (*Odyssey*, viii. 479 ff.):

*Πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθράποισθν ἐπιχθωνίοισιν δοιδοί  
Τιμῆς ἔμμοροι εἰσι καὶ ἀιδοῦς, θυνεκ' ἄρα σφέας  
Οὐιμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ φῦλον ἀοιδῶν.*

"All mortal men with awe regard,  
And honourably treat, the bard ;  
Because the Muse has taught him lays,  
And dearly loves his tuneful race."

And again he addresses him thus (*Odyssey*, viii. 487) :

*Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δὴ σε βροτῶν ἀνήσουμ' ἀπάντων.  
Ἡ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε Διὸς πᾶσι, ἡ σέ γ' Απόδλλων.  
Λίγην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν διτον ἀείδεις, κ.τ.λ.*

"Demodocus, beyond the rest  
Of mortals I esteem thee blest.  
For thee, the Muse, Jove's child, has taught,  
Or Phœbus in thee skill has wrought;  
So perfectly thou dost relate  
The story of the Argives' fate."<sup>32</sup>

Phemius, the Ithacan minstrel, thus supplicates Ulysses to spare his life (*Odyssey*, xxii. 345 ff.):

*'Αυτῷ τοι μετέπισθ' ἄχος ἔσσεται, ἔκεν ἀοιδόν  
Πέρνης, ὃς τε θεῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν δεῖδω.  
'Αυτοδίδακτος δ' ἐμι, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν δύμας  
Παντοῖας ἐνέψυσεν.*

"Thou soon wilt grieve, if thou the bard shouldst slay,  
To gods as well as men who pours his lay.  
Self-taught I am ; and yet within my mind  
A god hath gendered strains of every kind."

<sup>32</sup> "That is," says Mr. Grote, "Demodocus has either been inspired as a poet by the muse, or as a prophet by Apollo, for the Homeric Apollo is not the god of song. Kalchas, the prophet, receives his inspiration from Apollo, who confers upon him the same knowledge, both of past and future, as the Muses give to Hesiod." But does not this passage (*Odyssey* viii. 488) rather show that the Homeric Apollo was the god of song, as well as the bestower of prophetic intuition; and do we not learn the same from *Iliad*, i. 603? In any case, it is quite clear from *Theog.* 94, quoted above, that Hesiod regarded Apollo in this character.

The early Greeks believed that the gift of prophecy also, as well as that of song, was imparted by the gods to mortals. This appears both from Hesiod, as already quoted, and from the following passage of Homer (*Iliad*, i. 69) :

Κάλχας Θεστορίδης, διωνοπόδλων δχ' ἄριστος,  
\*Ος γῆη τά τ' ἔνντα τά τ' ἐστόμενα, πρό τ' ἔνντα,  
Καὶ νήευσ' ἡγήσατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἰλιον ἔισσε,  
\*Ην διὰ μαντοσύνην, τήν δι πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

“Of augurs wisest, Calchas knew  
Things present, past, and future too.  
By force of that divining skill,  
Vouchsafed to him by Phœbus’ will,  
The Grecian fleet he safely bore  
From Aulis’ bay to Ilion’s shorc.”

It is thus argued by Mr. Grote that the early Greeks really believed in the inspiration of their bards by the Muses (*History of Greece*, i. 477 ff.):

“His [the early Greek’s] faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolized meaning : it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt. And if indeed there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success. The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her assisting impulse. She puts the words into his mouth and the incidents into his mind ; he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ, and speaking from ~~her~~ revelations. As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is then left silent and helpless. It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech ; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from

the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them ; nor would it ever have become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry, and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown ; the simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling are exalted ; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in."

If we extend our researches over the pages of Homer, we shall speedily discover numerous other instances of a belief in divine interference in human affairs, not merely (1) in the general government of the world, in the distribution of good and evil, and the allotment of the diversified gifts, intellectual, moral, and physical, which constitute the innumerable varieties of human condition, but also (2) in the way of special suggestion, guidance, encouragement, and protection, afforded to individuals.

Illustrations of the general control exercised by the gods over the fortunes of mankind may be found in the following passages of the Iliad,—xiii. 730 ff., and of the Odyssey,—i. 347 f.; iv. 236 f.; vi. 188 f.; viii. 167–175 ; xvii. 218, 485 ff.

The following are illustrations of the special interference of the gods on behalf of their favourites : Iliad, i. 194 ff., 218; iii. 380 ff.; v. 1 ff.; vii. 272 ; xiii. 60 f., 435 ; xvi. 788 ff. :—Odyssey, i. 319 ff.; iii. 26 ff.; xiv. 216 f., 227 ; xvi. 159 ff.<sup>33</sup> Of the latter class of passages, I quote two specimens.

*Odyssey*, i. 319 ff. :

‘Η μὲν ἄρ δις εἰποῦσα ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,  
‘Ορνις δὲ ὡς ἀντοῖα διέκπειτο· τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ θυμῷ  
Θῆκε μένος καὶ θάρσους, ὑπέμνησέν τέ ἐ πατρός  
Μᾶλλον ἔτ’ ἦ τὸ πάροιθεν δὲ φρεσὶν ἥσι νοῆσας  
Θεμβησεν κατὰ θυμόν, δύσατο γάρ θεὸν ἔναι.

“ As thus she spake, thene flew  
Aloft, and soared beyond his view.  
His soul she filled with force and fire,  
And stronger memory of his sire.  
Amazed, he felt the inward force,  
And deemed a god must be its source.”

<sup>33</sup> Compare Prof. Blackie's dissertation on the theology of Homer in the “Classical Museum,” vol. vii, pp. 414 ff.

When Telemachus urges his youth and inexperience as a reason for diffidence in approaching Nestor, Minerva says to him (*Odyssey*, iii. 26):

Τηλέμαχ', οὐλλα μὲν ἀντὸς ἐν φρεσὶ σῆσι νοήσεις,  
"Αλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται" ὃν γὰρ οὐ  
"Οὐ σε θεῶν δέκητι γενέσθαι τε τραφέμεν τε."

"Some things thy mind itself shall reach,  
And other things a god shall teach;  
For born and bred thou ne'er hadst been  
Unless they gods had will'd, yea ween.

These passages, however, afford only one exemplification of the idea which runs through, and in fact created, the entire mythology of the Greeks, viz. that all the departments of life and of nature were animated, controlled, and governed by particular deities, by whom they were represented, and in whom they were personified.

The Indian mythology,—as is evident to every reader of the *Vedas*, as well as (to some extent) to the student of the *Purāṇas*,—is distinguished by the same tendency as the Grecian. Indra, Agni, Vāyu, Savitri, Sūrya, and many other gods are nothing else than personifications of the elements, while Vāch or Sarasvatī and some other deities, represent either the divine reason by which the more gifted men were supposed to be inspired, or some mental function, or ceremonial abstraction.

In the later religious history, however, of the two races, the Hellenic and the Indian, there is in one respect a remarkable divergence. Though the priestesses of the different oracles, and perhaps some other pretenders to prophetical intuition, were popularly regarded as speaking under a divine impulse,<sup>34</sup> the idea of inspiration as attaching to poems or other compositions of a religious, didactic, or philosophical character, very soon became extinct. The Greeks had no sacred Scriptures. Although a supernatural character was popularly ascribed to Pythagoras, Epimenides, and Empedocles, the Hellenic philosophers in general spoke and wrote in dependance on their own reason alone. They rarely professed to be guided by any supernatural assistance, or claimed any divine authority for their dogmas.<sup>35</sup> Nor (unless such

<sup>34</sup> See Nügelsbach's *Nachhomeriche Theologie*, pp. 173 ff., and Dr. Karl Köhler's *Prophetismus der Hebräer und die Mantik der Griechen in ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältniss*, (Darmstadt, 1860), pp. 39 ff.

<sup>35</sup> I express myself cautiously here, as a learned friend profoundly versed in the study of Plato is of opinion that there are traces in the writings of that author of a

may have been the case at a very late period) was any infallibility claimed for any of them by their successors.

In India, on the other hand, the indistinct, and perhaps hesitating, belief which some of the ancient rishis seem to have entertained in their own inspiration was not suffered to die out in the minds of later generations. On the contrary this belief grew up (as we have seen above, pp. 57–138, and 207 ff.) by degrees into a fixed persuasion that all the literary productions of those early sages had not only resulted from a supernatural impulse, but were infallible, divine, and even eternal. These works have become the sacred Scriptures of India. And in the popular opinion, if not in the estimation of the learned, most Indian works of any importance, of a religious, scientific, or philosophical kind, which were produced at a later period, have come to be regarded as inspired, as soon as the lapse of ages had removed the writers beyond familiar or traditional knowledge, and invested their names with a halo of reverence.

To return from this digression to the inquiry which was being pursued regarding the opinions of the ancient Vedic rishis on the subject of their own inspiration :

How, it will be asked, are we to reconcile this impression which the rishis manifest of being prompted by supernatural aid, with the circumstance, which seems to be no less distinctly proved by the citations made in the preceding section (pp. 232 ff.), that they frequently speak of themselves as having *made, fabricated, or generated* the hymns, without apparently betraying any consciousness that in this process they were inspired or guided by any extraneous assistance ?

In reply to this I will only suggest (1) that possibly the idea of inspiration may not have been held by the earliest rishis, but may have grown up among their successors ; or (2) that it may have been entertained by some rishis, and not by others ; or again (3), if both ideas

claim to supernatural guidance, though by no means to infallibility. See also the mention made of the inspiration ascribed to Pythagoras, in Mr. Grote's Greece, iv. 528, 530 ; and the notices of Epimenides and Empedocles given by the same author, vol. iii. 112 ff., vol. vii. p. 174, and vol. viii. 465 f. ; and compare on the same subjects Bp. Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, ii. 32 ff., and 155 ff. ; and Plato, Legg. i. p. 642. See also Prof. Geddes's Phædo, note P. p. 251, and the passages there referred to ; and the Tract of Dr. Köhler, above cited, pp. 60 and 64.

can be traced to the same author, we may suppose that the one notion was uppermost in his mind at one moment, and the other at another; or (4) that he had no very clearly defined ideas of inspiration, and might conceive that the divine assistance of which he was conscious, or which at least he implored, did not render his hymn the less truly the production of his own mind; that, in short, the existence of a human, was not incompatible with that of a superhuman, element in its composition.

The first of these suppositions is, however, attended with this difficulty, that both conceptions, viz., that of independent unassisted composition, and that of inspiration, appear to be discoverable in all parts of the Rig-veda. As regards the second supposition, it might not be easy (in the uncertainty attaching to the Vedic tradition contained in the *Anukramanī* or Vedic index) to show that such and such hymns were written by such and such rishis, rather than by any others. It may, however, become possible by continued and careful comparison of the Vedic hymns, to arrive at some probable conclusions in regard to their authorship, so far at least as to determine that particular hymns should probably be assigned to particular eras, or families, rather than to others. I must, however, leave such investigations to be worked out, and the results applied to the present subject, by more competent scholars than myself.

III. While in many passages of the Veda, an efficacy is ascribed to the hymns, which is perhaps nothing greater than natural religion teaches all men to attribute to their devotions, in other texts a mystical, magical, or supernatural power is represented as residing in the prayers and metres. (See Weber's *Vājasancyi-Sanhītā* specimen, p. 61; and Vol. I. of this work, p. 242.) Some of the following texts are of the latter kind.

Thus in R.V. i. 67, 3, it is said :

*Ajo na kshām dadhāra prithivīṁ tastambha dyām mantreibhiḥ satyaiḥ |*  
“(Agni) who like the unborn, supported the broad earth, and upheld the sky by true prayers.”

The following is part of Sāyaṇa's annotation on this verse :

*Mantrair divo dhāraṇām Taittirīye samāmnātām | “dovāḥ vai āditi-yasya svarga-lokasya parāčo 'tipatād abibhayuḥ | taṁ chhando bhīr adri-han dhrityā” iti | yadvā satyair mantraiḥ stūyamāno 'gnir dyām tastambha iti |*

"The supporting of the sky by mantras is thus recorded in the Taittiriya: 'The gods feared lest the sun should fall down from the heaven; they propped it up by metres.' Or the verse may mean that Agni, being lauded by true mantras, upheld the sky."

See also R.V. i. 96, 2, quoted above, in p. 225, and Ait. Br. ii. 33, cited in the First Volume of this work, p. 180.

i. 164, 25. *Jagatā sindhum̄ divi astabhāyad rathantare sūryam pari  
apaśyat | gāyatrasya samidhas tisraḥ āhus tato mahnā pra ririche ma-  
hitvā |*

"By the Jagatī metre he fixed the waters in the sky; he beheld the sun in the Rathantara (a portion of the Sāma-veda): there are said to be three divisions of the Gāyatra; hence it surpasses [all others] in power and grandeur."

iii. 53, 12. *Viśvāmitrasya rakshati brahma idam Bhāratāñ janam |*  
"The prayer of Viśvāmitra protects this tribe of the Bharatas."  
(See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 342.)

v. 31, 4. *Brahmānah Indram mahayanto arkair avardhayan Ahaye  
hantavai u |*

"The priests magnifying Indra by their praises, have fortified him for slaying Agni."

Compare the following texts already quoted, iii. 32, 13, p. 226; vi. 44, 13, p. 227; viii. 6, 11, p. 228; viii. 8, 8, p. 243; viii. 44, 12, p. 230; viii. 63, 8, p. 230; x. 67, 13, p. 244; and also i. 10, 5; ii. 11, 2; ii. 12, 14; iii. 34, 1, 2; v. 31, 10; viii. 6, 1, 21, 31, 35; viii. 13, 16; viii. 14, 5, 11; viii. 82, 27; and viii. 87, 8, where a similar power of augmenting, or strengthening, the gods is attributed to the hymns.

v. 40, 6. . . . *Gūlham sūryam tamasā apavratena turiyena brahmañ  
avindad Atriḥ | 8. . . . Atriḥ sūryasya divi chakshur ādhāt svarbhānor  
apa māyāḥ aghukshat | 9. Yām vai sūryam svarbhānus tamasā avidhyad  
āsurah | Atrayas tam anvarindan na hi anye asaknuvan |*

"Atri, by his fourth prayer, discovered the sun which had been concealed by the hostile darkness. 8. . . . Atri placed the eye of the sun in the sky, and dispelled the illusions of Svarbhānu. 9. The Atiris discovered the sun, which Svarbhānu, of the Asura race, had pierced with darkness; no other could [effect this]." (See Vol. I. of this work, pp. 242 and 469.)

vi. 75, 19. . . . *Devās taṁ sarve dhūrvantu brahma varma mamāntaram* |

“ May all the gods destroy him ; the prayer is my protecting armour.”

vii. 19, 11. *Nu Indra śūra stavamānah ūti brahma-jūtas tanvā vavridhasva ityādi* |

“ Heroic Indra, lauded, and impelled by our prayers, grow in body through (our) aid [or longing],” etc. (Compare viii. 13, 17, 25.)

vii. 33, 3. . . . *Even nu kaṁ dāśarājne Sudāsam prāvad Indro brahmanā vo Vasishṭhāḥ* | 5. . . . *Vasishṭhasya stuvataḥ Indraḥ aśrod uruṁ Tritsubhyāḥ akriṇod u lokam* |

“ Indra has delivered Sūdas in the combat of the ten kings through your prayer, o Vasishthas. 5. Indra heard Vasishtha when he praised, and opened a wide place for the Tritsus.” (See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 319.)

viii. 49, 9. *Hi nah Agne ekayā pāhi uta dvitīyayā* | *pāhi gīrbhis tisṛibhir ārjāmpate pāhi chataṣṛibhir vaso* |

“ Protect us, Agni, through the first, protect us through the second, protect us, lord of power, through three hymns, protect us through four, thou bright god.”

The following passage celebrates the numbers of the metres :

x. 114, 8, 9. *Sahasradhā panchadaśāni ukthā yāvad dyāvā-prithivī tāvad it tat* | *Sahasradhā mahimānaḥ sahasraṁ yāvad brahmā vishṭhitāṁ tāvatī vāk* | 9. *Kaś chhandasāṁ yogam āveda dhiraḥ ko dhishnyām prati vācham papāda* | *kam ritvijāṁ ashṭamaṁ śuram āhur hari Indrasya ni chikāya kah svit* |

8. “ There are a thousand times fifteen *ukthas* ; that extends as far as heaven and earth. A thousand times a thousand are their glorious manifestations ; speech is commensurate with devotion. 9. What sage knows the [whole] series [or application] of the metres ? Who has attained devotional speech ? Whom do they call the eighth hero among priests ? Who has perceived the two steeds of Indra ? ”

(The word *dhishnya* is said by Yāska, Nirukta, viii. 3, to be = to *dhishanya*, and that again to be = to *dhishanā-bhava*, “ springing ” from *dhishanā*, “ speech,” or “ sacred speech.”)

I conclude the series of texts relating to the power of the mantras by quoting the whole of the 130th hymn of the 10th Maṇḍala of the Rig-veda :

1. *Yo yajno viśvatas tantubhīs tataḥ ekaśataṁ deva-karmeḥbir āyataḥ* |

*ime vayanti pitaro ye āyayuh pra vaya apa vaya āsate tate | 2. Pumān  
enam tanute utkrinatti pumān vi tatne, adhi nāke asmin | ime mayūkhāh  
upa shedur ū sadah sāmāni chakrus tasārāṇi otave | 3. Kā āsit pramā  
pratimā kiṁ nidānam ājyam kiṁ āsit paridhiḥ kahā āsit | ohandaḥ kiṁ  
āsit prāgaṁ kiṁ uktham yad devāḥ devam ayajanta viśve | 4. Agner  
gāyatrī abhavat sayugvā ushnihayā Savitā sambabhūva | anushṭubhā  
Somah ukthair mahasvān Brihaspater brihati vācham āvat | 5. Virāṇ  
Mitrāvarunayor abhiśrir Indrasya trishṭub iha bhāgah ahnāḥ | Viśvān  
devān jagatī āviveśa tena chākliripe rishayo manushyāḥ | 6. Chākliripe  
tena rishayo manushyāḥ yajne jāte pitarah naḥ purāṇe | paśyan manye  
manasā chakshasā tān ye imān yajnam ayajanta pūrve | 7. Saha-stomāḥ  
saha-ohandasāḥ āvritāḥ saha-pramāḥ rishayaḥ sapta dāivyāḥ | pūrveshām  
panthām anudriśya dhīrāḥ anvālebhire rathyo na raśmīn |*

“ 1. The [web of] sacrifice which is stretched on every side with threads,<sup>36</sup> which is extended with one hundred [threads], the work of the gods,—these fathers who have arrived weave it; they sit where it is extended, [saying] ‘weave forwards, weave backwards.’ 2. The Man stretches it out and spins it, the Man has extended it over this sky. These rays approached the place of sacrifice; they made the Sāma verses the shuttles for the woof. 3. What was the measure [of the ceremonial], what the form, what the type, what the oblation, what the enclosing fuel, what the metre, what the *prāga*, and what the *uktha*, when all the gods sacrificed to the god? 4. The gāyatrī was associated with Āgni; Savitṛi was conjoined with the ushniḥā; and Soma, gladdening (us) through hymns (*ukthas*), with the anushṭubh; the brihati attached itself to the speech of Brihaspati. 5. The virāj adhered to Mitra and Varuṇa; the trishṭubh, a portion of the day (?), [accompanied] Indra. The jagatī entered into the Viśvedevas. By this means human rishis were successful. 6. By this means our human fathers the rishis were successful, when this ancient sacrifice

<sup>36</sup> In R.V. x. 57, 2, we find the same word *tantu* occurring : *Yo yajnasya prasā-  
dhanas tantur deveshu ātatas tam āhutām naśimahi* | “ May we obtain him [Agni]  
who is offered, who is the fulfiller of sacrificee, who is the thread stretched to the  
gods.” (Comp. the versions given by Prof. Müller in the Journ. R. A. S. for 1866, pp.  
449, and 457.) Prof. Roth quotes under the word *tantu* the following text from the  
Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 4, 2, 6 : *Ā tantum Agnir divyām tatāna | tvām nas tantur  
uta setur Agne tvam panthāḥ bhavasi deva-yānaḥ* | “ Agni has stretched the divine  
thread. Thou, Agni, art our thread and bridge; thou art the path leading to the  
gods.”

was celebrated. I believe that I behold with my mind, [as] with an eye, those ancients who performed this sacrifice. 7. The seven wise and divine rishis, with hymns, with metres, [with] ritual forms, and according to the prescribed measures, contemplating the path of the ancients, have followed it, like chariooteers seizing the reins."

I shall not attempt to explain the meaning and purport of this obscure and mystical hymn, which has been translated by Mr. Colebrooke (*Essays*, i. 34, 35, or p. 18 of Williams and Norgate's ed.). My object in quoting the verses is to show how the various metres are associated with the different deities, in this primeval and mysterious rite, and how a certain sanctity is thus imparted to them. In verse 7, it will be observed, the rishis are spoken of as seven in number, and as divine. The Atharva-veda (x. 7, 43, 44) gives the second verse somewhat differently from the Rig-veda, as follows : *Pumān enāt vayati udgrinātī  
pumān enād vi jahāra adhi nāke | ime mayūkhāḥ upa tastabhuḥ divām  
sāmāni chakrus tasrāṇi vātave |* "The Man weaves and spins this : the Man has spread this over the sky. These rays have propped up the sky ; they have made the Sāma-verses shuttles for the woof."

IV. But whatever may have been the nature or the source of the supernal illumination to which the rishis laid claim, it is quite clear that some among them at least made no pretensions to anything like a perfect knowledge of all subjects, human and divine, as they occasionally confess their ignorance of matters in which they felt a deep interest and curiosity. This is shown in the following texts :

R.V. i. 164, 5. *Pākah prichohhāmi manasā avijānan devānām enā  
nihitā padāni | vatse bashkaye adhi saptā tantūn vi tatnire kavayaḥ  
otavai ū |* 6. *Achikitoān ohikitasaś chid atra kavīn prichohhāmi vidmane  
na vidvān | vi yas tastambha shal imā rajāñsi ajasya rüpe kim api svid  
ekam |* 37. *Na vi jānāmi yad iva idam asmi ninyāḥ sannaddho manasā  
charāmi | yadā mā āgan prathamajāḥ ritasya ād id vāchaḥ aśnuve bhā-  
gam asyāḥ |*

" 5. Ignorant, not knowing in my mind, I enquire after these hidden abodes of the gods ; the sages have stretched out seven threads for a woof over the yearling calf [or over the sun, the abode of all things]. 6. Not comprehending, I ask those sages who comprehend this matter; unknowing, [I ask] that I may know ; what is the one thing, in the form of the uncreated one, who has upheld these six

worlds? 37. I do not recognize if I am like this; I go on perplexed and bound in mind. When the first-born sons of sacrifice [or truth] come to me, then I enjoy a share of that word."

I do not attempt to explain the proper sense of these dark and mystical verses. It is sufficient for my purpose that they clearly express ignorance on the part of the speaker. Prof. Wilson's translation of the passages may be compared. Prof. Müller, *Anc. Ind. Lit.* p. 567, renders verso 37 as follows: "I know not what this is that I am like; turned inward I walk, chained in my mind. When the first-born of time comes near me, then I obtain the portion of this speech."

x. 31, 7. *Kim svid vanam kah u sa vrikshah asa yato dyavā-prithivī nishṭatakshuh | santasthāne ajare itautī ahāni pūrvir ushaso jaranta |*

"What was the forest, what the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth, which continue to exist undecaying, whilst days, and many dawns have passed away?"

Compare x. 81, 4, where the first of these lines is repeated and is followed by the words: *Manishino manasā prichhata id u tad yad adhyatishthad bhuvanāni dhārayan |* "Ask in your minds, ye intelligent, what that was on which he took his stand when upholding the worlds;" and see verso 2 of the same hymn.

i. 185, 1. *Katarā pūrvā katarā aparā ayoh kathā jāte kavayo ko vi veda |*

"Which of these two (Heaven and Earth) is the first? which is the last? How were they produced? Who, o sages, knows?"

x. 88, 18. *Kati agnayah kati sūryāsaḥ kati ushasaḥ kati u svid āpaḥ | na upaspījaṁ vaḥ pitaro vadāmi prichchāmi vaḥ kavayo vidmano kam |*

"How many fires are there? how many suns? how many dawns? how many waters? I do not, fathers, say this to you in jest; I really ask you, sages, in order that I may know."

Compare x. 114, 9, above, p. 227.

x. 129, 5. *Tiraśchino vitato raśmir eshām adhaḥ svid āśid upari svid āśit | retodhāḥ āśan mahimānah āśan svadhā avastat prayatiḥ parastat |*  
6. *Kah addha veda kah iha pravoehat kutah ajātā kutaḥ iyam visrishtih | arvāg devāḥ asya visarjanena atha ko veda yataḥ ābabhuva |* 7. *Iyam visrishtir yataḥ ābabhuva yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na | yaḥ asya adhyakshah parame vyoman sa anga veda yadi vā na veda |*

5. "Their ray [or cord], obliquely extended, was it below, or was it above? There were generative sources, and there were great powers,

svadhā (a self-supporting principle) below, and effort above. 6. Who knows, who hath here declared, whence this creation was produced, whence [it came]? The gods were subsequent to the creation of this universe; who then knows whence it sprang? 7. Whence this creation sprang, whether any one formed it or not,—he who, in the highest heavens, is the overseer of this universe,—he indeed knows, or he does not know.”

See the translation of the whole hymn by Mr. Colebrooke in his Essays, i. 33, 34, or p. 17 of Williams and Norgate’s ed. See also Prof. Müller’s version and comment in pp. 559–564 of his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature; and my own rendering in the article on the “progress of the Vedic religion towards abstract conceptions of the Deity,” in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 345 f.

We have seen (above, p. 62) that a claim is set up (by some unspecified writer quoted by Sāyaṇa) on behalf of the Veda that it can impart an understanding of all things, past and future, subtle, proximate, and remote; and that according to Sankara Āchāryya (on the Brahma-sūtras, i. 1, 3) as cited above, p. 106, the knowledge which it manifests, approaches to omniscience. All such proud pretensions are, however, plainly enough disavowed by the rishis who uttered the complaints of ignorance which I have just adduced. It is indeed urged by Sāyaṇa (see above, p. 64) in answer to the objection, that passages like R.V. x. 129, 5, 6, can possess no authority as sources of knowledge, since they express doubt,—that this is not their object, but that their intention is to intimate by a figure of speech the extreme profundity of the divine essence, and the great difficulty which any persons not well versed in the sacred writings must experience in comprehending it. There can, however, be little doubt that the authors of the passages I have cited did feel their own ignorance, and intended to give utterance to this feeling. As, however, such confessions of ignorance on the part of the rishis, if admitted, would have been incompatible with the doctrine that the Veda was an infallible source of divine knowledge, it became necessary for the later theologians who held that doctrine to explain away the plain sense of those expressions.

It should, however, be noticed that these confessions of ignorance and fallibility are by no means inconsistent with the supposition that the rishis may have conceived themselves to be animated and directed in

the composition of their hymns by a divine impulse. But although the two rivals, Vasishtha and Viśvāmitra, whether in the belief of their own superhuman insight, or to enhance their own importance, and recommend themselves to their royal patrons, talk proudly about the wide range of their knowledge (see above, pp. 246 ff.), it is not necessary to imagine that, either in their idea or in that of the other ancient Indian sages, inspiration and infallibility were convertible or co-extensive terms. The rishis may have believed that the supernatural aid which they had received enabled them to perform what they must otherwise have left unattempted, but that after all it communicated only a partial illumination, and left them still liable to mistake and doubt.

I must also remark that this belief in their own inspiration which I imagine some of the rishis to have held, falls very far short of the conceptions which most of the later writers, whether Vaiśeshika, Mīmānsaka, or Vedāntist, entertain in regard to the supernatural origin and authority of the Veda. The gods from whom the rishis supposed that they derived their illumination, at least Agni, Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Soma, Pūshan, etc., would all fall under the category of productions, or divinities created in time. This is clearly shown by the comments of Sankara on the Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 28, (above, pp. 101 ff.); and is otherwise notorious (see my "Contributions to a knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology" in the Jl. R. A. S. for 1864, p. 63). But if these gods were themselves created, and even (as we are told in the Rig-veda itself, x. 129, 6, cited in p. 280) produced subsequently to some other parts of the creation, the hymns with which they inspired the rishis, could not have been eternal. The only one of the deities referred to in the Rig-veda as sources of illumination, to whom this remark would perhaps not apply, is Vāch or Sarasvatī, who is identified with the supreme Brahma in the passage of the Brīhad Āranyaka Upanishad quoted above (p. 208, note 179); though this idea no doubt originated subsequently to the era of the hymns. But it is not to created gods, like Agni, Indra, and others of the same class, that the origin of the Veda is referred by the Vaiśeshikas, Mīmānsakas, or Vedāntists. The Vaiśeshikas represent the eternal Īśvara as the author of the Veda (see the passages which I have quoted in pp. 118 ff. and 209). The Mīmānsakas and Vedāntists, as we have seen (pp. 70 ff., 99 ff. and 208),

either affirm that it is uncreated, or derive it from the eternal Brahma. And even those writers who may attribute the composition of the Veda to the personal and created Brahmā (see pp. 69, 105 f. and 208), with the Naiyāyikas who merely describe it as the work of a competent author (see pp. 116 f. and 209), and the Sāṅkhyas (see pp. 135 and 208), concur with the other schools in affirming its absolute infallibility. Their view, consequently (unless we admit an exception in reference to Vāch), differs from that of the Vedic rishis themselves, who do not seem to have had any idea, either of their hymns being uncreated, or derived from the eternal Brahma, or of their being infallible.

As regards the relation of the rishis to deities like Indra, it is also deserving of notice that later mythologists represent the former, not only as quite independent of the latter, and as gifted with an inherent capacity of raising themselves by their own austerities to the enjoyment of various superhuman faculties, but even as possessing the power of rivalling the gods themselves, and taking possession of their thrones. See the stories of Nahusha and Viśvāmitra in the First Volume of this work, particularly pp. 310 ff. and 404. Compare also the passages from the Rig-veda, x. 154, 2, and x. 167, 1, quoted above, p. 250, where the rishis are said to have attained to heaven, and Indra to have conquered it, by austere-fervour (*tapas*).

**SECT. V.—*Texts from the Upanishads, showing the opinions of the authors regarding their own inspiration, or that of their predecessors.***

I shall now adduce some passages from different Upanishads, to show what opinions their authors entertained either in regard to their own inspiration, or that of the earlier sages, from whom they assert that their doctrine was derived by tradition.

I. Svetāśvatara Up. v. 2 (already quoted above, p. 184). *Yo yonim  
yonim adhitishthaty eko viśvāni rūpāṇi yoniś cha sarvāḥ | rishim pra  
śutām Kapilaṁ yas tam agre jnānair bibhartti jāyamānam cha paśyet |*

“He who alone presides over every place of production, over all forms, and all sources of birth, who formerly nourished with various knowledge that rishi Kapila, who had been born, and beheld him at his birth.”

II. Svetāśvatara Up. vi. 21. *Tapah-prabhāvād veda-prasādāch cha  
Brahma ha Svetāśvataro 'tha vidvān | atyāśramibhyah paramam pavitram  
provācha samyag rishi-sangha-jushṭam |*

"By the power of austere-fervour, and by the grace of the Veda, the wise Svetāśvatara declared perfectly to the men in the highest of the four orders, the supreme and holy Brahma, who is sought after by the company of rishis." (Dr. Röer's translation, p. 68, follows the commentator in rendering the first words of the verse thus: "By the power of his austerity, and the grace of God." This, however, is not the proper meaning of the words *veda-prasādāch cha*, if the correctness of that reading, which is given both in the text and commentary (Bibl. Ind. p. 372), be maintained. Sankara interprets the words thus: "*Veda-prasādāch cha*" | *kaivalyam uddiṣya tad-adhikāra-siddhaye bahu-janmasu samyag ārādhita-parameśvarasya prasādāch cha* | "By the grace of the Veda: ' by the grace of the supreme God who had been perfectly adored by him during many births in order to acquire the prerogative of (studying) it (the Veda) in reference to *kaivalya* (isolation from mundane existence);" and thus appears to recognize this reading.

In the 18th verse of the same section of this Upanishad the Vedas are said to have been given by the supreme God to Brahmā :

*Yo Brahmānaṁ vidadhāti pūrvam् yo vai vedāṁś cha prahinotī tasmai |  
taṁ ha deram ātma-buddhi-prakāśam mumukshur vai śaraṇam aham prapadye |*

"Seeking after final liberation, I take refuge with that God, the maniferter of the knowledge of himself, who at first created Brahmā and gave him the Vedas."

III. Muṇḍaka Up. i. 1 ff. (quoted above, p. 30, more at length). *Brahmā devānām prathamaḥ sambabhūva viśvasya karttā bhuvanasya  
goptā | Sa brahma-vidyāṁ sarva-vidyā-pratishṭhām Atharvāya jyeshṭha-  
putrāya prāha |*

"Brahmā was born the first of the gods, he who is the maker of the universe and the supporter of the world. He declared the science of Brahma, the foundation of all the sciences, to Atharva, his eldest son."

IV. The Chhāndogya Up. viii. 15, 1, p. 625 ff. concludes as follows:

*Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpatayे uvāha Prajāpatir Manave Manuḥ  
prajābhyah | ādhāryya-kulād vedam adhītya yathā vidhānam guroḥ kar-  
mātiśeshena abhisamāvṛitya kuṭumbe śuchau deśe svādhyāyam adhīyāno*

*dhārmikān vidadhad ātmani sarvendriyāṇi sampratishṭhāpya ahīṁsan sarva-bhūtāni anyatra tīrthebhyaḥ sa khalv evam varttayan yavad-āyu-sham Brahma-lokam abhisampadyate na cha punar āvarttate na cha punar āvarttate |*

“This [doctrine] Brahmā declared to Prajāpati, Prajāpati declared it to Manu, and Manu to his descendants. Having received instruction in the Veda from the family of his religious teacher in the prescribed manner, and in the time which remains after performing his duty to his preceptor; and when he has ceased from this, continuing his Vedic studies at home, in his family, in a pure spot, communicating a knowledge of duty [to his pupils], withdrawing all his senses into himself, doing injury to no living creature, away from holy places,—thus passing all his days, a man attains to the world of Brahma, and does not return again, and does not return again [*i.e.* is not subjected to any future births].”

I quote the commencement of Sankara’s comment on this passage :

*Tad ha etad ātma-jnānaṁ sopakaranam om ity etad aksharam ity-ādyaiḥ saha upāsanais tad-vāchakena granthena ashtādhyāya-lakshanena saha Brahmā Hiranyagarbhaḥ Parameśvara vā tad-dvārena Prajāpataye Kaś-yapāya uvācha | asāv api Manave sva-putrāya | Manuḥ prajābhyaḥ | ity evam śruty-artha-sampradāya-paramparayā āgatam upanishad-vijnānam adyāpi vidvatsv avagamyate |*

“This knowledge of soul, with its instruments, with the sacred monosyllable *Om* and other formulæ of devotion, and with the book distinguished as containing eight chapters, which sets forth all these topics, [viz. the Chhāndogya Upanishad itself] was declared by Brahmā Hiranyagarbha, or by Parameśvara (the supreme God), through his agency, to the Prajāpati Kaśyapa. The latter in his turn declared it to his son Manu, and Manu to his descendants. In this manner the sacred knowledge contained in the Upanishads, having been received through successive transmission of the sense of the Veda from generation to generation, is to this day understood among learned men.”

In an earlier passage of the same Upanishad iii. 11, 3 f. (partly quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 195), we find a similar statement in reference to a particular branch of sacred knowledge (the *madhu-jnāna*) :

3. *Na ha vai asmai udeti na nimlochati sakrid divā ha eva asmai bha-*

*vati yaḥ etām evam brahmopanishadaṁ veda | 4. Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpataye uvācha Prajāpatir Manave Manuh prajābhyaḥ | tad etad Uddālakāya Ārunaye jyeshṭhāya putrāya pitā brahma uvācha | 5. Idam vāva taj-jyeshṭhāya putrāya pitā brahma prabṛuyāt prāṇāyyāya vā antavāsine (6) na anyasmai kasmaichana | yadyapy asmai imām adbhiḥ parigṛihitāṁ dhanasya pūrṇām dadyāt etad eva tato bhūyah ity etad eva tato bhūyah iti |*

“3. For him who thus knows this sacred mystery, the sun neither rises nor sets, but one day perpetually lasts. 4. This (*Madhu-jnāna*) was declared by Brahmā to Prajāpati, by Prajāpati to Manu, and by Manu to his descendants. This sacred knowledge was further declared to Uddālaka Āruṇi by his father. 5. Let a father expound it to his eldest son, or to a capable pupil, but to no one else. 6. If any one were to give him this entire earth, which is surrounded by water, full of wealth, this sacred knowledge would be more than that, yes, would be more than that.”

Compare Manu, xi. 243, where that Code is said to have been created by Prajāpati (First Volume of this work, p. 394); and Bhagavad Gītā iv. 1, where the doctrine of that treatise is said to have been declared by Krishṇa to Vivasvat (the Sun), by Vivasvat to Manu, by him to Ikshvāku, and then handed down by tradition from one royal rishi to another (Vol. I. p. 508).

## APPENDIX.

*Page 4, line 5.*

I have omitted here the verse from the Atharva-veda, xi. 7, 24 (quoted by Professor Goldstücker in his Panini, p. 70): *Richah sāmāni chhandāñsi purāñāñ yajushā saha | uchchhishtāj jajnire surve devāḥ divisritāḥ* | “From the leavings of the sacrifice sprang the Rich- and Sāman-verses, the metres, the Purāna with the Yajush, and all the gods who dwell in the sky.”

Professor Aufrecht has favoured me with the following amendments in my translations in pp. 7 and 8 :

*Page 7, line 13.*

For “the text called *sāvitrī* [or *gāyatrī*]” he would substitute “the verse dedicated to Savitri.”

*Page 7, line 16.*

For “the mouth of Brahma” he proposes “the beginning of the Veda.” (Sir W. Jones translates “the mouth, or *principal part* of the *Veda*.”)

*Page 8, line 8.*

For “from Vāch (speech) as their world” he proposes “out of the sphere (or compass) of speech.”

*Page 8, line 8.*

For “Vāch was his: she was created” he proposes “For in creating the Vedas, he had also created Vāch.”

*Page 8, line 13.*

For “He gave it an impulse” he proposes “He touched it.”

*Page 8, line 16.*

For “Moreover it was sacred knowledge, which was created from that Male in front” he proposes “For even from that Male (not only from the waters) Brahma was created first.”

*Page 9, line 16.*

This passage of the Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad corresponds to Satapatha Brahmana x. 6, 5.

*Page 10, line 2.*

“May the brilliant deity,” etc., Professor Aufrecht would prefer to translate the second line of the verse, beginning *sudevah* (p. 9, l. 6 from the foot), “Goodness (the good god) only knows where they put the earth which was thrown up (*nirvapana*).”

*Page 20, line 17.*

See Āśvalāyanas Grīhya Sūtras, pp. 155, and 157 ff.

*Page 22, line 13, note 25.*

I quote two verses from Manu, of which the second confirms the correctness of the rendering I have given of the words *ā ha eva sa nakhāgrebhyaś tapyate*, and the first illustrates the text of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka cited in the note: Manu ii. 166. *Vedam eva sadā 'bhyasyet tapas tapsyan dvijottamah | vedābhyāśo hi vīprasya tapah param ihochyate |* 167. “*Ā haiva sa nakhāgrebhyaḥ*” *paranām “tapyate” tapah | yaḥ sragvya api dvijo 'dhīte svādhyāyāṁ śaktito 'nrahām |* “Let a good Brāhmaṇa who desires to perform tapas constantly study the Veda; for such study is a Brāhmaṇa’s highest tapas. 167. That twice-born man who daily studies the Veda to the utmost of his power, even though (luxuriously) wearing a garland of flowers (really) performs the highest tapas to the very extremities of his nails.” This verse, it will be observed, quotes verbatim one of the phrases of the Brāhmaṇa, and gives definiteness to its sense by adding the words *paramām tapah*. Verses 165 ff. of the same book of Manu prescribe the abstemious mode of life which the student (*brahmachārīn*) is to follow whilst living in his teacher’s house. The Mahābhārata, Udyoga-parvan, 1537, thus states the conditions of successful study in general; *Sukhārthinaḥ kuto vidyā nāsti vidyārthinaḥ sukham |*

*sukhārthī vā tyajed vidyārthī vā tyajet sukhām* | “How can one who seeks ease acquire science? Ease does not belong to him who pursues science. Either let the seeker of ease abandon science, or the seeker of science abandon ease.”

*Page 30, line 17.*

Compare the lines quoted by the Commentator on Sāṇḍilya’s Bhaktisūtra, 83, p. 60, from the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, Moksha-dharma, verses 13,551 ff.: *Sahopanishado vedān ye vīprāḥ samyag āsthitāḥ | paṭhanti vīdhīm āsthāya ye chāpi yati-dharmināḥ | tato viśiṣṭāṁ jānāmi gatim ekāntinām nṛinām* ! “I regard the destination of Ekāntins (persons devoted to the One as their end) as superior to that of Brāhmans who perfectly study the Vedas, including the Upanishads, according to rule, as well as to that of those who follow the practices of ascetics (*yatis*).”

*Page 34, line 1.*

Perhaps this was scarcely a suitable passage to be quoted as deprecatory of the Veda, as in such a stage of transcendental absorption as is here described all the ordinary standards of estimation have ceased to be recognized.

*Page 43, line 10.*

With the expression *hrid-akāśa*, “the æther of the heart,” compare the passage quoted from the Veda in Sankara’s commentary on Brahma Sūtra iii. 2, 35 (p. 873): “*Yo yam vahirdhā purushād akāśo yo’yam antah-purushe akāśo yo’yam antar-hridaye akāśah*” | “This æther which is external to a man, this æther which is within a man, and this æther which is within the heart.” See also the Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad ii. 5, 10 and iii. 7, 12.

*Page 44, line 1.*

See the Yoga aphorisms i. 2 ff. as cited and explained by Dr. Ballantyne.<sup>1</sup> The second aphorism defines *yoga* to be “a stoppage of the functions of the mind” (*Yogaś chitta-vritti-nirodhāḥ*). “The mind then abides in the state of the spectator, i.e. the Soul” (*tadā drashtuḥ svārūpe’vasthānam*—Aph. 3). “At other times it takes the form of the

<sup>1</sup> Two fasciculi only, containing two Pādas and 106 Sūtras, were published at Allababad in 1852 and 1853; but a continuation of Dr. B.’s work has been commenced in the “Pandit” for Sept. 1868.

functions" (*vritti-sārūpyam itaratra*—Aph. 4). These functions, or modifications (as Dr. Ballantyne translates) are fivefold, and either painful, or devoid of pain, viz. proof, or right notion (*pramāṇa*), mistake (*viparyyaya*), groundless imagination (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*), recollection (*smṛiti*)—Aphorisms 5–11. See also Dr. Ballantyne's Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, iii. 31 ff.

*Page 57, note 61.*

With the subject of this note compare the remarks in p. 108, and the quotations from Dr. Roer and Professor Müller in pp. 173, 175, and 193.

*Page 62, note 65.*

Professor Cowell does not think that the text is corrupt. He would translate it, "the other *pramāṇas*, beside *śabda*, (scil. perception and inference), cannot be even supposed in a case like this" (which refers to such a transcendental object as the existence of an eternal Veda). Sāyaṇa, in his reply to the objector, recapitulates the applicable proofs as *śruti*, *smṛiti*, and *loka-prasiddhi*,—all three only different kinds of testimony, *śabda*.

*Page 63, lines 11 f., and note 68.*

Compare pp. 322 f., 329 f., 334 f., and 337 of my article "On the Interpretation of the Veda," in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866.

*Page 84, note 89, and page 180, line 7.*

I have been favoured by Professor Cowell with the following note on *kālātyayāpadishṭa*:

"My Calcutta Pandit considered this fallacy to be the same as that more usually called *bādha* (cf. too Bhāshāparichchheda, sl. 70, 77, and the Bengali translation, p. 65). Its definition is *pakṣhe sādhyābhāvah*. The Tarka-saṅgraha defines a *hetu* as *bādhita*, 'when the absence of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof,' as in the argument *vahnir anushno dravyatvāt*. The essence of this fallacy is that you deny the *major*, and therefore it does not matter whether you accept the middle term in itself or not. It is involved in the overthrow of the major term. I should translate it the 'precluded argument,'—it might have been plausible if it had not been put out of court by something which settles

the point,—it is advanced too late (the *pre* in ‘precluded’ expresses the *kālatīta* of the old name). This corresponds to the account in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛitti: *Kālaśya sādhana-kālaśyātyaye 'bhāve 'padishṭah prayukto hetur | etena sādhyābhāvapramālakṣaṇārtha iti sūchitam | sādhyābhāvānirṇaye sādhanāsambhavāt | Ayam eva bādhitasādhyaka iti giyate.* The Vṛitti goes on to say that you need not prove *vyabhichāra* (*i.e.* that your opponent’s *hetu* or middle term goes too far, as in *parvato dhumavān vahneḥ* where *vahni* is a *savyabhichāro hetuḥ*) in order to establish the *bādha*. I should therefore prefer to translate the passage from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, p. 84, ‘your alleged middle-term *vākyatva*, the possessing the properties of a common sentence, is liable to two objections,—(1) it is opposed by the fact that no author was ever perceived, and (2) it also is precluded by weighty evidence (which proves that your proposed major term is irrelevant).’ Sāyaṇa then adds his reasons for each objection,—for the first, in the words from *yathā Vyāsa* down to *upalabdhaḥ*; for the second, in the fact that *smṛiti* and *śruti* agree in the eternity of the Veda (the *pūrvam* I suppose refers to p. 3 of the Calcutta printed text), and that even if the Supreme Spirit be ‘the author he is not *purushaḥ* in the sense in which the objector uses the term. Either way, the major term of the objector’s syllogism *pau-rusheya* is precluded, *bādhita*; or, in the technical language of the Nyāya, Sāyaṇa establishes an absence from the minor term (*pakṣa*) of the alleged major term (*sādhya*); and hence no conclusion can be drawn from the proposed syllogism. I may add that I have also looked into Vātsyāyana, but his explanation seems to me an instance of what my Pandit used so often to impress on me, that the modern logic (which such a late mediæval writer as Sāyaṇa follows) is not always that of the Nyāyabhashya. He makes the error lie in the example, *i.e.* in the induction; and it is therefore, as Professor Goldstücker says, a ‘vicious generalization.’”

*Page 88, note 95.*

Professor Cowell disagrees with the explanation I have hazarded of the object of the sentence in the text to which this note refers. He thinks that its purport, as shewn by the word *vyabhichārāt*, is to intimate that the former of the two alternative suppositions would prove too much, as it would also apply to such detached stanzas as the one

referred to, of which the author, although unknown to some persons, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries no doubt knew who wrote it, and his descendants, as well as others, might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which nevertheless was not superhuman (*apaurushya*). This is no doubt the correct explanation.

*Page 99, line 1.*

The argument in proof of the incompetence of the Sūdras for the acquisition of the highest divine knowledge is contained in Brahma Sūtras i. 3, 34–38. As the subject may possess an interest for any educated persons of this class into whose hands this book may fall in India, I extract the entire discussion of the question :

34. “*Sug asya tad-andara-śravanāt tad-ādṛavanāt sūkyate hi*” |  
*yathā manushyādhikāra-niyamam apodya devādinām api vīdyāsv adhi-*  
*kāraḥ uktas tathaiva dvijāty-adhikāra-niyamāpavādena śūdrasya apy*  
*adhikāraḥ syād ity etām āśankām nivarttayitum idam adhikaranam āra-*  
*bhyate | tatra śūdrasya apy adhikāraḥ syād iti tāvat prāptam arhitva-*  
*sāmarthyayoh sambhavat | tasmāch “ ohhūdro yajne ‘navakṛiptaḥ” iti-*  
*vach ohhūdro vīdyāyām anavakṛiptaḥ iti nishedhaśravanāt | yach cha*  
*kaṭmasv anadhikāra-kāraṇām śūdrasya anagnitvām na tad vīdyāsv adhi-*  
*kārasya apavādakam | na hy āhavaṇīyādi-rahitena vīdyā veditum na*  
*śakyate | bhavati cha lingām śūdrādhikārasya upodbalakam | saṁvarga-*  
*vīdyāyām hi Jānaśrutim Pautrāyanām śūśrūshum śūdra-śabdena parā-*  
*mriśati “aha hāre tvā śūdra tava eva saha gobhir astv” iti | Vidura-*  
*prabhritayaś cña śūdra-yoni-prabhavāḥ api viśiṣṭa-vījnāna-sampannāḥ*  
*emaryyante | tasmād adhikriyate śūdro vīdyāsu | ity evam prāpte brūmaḥ |*  
*na śūdrasya adhikāro vedādhyayanābhāvūt | adhita-vedo hi vidita-vedārtho*  
*vedārtheshv adhikriyate | na cha śūdrasya vedādhyayanam asty upanayana-*  
*pūrvakatvād vedādhyayanasya upanayanasya cha varṇa-traya-vishayatvāt |*  
*yat tv arhitvām na tad asati sāmarthyē ‘dhikāra-kāraṇām bhavati | sā-*  
*marthyam api na laukikām kevalam adhikāra-kāraṇām bhavati sāstriye*  
*‘rthe sāstriyasya sāmarthyasya apekṣhitatrāt sāstriyasya cha sāmarthyasya*  
*adhyayana-nirākaranāna nirākriitatvāt | yach cha idām śūdro yajne*  
*‘navakṛiptaḥ iti tad nyāya-pūrvakatvād vīdyāyām apy anavakṛiptatvām*  
*dgatayati nyāyasya sādhāranatvāt | yat punah saṁvarga-vīdyāyām śūdra-*

*śabda-śravaṇam lingam manyase na tal lingam nyāyābhāvāt | nyāyokter hi linga-darśanam dyotakam bhavati na cha attra nyāyo 'sti | kāmām cha ayam śūdra-śabdah saṁvarga-vidyāyām eva ekasyām śūdrām adhikuryyāt tad-vishayatvād na sarvāsu vidyāsu | arthavāda-sthātvāt na tu kvachid apy ayam śūdrām adhikarttum utsahate | eākyate cha ayam śūdra-śabdo 'dhikṛita-vishaye yojayitum | katham iti | uchyate | “‘ kam u are enām elat sāntām eayugvānam iva Rainkam āttha’ (Chāndogya Upanishad, iv. 1, 3.) ity asmād haṁsa-vākyād ātmano ‘nādaraṁ śrutavato Jānaśruteḥ Pautrāyanasya śug utpede tām rishī Rainkah śūdra-śabdēna anēna sūchayāmbabhūva ātmānah paroksha-jnānasya khyāpanāya iti gamyate jāti-śūdrasya anadhikārāt | katham punah śūdra-śabdēna śug utpannā sūchyate iti | uohyate | tad-ādravaṇāt śucham abhidudrāva śuchā vā 'bhidudruve śuchā vā Rainkam abhidudrāva iti śūdrāvayavārtha-sambhavād rūḍhārthasya cha asambhavāt | dṛiṣyate cha ayam ərtho 'syām ākhyāyikāyām |*

35. “*Kshattriyatva-gatēs cha uttarattra Chaitrarathena lingāt*” | Itaś cha na jāti-śūdro Jānaśrutiḥ yat-kāraṇam prakarāna-nirūpaneṇa kshattriyatvam asya uttarattra Chaitrarathena Abhipratāriṇā kshattriyena samabhivyāhārāl lingād gamyate | uttarattra hi saṁvarga-vidyā-vākyā-śeshe Chaitrarathir Abhipratāri kshattriyāḥ sankirttyate | “atha ha S'aunakaṁ cha Kāpeyam Abhipratāriṇām cha Kākshasenīm sūdena pari-viśyamānau brahmachārī bibhikṣe” (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5) iti | Chaitrarathitvām cha Abhipratāriṇāḥ Kāpeya-yogād avagantavyam | Kāpeya-yogo hi Chaitrarathasya avagataḥ | “etena vai Chaitrarathām Kāpeyāḥ ayājayann” iti samānānvaya-yājinām cha prāyenā samānānvayāḥ yājākāḥ bhavanti | tasmāch “Chaitrarathir nāma ekaḥ kshattrā-patir ajāyata” iti cha kshattrā-jātītvāvagamāt kehattriyatvam asya avagantavyam | tena kshattriyena Abhipratāriṇā saha samānāyām vidyāyām sankirttanām Jānaśruter api kshattriyatvām sūchayati | samānānām eva hi prāyenā samabhivyāhārāḥ bhavanti | kshattri-preshanādy-aīśvarya-yogāḥ cha Jānaśruteḥ kshattriyatvāvagatiḥ | ato na śūdrasya adhikāraḥ |

36. “*Sāṁskāra-parāmarsūt tad-abhāvābhilāpāch cha*” | itaś cha na śūdrasyā adhikāro yad vidyā-pradeśeshu upanayanādayaḥ sāṁskārāḥ parāmr̄iṣyante “tām ha upaninye” | “‘ adhīhi bhagavāḥ’ iti ha upasā-sāda” | “brahma-parāḥ brahma-niṣṭhāḥ param Brahma anveshamānāḥ ‘esha ha vai tat sarvām ugkṣyati’ iti te ha samit-pāṇayo bhagavantam Pippalādam upasannāḥ” iti cha “tām ha anupanīya eva” ity api pradarśitā eva upanayana-prāptiḥ bhavati | śūdrasya cha sāṁskārabhāvo

*'bhilapyate "śūdraś chaturtho varnaḥ ekajātir" ity ekajātitva-smarananena "na śudre pātakaṁ kinchid na cha sañskāram arhati" ity-ādibhiś cha |*

37. “*Tad-abhāva-nirdhāraṇe cha pravṛitteḥ*” | Itaś cha na śūdrasya adhikāro yat satya-vachanena śūdratvābhāve nirdhārite Jābalaṁ Gautamah upanetum anuśāsitum oha pravavrite “*na etad abrahmano vivaktum arhati | samidham somya āhara upa tvā neshye na satyād agāḥ*” (Chh. Up. iv. 4, 5) iti śruti-lingāt |

38. “*Sṛavanādhyanārtha-pratishedhāt smriteś cha*” | Itaś cha na śūdrasya adhikāro yad asya smriteḥ śravanādhyanārtha-pratishedho bhavati | *veda-śravāṇa-pratishedho vedādhayana-pratishedhas tad-artha-jnā-nānushṭhānayoḥ cha pratishedhāḥ śūdrasya smaryyate | śravāṇa-pratishedhas tāvad atha asya 'vedam upaśriṇvatas trapu-jatubhyāṁ śrotra-prati-pūranam'* iti “*padyu ha vai etat śmaśānam yat śūdras tasmāt śūdra-samīpe na adhyetavyam*” iti cha | atāḥ eva adhyayana-pratishedhāḥ | *yasya hi samīpe'pi na adhyetavyam bhavati sa kathāṁ śrutiṁ adhīyiyata | bhavati cha uchchāraṇe jihvā-chhedo dhāraṇe śārīra-bhedāḥ iti | atāḥ eva cha arthād artha-jnānānushṭhānayoḥ pratishedho bhavati | "na śūdrāya matīm dadyād"* iti “*dvijātinām adhyayanaṁ ijyā dānam*” iti cha | *yeshāṁ punaḥ pūrva-kṛita-saṁskāra-vaśād Vidura-dharma-vyādha-prabhrītiṁ jnānotpattis teshāṁ na śakyate phala-prāptiḥ pratibaddhuṁ jnānasya ekāntika-phalatvāt | "śrāvayech chaturo varnān"* iti cha itihāsa-purānādhigame chāturvarṇyādhikāra-smaranāt | *veda-pūrvakas tu nāsty adhikāraḥ śūdrānām iti sthitam* |

34. “In the word ‘Sūdra’ reference is made to his vexation on hearing that disrespectful expression, and to his running up.”

“This section is commenced to silence the doubt whether in the same way as it had been denied (above) that the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge is restricted to men, and affirmed that it extends to the gods, etc., also, the limitation of the same prerogative to twice-born men may not also be questioned, and its extension to Sūdras maintained. The grounds alleged in favour of the Sūdra having this prerogative are that he may reasonably be supposed to have both (*a*) the desire and (*b*) the power of acquiring knowledge, and that accordingly (*c*) the Veda contains no text affirming his incapacity for knowledge, as it confessedly has texts directing his exclusion from sacrifice : and further (*d*) that the fact of the Sūdra’s not keeping up any sacred fire, which is the cause of his incapacity for sacrifice, affords no reason

for denying to him the prerogative of gaining knowledge; since it cannot be maintained that it is impossible for a man who is destitute of the *ahavaniya* and other fires to acquire knowledge. There is also (*e*) in a Vedic text a sign which confirms the Sūdra's prerogative. For in the passage which treats of the knowledge of the Saṁvarga (Chhāndogya Upanishad, chapter iv. section 1-3) a speaker designates Jānaśruti, descendant of Janaśruta in the third generation, who was desirous of performing service, by the term Sūdra: 'Keep to thyself, o Sūdra, thy necklace and chariot<sup>2</sup> with thy cattle.' (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2.) And further (*f*) Vidura and others are spoken of in the Smṛiti as possessed of distinguished knowledge, although they were of Sūdra descent. Consequently the Sūdra enjoys the prerogative of acquiring various sorts of divine knowlege. To this we reply: The Sūdra has no such prerogative, because he cannot study the Veda. For it is the man that studies the Veda, and obtains a knowledge of its contents, who enjoys the prerogative of [access to] those contents. But a Sūdra does not study the Veda, for such study must be preceded by initiation, which again is confined to the three upper castes. As regards (*a*) the desire of knowledge,—that, in the absence of power, confers no prerogative. And (*b*). mere secular power does not suffice for the purpose; since scriptural power is necessary in a matter connected with Scripture; and such scriptural power is debarred by the debarring of study. And (*c*) the passage which declares that a 'Sūdra is incapacitated for sacrifice,' demonstrates his incapacity for knowledge also; since that follows

<sup>2</sup> Such is the sense given to *hāretvā* by the Commentators, who make it out to be a compound of the words *hāra*, "necklace," and *itvā*, "a chariot;" but although *itvā* might be the nominative of *itvan*, "going," no such word appears in the lexicons with the sense of "chariot." Besides, the compound seems a very awkward one. Perhaps the word should be separated into *ha are tvā*; but then there would be no nominative to *astu*, and it would be difficult to construe *tvā*, "thee."—Since the above was written, I have been favoured with a note on the passage by Professor Goldstücker. He conjectures that the words should be divided as follows: *ahaha are tvā Sūdra tava eva saha gobhir astu*; that *tvā* may be the nominative singular feminine of the Vedic pronoun *tva*, meaning "some one," and then the sense might be as follows: "O, friend, some woman belongs to thee, Sūdra! Let her be (*i.e.* come) along with the cows." And Jānaśruti would appear to have understood the word *tvā* in this sense here supposed, for we find that on hearing the reply of Raikva, he took his *daughter* to the latter, along with four hundred additional cows and the other gifts; and that on seeing the damsel, Raikva expressed his satisfaction and acceded to the request of her father.—The author of these puzzling words, it seems, intended a pun; and Sankara perhaps gave only one solution of it.

from the rule, which is of general application. As regards the circumstance that in the Vedic text regarding the knowledge of the Saṁvarga, the word Sūdra occurs, which you regard as a sign in favour of your view; it is (*d*) no sign; because in that passage no rule is laid down. For the discovery of a sign indicates that a rule has been laid down; but in the passage in question there is no such rule. And although it were conceded that [if it were found in a precept regarding the Saṁvarga] the word Sūdra would confer on a man of that caste a prerogative in regard to that particular knowledge alone, (from its being intended for him), although not to all sorts of knowledge, yet as the word occurs [not in precept, but] in an illustrative narrative (*arthavāda*) it cannot confer on him a prerogative in regard to any knowledge whatever. And in fact this word Sūdra can be applied to a person [of a higher caste] who possessed the prerogative. How? I explain: Vexation (*suk*) arose in the mind of Jānaśruti when he heard himself disrespectfully spoken of in these words of the swan: 'Who is this that thou speakest of as if he were Rainka yoked to the chariot?'<sup>3</sup> (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 3). And since a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge, we conclude that it is to this vexation (*suk*) that the rishi Rainka referred, for the purpose of shewing his own knowledge of things imperceptible by sense, when he made use of this word Sūdra (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2, see above). But again, how is it indicated by the word Sūdra that vexation (*suk*) arose in his mind? We reply: by 'the running to it [or him]' (*tad-adravanāt*); i.e. either 'he ran to vexation,' or 'he was assailed by vexation,' or 'in his vexation he resorted to Rainka.' We conclude thus because the sense afforded by the component parts of the word Sūdra is the probable one,<sup>4</sup> whilst the conventional sense of the word Sūdra is here inapplicable. And this is seen to be the meaning in this story.

<sup>3</sup> This appears to allude to the person referred to being found sitting under a chariot (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 8). See p. 67 of Babu Rājendralāl Mitra's translation. This story is alluded to by Professor Weber in his Ind. Stud. ix. 45, note, where he treats Sayugvan as a proper name, and remarks "The Vedānta Sūtras (i. 3, 34, 35), indeed, try to explain away this" (the circumstance of Jānaśruti being called a Sūdra) and of course S'ankara in his commentary on them does the same, as well in his explanation of the Chhāndogya Upanishad." I am not, however, by any means certain that the epithet "Sūdra," applied to Jānaśruti by Rainka, is not merely meant as a term of abuse.

<sup>4</sup> The meaning of this is that the word Sūdra is derived from *suk*, "vexation,"

Sūtra 35. "And that Jānaśruti was a Kshattriya is afterwards indicated by what is said of Abhipratārin of the race of Chaitraratha."

"That Jānaśruti was not a Sūdra appears also from this, that by examining the context he is afterwards found to be a Kshattriya by the sign that he is mentioned along with Abhipratārin of the family of Chaitraratha. For in the sequel of the passage regarding the knowledge of the Sañvarga mention is made in these words of Abhipratārin Chaitrarathi, a Kshattriya: 'Now a Brahmacārin asked alms of Saunaka of the race of Kapi, and Abhipratārin the son of Kakshasena who were being served at a meal' (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5). And that Abhipratārin belonged to the family of Chaitraratha is to be gathered from his connection with the Kāpeyas; for the connection of Chaitraratha with the latter has been ascertained by the text: 'The Kāpeyas performed sacrifice for Chaitraratha.' Priests of the same family in general officiate for worshippers belonging to the same family. From this, as well as from the text: 'From him a lord of Kshat-

and dru, "to run." (See the First Volume of this work, p. 97, note 192.) Even the great S'ankara, it seems, was unable to perceive the absurdity of such etymologies. In his commentary on the Chhāndogya Upanishad the same writer tells us that various explanations had been given of the employment of the word Sūdra in this passage: *Nanu rājā 'sau kshattri-sambandhāt | "Sa ha kshattāram uvācha"* (iv. 1, 5) *ity uktam | vidyā-grahanāya cha brāhmaṇa-samīpopagamāt | sūdrasya cha anadhi-kārāt | katham idam ananurūpaṁ Raikvena uchyate "sūdra" iti | tatra āhūr āhāryyāḥ | haṁsa-vachana-sravanāt śug enam āviveśa | tena asau śuḥā s'rutvā Raik-varya mahimānām vā dravati iti | rishir ātmānah parokshajnatām daréayan "sūdra" ity āha | sūdra-vad bādhanena eva enam vidyā-grahanāya upajagāma na śuśrūshayā | na tu jātyā eva sūdraḥ iti | apare punar āhūr alpaṁ dhanam āhritam iti rushā eva enam uktavān "sūdra" iti | "But is not Jānaśruti shewn to have been a king, (a) from his name being connected with a charioteer in the passage 'He said to his charioteer,' (b) from his resorting to a Brāhmaṇa to obtain knowledge, and (c) from a Sūdra possessing no such prerogative? How then did Raikva address to him an appellation inconsistent with this in the words 'o S'ūdra?' Learned teachers reply: 'Vexation (*suk*) took possession of him on hearing the words of the swan: in consequence of which, or of hearing (*śrutvā*) of the greatness of Raikva, he ran up [S'ūdra is here derived either from *śuḥā + dravati*, or from *śrutvā + dravati*]; and the rishi, to shew his knowledge of things beyond the reach of the senses, called him S'ūdra. He had approached to obtain knowledge from the rishi by annoying him like a S'ūdra, and not by rendering him service; while yet he was not by birth a S'ūdra. Others again say that the rishi angrily called him a S'ūdra because he had brought him so little property." This passage is also translated by Bābu Rājendralāl (Chh. Up. p. 68, note), who renders *bādhanena* (which I have taken to mean "annoying") by "paying" for instruction; but I cannot find any authority for this sense of the word.*

triyas named Chaitrarathi was descended,' which proves that his family were Kshattriyas, we may gather that Abhipratārin belonged to this class. And the circumstance that Jānaśruti is mentioned in connection with the same branch of knowledge as Abhipratārin, the Kshattriya, shews that the former also was a Kshattriya. For it is in general men of the same class who are mentioned together. And from the fact of Jānaśruti sending a charioteer (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 5-7), and his other acts of sovereignty also, we learn that he was a Kshattriya. Hence (we conclude that) a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of divine knowledge.

Sūtra 36. "From reference being made to initiation, and from a Sūdra being declared to be excluded from it."

"And that a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, may be further inferred from the fact that investiture with the sacred cord and other rites are referred to in passages where science is the subject in question. For the fact that the seekers after such knowledge obtained initiation, is shewn by such passages as the following: 'He invested him;' 'He came to him, saying, teach me, Sir' (Chh. Up. vii. 1, 1?); 'Devoted to Brahma, resting in Brahma, seeking after the highest Brahma, they approached the venerable Pippalāda with firewood in their hands, (saying) 'he will declare all this' (Praśna Up. i. 1); and 'having invested them,' etc. And that a Sūdra receives no initiation is shewn by the text of the Smṛti which pronounces him to be but once-born, viz. 'the Sūdra is the fourth class, and once-born;' and by such other passages as this: 'There is no sin in a Sūdra, and he is not entitled to initiation.'"<sup>5</sup>

Sūtra 37. "And because he acted after ascertaining that it was not a Sūdra [who had come to him]."

"That a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge appears also from this that [according to the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad] Gautama proceeded to invest and instruct Jābāla after ascertaining by his truth-speaking that he was not a Sūdra: 'None but a Brāhmaṇ could distinctly declare this: bring, o fair youth, a piece of fuel; I will invest thee; thou hast not departed from the truth' (Chh. Up. iv. 4, 5).<sup>6</sup>

This last verse has been already quoted in Vol. I. p. 138, note 244.

<sup>6</sup> I shall quote in full the earlier part of the passage from which these words are

Sūtra 38. "And because, according to the Smṛiti, a Sūdra is forbidden to hear, or read, or learn the sense."

"And that a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, appears from this that, according to the Smṛiti, he is forbidden to hear it, or read it, or learn its sense: i.e. it is declared in the Smṛiti that he is forbidden either to hear the Veda, or read the Veda, or to learn its contents, or to practise its injunctions. Hearing is forbidden to him in these texts: 'If he listens to the reading of the Veda, his ears are to be filled with [melted] lead and lac;' and 'The Sūdra is a walking cemetery; therefore no one must read in his vicinity.' And consequently the reading of it is prohibited to him: for

taken, both for the sake of explaining the allusion, and for the illustration which it affords of ancient Indian manners: Chh. Up. iv. 4, 1. *Satyakāmo ha Jābālō Jabālām mātaram āmantrayānchakre "brahmacharyyam bhavati vivatsyāmi kiṁ-gotro nv aham asmi"* iti | 2. *Sā ha enam uvācha "na aham etad veda tāta yad-gotras tvam asi | bahv ahaṁ charantī parichārinī yauwane tvām alabhe | sū 'ham etad na veda yad-gotras tvam asi | Jābālō tu nāma aham asmi Satyakāmo nāma tvam asi | sa Satyakāmāḥ eva Jābālō 'bravīthāḥ"* iti | "Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā, addressed his mother Jabālā, saying, 'I wish, mother, to enter on the life of a religious student. To what family (*gottra*: see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 378 ff.) do I belong?' 2. She answered, 'I do not know, my son, to what family thou belondest. Much consorting [with lovers] and roving (or serving), in my youth, I got thee. I know not of what family thou art. But my name is Jabālā, and thine Satyakāma. Say, 'I am Satyakāma son of Jabālā.'" He accordingly goes to Hāridrumata of the race of Gotama, and asks to be received as a student. The teacher enquires to what family he belongs and the youth repeats verbatim the answer he had received from his mother, and says he is Satyakāma the son of Jabālā. The teacher replies in the words quoted by Śankara "No one other than a Brāhmaṇa could distinctly declare this," etc. The interpretation of paragraph 2, above given, seems to convey its correct sense. Jābālā apparently means to confess that her son was *nullius filius*: and that he must be content to call himself her son, as she did not know who his father was. The explanation of the words *bahv ahaṁ charantī parichārinī yauwane tvām alabhe* given by the Commentators and followed by Bābu Rājendralāl Mittra, that she was so much occupied with attending to guests in her husband's house, and so modest that she never thought of enquiring about her son's *gottra*, and that her husband died early, is founded mainly on the word *parichārinī*, and would not account for Jābālā's ignorance of her husband's name (which she does not mention) or even of her husband's lineage. In regard to the sense of *charantī* see the passage from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, ii. 5, 2, 20, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 136, note 242. Śankara was either ignorant of the laxity of ancient morals, or wished to throw a veil over the spurious origin of a sage like Satyakāma who had attained divine knowledge and become a teacher of it (see Chh. Up. iv. 10, 1). In his preface, however, p. 30, as I observe, Bābu Rājendralāl speaks of Satyakāma as a natural son in these words: "Although a natural born son whose father was unknown, and recognized by the contemptuous soubriquet of Jābālā from the designation of his mother Jābālā," etc.

how can he, in whose neighbourhood even the Veda is forbidden to be read, read it himself? And if he utters it, his tongue is to be cut; and if he retains it in his memory, his body is to be slit. And it results from the meaning of the terms that he is prohibited from learning its contents, or practising its injunctions, according to the texts, ‘Let no one impart intelligence to a Sūdra;’ and ‘reading, sacrifice, and liberality are the duties of twice-born men.’ As regards (f) Vidura, Dharma, Vyādha, and others in whom knowledge was produced in consequence of their recollection of acts performed in a former birth, their enjoyment of its results cannot be prevented, from the transcendent character of the effects of knowledge; and because in the text ‘Let the four castes be made to hear them,’ the Smṛiti declares that the four castes possess the prerogative of learning the Itihāsas and Purāṇas [by means of which Sūdras may attain perfection]. But it has been established that Sūdras do not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge derived [directly] from [the study of] the Veda.”

The Bhagavad Gītā affirms a different doctrine in the following verses, x. 32 f., where Kṛishṇa says :

*Mām hi Pārtha vyapāśritya ye 'pi syuḥ pāpa-yonayaḥ | striyo vaiśyās tathā sūdras te 'pi yānti parām gatim | 33. Kim punar brāhmaṇāḥ punyāḥ bhaktāḥ rājarshayas tathā |*

“ Those who have faith in me, even though they be of base origin, women, Vaiśyas, and Sūdras, attain to the most transcendent state. How much more pure Brāhmans and devout royal rishis.”

Sankara could scarcely have been ignorant that his principle was not in harmony with this text; but he has thought proper to ignore this discrepancy of views, as he probably shrank from directly contradicting a work held in such high estimation.

See also the account of the views entertained on the same subject by Śāṅkilya which I have stated above, p. 178.

*Page 105, line 24.*

The following quotation continues the discussion of this subject; and will also serve to illustrate pp. 6 and 16, above, as well as p. 60 of the First Volume :

Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30. “ *Samāna-nāma-ri�atvāch cha āvrittāv apy*

avirodho darśanāt smṛites̄ cha” | athāpi syāt | yadi paśv-ādi-vad deva-  
 vyaktayo’pi santatyā eva utpadyoran nirudhyoranś cha tato ’bhidhānā-  
 bhidheyābhidhātri - vyavahārāvichhedat̄ sambandha - nityatvena virodhah  
 śabde pariḥriyeta | yadā tu khalu sakalam traīlokyaṁ parityakta-nāma-  
 rūpaṁ nirlepam praliyate prabhavati cha abhinavam iti śruti-smṛili-vādāḥ  
 vadanti tada katham avirodhaḥ iti | tattra idam abhidhīyate “ samāna-  
 nāma-rūpatvād ” iti | tada’pi saṃsārasya anāditvām tāvad abhyupagan-  
 tavyam | pratipādayishyati cha āchāryyaḥ saṃsārasya anāditvam “ upa-  
 padyate cha apy upalabhyate cha ” iti (Brahma Sūtra ii. 1, 36) | anādaū  
 cha saṃsāre yathā svāpa-prabodhayaḥ pralaya-prabhava-śravaṇe’pi pūrvā-  
 prabodha-vad uttara-prabodhe’pi vyavahārād na kaścid virodhaḥ | evām  
 kalpāntara-prabhava-pralayayor api iti drashṭavyam | svāpa-prabodhayaḥ  
 cha pralaya-prabhavaū śrūyete | “ yadā suptaḥ svapnaṁ na kanchana  
 paśyati atha asmin prāṇaḥ eva ekadhā bhavati tada enaṁ•vāk sarvair  
 nāmabhīḥ saha apyeti chakshuḥ sarvaiḥ rūpaiḥ saha apyeti śrotrām sar-  
 vaiḥ śabdaiḥ saha apyeti manāḥ sarvair dhyānaiḥ saha apyeti | sa yadā  
 pratibudhyate yathā ‘gner jvalataḥ sarvāḥ diśo visphulingāḥ vīpratish-  
 therann evam eva etasmād ātmānaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ yathāyatanaṁ vīpratish-  
 thante prāṇebhyo devāḥ devebhyo lokāḥ (Kaush. Br. Utt. A. 3, 3) iti | syād  
 etat | svāpe purushāntara-vyavahārāvichchedat̄ svayaṁ cha sushupta-pra-  
 buddhasya pūrva-prabodha-vyavahārānusandhāna-sambhavād aviruddham |  
 mahāpralaye tu sarva-vyavahārochhedāj janmāntara-vyavahāra-vach cha  
 kalpāntara-vyavahārasya anusandhātum aśakyatvād vaishamyam iti | na  
 esha doshaḥ | saty api sarva-vyavahārochhedini mahāpralaye Paramēśva-  
 rānugrahād iśvarānām Hiranyagarbhadīnām kalpāntara-vyavahārānu-  
 sandhānopapatteḥ | yadyapi prākritaḥ prāṇino na janmāntara-vyava-  
 hāram anusandhānāḥ dṛiṣyante iti na tat prākrita-vad iśvarānām bha-  
 tavyam | yathā hi prāṇitvāviśeṣe’pi manushyādi-stamba-paryyanteshu  
 jnānaiśvaryyādi-pratibandhaḥ pareṇa pareṇa bhūyān bhavan ḍriṣyate  
 tathā manushyādiśhv eva Hiranyagarbha-paryanteshu jnānaiśvaryyād-  
 abhivṛyaktir api pareṇa pareṇa bhūyān bhavati ity etat śruti-smṛiti-  
 vādeshv asaṅkṛid eva anukalpādau prādurbhavatām pāramaiśvaryyam śrū-  
 yamānām na śakyam nāsti iti vāditum | tataś cha aśita - kalpānushthita-  
 prākrita-jnāna-karmanām iśvarānām Hiranyagarbhadīnām varttamāna-  
 kalpādau prādurbhavatām Parameśvarānugṛihitānām supta-pratibuddha-  
 vat kalpāntara-vyavahārānusandhānopapatteḥ | tathā cha śrutir “ yo  
 Brahmānām vidadhāti pūrvām yo vai vedāñś oha prahinotī tasmai | tañ

ha devam ātma-buddhi-prakāśam mumukshur vai śaraṇam aham prapadye” (Śvetāśvataro Upanishad, vi. 18) iti | smaranti cha Saunakādayo Ma-  
dhuchhandaḥ-prabhṛitibhir dāśatathyo drishṭāḥ iti | prativedāṁ cha evam  
eva kāñḍarshy-ādayaḥ smaryyante | śrutir apy rishi-jnāna-pūrvakam  
eva mantreṇa anushṭhānaṁ darśayati “yo ha vai aviditārsheya-chhando-  
daivata-brāhmaṇena mantereṇa yājayati vā adhyāpayati vā sthāṇum cha  
richhati gartīam vā prapadyate” ity upakramya “tasmād etāni mantere  
vidyād” iti | prāṇinām cha sukha-prāptaye dharmo vidhīyate duḥkha-  
parīhārāya adharmaḥ pratishidhyate | drishṭānuśravika-duḥkha-sukha-  
vishayau cha rāga-dveshau bhavato na vilakṣhana-vishayāv ity ato dhar-  
mādharma-phala-bhūtottarottarā srishṭir nishpadyamānā pūrva-sriṣṭi-  
sadrisy eva nishpadyate | snṛitiś cha bhavati “teṣāṁ ye yāni karmāṇi  
prāk-sriṣṭyām pratipedire | tāny eva te prapadyante sriyamānāḥ punah  
punāḥ | himarāhiṁsre mṛidu-krūre dharmādharmāv ritānrite | tad-bhā-  
vitāḥ prapadyante tasmāt tat tasya rochate” | iti | pralīyamānam api cha  
idām jagat śakti-avāśesham eva pralīyate śakti-mūlam eva cha prabhavati  
itarathā ākasmikatva-prasangāt | na cha anekākārāḥ śaktayaḥ śakyāḥ  
kalpayitum | tatas cha vichchidya vichchidya apy udbhavatām bhūr-ādi-  
loka-pravāhānām deva-tiryān-manushya-lakshanānām cha prāṇi-ni-  
kāya-pravāhānām varṇāśrama-dharma-phala-vyavasthānām cha anādau  
saṁsāre niyatavam indraya-vishaya-sambandha-niyatavat pratyeta-  
vyam | na hi indriya-vishaya-sambandhāder vyavahārasya prati sargam  
anyathātvāṁ shashthendriya-vishaya-kalpaṁ śakyam utprekshitum | ataś  
cha sarva-kalpānāṁ tulya-vyavahāratvāt kalpāntara-vyavahārānusān-  
dhāna-kshamatvāch cha iśvarānām samāna-nāma-rupāḥ eva pratisargaṁ  
viśeshāḥ prādurbhavanti samāna-nāma-rūpatvāch cha āvrittāv api mahā-  
sarga-mahāpralaya-lakehanāyām jagato ‘bhypagamyamānāyām na kaś-  
chich chhabda-prāmāṇyādi-virodhāḥ | samāna-nāma-rūpatām cha-śruti-  
smṛiti darśayataḥ “sūryā-chandramasau dhātā yathā-pūrvam akalpayat |  
divūm cha prithivīm chāntarīksham atho svāḥ” | iti | yathā pūrvasmin  
kalpe sūryā-chandramah-prabhṛiti jagat kṛiptām tathā ‘smīn api kalpe  
Paramēśvara ‘kalpayad ity arthaḥ | tathā “Agnir vai akāmayata ‘an-  
nādo devānām syām’ iti sa evam agnaye kṛittikābhyaḥ puroḍāśam ashṭa-  
kapālām niravapād” iti nakshattreshti-vidhau yo ‘gnir niravapad yasmai  
vā ‘gnaye niravapat tayoḥ samāna-nāma-rūpatām darśayati ity-evaṁ-  
jātiyakā śruti udāhartavyā | smṛitiḥ api “rishiṇām nāmadhēyāni yās  
cha vedesku drishṭayāḥ | śarvaryy-ante prasūtanām tāny evaibhyo dadāty

*ajah | yathartāv ritu-lingāni nānā-rūpāṇi paryayye | dṛiṣyante tāni tāny eva tathā bhāvāḥ yugādīshu | yathā 'bhimānino' titās tulyās te sāmpratair iha | devāḥ devaiप atitair hi rūpair nāmabhir eva cha" ity evāṁ-jatīyakā drashṭavyā |*

"Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30. 'And though there be a recurrence of creation, yet as (the new creation) has the same name and form' (as the old) there will be no contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda; since this is proved both by the intuition of rishis and by the Smṛiti.' And further, let it be so that if a series of individual gods, as of animals, etc., is born and disappears in unbroken continuity, the alleged contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda (viz. that as they are connected with objects which are not eternal, they cannot themselves be eternal) will be removed by the perpetuity of connection arising from the continuity of practice regarding the designation of things, the things to be designated, and the designator. But when, as texts of the Sruti and Smṛiti inform us, the entire three worlds, losing name and form,<sup>7</sup> are utterly annihilated and afterwards produced anew, how can the contradiction be avoided? [The meaning of this is: How can there be an eternal connection between the words of the Veda and objects which how long soever they may have existed, must yet have come into being at the new creation following after the total (not merely the partial) destruction of the universe? and if such a connection does not exist, how can the words of the Veda be eternal, when before this new creation they represented nothing existent? see above, p. 102.] A reply to this is given in the words, 'Yet as (the now creation) has the same name and form as the old,' etc. Even then the world must be admitted to have been without a beginning. This eternity of the world will be declared by our teacher in the words (of

<sup>7</sup> Professor Goldstücker is of opinion that here, as elsewhere, these words (*nāma-rūpa*) should be rendered "substance and form." See the note on the subject furnished by him in M. Burnouf's Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhisme Indien, p. 502.

<sup>8</sup> Govinda Ānanda remarks on the Sūtra before us, and S'ankara's comment: *Nanu mahā-pralaye jāter apy asattvāt śabdārtha-sambandhānayatvam ity āśankya āha "sa-māna" iti | sūtraṁ nirasya āśankām āha "athāpi" iti | vyakti-santatyā jātiñām avāntarā-pralaye sattvāt sambandhas tishthati vyavahārāvichchedōj jnāyeta oha iti vedasya anapekshatvena pramāṇye na kaścid virodhaḥ syāt | nirlepa-pralaye tu sambandha-nāśat punaḥ srishṭau kenachit pūmā sanketah karttavyah iti purusha-buddhi-sāpe-kshatvena vedasya apramāṇyam adhyāpakasya āśrayasya nāśād āśritasya anityatvam oha prāptam ity arthaḥ | mahā-pralaye 'pi nirlepa-layo 'siḍḍhaḥ sat-kāryya-vādat |*

Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36), 'It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.' And the world being eternal, although the Veda declares that its dissolution and reproduction take place during the sleep, and at the waking (of the creator), still as the practice continues the same in the later, as in the previous, waking condition, there is no contradiction (of the sort pretended). And it is to be considered that the same must be the case in regard to the dissolutions and creations of another Kalpa (see Vol. I. p. 43 f.). Now dissolutions and creations are said in the Veda to take place during (the creator's) sleep, and at his waking. 'When the sleeper does not see any vision, and when his breath is concentrated in him, then the voice with all names enters into him, the eye with all forms enters into him, the ear with all sounds enters into him, the mind with all thoughts enters into him. When he wakes, just as sparks shoot out in all directions from blazing fire, so do all breaths according to their several seats issue from this Soul; from the breaths spring deities; and from the deities worlds' (Kaushitaki Brāhmaṇa, latter part, 3, 3). But be it so, that [in the circumstances referred to] there is no contradiction of the kind alleged, because during the *tathā cha sāṃskārātmanā śabdārtha-tat-sambandhānām satām eva punah srishṭāv abhivyaktor na anityatvam | abhivyaktānām pūrva-kalpiya-nāma-rūpa-samūnatvād na sanketah kenachit kāryyah | vishama-srishṭau hi sanketāpekshā na tulya-srishṭāv iti pariharati "tattra idam" ity-ādinā |* "But since in a great dissolution even species cease to exist, will it not result that the connection of words with the objects they denote is not eternal? In reference to this doubt the aphorist says, 'as the name and form are the same,' etc. Waving the authority of the Sūtra, the Commentator expresses a doubt in the words 'And further,' etc. It is true that the connection subsists in consequence of the continuity of individuals owing to the existence of species during the intermediate dissolutions, and this connection will be known because the previous practice continues uninterrupted. And so from the independence of the Veda, there will be no contradiction in regard to its authority. But since in a total dissolution all such connection is lost, and some intimation (of what had existed before) must be given by some person at the new creation, the Veda will be dependent on the understanding of such person, and consequently its unauthoritativeness, as well as the non-eternity of the dependent object, owing to the extinction of the instructor on whom it depended, will result. But even in a great dissolution an absolute annihilation is unproved, according to the doctrine that effects exist in their causes. And so, as words, the objects which they denote, and the connection between both, (all of which things previously existed), are manifested at the new creation as reminiscences of a previous existence, they are not non-eternal. As the objects thus manifested have the same names and forms as in the previous Kalpa, there is no necessity for any intimation (of what had existed before) being given by any person. For such an intimation would, indeed, be required in a dissimilar creation, but not in one which is similar. It is thus that the commentator removes the objection in the words 'a reply to this is given,' etc."

sleep (of one person) the practice of others continues uninterruptedly, and even the person who has been in a deep sleep can ascertain the action which took place in his former waking state. But this is inapplicable to a great dissolution, because then there is an absolute annihilation of all practice, and because the practice which prevailed in another Kalpa, like that of another birth, cannot be ascertained. This objection, however, does not hold; for although all practice is annihilated by a great dissolution, still it is proved that through the favour of the supreme Lord, the lords Hiranyagarbha (Brahmā), etc., can ascertain the practice of the preceding Kalpa. Although ordinary creatures are not observed to evince the power of discovering the practice of a former birth, the limitation which is true of them will not attach to the great lords in question. For just as in the series of beings commencing with men, and ending with posts, although all the creatures included in it without distinction possess the attribute of life, yet, as we descend the scale, the obstructions to knowledge and to power are perceived to go on gradually increasing; so too, in the series beginning with men and culminating in Hiranyagarbha, there is an ever greater and greater manifestation of knowledge and of power, etc.; and thus the transcendent faculties which are declared in texts of the Sruti and Smṛiti to belong to the beings who again and again come into existence at the beginning of the successive Kalpas cannot be denied to be real. And consequently it is established that the lords Hiranyagarbha and others who during the past Kalpa had manifested distinguished knowledge and powers of action, and who again came into existence at the beginning of the present Kalpa, and enjoyed the favour of the supreme Lord, were able, like a person who has been asleep and awakes again, to ascertain the practice of the previous Kalpa. And accordingly the Sruti says: 'Seeking final liberation, I take refuge with that God, shining by the light of his own intellect, who in the beginning creates Brahmā and reveals to him the Vedas' (Svetāśv. Upan. vi. 18). And Saunaka and others record in their Smṛitis that the hymns in the ten Māndalas of the Rig-veda were seen by Madhuchhandas and other rishis. In the same way the Kāndarshis, etc., of each of the Vedas are specified in the Smṛitis. The Sruti, too, in the passage commencing 'Any priest who in sacrificing for another person, or in teaching a pupil, employs a text of which he does not know the rishi, metre, dūtiy,

and proper application, is turned into a post, or falls into a pit,' and ending, 'Wherefore let him ascertain all these points regarding every text;' —declares that a knowledge of the rishi by whom it was seen should precede the ceremonial use of every text.<sup>9</sup> Further, righteousness is prescribed and unrighteousness is forbidden, with a view to promote the happiness and obviate the misery of living beings: and love and dislike have for their objects nothing but the happiness and misery which are perceptible by sense or are scripturally revealed. Consequently each succeeding creation which is effected, forming, as it does, the recompence of righteousness and unrighteousness, is constituted perfectly similar to each of those which preceded it. And the Smriti, too, declares: 'These creatures, as they are reproduced time after time, perform, respectively, the very same actions as they had performed in the previous creation.<sup>10</sup> They so act under the influence of (their previous tendencies) whether noxious or innoxious, mild or cruel, righteous or unrighteous, to truth or to falsehood; and it is from this cause that they are disposed to one or another course of conduct.' Besides, even when this world is destroyed, a residuum of its force (*śakti*) continues, and it is reproduced only because it has this force for its basis: for any other supposition would involve the difficulty of the world having no cause. And as we cannot conceive that there are many forms of force (*śakti*), we must believe that, as the relations between the senses and their objects are invariable, so too, in a world which had no commencement, the successions of earths and other worlds, and of different classes of living beings distinguished as gods, animals, and men, (although separated from each other in the period of their production,) as well as the ordinations of castes, orders, duties, and recompences are invariable. For we cannot imagine that such conditions as the re-

<sup>9</sup> The object of these remarks of S'ankara regarding the rishis is thus explained by Govinda Ānanda: *Kincha mantrānām rishy-ādi-jnānāvāsyakatva-jnāpikā śrutiḥ mantra-dṛg. rishīnām jnānātisayaṁ darśayati ity āha ] . . . tathā cha jnānādhikaiḥ kalpāntaritām vedām smṛitvā vyavahārasya pravarttitavād vedasya anāditvam anapekṣhatvām cha aviruddham iti bhāvah ]* "In these words S'ankara intimates that the Śruti which declares the necessity of knowing the rishis, etc., thereby manifests the transcendent knowledge of the rishis who saw the mantras. . . . And so from the fact that these rishis, distinguished by eminent knowledge, recollect the Veda which had existed in a different Kalpa, and [again] gave currency to the [ancient] practice [of its precepts], it is shewn that the eternity and independence of the Veda is not in contradiction [to any fact].—such is the purport."

<sup>10</sup> See the First Volume of this work, p. 60.

lations between the senses and their objects, etc., should vary in every creation, in such a way, for example, as that there should exist objects for a sixth sense. Hence, as all Kalpas exist under the same conditions, and as the lords (Hiranyagarbha, etc.) are able to ascertain the conditions which existed in another Kalpa, varieties (of beings) having the same name and form are produced in every creation; and in consequence of this sameness of name and form, even though a revolution of the world in the form of a great creation and a great dissolution is admitted, no contradiction arises affecting the authority of the words of the Veda, etc. Both Sruti and Smṛiti shew us this sameness of name and form. Here such texts of the Sruti as these may be adduced : ‘The creator formed as before the sun and moon, the sky and the earth, the air and the heaven.’ This means that in this Kalpa the supreme Lord fashioned the sun, the moon, and the rest of the world in the same way as they had been fashioned in the former Kalpa.’ Again : Agni desired, ‘May I be the food-eater of the gods.’ He offered to Agni [as the deity presiding over] the Krittikās<sup>11</sup> (the Pleiades) a cake in eight platters.’ In this passage the Sruti shews that the two Agnis, he who in the ceremony of sacrifice to the constellation offered the oblation, and he to whom it was offered, had the same name and form. And such Smṛitis, too, as the following should be examined : ‘The Unborn Being gives to those born at the end of the night (*i.e.* of the dissolution<sup>12</sup>) the names of the rishis and their intuitions into the Vedas.<sup>13</sup> Just as on the recurrence of each of the seasons of the year its various characteristics are perceived to be the very same (as they had been before), so too are the things produced at the beginning of the yugas;<sup>14</sup> and the past gods presiding over different objects resemble those who exist at present, and the present (resemble the) past in their names and forms.’ ”

I shall quote a part of Sankara’s remarks on the Brahma Sūtra, ii. i, 36, referred to in the earlier part of the preceding quotation, in which the eternity of the world is affirmed :

<sup>11</sup> *Krittikā-nakshattrābhimāni-devāya Agnaye* — Govinda Ānanda.

<sup>12</sup> *S'arvaryy-ants pralayāntे*—Govinda Ananda.

<sup>13</sup> The sense of the last words, which I translate literally, is not very clear. Govinda Ānanda says that in the word *vedeshu* the locative case denotes the object (*vedeshv iti vishaya-saptamī*). Compare the passages quoted above in p. 16 from the Vishṇu P. and M. Bh. which partially correspond with this verse.

<sup>14</sup> Already quoted from the Vishṇu P. in the First Volume of this work, p. 60.

ii. 1, 36. “*Upapadyate cha upalabhyate cha*” | “*upapadyate cha*”  
*samsarasya anadityam | adimattve hi samsarasya akasmad udbhuter muk-*  
*tanam api punah samsarodbhuti-prasangah | akritatbhya-gama-prasanga-*  
*cha sukha-dukhadi-vaiashamyasya nirnimittatvati | na cha isvaro vaiasha-*  
*mya-hetur ity uktam | na cha avidya kevala vaiashamyasya karanam eka-*  
*rupatvati | ragadi-klesa-vasanakshipta-karmapekshah tv avidya vaiashamy-*  
*kari syat | na oha karma antarena sariram sambhavati na cha sariram*  
*antarena karma sambhavati iti itarestarasraya-dosha-prasangah | anaditve*  
*tu vijankura-nyayena upapatter na kauchid dosho bhavati |*

“‘It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.’ The eternity of the world is agreeable to reason. For on the supposition that it had a beginning, as it came into existence without a cause, the difficulty would arise (1) that those who had obtained liberation from mundane existence might become again involved in it;<sup>15</sup> and (2) that men would enjoy or suffer the recompense of what they had never done, as the inequalities occasioned by happiness and misery, etc., would be causeless. But God is not the cause of this inequality, as we have said (see the comment on Sutra ii. 1, 34). Nor can ignorance alone be its cause, since ignorance is uniform (whilst conditions are varied). But ignorance, when connected with works induced by the surviving memory of desire and other sources of disquiet, may be the cause of inequality. Further, corporeal existence does not originate without works, nor works without bodily existence: so that (this hypothesis of the world having had a beginning) involves the fallacy of making each of two things depend upon the other. But on the supposition that the world had no beginning, there is no difficulty, as the two things in question may be conceived to have succeeded each other like seed and sprout from all eternity.” (See Ballantyne’s Aphorisms of the Sankhya, Book i. pp. 60 and 126.)

*Page 111, line 2 from the foot; and Page 113, line 11.*

In the first edition, p. 78, I had translated the word *samayadhyuhite* “in the morning twilight.” When revising the translation for the new edition I became uncertain about the sense, and did not advert

<sup>15</sup> i.e. as Professor Cowell suggests, if there is no cause for the production of the world, it comes into existence at hap-hazard, and by some chance the liberated may be born again as well as the unliberated.

to the fact that the term is explained in Professor Wilson's Dictionary as denoting "a time at which neither stars nor sun are visible." Professor Cowell has since pointed out that the word occurs in the second of the following verses of Manu, where a rule is given for the interpretation of the Veda in cases such as that referred to by the commentator on the Nyāya Sūtras: ii. 14: *S'ruti-dvaidhām tu yatra syat tatra dharmāv ubhau smṛitau | ubhāv api hi tau dharmau samyag uktau manīshibhīḥ |* 15. *Udite 'nudite chaiva sāmayādhyushite tathā | sarvathā varttate yajnah ityām vaidiki śrutiḥ |* "14. In cases where there is a twofold Vedic prescription, both the rites are declared in the Smṛiti to be binding; since they have been distinctly pronounced by sages to be of equal authority. 15. The Vedic rule is that sacrifice may be performed in all the three ways [indicated in a particular text], viz. when the sun has risen, when it has not risen, and when neither stars nor sun appear, i.e. in the morning twilight." Kullūka says: *Sūrya-nakshatra-varjitaḥ kālah samayādhyushita-śabdena uchyate |* "a time devoid of sun and stars is denoted by the word *samayādhyushita*.

*Page 142, lines 14 and 16.*

The first of these quotations is from the Bṛihad Āranyaka Upanishad, i. 4, 10; and the second from the Chhandogya Upanishad, viii. 7, 2.

*Page 149, line 6.*

For *śabdādīkshiter* read *śabdād īkshiter*.

*Page 154, note 140.*

Professor Cowell observes on the close of this note that the Sāṅkhya opponent maintains that the metaphor is in every case a real one.

*Page 157, line 18.*

Professor Cowell remarks that the meaning of the phrase *śabda-pramāṇake 'rthe* is not correctly rendered by the translation here given, viz. "where the (proper sense) is established by the words." The author is laying down the general rule that in cases where there is nothing in the purport of any passage in which a particular word occurs to lead the reader to suppose that it is figuratively used, and where consequently the word itself is the only index to the sense, it must be understood in its primary signification. The proper rendering, therefore, is: "Where the sense can only be determined by the word itself."

*Page 160, line 18.*

For *punar-utpattir* read *punar-anutpattir*.

*Page 181, lines 7 and 11 from the foot.*

I learn from Professors Cowell and Goldstücker that *vimatā smṛitih* should be rendered not “the variously understood Smṛiti” but “the Smṛiti which is here the subject of dispute.”

*Page 183, note 160, line 4.*

With R.V. i. 179, 2, compare R.V. vii. 76, 4, quoted in p. 245.

*Page 201, line 21.*

The commentator thus explains this verse of the Vishnu Purāna (I am indebted to Dr. Hall for a collation of the best MSS. in the India Office Library): *Ete oha dveshopaśama-prakārāḥ madhyamādhikāriṇām eva uktāḥ na tu uttamādhikāriṇām ity āha “ete” | “bhinna-driṣṭā” bheda-driṣṭyā | “bhinna-driṣṭām” iti vā pāṭhaḥ | tattva bhinna-darśane “abhyupagamam” angikāraṁ kṛitvā dveshopaśamopāya-bhedāḥ kathitāḥ | uktānām upāyānām paramārtha-sankshepo mama mattāḥ śrūyatām |* “In the words ‘these notions,’ etc.’ he tells us that the methods of repressing hatred which have been hitherto declared are those which are followed by the persons who have attained only to the secondary, not to the highest, stage of knowledge. *Bhinna-driṣṭā* is the same as *bheda-driṣṭyā*, ‘with a view which distinguishes [the Deity from themselves],’ or the reading is *bhinna-driṣṭām*, ‘of persons who look [on Him] as distinct.’ ‘Accepting’ (*abhyupagamām kṛitvā*), i.e. admitting, this opinion regarding a distinctness, ‘I (the speaker in the V.P.) have declared these methods of repressing hatred. Now hear from me a summary’ of the highest truth in regard to these methods.”

*Page 225, line 21.*

There is a verse in the Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā, xiii. 45, in which also Agni is connected with the creation: *Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata śokāt prīthivyāḥ uta vā divas pari | yena prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna tam Agno heḍāḥ pari te vrinaktu |* “Agni, may thy wrath avoid that Agni who sprang from Agni, from the flame of the earth or from that of the sky, by whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures.” This verse is quoted and after its fashion explained in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 21: *Atha dakshinato ’jam | “Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata” ity*

*Agnir vai esha | Agner adhyajāyata | “śokāt prithivyāḥ uṭa vā divas pari” iti yad vai Prajāpateḥ śokād ajāyata tad divaś cha prithivayai cha śokād ajāyata | “Yena prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna” iti vāg vai ajo vācho vai prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna ityādi | “Then [he places] a goat (aja) on the southern side,’ (saying): ‘That Agni who sprang from Agni:’ this goat is Agni and sprang from Agni. ‘From the flame of the earth or from that of the sky:’ that which sprang from the flame of Prajāpati sprang from the flame of the earth and of the sky. ‘By whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures:’ The goat, [or the Unborn], is Vāch (Speech): Viśvakarman generated living creatures from Vāch,” etc. Compare R.V. i. 67, 5, quoted above in p. 275.*

*Page 235, line 9.*

Add after this the following texts, in which the verbs *taksh* and *jan* are applied to the composition of the hymns:

R.V. i. 67, 4. *Vindanti īm attra naro dhiyām-dhāk hṛidā yat tashṭān mantrān aśāṁsan |* “Meditative men find him (Agni) here, when they have uttered hymns of praise fashioned by the heart.”

i. 109, 1. *Vi hy akhyam manasū vasyaḥ iohhann Indrāgnī jnāsaḥ uta vā sajātān | nānyā yuvat pramatir asti mahyaṁ sa vām dhiyām vājāyantīm ataksham |* 2. *Aśravaṁ he bhūri-dāvattarā vām vijāmātūr uta vā syālāt | atha somasya prayati yuvabhyām Indrāgnī stomām janayāmi navyam |* “1. Seeking that which is desirable, I beheld [in you], o Indra and Agni, relations or kinsmen. I have no other counsellor than you,—I who have *fabricated* for you a hymn supplicating food. 2. For I have heard that you are more bountiful than an ineligible son-in-law (who has to purchase his bride), or than a bride’s brother; so now, while presenting a libation of Soma, I generate for you a new hymn.”

*Page 253, line 15.*

Insert after this the following verse : R.V. x. 66, 5. *Sarasvān dhībhīr Varuno dhṛita-vratāḥ Pūshā Viṣhnur mahimā Vāyur Aśvinā | brahma-kṛito amṛitāḥ viśva-vedasāḥ śarma no yaṁsan trivarūtham aṁhāsaḥ |* “May Sarasvat with thoughts, may Varuna whose laws are fixed, may Pūshan, Viṣhnū the mighty, Vāyu, the Aśvins,—may these makers of prayers, immortal, possessing all resources, afford us a triple-cased protection from calamity.”

*Supplementary Note on Kälätayayāpadishṭa.*—See page 84, note 89, and page 290.

I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for the following additional remarks on this expression :

The Tarkasangraha, quoted by Professor Cowell in his interesting note which you kindly communicated to me, differs materially from the Bhāshāparichchheda in its interpretation of the fallacy called by them *bādha*; and I might add that the Tarkasangraha-dīpikāprakāśa offers even a third explanation of the same Vaiśeshika term. But I do not think that the *bādha* of the Vaiśeshikas is the same as the *kälätita* of the Naiyāyikas. For when we find that the Bhāshāparichchheda in its enumeration at v. 70 applies to the fifth *hetvābhāsa* the epithet *kälätayopadishṭa* (probably the same as the *kälätayayāpadishṭa* of the Nyāya-sūtra i. 50) yet in its explanation of v. 77 does not call it *kälätita*, as the Nyāya does, but *bādha*, such a variation in terms seems pointed; and when we find moreover that its interpretation of *bādha* differs from Vātsyāyana's interpretation of *kälätita*, there seems to be a still greater probability that the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika disagree on the question of the fifth *hetvābhāsa*.

For that there is *no* real difference between the Nyāyabhāṣya and the Nyāyavṛitti is still my opinion. Both commentaries, I hold, agree in stating that the fallacy *kälätita* arises when a reason assigned exceeds its proper sphere (*sādhanakālu*), and neither, I think, can have taken *kāla* in its literal sense of "time." This might have been the case if, as Professor Cowell seems to suggest, "plausibility" of an argument were the subject of the Sūtra; but as, in my opinion, the *hetu* is always intended to be a valid and good *hetu*, I do not see how such a *hetu* can become a bad one simply by being advanced too late. It would, however, become bad by being applied to a time, i.e. to a case to which it properly does not belong.

The circumstance that the Vṛitti and Bhāshāparichchheda are probably works of the same author, does not invalidate my opinion; it would seem on the contrary to confirm it, since the object of both these works is a different one: the former being intended as an exposition of the Nyāya, and the latter as one of the Vaiśeshika.

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